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ABSTRACT

SAVING THE ENVIRONMENT: SCIENCE AND SOCIAL ACTION
by Patricia D'Andrade

Adviser:

Professor Lindsey Churchill

This dissertation analyzes environmental arguments for
their stance toward science.

It is a sociology of knowledge

investigation of arguments made primarily by environmental
scientists in the United States in the 1960s and 70s.
The environmental crisis puts science in question but
at the same time looks to science for information and
solutions.

Thus,

science is a center of contention around

which arguments develop and oppositions are established.
Science is beginning to take the place of political thought
in providing legitimating concepts for arguments intended to
effect social change.

Major environmental books and

articles by American authors of the 1960s and 70s judge
postwar science and technology from the opposed positions of
"science skeptic" and "science truster."
The guiding theory for this research is from Karl

Mannheim,

especially from his interpretive,

analysis of conservative thought,

cultural

in which he uses the term

"style of thought" for a coherent argument intended to
persuade toward a course of social action.

Thought styles

develop oppositionally around a common center of contention
during periods of great change; conservative and liberal
thought styles developed with the rise of modern politics.
This study concludes that there is an environmental
style of thought organized around questions about science in
society,

that its current form originated among biologists,

and that it is the main argument to have introduced
skepticism of science to the public.
The influence of science imparts to politics a new
identity which does not accord with older political
concepts.

A "conceptual shift" is occurring,

societies,

in legitimating arguments for social and

political action.

in Western

This shift is from arguments that rely on

political-frame concepts of a just society,

to arguments

that rely on scientific-frame concepts of truth and
factuality,

and it is particularly evident in the

environmental debate.
Works analyzed;

Silent S o r i n g . Science and S u r v i v a l .

The Population B o m b . "The Tragedy of the Commons,"

"The

Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis," Post-Scarcitv
A n a r c h i s m . The Closing Ci r c l e . Only One E a r t h . The Limits to
Growth.
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Since I live in Manhattan,

recourse was to Central Park.

My birding began in late

October,

went through the winter months,

develop into a passion in the spring.

my

and began to

I have often been a

walker in the woods and wished that I could identify what I
saw and heard.

I now found that learning the names and

habits of one group of beings in this natural world opened
up that world as having a depth and design I had previously
felt but had only the smallest knowledge of.
entered a world of beauty,

On my walks I

complexity, vitality,

and

spaciousness and minutiae combined.
This very different activity from writing the
dissertation was sustaining and restorative.

That I was

able to pursue it less than half an hour's walk from my
apartment,

in the most densely populated part of the biggest

city in the United States is a tribute to those who had the
vision and determination to put a people's park the size of
the Kingdom of Monaco in the center of a real-estate hungry
urban island.

Central Park is a magnet for migrating birds,

for overwintering birds,

for any bird that has somehow come

to the city and is looking for lakes and streams, woods and

fields,

hills and hollows.

There is greater variety in its

small compass than can be found in many square miles by
birders in many other parts of the country.

The park's

layout was intentionally and cleverly designed to produce
the illusion of greater distance and more space than its
objective measurements indicate.

It is landscaped with a

variety of plants and trees that provide changing texture
and color across the seasons.
makers of this park,

I feel real gratitude to the

and I would like to express it here,

approximately one hundred years after its beginnings.
had an appreciation of natural beauty,

They

and they passed on to

us both a place where that beauty could be felt and the
civic value that a great city should provide such a space
for all its citizens.
Not all of my forays into the park were thoroughly
enjoyable.

On many trips, thickets and small streams were

choked with trash.

Plastic bags and deflated balloons hung

in ugly tatters from splendid trees unmatched in any of the
unprotected woodlands of the countryside outside of New York
City.

Homeless people on the edge of desperation occupy the

park's rustic,

small, pergola-like open wooden shelters;

they huddle in the arched passageways that take the park
walker under the vehicular roads; they camp without shelter
or fire in the Ramble,
groomed section

the park's most wooded and least

(and the area most favored by its b i r d s ) .

Muggings and gay-bashings in the part of the park I
frequented were reported to me by acquaintances.

Economic

recession has caused cutbacks in park maintenance and
cleanup,

and heavy use of the park has thus subjected it to

environmental degradation,

destroying both wildlife habitat

and places where people can find the lawns, gardens,

and

relief from city concrete and grimct that they hope for.
The park,

then,

is not •separate from the social world.

In this way it is a metaphor for our time, when Nature
itself is no longer a place apart.

The natural world

everywhere bears our mark and suffers a combination of
overuse,

neglect,

and misuse.

and thrusting and burgeoning,
of life, death,
forever.

And yet it keeps on living
cycling through its sequences

and new life as if it would all go on

Whether that forever happens is now up to us.

To all who have ever tried to speak for Nature, my
appreciation.
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INTRODUCTION

Knowledge and Society:
The Case of Science and the Environment

Knowledge is so integral to society that it often
functions as unnoticed background.

Like the physical

environment that we organize for our purposes,

knowledge is

something that we make and then make use of but that we only
occasionally wonder about.

We are aware that knowledge

changes in content and guantity,
changes in its form.

but are not alert to

The exception,

in our modern society,

is that we distinguish between scientific and pre-scientific
knowledge.

Yet even this change is widely considered to be

mostly a matter of knowing more.
knowledge,

however,

For the sociology of

it is a matter of knowing differently.

Science is now central to our concepts of knowledge,
and as a practice, has a powerful influence on economy and
politics.

Today,

'science'

is achieving equal status with

'the state' as a conceptual focus for public discourse,
as a source of legitimation for action on social and
political issues.

and

This conceptual focus is evident in sociological
analysis,

political debate,

and philosophical argument about

social change and public policy issues.

These debates are

directed as much toward the presence of science and
technology as they are toward the presence of government and
law.

This is especially evident in the debate over what to

do about environmental problems.
The environmental movement in the United States
includes a wide variety of organizations and groups acting
to defend the environment against degradation:
pollution,

against

against overuse, destruction of ecosystem,

extinction of species,
threat, global warming,

elimination of wilderness,

nuclear

and a host of other damages.

The

common term for the movement to preserve the environment,
change our use of it, and establish ecological awareness is
"environmentalism"; some activists now say that
environmentalism is a failed and co-opted movement of the
past, which has to be replaced by an "ecological" movement.
Despite its diversity,

it can be argued that the

environmental movement generally shares a view of science
that is skeptical of its benefits while relying on its
findings.

This does not mean that the environmental

movement is against science;

it must depend upon science in

many of its efforts to convince the world to change.
environmentalism does challenge, however,

What

is the traditional
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notion of how science should 'be' in society.

Within

environmental arguments is a skepticism about the benefits
of science,

a critique of the direction of its efforts,

and

sometimes the claim that it should be in service to specific
societal goals.
The focus on science occurs not only in the
environmental movement,
States.
political
issues.

but throughout society in the United

We often think of our publicly-debated problems as
issues, but many of them are now also science
Much of the argument about problem issues —

environment,

medical technology,

nuclear power,

areas of conflict mentioned earlier —
of science in society.
immediately apparent,

and other

centers on the role

This concern is not always
and showing that it exists is what the

following chapters are about.

The orienting theory for my

analysis comes from the sociology of knowledge developed by
Karl Mannheim, which traces bodies of thought to their
social origins, and relates different styles of argument to
central social concerns.

Argument of the Dissertation

Mannheim's analysis of conservative political thought
serves as a model for this study,1 in which I argue three

4

main points:

1)

Science —

both as practice and as knowledge —

has

become central in debates over social action in the United
States.

The centrality of science is shown by a developing

polarization over how science should 'be' in society, with
those who trust science to take a direction that benefits
people and planet on one side, and those who are skeptical
of its uses on the other.
scientific knowledge;

Both sides accept the validity of

it is how science is used and where it

is going that is a source of division.

The polarization

develops because a threat exists to perceived interests,
namely the threat to environment and human health
ultimately,

(and

survivability), which comes from the power of

scientific developments to harm, whether with atomic bombs
or with pesticides.

2)

The sociology of knowledge developed by Karl Mannheim

provides a method that points to this centrality and a model
for analyzing it.
social,

The arguments about science and its

economic and political aspects develop as Mannheim

said styles of thought develop,
thought.

in his work on conservative

A style of thought

- develops in a context of large-scale,
change

"oriented"
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- is a response to polarizing event(s)
- solves a key epistemological problem
- is motivated by a basic social intention
- requires an effective group to sustain it.

3)

There is a particular response to science in arguments

about the environment,

a coherent environmental stvle of

t h o u g h t . which is where the critique of science,
doubt about how it is pursued and used,

or the

is especially

evident.

My argument is parallel to much of Mannheim's analysis
of conservatism,

by which:

1) The centrality of politics is shown in polarized
arguments over the relationship of citizen and state, and
over the philosophical basis of politics
autonomous sphere of politics,

(i.e., over an

not tied to religious

justification or theories of divine right).

The

polarization develops because of the threat to old landed
interests stemming from the French Revolution and
Enlightenment thought.

2) The arguments develop

(as in #2, above) contextually:

they are responses to polarizing events; take

epistemological positions; grow out of social intentions;
are carried by identifiable groups.

3) There is a conservative stvle of thought which is where
the critique of the autonomous political sphere/abstract
natural law/Enlightenment thought is especially evident.

In addition,

I propose that the broader context of the

centrality of science shown in the appearance of an
environmental style of thought is a conceptual shift in how
we understand and explain social action.

The dominance of

science as a form of Knowledge leads me to believe that we
are shifting from the use of a political framework of
explanation for what society requires and does to a
scientific framework.

Science has become basic to the

legitimation of social action,

and politics can no longer

base its arguments only on a philosophy of social contract.
"Individual and science" have become as relevant to our
personal and political lives as "citizen and state."

This

evaluation of the influence of scientific knowledge cannot
be fully developed in this dissertation, but it contributes
to my discussions of knowledge, worldview,
argument.

and science-based

Applying Mannheim

In his study of conservatism, Mannheim, while doing
empirical research,

also proposed "style of thought" as a

category of cultural and political analysis.

A style of

thought is a coherent argument intended to persuade toward a
course of social action.

It has its roots in the social

experience of a particular social group,
characteristic content and expression.
thought,

and has a
Opposing styles of

representing opposed social groups, have a common

center of contention.

Using these and other categories,

Mannheim argued that a major discourse became organized
around political events and concepts in early 19th-century
Germany,

resulting in conservative and liberal

(progressive)

styles of thought which supported different social agendas.
Mannheim's analysis serves as a model for my
examination of environmental arguments organized around
post-World War II scientific and technological developments.
Though Mannheim's analysis of conservative thought is
generally considered his best empirical work,
been taken as an example to follow.

it has not

There have been many

commentaries on the theoretical aspects of Mannheim's work,
but few attempts to apply his method, which is thought to
provide little more than a general injunction to seek
interests in arguments.

This dissertation is the first
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application of Mannheim's theory and method of "style of
thought" since his own application of it,

in the 1920s, to

19th-century conservatism.
The dissertation analyzes a subset of environmental
arguments for their stance toward science,
arguments made by scientists themselves.

primarily those
It is a sociology

of knowledge investigation into the content and social
context of these particular environmental arguments that
developed in the United States in the 1960s and 70s.
This research attempts to identify for environmental
thinking the elements that Mannheim identifies in the
development of conservative thought.

Mannheim is not

explicit about all these elements; I have abstracted them
from his analysis.

Such a specification of contributing

elements has not been done before.

I use it experimentally

as specifying the reguisites for the development of anv
style of thought,

not just conservative thought.

These

style-of-thought elements provide the outline for the
analysis made in the dissertation.
Mannheim is credited as a founder of the sociology of
knowledge,

but is often criticized for failure to make it

either sufficiently critical or sufficiently operational.
This dissertation argues that the application of Mannheim's
method for analyzing public discourse, which he did
retrospectively,

can be done in the present to alert us to
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emerging changes in societal priorities w h tch accompany the
use of and belief in certain types of knowledge.

What the Dissertation Is and Is Not

Because the sociology of knowledge is less familiar in
American sociology than the sociology of social movements,
and because the empirical reference point of this study can
be considered a social movement,

it may help to explain what

the dissertation is and what it is not.
It

is not a history of the environmental movement in

the United

States,

an attitudes survey,

survey of who environmentalists are.
study of environmental groups,

or a demographic

It is not a political

or an account of where they

stand on different single issues, e.g., whales,
power,

forests, water pollution,

nuclear

or global warming.

It is

not a score sheet of successes and failures of the
environmental movement.

In short,

it is not a sociological

or political analysis of a social movement.
It is an analysis of how arguments and intellectual
positions have as their conceptual magnet a dominant concern
spread across many social issues over a significant period
of time

— in this

case: How should science be in society?

How can

it balance

autonomy and responsibility?
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It is a sociology of knowledge —

an analysis of how

the legitimacy of institutionalized science as guide to
truth and action becomes an issue in various areas,
example here being environment.

the

It is a look at a piece of

the process whereby great change means an intensification of
polarization in interests and ideologies.

The Organization of the Material

I begin with an introduction to the study of knowledge
and to science as a distinct type of knowledge.

I next

propose that scientific knowledge also provides an orienting
framework for us now, one that is replacing an older
framework of political concepts when it comes to social
action.

I then discuss some organizing concepts and

theoretical

issues related to Mannheim's sociology of

knowledge.

A detailed study of Mannheim's analysis of

conservative thought follows.

I go on to consider what is

involved in using Mannheim's work as a model for analyzing a
style of thought where science is the focus of attention.
Part II reviews important environmental books by
American authors of the 1960s and 70s, most of whom had
scientific training.

Their views of science are evaluated,

and I take a brief look at some of the events that were the

social context of these environmental arguments.

The

conclusion relates these works to Mannheim's sociology of
knowledge.

NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION

1. Two versions of Mannheim's study are now in print:
"Conservative Thought" in From Karl M a n n h e i m , ed. Kurt H.
Wolff (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), and
Conservatism, ed. David Kettler, Volker Meja, and Nico Stehr
(London/Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986).
See note
appended to Chapter Four.

13

PART I

CHAPTER ONE
SCIENCE IN SOCIETY

Science as a Dominant Form of Knowledge

Knowledge is something that we make, as well as
something that we discover.
imprint of our making.

This means that it bears the

For example, we discovered centuries

ago that the earth revolves around the sun.
analytical discovery by Copernicus,

From that

and its later supporting

theory and mathematical explication, we have built knowledge
with different purposes.

The mechanics of planetary motion,

at first an enterprise of theory,

has, centuries later,

become integrated into national space programs with both
military and commercial applications.

From the starting

point of celestial mechanics there have also developed
abstruse theories of the origin of the universe, with no
"practical" applications.

And in still another direction,

the discovery of the solar system has been developed into a
heliocentric astrology,

an updated version of the old earth-

centered astrology.
A given discovery,

then, can be elaborated into a

variety of different knowledges, with different assumptions
and intentions.

The same discovery can even be the basis of

contradictory claims to knowledge —

as is the case with an

astrology revised but still based on assumptions inimical to
today's astronomy, which takes the Copernican revolution as
exclusively its own special heritage.
We can see a historical development of knowledge,
discoveries,
other.
skies

as

theories and applications build one upon the

So we have gone from precise observation of the
(which, however,

allowed us to conceive of the earth

as the center of the universe), to mathematical theories
which shifted the center of observed planetary motions,
the combination of physics,

astronomy,

engineering,

to

and

massive-scale bureaucratic administration which enables us
to put space shuttles into orbit, and to place human beings
on the surface of the moon.

The shift from an earth-

centered to a sun-centered view of our world is generally
considered to be a useful point for marking the beginning of
the scientific era, although many other factors contributed
to the rise of a scientifc approach to the world.
It is commonplace to contrast science with religion,
and sometimes the comparison between the medieval world and
the modern one is made,
these opposed terms.1

for purposes of simplification,

in

But the development of a

scientifically oriented society has taken centuries,

as did
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the development of a society organized to meet the
requirements of the Christian faith.
course,

Christianity was, of

not the only organizing principle of medieval

society,

any more than science is the only organizing

principle of ours, but just as we devote substantial
resources to the maintenance and growth of scientific
endeavors,

the medieval world devoted substantial resources

to the maintenance and growth of the Christian faith.
The forms of knowledge —

religious and scientific --

of these different eras can be called dominant in their
pervasiveness and in their political support or connection
with ruling power.

In its pervasiveness,

a dominant form of

knowledge shapes our understanding of the world.
Understanding is not wholly individual;

it is shaped by

society through education, example, precept,

law, custom.

It is not necessary to be a scientist to have a scienceinfluenced understanding of how the world works.2

Perhaps

the influence of forms of knowledge is clearer in the case
of religion,

because we are less immersed in it as a society

than we are in science,

and can view it from some distance.

Many Americans who do not actively attend religious ser/ices
nonetheless identify themselves as Christian, Jewish,
Muslim,

or of some other faith, and hold beliefs about life,

morality,
faith.

and sanctity that come from the tradition of that

It is not necessary to be a church-goer to have a
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religion-influenced understanding of life.
Dominance of a form of knowledge has nothing to do with
its intrinsic worth

(if that can be judged).

It also is not

directly related to power over the conscience or aspirations
of the individual, where,
science.

religion may eclipse

It is not pervasiveness alone that makes for

dominance,
religion

for example,

for just to take the case of the United States,

(as religiousness)

remains pervasive,

different spheres of action from science.

but in

It is the

connection of a form of knowledge with the educational,
political,

commercial, governmental,

and legal institutions

of society that give it dominance.
It has taken time for science to become central to our
lives.

Western society did not immediately give up religion

for science as central to institutions and knowledge,
the intellectual debate over secularization,

and in

it moved from

an emphasis on religion as the guiding force of society to
an emphasis on politics,

nationhood,

and statecraft,

on

contractual agreements as the basis of what we now call
political and economic stability.
an emphasis on science.

It did not go directly to

This change became particularly

evident with the Enlightenment,3 and our (liberalprogressive)

idealization of society as a joint effort

toward equality and justice dates to that time.

That 18th-

century political understanding of society, however,

based
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on a concept of what I call a "just society",

no longer

seems to us to be an explanation or description of society.
It is now seen as more inspirational than realistic;

it

continues to inspire the desire for democracy, but does not
provide an accurate picture of its 20th-century form.

The

just society is one for which justice is considered both a
cause of its coming into being
to assure liberty and equality,
injustice)

(since the social contract is
and the lack of these is

and an end to be pursued;

justice is to be

assured by a combination of rational interest,

natural

rights, and the rule of law.4

From Just Society to Scientific Society

But we are now shifting from a classically political
attitude in Western society to a scientific attitude,

from

the notion of a just society to the notion of a scientifc
society.

We still do politics,

just as we still have

religion, but just as we once justified politics with
religious arguments, we now justify it with scientific ones.
The justification we have used since the rise of the nation
state and the development of political science —

that of a

philosophy of the relation between citizen and state —
giving way to to a reliance on scientific

(or putatively

is
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scientific)

validation for legitimacy.

The shift from

politics to science could also be called the shift from
social contract to science.

That is a more specific way of

naming it.
The contrast between politics and science is not as
clear to us as the contrast between science and religion,
because the shift is still occuring,

and we have less

historical distance on the difference,

and thus less

experience with the effects of the change.

Also, we often

ignore contrast if it is not outright opposition.
points,

science and religion are opposed,

politics,

though contrasting,

opposition.

On many

but science and

are not so often clearly in

One very important point of opposition between

science and politics, however,

is that in principle science

is directed toward the universal and impersonal;
interests of truth it must adopt disinterest,

in the

and this has

been expected to be the practice of scientists themselves.
Politics,

on the other hand,

is the negotiation of

particular interests; even if it is theoretically aimed at
the general interest,

it is rarely expected of politicians

that they act disinterestedly.

Politicians have

constituencies; scientists have principles to answer to.

The

Scientific Attitude

What is the scientific attitude?

There are many

enumerations of the characteristics of scientific endeavor,
but for the purpose of studying forms of knowledge as
competing claims to truth,

the primary characteristic of

science is that it has as its goal objective knowledge:
knowledge that is so whether or not we like it, agree with
it, or believe it.

Scientific knowledge is supposed to be

uncolored by personal input and to be the same for
everybody.

It is usually described as requiring

observation,

experiment,

and the possibility of being either

verifed or falsified by test, especially a test by persons
other than the one originally making the claim.5

Over the

past generation or so, considerable debate has developed
over whether science meets its own criteria for objectivity.
One part of the critique of scientific objectivity is that
science does not achieve in practice what it professes as a
principle;

another part is that the mind can never be sure

that it has grasped the world objectively.6
In modern society we see our understanding of and
approach to the world as substantially different from that
of pre-scientific society.

Now we have fact; before, we had

belief and ignorance: that,

in its simplest terms,

is our

understanding of the changeover to scientific knowledge.
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Even if our previous knowledge was valuable,
was right, we believe,

and even if it

it was not as complete or as

substantial as scientific knowledge, which can be
universally proven, whereas unscientific knowledge can only
be personally validated or taken on faith.
This conviction that we have advanced over time to a
superior knowledge is a major characteristic of knowledge in
our time.7

The conviction that science "knows more" is

part of our education and part of our presentation of our
achievements and problems in the news, on talk shows,
in soap operas

and

(in which the unavoidable factuality of

scientific medical knowledge may itself be an 'actor').
(This conviction, of course,

is not the same thing as being

scientifically knowledgeable.)

At the same time, we have

the sense that there are many areas of our life where
science does not apply —
relationships,

family life, personal

religious conviction,

enjoyment of music and

art, and what goes on inside our heads generally
we are not thinking analytically —

(i.e., when

and especially in our

dreams).
Yet even in these areas, science pervades our lives.
family may be started with a child's conception and fetal
growth scientifically mediated by genetic counseling and
surgical intervention.

Or the survival of a premature

newborn may depend on technological monitoring.

Personal

A

relationships are affected by scientific tests that reveal
the AIDS virus,

and personal behavior may be moderated by

psychiatric therapies that are based on a scientific model
and often include the use of behavior-modifying drugs.
Organized religion is constantly in the position of having
to contend with or integrate scientific knowledge —

the

theory of evolution and the use of medical techniques are
two examples.
transmitted,

The music most of us hear is electronically
and sometimes electronically generated.

Art

restoration is technologized with sophisticated techniques
of materials analysis,

and artistic creation often relies on

new technologies and non-natural materials that are
scientific spinoffs.

Only inside our heads do we seem to

live in a non-scientific world.
Even here, we have a scientific habit of mind which
takes the world as data to be organized for analysis; even
if we don't bother to do the analysis, we assume that things
can be figured out —
times,

that we can calculate distances,

sizes, weights; that we can move things around,

increase or diminish them; that we can connect cause and
effect,

and prove that connection in a way that invalidates

contending but incorrect explanations.

We also extend this

attitude of calculation about the physical world to the
psychological world,

"weighing" psychological states,

being less successful in assigning cause and effect.

but

Lending Aut h o r i t y to Knowledge

Besides being pervasive in our lives,
authority to knowledge.
Western world,

By comparison,

science gives

in the medieval

religion gave authority to knowledge.

The

institutions that preserved and transmitted knowledge were
religious ones, and the arguments that one type of human
action was to be preferred over another were made from the
authority of religious scripture as interpreted by the
Church.

This does not mean that everyone was devout,

that no one calculated weights and measures,
made political calculations,
only religious content.

or

that no one

or that poetry and song had

What it does mean is the influence

of religion was inescapable.

Religious imagery was the

dominant symbology; the stages and duties of life were
defined in terms of the sacraments,

from baptism to extreme

unction, because life was to be directed toward salvation.
Today,

stages of life are marked off physiologically and as

points on a path of career and family responsibilities.

We

have a multitude of symbols, but the foremost are material
wealth as a symbol of status and personal achievement,

and

sophisticated technology as a symbol of societal
advancement.

Emphasis is more on fulfillment in this life

than on salvation in the next.
In matters of law and governance, medieval secular and
religious authority had different jurisdictions, but
ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction in matters of
heresy —

that is, control over contending knowledge.

Rulers competed politically,

just as we have political

struggle today, and they fought with the pope as well as
with one another, but they justified their actions or were
made to answer for them according to the dictates of
religion,

not in the language of politics.8

Not until

Machiavelli did anyone make a formal and widely publicized
statement of the argument for coldly calculated personal and
political power.

Merchants traded,

and commerce had periods

of growth and decline, but the guiding economic principle of
trade was supposed to be the Christian one of "just price,"
or profit limited to the maintenance of the producer's
status quo.

The pursuit of profit itself was considered

against Christian principles.
Today,

science has taken the place of religion as the

organizing and inescapable force of our modern Western
and/or industrialized society.

Not everyone does science,

any more than everyone 'did' religion by becoming a monk or
a nun in medieval society, but everyone is affected by the
institutions and knowledge of science,

as in the medieval

world everyone was affected by the institutions and faith of
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religion.

The effect of a dominant form of knowledge such

as science or religion is not evenly distributed across
society; there are gaps and bumps, valleys and mountains in
the terrain of its influence.
always present,

Other types of knowledge are

to contend with the dominant form in varying

degrees of success or non-success.
The power of science to lend authority has two major
bases:

one is its institutional presence and power; the

other is its epistemological claim to objectivity.

Science

owns facts, and facts are to us as the words of the Bible
were to the medieval world —

they are treated as

foundations of formal knowledge.

(Whether they are

foundational or not is another question.)
distinguish formal knowledge —

the knowledge we are given

formal instruction in, are educated to —
knowledge,

We can

from personal

the knowledge we gain from our experience of

life, which cannot easily be articulated or put into a
formal statement.
personal knowledge,

Science could also be part of our
if we are scientists, but will not

necessarily be so.9

Analyzing Knowledge across History

Grouping historical periods and knowledge in this broad
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way —

medieval and religious, modern and scientific —

is

an exercise in making categories that can never entirely fit
events.
world,

The medieval world, the modern
our contemporary world

(post-Renaissance)

(sometimes called post-modern)

are constructs that help us see difference and change across
time, but they are imperfect because they cannot fit the
variety of human life and thought that is always present.
These historical eras are ideal t y p e s , specifications of
major characteristics which can mark off categories of
things, but which are never all matched by the examples
picked to exemplify the category.

Max Weber is famous in

sociology for his use of the ideal type as a way to analyze
"the market",

or "bureaucracy” , neither of which exist in

their pure form.

Also, social scientists disagree on what

that pure form could be, on what characteristics should
define the ideal type of the market or of many other
elements
But

of society and economy.
the social sciences are not the only place where

ideal types are found.

Clothing sizes are a very mundane

example of the ideal type: they are a perfect fit for no one
but an imaginary person, but a good general fit for
different real people; some of the specifications overlap
from one

category

(size) to another?

and one manufacturer's

size will have different characteristics from another
manufacturer's size with the same name or number.

Michael
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Landmann has called Weber's ideal type an intellectual
picture that unifies historical events in a
"contradictionless universe of context."10

This analytical

requirement of a contradictionless context should be kept
well

in mind not only for the ideal types of historical

eras, but for the other ideal types presented here —
dominant forms of knowledge.

Contradictionless contexts do

not really exist in the course of history,
development of knowledge,

or in the

or in ways of thinking.

When it comes to the classification and study of
knowledge,
course,

the contradictions that are in question,

of

are the ones that are interior to a category —

within the category of science or within the category of
religion or of politics; the contradictions between such
ideal types as science and religion are already clear.

In

fact, specifying the contradictory opposition is part of the
idealization of types.

But contradictions within categories

cast doubt on whether the category is meaningful.11
"Bureaucracy"

is not just rational and efficient by virtue

of its purpose and structure

(as in its ideal t y p e ) , it is

also irrationally hampered by those same rules and form of
organization.

Thus, some analysts reject ideal types, and

those who accept them argue over their contents.
All classification is for a purpose,

and different

systems of classification serve different purposes.

The

purpose here is to understand our Western worldview,

and to

see how it has moved from one central concern to another.
The attempt is to categorize broad and general ways of
thinking that are both a response to and an influence on
events in society at a given time.

This sociological

version of intellectual history connects ideas to social
groupings,

to life experiences in the context of social

organization.

At a time when the Western worldview is

increasingly recognized as partial,

it becomes increasingly

important to understand what that partiality is, how it
changes,
analysis,

and what it derives, from.

Without such an

we are left with descriptions of the Western

worldview as either ethnocentric prejudice or sublime
humanism.

To the argument that there are not worldviews,

this analysis responds that there are, and that despite the
diversity and contradictory views present in any society,
there is an arena of public discourse in which central
concerns are evident.

Science as the Power to Legitimate

That science and its effects,
technology,

including its associated

are a matter of central concern for us can be

seen in the news,

in political debate,

in academic analyses,
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in change in the workplace,

in health care,

in calculations

of advantage and disadvantage in the global economy,

and

with pressing urgency in matters of the environment.
Science dominates our society epistemologically and
institutionally.12
As a way of thinking,

science is especially linked to

facts, or to claims of objectivity.
that can be universally validated,
truth.

science makes a claim on

Science becomes identified with truth, and in a

complementary process,
science,

By claiming knowledge

truth becomes identified with

so that for a thing to be true,

scientific.

it must be

For individuals in a scientific society,

personal truths about the meaning of life are still true,
but they are not provable in the way that scientific truth
is.

This is the epistemological power of science,

a power

advantage in claiming ownership to the most certain and
stable ground for knowledge.
The institutional power of science is its integration
into education, government and business,

and its presence in

the media and in the consumer marketplace.

Although a

convincing argument can be made that the educational system
in the United States does not give the majority of high
school students an adequate understanding of scientific
reasoning,13 and that too few college students major in
scientific fields,

science is firmly in place in the

institutional structure of education.

Though bachelor's

degrees granted in the natural sciences, math,

and

engineering together hovered around just 16%-18% of all
B.A.s in the 1980s,14 these fields of study get a primary
share of resources at the college and university level.
the 1980s,

In

about 60% of all federal aid to universities and

colleges was for support of science and engineering.
specifically,

More

federal financial support for research and

development is heavily weighted toward the natural sciences,
particularly the life sciences,

which received approximately

50% or more of such aid in the 1980s.
environmental sciences,

Physical sciences,

and mathematics received

approximately 25%, and engineering 15% or more, usually
leaving less than 10% for the social sciences
history), psychology,
In government,

(including

and "other sciences."15

the allocation of federal money to

scientific projects is a major annual budget exercise in the
United States Congress,

involving tens of billions of

dollars committed over periods of many years.16

Science is

integrated into business as research and development,
technology in manufacturing and in end product,
scientific approach of systems management.
media presence.

as

and as the

Science has

Major metropolitan daily newspapers report

daily on medical technology, or military technology,
manufacturing technology,

or

or on environmental problems
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either traceable to scientific advances,
scientific advances,
daily newspapers

or both.

or to be solved by

Twenty of the top one hundred

(highest circulation)

in the United States

have weekly science sections of two to eight pages; The New
York T i m e s , one of the highest-circulation papers,
12 pages in its weekly science section.17

averages

Television makes

a superior medium for the popularization of science because
it can show physical change —
all its movement,

the stuff of science —

color and sound.

with

It displays particle

traces, distant nebulae, gives us the eye of a microscope to
make journeys through the human body, shows the unfolding of
a flower or the development of storm clouds in seconds of
compressed time —

in short,

factuality of science.
marketplace:
cameras,

offers visual "proof" of the

Science saturates the consumer

the availability of computers,

VCRs, CDs, video

technologically sophisticated toys,18 fast-acting

medicines,

birth-control pills and home pregnancy tests

immerses consumers in a world of scientific knowledge and
its technological expression.
Both what we call "science" and what we call
"technology" are evident in these examples.

Although they

may be reasonably distinguished from each other,
become one thing in effects on our lives.
united by the interplay between them.
just the outcome of science,

they have

The are also

Technology is not

it also reacts back on science
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and affects the direction of scientific research, or shapes
it in the first place.19

"Science and technology" has

become one thing, although some scientists or public policy
advisers still want to separate the two, sometimes to
distinguish basic or pure research from applied research,
sometimes to refute the assertion that science is
responsible for its technological outcomes.20
To speak of "science"

(or of "technology")

speaking of "government" or "education" —

is like

the word becomes

the subject of a sentence, as if it were a unitary actor.
"Science has brought us progress," "Science has led to
destruction of the environment" are sentences like
"Government must find a way to balance military and social
needs,"

"Education is failing to prepare students for

skilled jobs."
actor,

In reality,

as the subject is in the sentence,

way to balance his budget."
actor,

the government is not a single

either

"Joe must find a

And science is not a single

(inclusive of technology or not).

of grammatical construction is unavoidable;

This kind

it is part of

the "ideal typing" we do all the time in order to be able to
speak of things.

If we don't gather common though varied

characteristics of a thing together in one word, we can't
proceed with speech or thought.21
Similarly,
thought,

in this analysis of science as a form of

I am gathering common characteristics together,

and
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I will speak of science as if it were some abstract thing
that has a self-existence and the power to act on us.
it often seems that that is the case,

While

I am not claiming that

"science" exists like a Greek god dwelling on a mountain,
that like electromagnetism in our physical world,
invisible but actual and actively felt force.
to reify science,

or

it is an

I do not wish

to "thingify" it, but this tendency of

speech and thought is unavoidable in ordinary language.22
The dual strength of science —
epistemological —

gives it the power to legitimate social

and political action.
social policy,
problems.

institutional and

Before government makes decisions on

it requires scientific surveys of social

Whether undertaken by government or industry,

the

damming of rivers, the mining of land, the regulation of
deep-sea fishing,

all require scientifc validation of the

actions proposed or taken.

The same is true of the

acceptability of new drugs, of potentially hazardous
manaufacturing processes, of military defense technology,
agricultural techniques,

of

and of innumerable other projects

affecting our present and future.

Science legitimates

action epistemologically by associating it with truth, with
the facts of the matter,

and institutionally by being

integrated into society's organization of knowledgegathering and decision making.
The concept of epistemological legitimation that I am
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using is akin to the concept of a philosophical basis of
legitimacy for the course taken by a society in a given era,
examined by Hans Blumenberg.

The legitimacy concept turns

around the question of whether the modern age in the West is
only a secularized version of the earlier Christian
religious age (with philosophical premises that are stolen
and distorted to fit concerns that are material rather than
s p iritual), or instead, has its own,
(Enlightenment)

legitimate

basis for its political culture.23

There

is another sense in which "legitimation" is used, more
common in American social sciences,

to refer to the

legitimizing of state power by establishing conditions of
consent among citizens of the state.

Both concepts refer to

the political course of society, but one examines the
techniques of politics and another examines the
philosophical basis of what we would call politics and
ideology.
When I say that we have shifted from the notion of a
just society to the notion of a scientific society as
central to our debates over what is the right course of
social and political action,
related to Blumenberg's

I am proposing a perspective

(which is that there has been a

genuine and philosophically sound change), but I am not
discussing the "legitimacy" of our age.

Rather,

discussing conceptual frameworks that organize

I am
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understanding,

and I am convinced that this "conceptual

shift" is the wider meaning of the centrality of science to
much public debate.

How Should Science

'Be*

in Society?

Science and technology have contributed a new level of
comfort,
time,

security,

and longevity to human life.

At the same

they have presented humanity with a host of problems

associated with the ability of our technological domination
of nature to outrun our understanding of nature.
faced with air pollution, water pollution,
depletion,

greenhouse warming,

Now we are

ozone layer

rainforest destruction and

consequent species and oxygen loss, hazardous chemicals in
the workplace,

the threat of nuclear destruction or

radiation contamination by accident, groundwater depletion,
the vulnerability of single crops produced on a massive
scale to destruction by pests or disease, problems of
accelerating population growth,

species extinction,

and many

other environmental abuses and imbalances.
In addition, we face ethical issues for which we cannot
find the grounds of decision in our scientific worldview:
medical technology that prolongs life beyond any quality or
desirability; manipulation of the genetic instructions that
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govern human,

animal and plant growth; the use of animals in

"scientific" research that benefits only an industry based
on the luxury needs of consumers

(cosmetics); the control of

behavior through psychoactive drugs, and the identification
of individuals at behavioral "risk" by analysis of
neurochemical brain function;

intervention in fetal

development, whether by an abortion pill or by corrective
surgery

(and the attendant issues of who shall have access

to these interventions); and, not least,

the seemingly

insurmountable gap between the science-and-technology rich
nations and the poor ones, between starving peoples and
people overwhelmed by choice of foods in semi-automated
supermarkets.
None of these problems, particularly the last, can be
laid at the feet of science alone, but they are, unarguably,
one of its outcomes —

even the gap betwen rich and poor is

tied in with a dominatory use of natural resources in which
the "industry of science" has been prominent.

Engaging in

such use exploits nature without accepting responsibility
for long term consequences in the natural world,

and affects

the economic future of many of the world's people while
denying the interaction of science with politics.24

Both

scientific and political institutions are relatively weak in
mechanisms for taking responsibility for long term
consequences of scientific research and technological
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developments.

Western scientific thinking itself has been

critically analyzed as historically permeated with a
dominatory bias.25
Science is not free of the culture it grows up in; it
is not only materially constrained or aided by that culture,
it is epistemologically structured with its elements.

Since

no form of knowledge is everywhere and at all times the
same,

it is as true that ecologically conscious and humanly

responsible attitudes can be located in the scientific
tradition as ecologically blind and humanly irresponsible
ones can.

These interior-to-science contradictions in

attitudes toward the object of scientific study clearly
exist; what is at issue is which attitudes have held sway,
and whether a dominatory approach to nature and persons is
inherent in the scientific worldview that we are heir to.
The

(feminist) charge that Western science shares the

(masculinist)

bias of Western culture toward analysis and

dominatory control

is based on a reinterpretation of texts

and historical events which opposes the abstraction that
presents science only as an ideal type,

science as objective

and neutral in a realm separate from historical and cultural
processes.

To the picture of what science should be is

opposed a record of what science has been.26
The existence of interlocked problems arising from
scientific knowledge and technological development,

and the

threat of overwhelming environmental damage that could end,
forever,

human life, has resulted in serious questioning of

how science should 'be' in society.
endeavor,

Should it be a special

with a legally and politically protected autonomy?

Then, goes the argument,

it can do the pure research it

requires for true knowledge, without having to answer to
popular pressure for better drugs or better brains,

or to

government pressure for better missiles and remote spying
techniques.

Or should science instead be directed toward

specific social goals,

so that it does not produce a

plethora of unplanned and unintended consequences which
endanger our health and survival?
should 'be'

This issue of how science

in our society will increasingly dominate our

public concerns.

Changing Knowledge

The turn from pre-scientific to scientific knowledge is
our primary example of a change in knowledge.27
this change occur,
the 17th century)

and why did it happen when
and where

(Europe)

it did?

the great questions of intellectual history,

Why did

(approximately
This is one of
and it is not

yet answered.
Knowledge is not simply idea-driven;

it is rooted in

conditions of life.
idea upon another,

While we can trace the influence of one
this does not give a complete picture of

the development of knowledge.
conditions,

Knowledge has material

and this is true of intellectual knowledge and

abstract ideas as well as of practical knowledge of how to
do things.

By intellectual knowledge I mean knowledge that

is speculative,

self-aware,

utilitarian purposes.

and not necessarily tied to

One of the conditions of intellectual

knowledge is that thinkers have time to engage in it, and
the opportunity and means to communicate with one another.
This condition can be met at very simple levels of material
development,

so long as not all of available time is spent

at survival activities,
to talk.

and people regularly come together

For this condition, the thinker in a village of

hunter-gatherers can have an advantage over the modern urban
worker who holds two jobs and has no extra time.
some point,

But at

an intellectual and speculative development of

knowledge requires written communication, which allows rapid
transfer of ideas among a large and differentiated number of
people, gives the opportunity to compare different accounts
at the same time, allows accurate translation,
diagrams, pictures,
words.

and can put

and mathematical formula alongside

In medieval Europe, this need was first met with

manuscripts

(as it had been in earlier cent u r i e s ) ; the use

of the printing press after the mid-15th century quickly
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increased the circulation of texts, and was a major factor
in the expansion of knowledge.
The invention of the printing press was in turn
something that required town life to support it, and towns
required agricultural surpluses as well as relatively
complex systems of commerce,

law and government.

A money

economy and mercantilism encouraged exploration and travel
for the increase of national wealth through trade.
Exploration of the new world, and the navigational needs
that went with it encouraged technological developments.
Trade with the Arab world and the East brought with it new
ideas.

Capitalism and free markets were a spur to

technological development in pursuit of profit,
technology gave impetus to scientific theories.

and
All of

these material conditions contributed to the devlopment of
science.

Whether or not they are all necessary

preconditions

is still being argued. But

science requires

it is clear that

a certain space in which to operate,

certain forms

of social organization,

and institutions of

support —

is not a development of

ideas alone.

it

knowledge is also not just materially driven,

Yet

and the

development of scientific reasoning and the emphasis on
objective knowledge based on observation,
test of physical phenomena,

measurement and

and directed toward prediction

and c o n t r o l , has had many twists and turns in Western
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thought

(including influences from outside the West)

since

the Greek philosophers first speculated on the fundamental
constitutents of matter.28
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NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1.
For more on this comparison, see Roland N. Stromberg, An
Intellectual History of Modern Europe (New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts, 1966), Suggested Reading for Chapters
1 and 2.
2.
Science-influenced understanding is not the same as
being able to reason scientifically, nor is it necessarily
knowledge of scientific findings.
Surveys of U.S., British,
and Japanese citizens have shown considerable unevenness in
scientific literacy, but in none of these countries is it at
much more than minimal levels by the terms of the surveys.
However, this type of literacy is not what is meant here by
having a science-influenced understanding or scientific
attitude.
It is instead the more general belief that
science can understand the world, and that benefits of
science outweigh the costs.
The same surveys that find low
scientific literacy find that this belief is present.
For U.S. and British surveys, see National Science
Board. Science and Engineering Indicators - 1989 (NSB 89-1).
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1989.
(NS 1.40) for summaries and further references.
For
comparisons of the U.S. and Japan, see Science and
Engineering Indicators - 198 7 .
3.
For the relationship of our current ideas of society to
the 18th century, see entry under "society" in Raymond
Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1976).
4.4.
The 17th and 18th century concept of natural and
inalienable rights of individuals, with the state having the
function of safeguarding these rights but not owning them
(Locke and the philosophes), though attacked by other
thinkers then and since, still exerts a strong pull in the
popular demand for "democracy" — in the established
democracies of Western Europe, in Eastern Europe and the
USSR as shown by the recent changes on government, and in
China as shown by student protest.
This widespread
insistence on basic rights is briefly discussed by Burns H.
Weston in the entry "Human Rights" in the Encyclopedia
Britannica. 15th edition, Vol. 20, pp. 714-717 (Chicago:
Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1987).
Also see, in the same
edition of the Encyclopedia, the entry "Philosophy, The
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History of Western” (section on "Modern Philosophy" by
Albert William Levi), Vol. 2, p.762 ("Social and political
philosophy") for the political problem of the Enlightenment
as the revolt against injustice.
5.
This common educated understanding of science is so
taken for granted that it is hard to find any specific,
condensed discussion of it.
Science textbooks do not bother
to spell it out.
Philosophies of science debate or support
this understanding, but do not provide any synopsis of it,
instead going right to the details.
I was suprised to find
that among my many books on science, I could find no simple
statement about observation, experiment, and verification.
6.
For recent critiques of scientific objectivity, see:
Gernot Bohrae and Nico Stehr, e d s . , The Knowledge Society;
The Growing Impact of Scientific Knowledge on Social
Relations (Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel, 1986);
Martin
Hollis and Steven Lukes, eds., Rationality and Relativism
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982); Karin Knorr-Cetina and
Michael Mulkay, eds., Science Observed (Newbury Park, CA:
Sage, 1983) ; Stephen Toulmin, "The Construal of Reality:
Criticism in Modern and Postmodern Science" in The Politics
of Interpretation, edited by W.J.T. Mitchell (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1983)
Alan Chalmers discusses
the arguments about science in Science and Its Fabrication
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990).
Steven
Yearly provides a review of critiques, particularly by
British scholars, in Science. Technology, and Social Change
(London: Unwin Hyman, 1988).
7.
Progressive knowledge, and the contemporary age as most
advanced, is a concept often traced to the Enlightenment.
In a sentence I read long ago and can no longer locate, a
concise author said that The Enlightenment (or 18th century)
was the first era to conceptualize itself in terms of
thought.
It is this kind of self conscious knowledge that
its owners see as in advance of previous forms.
Hans
Blumenberg discusses a similar idea in The Legitimacy of the
Modern Aae (Cambridge. MA: MIT Press, 1983); see (for brief
comments) p . 97, pp. 462-63.
8.6.
In hindsight, we can see much of the history of the
middle ages as a sparring between religious authority and
secular politics, but this is a theoretical distinction made
in our time, not in theirs.
The 11th century provides an
example of the weight given to religion.
Holy Roman Emperor
Henry IV (1056-1106) contested Pope Gregory VII's (10731085) ending of lay investiture of bishops, i.e.,
appointment of bishops by the emperor, who also granted them
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land and the equivalent status of nobles if they did not
already have it, and thus gained their allegiance.
Henry
called a council of German bishops to depose Gregory;
Gregory responded by excommunicating the emperor and
absolving his subject nobles (and bishops) from allegiance
to him.
Henry made penance, standing barefoot in the snow
at the gates of the pope's residence in the Apennines.
If
Gregory were to refuse absolution to Henry, the emperor
would be successfully deposed, but the pope's spiritual
authority would be undermined by his failure in the priestly
duty of absolving the penitent.
Gregory absolved Henry, and
the struggle between pope and emperor continued.
This event is presented as a dilemma for Gregory by
Gerald Kurland in Western Civilization I (New York: Monarch
Press, 1971), p p . 134-36.
But James Viscount Bryce in The
Holv Roman E m p i r e , a 19th-century history, views Henry's
penance as an abasement of the crown, since it confirmed the
pope, rather than the emperor, as the "highest power on
earth, created by and answerable to God alone."
(London:
Macmillan, 1961; reprint of 1904 - 5th - edn., p p . 154-63).
9.
On scientific practice as personal knowledge, see
Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1962).
10.
My lecture notes for the course "Philosophical
Foundations of the Social Sciences," New School Graduate
Faculty, New York, 5/7/83.
The complexities of typifying
the aspect of knowledge that we call reason are examined in
Michael Landmann, Alienatorv Reason (Normal, IL: Applied
Literature Press, 1978).
11.
Doubt over internal contradictions arises under the
strictures of Aristotelian formal logic.
If the dialectical
logic of "unity and struggle of opposites" is accepted,
internal contradictions are a matter of course.
12.
For an analysis of the interaction between these two
bases of scientific hegemony, see Stanley Aronowitz, Science
as Power: Discourse and Ideology in Modern Society
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988).
Aronowitz argues that authority in the contemporary world
rests on the possession of legitimate knowledge, i.e.,
science.
Science defines rationality, and integrated with
technology, permeates production, education, and business
and government decision-making.
The way in which science
constitutes its methods and objects of inquiry is tied not
only to its formal logic but also to the social and
technical division of labor.
The 'objectivity' of science
is therefore inextricably linked with social factors which
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must be critically analyzed.
13.
For news reports of government-sponsored studies of
science skills, see Joseph Berger, "U.S. Pupils Get Low
Marks in Science," The New York T i m e s . 9/23/88, p . 24 (the
National Assessment of Educational Progress —
"the Nation's
Report C a r d " ) ; Barbara Vobjeda, "Survey of Math, Science
Skills Puts U.S. Students at Bottom," Washington P o s t .
1/31/89, p.l (international study by the National Science
Foundation and the Department of Education). For non
government-sponsored comparative data on U.S. and other
students see International Association for the Evaluation of
Educational Achievement, Science Achievement in Seventeen
Countries: A Preliminary Report (Oxford: Pergamon Press,
1988).
The international studies, in which U.S. secondary
school students are compared with those in Canada and in
European and Pacific-rim countries, show them ranking at or
near the bottom in math and science.
The national study
shows primary and secondary school students' understanding
of science improving slightly over the period 1969-1986, but
remaining so low as to still count as scientific illiteracy.
14.
On B.A. degrees in the natural sciences, mathematics
and engineering, see U.S. Department of Education. Office of
Educational Research and Improvement. National Center for
Education Statistics, The Condition of Education — 1989,
Volume 2: Postsecondarv Education, edited by Curtis 0. Baker
and Gayle Thompson. (CS 89-651). Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1989.
Their natural science
category does not include "agriculture" or "health
sciences."
Natural sciences showed a slightly declining
trend from the 1970s, while engineering increased, and
computer sciences increased sharply.
If computer sciences
are added to the NCES figures, science B.A.s increase to
18%-20% of total B.A.s.
When social and behavioral sciences are included in the
count, as in National Science Board biannual reports
(Science & Engineering Indicators) . B.A. degrees in the
sciences approach 30% of total B.A.s.
15.
In 1986, the life sciences received approximately 53%
of such aid; the physical sciences, environmental sciences,
and mathematics received about 25%; engineering received
approximately 17% — for a total of approximately 95% for
"hard" areas, leaving about 5% for the social sciences
(including history), psychology, and "other sciences."
National Science Foundation. Federal Support to
Universities. Colleges, and Selected Nonprofit
Institutions — Fiscal Year: 198 6 . (NSF 87-318). Washington,
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D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, n.d. (Surveys of
Science Resource Series) (NS 1.30/2).
Also see National
Science Board, Science & Engineering Indicators -- 1 9 8 9 .
16.
William J. Broad, "Heavy Costs of Major Projects Pose a
Threat to Basic Science," The New York T i m e s . 5/27/90, p.l:
"New projects now planned for completion in the 1 9 9 0 's will
cost more than $60 billion to build.
More than $100 billion
will be needed to operate the instruments over their
lifetimes...."
These projects include the space stations
($30 billion to b u i l d ) ; the human genome project ($3
b i l l i o n ) ; Saturn and Mars probes, and a comet rendezvous
($2.1 billion); earth-orbiting satellites — EOS and
others — to gather environmental and other data ($19.2
b i l l i o n ) ; astronomical observatories and astrophysics
satellites ($2.2 billion); the superconducting
supercollider, an ion collider, and an electron beam
accelerator ($8.7 billion); an advanced photon source, an
advanced light source, and a high magnetic field laboratory
($665 m i l l i o n ) .
Also see other articles in this series, collectively
titled "Big Science — Is It Worth the Price?";
5/29/90,
Malcolm W. Browne, "Supercollider's Rising Cost Provokes
Opposition," p.Cl; 6/5/90, Natalie Angier, "Great 15-Year
Project to Decipher Genes Stirs Opposition," (described as
"biology's first foray into big-ticket science"), p.Cl;
6/10/90, William J. Broad, "How the $8 Billion Space Station
Became a $120 Billion Showpiece," p.l; 6/19/90, William K.
Stevens, "Huge Space Platform Seen as Distorting Studies of
Earth," p.Cl; 9/4/90, William J. Broad, "Small-Scale Science
Feels the Pinch From Big Projects," p.Cl.
17.
Survey by Scientists' Institute for Public Information,
reported in SIPIscope. Vol. 18, No. 1, Spring 1990, p.26.
This updates an earlier report summarized in S c i e n c e .
1/23/87, p.425, "Science Sections in U.S. Newspapers
Increase Dramatically in Past 2 Years," by Barbara J.
Culliton.
Circulation figures are from Editor & Publisher
YearBook. 1990 (front pages, no page number).
On newspaper science-reporting see Maurice Goldsmith,
The Science Critic: A Critical Analysis of the Popular
Presentation of Science (London and New York: Routledge &
Kegan P a u l ) ; and Dorothy Nelkin, Selling Science: How the
Press Covers Science and Technology (New York: W.H. Freeman
and C o . , 1986)
18.

I thank Lou Amdur for bringing this to my attention.
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19.
As argued by Robert Merton, the commercial need for
improved technological devices for navigation was a major
influence on the direction of development of 17th-century
science in England.
Science, Technology and Society in
Seventeenth-Centurv England (New York: Howard Fertig, 1970.
Orig. pub. 1938 in O s i r i s , vol. 4, Pt. 2) . Derek de Solla
Price asserts that the growth of science follows technology,
not the other way around; his example is that Galileo's
telescope made the Copernican revolution; in Little Science.
Big Science ...And Bevond (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1986, C h . 12).
20.
Whether or not a separation is made between science and
technology is a reflection of two basic and opposing
philosophies of science, in the analysis of Anne L. Hiskes
and Richard P. Hiskes, Science. Technology and Policy
Decisions (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986, Ch.l).
Logical empiricism emphasizes objective knowledge and
rejects the intrusion into (pure) science of interests and
social forces implied by technological goals.
The new
philosophy of science (since the 1960s) takes the
historically supported view that science has never been
dissociated from either the values of society at large or
from its own internal values and interests.
Richard Barke quotes Derek de Solla Price as saying
that the science/technology distinction is useful to
scientists when they want "'to get money', 'to get out of
responsibility', or 'to get status for themselves'" in:
Science. Technology and Public Policy (Washington, DC: CQ
Press, 1986, p . 7).
21.
The grouping of common characteristics for the purpose
of defining (which of course includes defining what is
common) doesn't mean that meanings don't shift, that
signifier and signified are always in the same relationship;
it means that we try to resist this movement.
Many social
thinkers agree that this resistance exists, although they
have different theoretical conceptions of it.
Garfinkel
says that common understanding shifts and moves, but that it
is constructed between participants in a situation so that
they can save the notion that there is an objective world
about which there can be common understanding.
Garfinkel
doesn't speculate on why we have this resistance to forgoing
agreed-upon meaning, but it is classical sociology to say
that we must, in order to have society.
For Durkheim, common understanding or shared
intellectual and emotional representations of the world are
the sine qua non of social life.
At the level of
conceptions about time, space, cause, number, etc., meaning
is not continually negotiated, as in Garfinkel's analysis,
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but at the level of totem and symbol it is the outcome of
social interaction.
Moscovici takes Durkheim's collective representations
and puts them in the framework of social psychology as
"social representations."
They remain, as in Durkheim, more
coercive over the individual than negotiated by individuals,
but they have a developmental course, and common sense is
always being created.
The purpose of social representations
is "to make the unfamiliar familiar," to give the
unidentified a social identity.
Concerning the literary theory of deconstruction, which
intentionally destabilizes meanings and the possibility of
meaning itself as understood in Western culture, traditional
sociology takes the position of "common sense" and resists
the dismantling of agreement.
22.
Moscovici observes that our "social representations" —
commonly-used and common-sensical words and ideas about
social phenomena — give to the things they describe an
ontological status.
Serge Moscovici, "The Phenomenon of
Social Representations" in Robert M. Farr and Serge
Moscovici, eds., Social Representations (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press / Paris: Editions de la Maisons
Sciences de l'Homme, 1984).
23.
Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Aae
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983).
The concept of
epistemological legitimation that I am using cannot be
considered the same as or as sophisticated as the concept of
legitimacy which is the issue that is the starting point for
Blumenberg's book, a work situated in German social theory,
in its long-standing debate over modernity, and in a
discussion of legitimacy that has been going on for a
generation.
24.
For the connection between science and politics in the
U.S., see David Dickson, The New Politics of Science (New
York, Pantheon, 1984).
For a philosophy of science view on
this connection, see Joseph Rouse, Knowledge and Power:
Toward a Political Philosophy of Science (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1987).
25.
The critical theory of the Frankfurt School, and its
concept of instrumental rationality, in which means become
ends, is a major source of this thinking.
Dialectic of
Enliahtenment (New York: Seabury, 1972) by Max Horkheimer
and Theodor W. Adorno is often cited for drawing attention
to how Western thought gives to reason the role of
dominating nature and circumstances, but this is a somewhat
ritualistic reference for those who lack the original
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context of the argument.
The centrality and even the
outline of the notion of domination are difficult to see in
the book without that context, which now must be
reconstructed around several diverse essays whose meaning
was further developed in intellectual discussion following
their original postwar publication in Europe.
26.
For feminist critiques of science, see Sandra Harding
and Merrill B. Hintikka, eds., Discovering Reality: Feminist
Perspective on Epistemologv. Metaphysics. Methodology, and
Philosophy of Science (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983); Sandra
Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1986); Evelyn Fox Keller,
Reflections on Gender and Science (New Haven and London:
Yale University Press, 1985); special issues of H v p a t i a :
"Feminism and Science - I, Fall 1987 (Vol. 2 #3), "Feminism
and Science - II," Spring 1988.
27.
The idea of a change in knowledge is familiar to
classical sociology.
Comte (like Hegel) arranged the
history of human society and knowledge into three
progressive stages.
Comte's were the theological,
metaphysical, and positive.
His "positive" stage was what
we would call scientific, and characterizes his, and our
own, time.
Each stage is an advance and complete break from
the one before; science cannot admit metaphysics as
knowledge.
Comte saw no advance beyond this third stage,
which he considered the final achievement of "positive"
knowledge.
Scheler (first to use the term "sociology of
knowledge") said that religion, metaphysics and science are
not stages but types of knowledge, existing side by side and
equal in rank.
Scheler proposed several different
classifications of knowledge by form or type, but did not
develop a systematic sociology of knowledge.
28.
For a comprehensive history of the development of
science and scientfic reasoning, see Sir William Cecil
Dampier, A History of Science and Its Relations with
Philosophy and Religion (London: Cambridge University Press,
1961; reprint of the 1948 -4th- edition).
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CHAPTER TWO
CONCEPTUAL SHIFT

The previous chapter discussed science as a dominant form of
knowledge and the shift in Western society from a political
attitude to a scientific attitude, with the attendant
question of how science should 'be' in society.

This

chapter continues the discussion of change in knowledge and
understanding,

with the environmental movement as an example

of a social and historical condition to which scientific
knowledge is essential.

The Environmental Movement

The environmental movement is now visible to the point
of being ordinary.

At the same time, however,

the movement

signifies a major change taking place in how we
conceptualize the economy,

the state,

and the individual.

This conceptual change is a subject for the sociology of
knowledge, which has,

from its beginnings,

concerned itself

with the relationship between knowledge and politics.

The environmental movement encompasses a wide variety
of groups whose two basic purposes are to defend the
environment against degradation and to defend human beings
against the health-threatening or life-threatening effects
of the technological disruption of the natural world.
Damage to environment and humans is seen, by critical
environmentalists,

as the outcome of rampant technology,

of the dominatory purposes of science,
economic growth,

or all of these.

or

or of the ideology of

Yet, not all

environmentally concerned voices are critical in this way,
and from Earth First! monkey-wrenchers who have spiked trees
so that they will be useless for lumber to scientists
observing minute interactions in natural environments,

the

movement is so broad that it is hard to say what it is.
The breadth of the environmental movement,
complexity of environmental problems,

the

and the relative

newness of the political presence of environmentalism has
resulted in opposed evaluations of the political character
of the movement.

Some see it as left, others as at least

partially right, while still others say that left/right
definitions cannot be made to fit.1

The movement is

conservative in its Nature philosophy
conservative 19th-century thought)
local control;
implicit,

(which is tinged with

and in its emphasis on

it is radical in its reguirement,

for economic restructuring.

explicit or

This problem of
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definition is an interesting problem for the sociology of
knowledge, because it indicates the failure of a general
framework of thought in modern society —
which the left/right opposition fits.

a framework into

That failure in turn

indicates the occurence of a "conceptual shift" in our
collective approach to explaining our society to ourselves.
It is not just that the complexity and newness of the
environmental phenomenon make it difficult to classify;

it

is that the framework that we are accustomed to using for
classification lacks the elements for a proper fit to the
issues.

To understand conflicting interests in society we

have long used a political framework; politics has been the
center of this discourse.

But for some time, a new center

of discourse has been emerging,
place:

and has now taken a central

that center is science.2

With this new center, the

old left/right polarity no longer works to explain or
classify many social and political developments.

As a

result, we lack a simple and commonly accepted analytical
framework for evaluating these developments or for acting on
them.
We often turn to the use of left and right labels for a
quick and simple explanation of where a group or idea fits
on the current scene.

If you ask whether environmentalists

(or any particular group of them)

are conservative or

liberal, you are assuming these terms can fit their
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concerns.

But conservative/liberal or right/left labels

grew up along with a particular concept of politics,

or

rather, a group of concepts forming a framework, which no
longer fits the facts of a world of environmental problems
linked to scientific and technological developments.

Conservative and Liberal Political Philosophies

The political framework which encompasses the
conservative/liberal terminology dates from the 18th
century,

and was further developed in the 19th century.

It

incorporates a relationship between citizen and state, and a
balancing of rights and responsibilities based on some
philosophy of the nature of man.

Men

(and we must note that

women were left out of these political philosophies)

are

either individuals of a universal, generic type with
inalienable rights and the rational capacity to steer a
course toward liberty
individuals,

(liberalism); or they are particular

localized and without universal rights —

although with rights established by local custom —
requiring the boundaries of community or nation to contain
their irrationality as well as to assure them benefits
(conservatism).
The right and left political categorization can be

looked at in several ways.

One way is to define the content

of their respective political philosophies.

Another is to

identify their social context: who is it that is left, and
who right?3

Here I only consider philosophies.

The terms

conservative/liberal and right/left are not an exact match,
especially in the European context,
interchangeably.

but they are often used

These terms are tied to concepts whose

origins are in historical developments that have been
superseded.

The terms shift in meaning,

and they differ

between Europe and the United States.
To the classical,

19th-century form of conservatism,

with its emphasis on tradition,
establishment has been added,

institutions,

in the 20th century,

for the free market and capitalism,

support

along with opposition to

state intervention and public expenditure.
classical,

and the

To the

19th century form of liberalism, with its

emphasis on freedom,

individual rights, and limited

government has been added,

in the 20th century,

an agenda

for social justice and support for the welfare state.
result of these additions,

As a

the classical British liberal has

his equivalent in the modern-day American conservative.

As

one dictionary puts it, in the United States, progressives
(that is, those in favor of the welfare state)
captured the 'liberal'

"have

label, and the older liberals are now

called 'conservatives'."4

Another dictionary says of
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liberalism that "a term that meant small government and low
taxation in the last century has in this century come to
mean big government and high taxation."5
Obviously,

conservative/liberal terminology is not

fixed in meaning,

and it changes over time.

In general,

yesterday's liberals are today's conservatives,
called neo-conservatives
l iberals).
liberals,

sometimes

(and occasionally called paleo-

Today's liberals are sometimes called neo

to distinguish them from those liberal forerunners

who would not accept a welfare state.

A simpler way of

keeping this straight is that today's liberals like to think
of themselves as for social justice, while today's
conservatives like to think of themselves as for the freedom
of the individual from interference by the state.

But what

has not changed as characteristically conservative or
liberal is the respective concept of human nature.

If

you're a conservative, whether neo or old-fashioned, you
doubt the perfectability of human nature?
liberal,

if you're a

paleo or neo, you take it that altering people's

circumstances alters their behavior.

Human Nature

Human nature is a basic component of the political-

thought framework of the conservative/liberal terminology.
Philosophically,

for both, human nature determines the best

arrangement for governance.
basically good,

For liberals, human nature is

or at least not fundamentally flawed;

it has

a universal character not conditioned by time or place; all
men

(ideally all people but in originally in effect all

property-owning males)
to life and liberty,
individuals,

and these rights can be vested only in

not in the state; human will and reason can

shape human destiny;
of society,

are equally endowed with basic rights

social evils arise out of the structure

not out of human nature.

be by consent of the governed,
—

and —

Thus, government is to
for classical liberals

that government is best which governs least.

is not a natural development;

Government

it is a contractual

arrangement.
For conservatives, human nature is essentially flawed,
or at least unavoidably irrational some of the time, and the
problems arising from the limitations of this nature can
only be ameliorated,

not abolished.

We are to be skeptical

about the perfectability of society through the application
of human will and reason.

There is nothing in humans or in

human nature which gives grounds for the belief in universal
equality.

Liberty does not exist as an abstract right, but

only as the hard-won gain of many generations of human
experience,

preserved in traditions and institutions which
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are necessarily local,

not universal.

traditional rulers and institutions,
not overthrown by revolution,
new excesses of irrationality.
in its extent,

Thus tradition,

and

are to be respected and

which will only leave room for
Government should be limited

but not limited by popular sovereignty,

since

this gives room to the irrationality of the passions of the
moment.

Limits on government should be by rule of law which

is itself a repository of custom,
over time.

or practices proved worthy

The institutions of the state are an organic

development; attempts to design government according to
abstract and universal principles
equality)

(such as liberty and

are only "Utopian blueprints" which have no basis

in empirical reality.6
The social psychologist Serge Moscovici has summed up
the differences between left and right explanations of the
reasons for social phenomena by saying that personality is a
right-wing explanation; situational causality is a left-wing
explanation.7

Frameworks

Does this political philosophy have anything to do with
a world of environmental problems linked to science and
technology?

I have gone into some detail over the
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philosophical content of conservatism and liberalism in
order to show that there is a framework of linked ideas for
political philosophy,
several others.
and liberal,

each idea depending for meaning on

The distinctions made between conservative

or between right and left, are part of a

framework of understanding for politics that is different
from the framework of understanding that we increasingly
apply to environmental problems.
the one that we have for science.
these two frameworks —

This other framework is
The lack of fit between

political and scientific —

left/right distinctions inapplicable to many

makes

(if not most)

scientific and technological issues, even though science and
politics are inseparably connected in modern life.
The political framework has four main elements:
state, the citizen, human nature, and the economy.
framework,

the
In the

state and citizen are linked by rights and

obligations; the nature of this relationship is determined
by human nature.

The economy flanks state and citizen.

economy supports the state, and the state safeguards,
least minimally,

the economy.

The

at

You are a citizen in respect

to the state, but an individual in respect to the economy,
i.e., on your own.8

This framework holds for both

conservative and liberal.

Other relationships can be

specified, and excluded non-citizens noted, but they are
left out of the basic framework.
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This framework is not meant to be an accurate
representation of how politics works in society.

It is not a

working diagram for social and political engineers;

it is a

conceptual framework for thinking about politics and
society,

for handling information,

for making sense of

events.

The relationship of its elements has been theorized

at high levels, but the framework also has its place in
common understanding.

Many elements are left out; the

framework is simplified for the purpose of being able to
deal with many variants.

I am proposing this framework both

as an analytical tool, to help us see a change that is
occuring in our society; and as a model of how, as members
of our society, we actually do understand it.
sense,

it is kind of a cognitive prototype.

In the latter
Like the

prototypical mental chair that allows us to recognize both
Barcaloungers and folding metal chairs as chairs,

it allows

us to recognize many kinds of societal phenomena as variants
of a familiar political and economic form.
In the framework that I see developing for thinking
about science in society,

science occupies the place that

the state does in the political framework.
the citizen,
science.

instead of

there is the utilizer or passive recipient of

This includes utilizers of scientific method as

well as users of the products of science.
nature,

Then,

Instead of human

there is the natural world; and again,

there is the
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economy.
The rights and obligations between science and
utilizer/recipient are yet to be worked out, so the relation
is not yet established
and c i t i z e n ) .

(unlike the relation between state

The natural world does not determine

obligations between science and its recipients as human
nature does for state and citizen.
only what science should be
of scientific endeavor).

Instead it determines

(at least in the classical model

So far, the only obligation

established for science is to the truth of this natural
world,

and at the highest reaches of science,

general,

thus truth among human beings.

to truth in

(This obligation of

science to truth is something like the obligation of the
Hegelian state to the highest expression of mind.)

The

economy flanks science and its utilizers/recipients as it
does state and citizen, with technology as mediator.

This

framework for science doesn't have the state or government
in it.

However,

once again, what's at the bottom is an

individual, this time even more on his or her own than in
the political framework, because, here,
obligations are established.

no rights and
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FRAMEWORK OF UMDER8TAMDIMO FOR POLITICS

the state
the

human
nature

e c on o my

the citizen
[the excluded — prisoners, slaves,
the unenfranchised, aliens]

FRAMEWORK OF UNDERSTANDING FOR 8CIENCE

science
technology
the
economy

truth

i

i_

* rights ^
I
and
I
obligations
V
not established

natural
world

..
the utilizer/active recipient
the subject of research
the passive recipient

(Arrows represent established and accepted relationships)
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Note that both these frameworks use ideal types,

and

are also presentations of the way things are conventionally
said to be, not necessarily the way they actually are.
Although the state is not in the framework for understanding
science,

there is empirically a relation between them; this

is a fault in the model we have for thinking about science.
There are, of course,

theories about the relation between

science and the state

(or its expression, government)

among

academics and ordinary citizens, but we still at the same
time have this contradictory model of an autonomous science.
What has happened is that we have developed a way of
thinking about science that has left out politics.

Use of

this autonomous-science model means that terms are lacking
for certain developments.

The attempt to use left/right

labels for many scientific and technological issues doesn't
work either, because the political-thought framework,

for

historical reasons, doesn't include science.

Environmental Issues

In particular, many commentators have noted that it is
difficult to classify the environmental movement on the
whole as left or right, despite left claims by some Greens.
I would say that the issues of environmentalism,

as well as
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its activist groups, cannot adequately be captured by the
left/right characterization.

Rather,

they call for

characterization by a polarity that expresses differences
among various social groups over how science
associated technology)

(and its

should 'be' in society.

This

polarity in its extreme form is autonomous science/servant
s c i e n c e . and the dispute is over what controls,
should be placed on science.

Science skeptics doubt that

science can be free of interests.
skepticism is that,
goals anyway

if any,

The extreme argument of

since science serves particular social

(military and industrial,

for example),

we

should straightforwardly direct it toward human benefit and
ecological balance,

and not be taken in by claims for the

need to have scientific autonomy in order to serve
scientific objectivity.
Science and politics are entwined in environmental
issues.

For examples,

I have taken some newspaper and

magazine reports from the last few years.
headlines,

leads,

What follows are

quotes, or brief summaries.

California growers say "we are not going to let
the environmental community put an arbitrary
scientific standard on the chemicals we can
u s e . 1,9
"rapid changes in global environment caused by
human activity demand urgent corrective action on
an international scale"10
The Green Belt tree-planting environmental
movement headed by Wangari Maathi is labeled
"subversive" by the Kenya government.11
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"World Lenders Facing Pressure From Ecologists —
Activists Urge Banks to Halt Harmful Projects."12
"Ivory Trade Is Banned To Save the Elephant"13
"U.S. Court Says Industry Polluters Should Pay
Full Environmental Cost"34
A mothers' group in East Los Angeles stops a
planned above-ground oil pipeline that would go
through their neighborhoods, "bypassing affluent
white coastal communities."35
"Save the Rain Forests, Eat Ice Cream, Meet Ben" - 40% of profits from Ben & Jerry's Rainforest
Crunch ice cream will go to rainforest groups.16
"The greening of the church"17
"Does Your Cup of Coffee Cause Forest Fires?"18
"Traditional definitions of national security are
shaken by global environmental threats."19
Women's group meets at U.N. to plan for "full
participation by women in environmental policy at
all levels."20
East German authorities at a huge chemical complex
say "the region was poisoned willfully in a scheme
to raise money for the state."
Government
officials refused funds to plant managers for
antipollution technology, then skimmed off
millions of dollars worth of fines when the plants
dumped chemicals into nearby rivers.21
"University's Choice: Stars or Squirrels."
Astronomers are pitted against biologists over
plans for a mountain-top observatory that would
endanger a dwindling subspecies of squirrel.22
In these examples, as contending players in the unspecified
relation of science-utilizers and recipients to science as
the fount of truth, we have growers

(industry)

resisting

environmentalists and "arbitrary" science; mothers against
oil companies which rely on scientific technologies;
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astronomers against biologists.

Acting in the field

established by scientific knowledge, but not included in the
conceptual framework for it, we have a democratic government
trying to assess industry for environmental costs; a
communist government forcing industry both to pollute and to
pay for polluting.
the nation state,
the elephant;

Then,

in regard to the free market and

international trade is restricted to save

international action to save the environment

is said to be urgent;

international lenders are called upon

to help preserve ecological balance; global environmental
threat makes traditional definitions of national security
inadequate.

Additionally, women are a particular class of

environmental advocate; savvy businesses and progressive
churches go "green"; seemingly inconsequential individual
actions on coffee break have far-reaching, possibly
disastrous, consequences.

(Literary theorists and cultural

analysts can observe an environmental drama being written in
these reports.)
At issue here are the reliability and useful —
is to say, timely —

predictive power of scientific

information about the environment.
"ownership"

—

which

if any —

Also at issue are the

of the natural environment and

thus of the corresponding rights and obligations concerning
it; the fact that national boundaries cannot contain
environmental problems or be manned in defense against them;
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the free market as a threat to ecological stability.

Conservative and Liberal on the Environment

Today's conservative position is that the private
sector,

rather than government,

problems.

should solve environmental

In support of this position,

conservatives can

refer back to either classical conservatism for the argument
that social ills cannot be solved by social engineering
according to abstract principles, or to classical liberalism
for the argument that the least government is the best
government.

But neither of these classical notions of

limited government —

whether limited by conservative

caution or by liberal insistence on individual liberty —
specify anything about "rights" of the natural world and
other species,

or about human "obligations" toward nature.

At the same time, each tradition assumes, but does not
specify, the rights of humans to dominate nature in the very
way that has led to environmental damage.
"Conservative" and "liberal" used as labels for
positions on environmental issues are only patches on a
conceptual framework that no longer works to help us see the
whole picture in a society shaped by science.
us where politicians,

They may tell

corporations, and environmental
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activists stand on the free market, but they don't explain
the changed relationship of the market to the social and
political structure when science begins to supplant certain
functions of the state.

These so-called liberal and

conservative stances on the environment are dependent on a
political-economic framework of thought.

But environmental

issues go beyond this framework.
Without factoring nature into the equation of rights
and obligations,

how will we determine courses of action to

maintain a sound environment?
is not enough.

Relying on the old equation

What do the liberty and equality of human

beings have to do with the mountain-dwelling red squirrels
of the newspaper report cited earlier?

What is the value

and meaning of 'private' property if actions thousands of
miles away and possibly many years previous in time
contaminate it —
Or,

if it is land, water,

if the private property is capital,

crops or livestock?
what value does it

have if it cannot be invested on the assumption that
economic growth is,

in principle, unlimited?

Can the environmental problem be solved outside of
government?

The conflict between growers and

environmentalists in California over pesticides could be
theoretically relegated to civil society,
supposedly separate from the state,

that sphere

if it were still

possible to believe in such a sphere, but state regulations
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and federal farm policy already apply to the farm industry
there.

Yet despite the involvement of the state, the key

relationship here is not citizen and state,

flanked by the

economy and driven in some way by human nature,

but is

utilizer and passive recipient of science/technology,
flanked by the economy and constrained by the ecosystem of
the natural world.

The terms conservative and liberal can

be grafted onto the relationship, but they suggest roles for
citizen and state that are no longer adequate to the
situation.

Comparing Frameworks

We can compare frameworks of understanding for the
California growers versus environmentalists over pesticides.
In the framework for thinking about science and society,
California growers are utilizers of science,
factor in the economy.

the

and a major

Environmentalists are a segment of

the recipients of science —

in this case of the chemical

science of pesticides and the rational science of crop
management —
recipient.

who are unwilling to be in the position of
Science sets standards for safe pesticide use,

ultimately derived from studies of how the natural world
works.

In the framework for understanding politics and

society,

both growers and science-recipients are citizens of

the state,

and individuals in civil society —

consumers in the economy.

producers and

But science is not in the

traditional political conceptual framework,

and its

standards are not relevant, nor is the condition of the
natural world a conceivable part of any negotiation of
rights or powers.

Correspondingly,

science conceptual framework,

the state is not in the

and scientific standards are

assumed to be, by those who accept them,
for taking action, and legitimacy enough.

rationale enough
Both science

trusters and science skeptics accept the knowledge claims of
science,

but science skeptics, while referring to science

for environmentalist arguments,

are not willing to separate

science from special interests, power alignments,

or

ideology.
Accepting the claims of science as the most valid
report on reality shifts players to another framework from
the familiar political one, whether they are critics of the
current uses of that science, or proponents of it.

The

claims that global changes in the environment require
international action; the reports that world lenders face
pressure from ecologists; the labeling of a tree-planting
movement as subversive; the banning of the ivory trade to
save the elephant —

all occur within a conceptual frame in

which science tells the truth about nature, and we are all
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recipients of this information, with the need or obligation
to respond to it, rather than primarily citizens responsible
to different nation states.
A U.S. court's judgment that polluters must pay
exemplifies the complexities of the cross-overs between
science,

politics,

and the economy.

formulated by the U.S.

In a challenge to rules

Department of the Interior as its

interpretation of environmental laws passed in Congress,

a

federal appeals court concluded that the restitution that
should be made by an industry which has polluted the
environment extends to restoring the environment to its pr e 
polluted condition, not just to paying the market value of
damaged natural resources.
spill,

for example,

In the case of the Valdez oil

Exxon would not just pay the market

value of seal pelts damaged by oil, but would also be
liable, perhaps,

for the deaths of sea birds with no

commercial value

(presumably having to somehow pay or

arrange for their replacement),Z3

The court said:

"From

the bald eagle to the blue whale and the snail darter,
national resources have values that are not fully captured
by the market system."24
Here is an environmental problem that starts off
positioned within the traditional political frame but then
is found to fall outside of it in respect to the economy.
In the political framework,

the state, through the

judiciary, partially regulates the economy by the assessment
of fines upon the violation of some standard.

There is a

considerable body of environmental law developing around
such issues, but the political framework has to be bent in
order to fit the issues.

Value is not just market value;

standards are given by science, not by political philosophy
or economic theory.

Restitution is, ultimately,

individuals or classes, but to Nature.
social action —
damage —

not made to

The legitimation for

in this case, the action of restitution for

comes not primarily from the established rights

and obligations between citizen and state, but from science
as the source of truth about our survivability and quality
of life.

The New Identity of Politics

Because politics is always with us, we can easily go
along thinking it's still the same politics it always has
been.

All the assumptions that accompanied the formation of

our idea of politics —
nature —

citizen and state, economy and human

are in our attempts to understand our political

situation, but they no longer advance our understanding.
Instead,
ahead.

these assumptions remain fixed, while reality moves
We find it necessary to develop a new framework of
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u n d e rstanding•
The conceptual shift from the traditional political
framework to a science-oriented framework does not remove
politics as an empirical reality.

Politics remains in

place, but it is taking a new identity,
relation to science.25

an identity in

Newly framed environmental issues

offer evidence that it is now scientific knowledge that
legitimates much of social action, rather than the concept
of a just relation between citizen and state.
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CHAPTER THREE
WORLDVIEW AND STYLE OF THOUGHT

The previous chapter discussed a "conceptual shift" to
reliance on scientific legitimation for social action.

The

difficulties of integrating scientific and political
concepts were briefly considered.

This chapter considers

how the arguments about science and society can be examined
using the concepts and methods of Mannheim's sociology of
knowledge.

A central concept is "style of thought."

The

concept does not stand alone, but is part of a theory of
knowledge as socially situated.

The categories of this

theory are discussed below.

Knowledge and Traditions

One of the sources of knowledge is tradition —

not the

traditional practices that are quaintly old-fashioned,

but

the ways of living, economically and socially based, that
are reproduced with each generation and that influence
outlook on life.

Not just what is known, but what is

considered worth knowing,

what counts as knowledge,

to go about becoming knowledgeable —
information,

and how

these are passed on as

practices and attitudes from one generation to

the next, or from old hands to newcomers.1

It is not just

aristocracy or gentry who have such traditions; all social
groups have them,

and the groups need not be descended

through family relationships.

Even when the original social

and economic conditions that strongly supported a way of
life are weakened by change, the older complex of
information, practices and attitudes can be maintained in
modified form.
underground,

Certain beliefs may have to be held

or in determined resistance to prevailing

currents of opinion and political realities, but they do not
disappear.

Democratic convictions are held by subjects of

dictatorships; racist convictions are held by citizens of
equality-affirming democracies; creationist convictions are
held by people in a scientific world who reject the
evolutionary account of life.

All these convictions are

tied into their respective traditions of outlook on life,
and people can be associated with these traditions by birth
or by choice.2

77

Knowledge and Conditions

Another major influence on knowledge is existing
conditions.

It may not be only a tradition of belief in

democracy that supports democratic convictions in a country
become a dictatorship,

but the oppressive conditions

themselves that fuel the desire for democracy.

Or, on the

side of acceptance of the status quo rather than resistance
to it, prosperity and relative class mobility could make
believers in capitalism out of American workers when their
European counterparts were turning in large numbers to
socialism.

Tradition and conditions interact,

so that the

same scientific worldview which is adopted by most Americans
because it is the contemporary one,

is exactly what requires

determined resistance by Americans who have adopted or
inherited the tradition of religious fundamentalism.
deterioration occurs in the natural environment,

As

these

changed environmental conditions reactivate traditions of a
desire for emotional harmony with Nature on the one hand,
while giving rise to rationalist systems of environmental
management based on new technologies on the other.
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Tradition,

Conditions,

and Styles of Thought

These twin influences on knowledge and thought -tradition and conditions —

combine in styles of thought,

in

analytical and persuasive arguments that each have their own
noticeable style because of the concepts they refer to, the
language they use, and the outlook on life that they
display.

Styles of thought are the intellectual products of

particular social groups, which can be economic classes, or
generations,

or adherents to a religion,

or any other group

that shares a combination of traditions and conditions which
acquire vital importance because of the course of events.
The concept of such styles of thought was developed by
Karl Mannheim,

a founder of the sociology of knowledge —

the study of the connections between groups of people and
ideas, between societal purpose and intellectual endeavor.
Mannheim analyzed 19th-century conservative thought as a
response in opposition to the French Revolution and liberal
Enlightenment thought.

Conservative thought had its social

base in a landed class threatened by the ideas of the
revolution.

Today,

accelerated change in the environment is

an event that can push various views on the relationship
between humans and Nature to opposing poles.

It can bring

out an 'environmental' style of thought supported by a
social group that is positioned to take the change as a
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threat.

Inevitably,

such a style of thought must take a

position on science.

Science as a Center of Contention for Styles of Thought

The question of how science should 'be' in society is
the issue at the center of many arguments that are intended
to affect social action, to make something happen or not
happen which requires concerted effort and commitment by
private groups,
industry,

or government agencies,

or by all sectors.

technology,

or business and

The environment, medical

energy use, consumer goods,

education —

all

involve the uses of science and the making of choices guided
by the scientific attitude.

There is a spectrum of

differing arguments concerning science in society,
mentioned in the Introduction,

and as

at one extreme are those who

trust science to take a direction that benefits people and
planet, while at the other are those who are skeptical of
its uses and wary of its direction.
The focus on science is particularly evident in the
environmental debate, and it is just in this area of
environmental position-taking that the traditional political
categories of right and left are proving most difficult to
apply.3

The conservative/liberal polarity applies to

stances taken on the market,

and thus to the economics of

the environment, but not to deeper environmental issues.

We

are at a point where the left-right categorization of public
debate on issues is often no longer adequate or,
cases applicable at all.

in some

It may be that we have a science-

truster/science-skeptic spectrum developing, because the
concept-organizing center of much debate is no longer a
notion of a just society based on contractual agreements and
philosophical ethics, but is instead the notion of a society
able to determine its best course through the application of
science to all its problems.

The arguments which legitimize

action are no longer only about citizen and state, but are
also about individual and science, and planet and science.
It's not that we don't argue anymore about the just
distribution of social good, but that the terms under which
and by which we argue about those goals have changed.

The

identity of our politics is changing.

Science as Worldview

To some extent,

in a society where science is a

dominant form of thought, we all think scientifically.
Thus, even critics of science will use scientific reasoning
and scientific findings to support their positions.4

Science as a dominant form of thought is the intellectual
part of a scientific w o r ldview.

Worldview is knowledge and

attitudes that are organized into an outlook that serves as
an orienting device in many different situations for the
individual.

That outlook, however,

not unique to the individual.
socialization —

is collectively formed,

It is acquired through

partly through formal education,

through informally received attitudes.
worldview,

With a scientific

we view things through scientific eyes, through

scientific assumptions and habits of thought.
scientific,
time —

partly

however,

We are

in comparison to a pre-scientific

in a very general way,

scientifically trained.

not as if we were

Along with this intellectual

predisposition, we have values that are related to science
(putting a positive value on change and progress,

for

ex a m p l e ) .
The scientific worldview is more general than the
appearance of science as a central issue for opposed
arguments.

Historically,

it began to take shape earlier,

the 17th century or in the Renaissance.5

It has become a

view that the world is something to be measured,
acted upon, and mastered.

understood,

The scientific worldview has not

always had science itself as the organizing center of
argument and public debate.
Introduction,

in

As mentioned in the

in 19th-century Germany,

according to
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Mannheim, politics was the center of contention for styles
of argument/thought, because of the preceding polarizing
event of the French Revolution.

Science as a Form of Thought

Science is also a form of thought —
earlier,

a dominant form of knowledge.

as described
"Knowledge" and

"thought" are used interchangeably here, with "thought"
referring,

not just to the process of thinking,

but to the

intellectual product of a historical time and place.6
Science is a form of thought or knowledge because it
differs from pre-scientific thought in form as well as in
content.

It is not just guantity of facts which

distinguishes science,
calculation.

but an

approach of objectivity

and

There are other

examples of differences

in

form which may make this distinction clearer.

There is a

difference in form between computer information and book
information —

not only is content within a given physical

space increased, but access is changed.

The variety of

routes of access is much greater by computer,

because the

information is in a different form from the printed form.
Computer information is digital and electronically
accessible;

it is compact;

it is highly manipulable.

These
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things distinguish it from the printed book form.

This

difference in form engenders a difference in attitude toward
information,

toward the content of the form —

becomes something to manipulate,
a new way.

fragment,

content

and integrate in

In a somewhat more abstract way,

science is a

form in which knowledge and information can be put and
accessed in a different way from non-science.
another example,

To give

life experience is a form of knowledge.

Our awareness of this form of knowledge,

even if we don't

have a name for it, often gives us the feeling that it's not
what you learn in books that's important in life.

In this

way, personal or experiential knowledge seems different in
both content and form from book knowledge.

Classifying Knowledge

How do all these things fit together —
thought,

center of contention, worldview,

or thought?

style of

form of knowledge

The scientific worldview is a historical

phenomenon that we can trace back only a few centuries, but
it is often observed that scientific reasoning,

or science

as a form of t h o u g h t , had its beginnings in ancient Greece,
although for many reasons,

it did not develop there into the

inductive method that is so important to modern science.7
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Science as a dominant form of knowledge is a recent
development on a historical scale,
organizing center for arguments

and science as an

(or styles of thought)

is a

current event.
Some of these terms for speaking about knowledge and
thought are also categories at different levels of
generality,
Kingdom

like Linnaean categories for living things:

(animal or vegetable,

than Phylum

for instance)

is more general

(e.g., the chordates among animals)

down through a series of classifications.
dogs are both in the chordate Phylum and,
both are in the Class of mammals.
general classification,

Thus, humans and
less generally,

However,

in the next less

dogs are in the Order of carnivores,

and humans are in the Order of primates.
of primates,

and so on

Within the Order

humans belong to the hominid Family, while

chimpanzees and gorillas, which are also primates, do not
belong to this Family.

Each category is followed by a

subgroup that is more specialized.
In a similar way, worldview is more general than
whatever is the center of contention in styles of thought;
that center is more general than the specific styles of
argument.

A scientific worldview can have politics as a

center of contention,

because the center organizes

intellectual activity at a different and more specific level
than worldview.

Politics can have either conservative or
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liberal styles of thought, because these arguments are
varieties of political thought —

sub-versions.

Different

major worldviews exist concurrently, although one may
dominate the others.8

This classification of thought and

knowledge is not exactly like Linnaean categories, however,
for several reasons.

One important reason is that the

contents of Linnaean categories make an array of
evolutionary stages, but worldview and thought style do not
have higher or lower evolutionary forms.9
Form of thought

(e.g., scientific or religious)

is a

characteristic that, with some

qualifications,

has the

possibility of running through

the levels of generality.

can be part of worldview or of

style of thought.

worldview and thought style were horizontal lines,

If
form of

thought would be a vertical line that weaves between them.
These categories are not necessitated by some
unchangeable characteristics of knowledge; they are simply
aids to trace a history and sociology of intellectual
concerns.

What is important is not so much the terms as

that there is more than one dimension of classification.
Thought or knowledge not only covers an area which can be
defined either broadly or narrowly,

it also has different

forms and, thirdly, different historical durations.

It

Worldview - The Broad Term

"Worldview"
W e l t anschauung.

is a translation of the German word
This term was given its theoretical

development by Wilhelm Dilthey,
and historian of ideas.

the 19th-century philosopher

His concept of worldview was more

philosophical than the concept that has evolved with use of
the term by others.

"Worldview" is now used more

sociologically than philosophically.

For Dilthey,

a

worldview "undertakes to resolve the enigma of life."10

it

is not the product of thinking per se, but emerges from life
experience in general,

from the totality of our

psychological existence
Erlebnisl .11
conduct.

(called "lived experience" —

From it derive ideals and principles of

A worldview is a systematic relationship of views

rather than a single view.
Worldviews are ephemeral in the individual,
with life stages,

changing

time, place and experience, but they fall

into a few major cultural formations within any historical
period.

While worldviews are historically conditioned,

they

have basic types, all of which can emerge within the
different "cultural systems," identified by Dilthey as
poetry or literature,

religion, and philosophy.

took the concept of worldview from Dilthey,

Mannheim

and proposed

that it appears in "styles of thought," which present ideas
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at a theoretical level, but not necessarily as philosophy.
Neither Dilthey nor Mannheim spoke of a scientific
worldview.12

Science,

for them, was the pursuit and

accumulation of objective knowledge,

separate from knowledge

with psychological and metaphysical elements,

as found in

the worldview.
Dilthey's theory of worldviews is complex,
philosophy,
history.

psychology,

combining

hermeneutics and attention to

Like Kant, he thought that there are categories of

mind behind which you cannot go for their causes.

The

"attitudes" underlying worldviews are such mental
categories.

These are not attitudes of the kind polled in

opinion surveys,

but fundamental responses of mind to

external reality, to the question of the meaning of life,
and to one's own course of life.
considerable depth.

Thus worldview has

A knowledge and attitudes survey would

only touch the surface of the total complex of the worldview
held by any of the survey's respondents,

or alternatively,

of the historical worldview which the survey findings,
average,

represent.13

on

There therefore must be other ways

to get at worldview than to ask people what they think;
survey methods are not sufficient for analysis.
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Style of Thought - The Narrower Term

Using the category of style of thought is one of
several ways to take the broad category of worldview and
break it down.

Dilthey studied worldview itself,

and

classified worldviews into philosophical types and
historical examples.

Mannheim investigated how worldviews

act in society.

Society develops through both cooperation

and competition,

and since knowledge is a social effort,

too develops both cooperatively and competitively.

When a

significant and change-making event occurs in society
political revolution,

it

(a

for example), groups with contending

views each develop their arguments about how to deal with
it.

The event p o l arizes. and becomes the "impetus" to a

sharp differentiation of styles of argument,

as opposed

groups draw on different worldviews and refer to different
material experiences in order to respond to new
circumstances.

This happens when the event occurs in what

Mannheim called a matrix of "oriented change" —
change affecting all of society —

wholesale

political and economic

restructuring.
A thought style integrates some of the fundamental
attitudes of its adherents

(derived from a shared worldview)

with a developing stance on events that are currently of
pressing importance for them.

It articulates elements of

the worldview and particulars of the group's material
experience in ways that have not been necessary before, but
are vital now because the group feels its material and
philosophical position threatened or denigrated,
its own possibilities of power.

or feels

Mannheim's analysis was

that styles of thought develop oppositionally, the response,
roughly speaking,
side,

of the "outs" to the "ins."

On their

the "ins" sharpen their arguments in turn.

thought, Mannheim said,

Styles of

"crystallize" around a central issue

of debate which has become important because of the
polarizing event.14
A contested sphere of social activity

(center of

contention) becomes the center around which concepts are
organized as opposing arguments develop.
arguments

The opposed

(thought styles) draw on more general worldviews,

and each comprises distinguishable but related lines of
thought.

The summaries below compare the levels of thought

organized around politics and those organized around
science.
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WORLDVIEW
LEVEL

TRADITIONALIST

CENTER OF
CONTENTION

PROGRESS-ORIENTED
POLITICS

THOUGHT
STYLE
LEVEL

Conservative

Liberal

SUB
VERSIONS

Burkean;
Roman t i c ;
Feudalistic;
etc.

Bourgeoisrevolutionary ;
Laissez-faire;
Egalitarian; etc.

WORLDVIEW
LEVEL

HOLISTIC

REDUCTIONIST

CENTER OF
CONTENTION

SCIENCE

IE
SOCIETY

THOUGHT
STYLE
LEVEL

Environmental

Technoprocrressive

SUB
VERSIONS

Conservationist;
Green; Back-toNature; etc.

no common
descriptive
terms yet —
examples in
bioengineering,
resource management
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Mannheim took the French Revolution to be the
polarizing event that was the impetus for social and
intellectual change.

Intellectually,

there was a change in

the center for European styles of thought.
Revolution that center became politics.
says,

it might have been religion,

this comparison.)

With the French

(Earlier, Mannheim

but he does not expand on

With politics as a center of thought,

conservative and liberal arguments each expressed some
aspects of the differing worldviews of opposed social
groups.
Different arguments were not only different in content,
but had an identifiable style, analogous to styles in art
that are identified by its different motifs —
thematic or design elements.

recurring

The thought style also had

recurring themes and conventionalized ways of presenting
them.

Beyond this,

the thought style also had an intention,

comparable to the motivation behind an art style that was
postulated by the art historian, Alois Riegl.

This concept

of Riegl's influenced Mannheim's construction of the concept
of style of thought.15

That arguments had a style, that

they didn't just have innumerable elements that didn't come
together,

rests on the fact that they articulate a

particular set of circumstances, a bounded social
experience,

and a social intention,

available intellectual materials.

and do so with certain
Not only were the
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political purposes of conservatives and liberals different,
their outlook on life was also different,

and their

intellectual styles and the types of knowledge they referred
to were different.
Different arguments about what society should do are
rooted in different social and material conditions,
different experiences of different groups.

in the

"The principal

thesis of the sociology of knowledge," Mannheim said,

"is

that there are modes of thought which cannot be adequately
understood so long as their social origins are obscured."16
For a style of thought to develop fully,
effective group behind it.

it must have an

Groups can be classes —

bourgeoisie vs old line aristocrats; proletariat vs
bourgeoisie —

as in Marxist theory; or socioeconomic

"lifestyle" classes; or as pointed out by Mannheim,

they can

be in other categories which were then often overlooked,
such as generations.

The group will have a "basic

intention," for example,
life,

to hold on to a traditional way of

or to initiate change in the name of progress.

Their

arguments will take up a "key problem"; this is not a
particular social or political goal, but an epistemological
problem,

a question of what the valid grounds of knowledge

are.
Mannheim does not provide a systematic identification
of the elements of empirical reference and conceptual

93

analysis of a style of thought as I have given them here.
This presentation is my own synopsis, derived from his
"Conservative Thought" essay.

Summarizing

(and using

Mannheim's own terms in quotes), what is needed for the
appearance and development of "styles of thought"
"catalyzing"

(polarizing)

event,

is a

in a context of "oriented

change," and groups at either end of the spectrum of
responses to that event who can effectively argue their
case.

Their arguments, or styles of thought,

characterized according to a polarity,
conservative/liberal.

analyzed as "basic intention"

(social)

These can be
and "key problem"

The arguments will "crystallize" around

a center of contention —
polariziing event

e.g.,

Styles of thought have both a social

context and an epistemological content.

(epistemological).

can be

an issue central to the

(or it can be said that the event will be

construed in terms of that issue.

Thus, the French

Revolution and Enlightenment thought were debated by the two
sides as matters of politics and government,

as the issue of

whether the norm should be a just society realizing natural
equality,

or a stable society incorporating traditional or

natural aristocracies.

All of these social and conceptual

elements must be identified in an analysis of a thought
style.

The Center of Contention

The conceptual tools that Mannheim used to study 19thcentury thought can help explain the late 2 0th-century's
complex relations of science,

ideology and power.

I am

applying the same methodology to contemporary environmental
thought that Mannheim applied
century political theory.
called "style of thought"

(retrospectively)

What I have called "argument" he
(arguments made to convince as

part of a debate about societal g o a l s ) .

Politics, Mannheim

said, became the "crystallizing agency" for
styles of thought —
crystallized —
Subsequently,

to 19th-

(European)

the center around which differences

as a result of the French Revolution.
Enlightenment thought and Conservative thought

contended for the vision of social good that would guide
organized action by people living in the nation state and
the capitalist economy.

What Mannheim called the

"crystallizing " center or agency,
organizing center,

I call the concept-

or center of contention.

In comparison,

I am saying that the center of contention for styles of
thought has now shifted from politics to science.
This central issue of debate organizes the arguments,
but it is not always directly addressed by them.
always an explicit center of contention.
analysis,

It is not

In Mannheim's

politics was a conceptual center which acted as a

focus for anti-Enlightenment thought,

in which such diverses

strains as Romanticism and Pietism contributed to the
development of what became the conservative argument.
Romanticism,
conservatism,

a major influence inthe early stages of
did not make a direct political argument, but

in its emphasis on unique individuals and the qualities of
place,

it implied a citizen and community very different

from those posited by universalistic Enlightenment thought.
Romanticism's celebration of the emotions and qualities
ignored by rationalism provided material for the political
argument against the Enlightenment.
celebrations of Nature,

Similarly,

there are

critiques of specific technologies,

and fact-centered arguments which do not directly address
the role of science in society,

but which nonetheless imply

different uses of science and a different direction for it
than are now the outcome of a conventional view which posits
a science autonomous and separate from social values.
With politics as a center for arguments,
developed "conservative" and "progressive"
styles of thought —

there

(or "liberal")

that is, specific styles of argument at

each end of the politically-focused spectrum.

With science

as an organizing center for argument, we now get,
of better terms,
styles.

for lack

"science truster" and "science skeptic"

In the environmental movement,

there is a

particular version of the science-skeptic style.
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Connecting Stvle of Thought to Worldview

The social context and the epistemological content of
the thought style, combined and integrated,

represented

something theoretically similar to Dilthey's worldview.
Mannheim did not use Dilthey's typology of worldviews,

which

was psychophilosophical, but made a sociological assessment
of worldviews.

Styles of thought were analyzed by Mannheim

as very particular to a time and place,
investigation to "one period,
group"17 —

and he limited his

one country,

one social

the first half of the 19th century; Germany;

declining nobility

(represented by four or five major

theorists who spoke for them,

if they were not of t h e m ) .

His starting point was to analyze the conservative style of
thought,
context.

and from that beginning,

he went back to the social

He did not start with the social group and try to

find out how they thought; he started with the thought style
and tried to link it with its social origins using the
theoretical tool

(from Dilthey)

of worldview rooted in life

experience.
Similarly,

I am starting with a thought style that I am

provisionally calling environmental,

limiting my

investigation to the United States in the 1960s and 70s, and
taking a few theorists

(or their contemporary replacement,

committed popularizers)
the analysis,

for analysis.

At the beginning of

it will not necessarily be clear who the

"effective group" are, other than that they can be called
"environmentalists."

The analysis of the thought style will

help to identify the group, by identifying what interests
the argument represents.

This application of Mannheim's

methodology is a test of its usefulness both for identifying
major societal concerns and for identifying the knowledge
locations in society from which contending arguments
originate.

The question of who is represented by these

arguments,

and why certain groups support them,

historical

investigation.

requires a

Mannheim only touched on such an

investigation in "Conservative Thought" and I only touch on
it in the investigation of environmental thought.
A few studies suggest that environmentalists

(that is,

those members of the public who support or profess
environmentalism)
professionals.18

are white, middle class, service-sector
These studies are attitude surveys,

and

as such they are methodologically suited to singling out
groups characterized by a set of opinions, and to locating
those groups socioeconomically.

Like the survey approach,

the sociology of knowledge approach links attitudes and
social groups, but in Mannheim,

its method and categories

are directed toward finding the meaning and history that
attitudes have for the people that hold them,

rather than
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toward making a detailed specification of their social
position.

Interpretation
The problem of interpreting what other people say, or
what they present or accept as knowledge,
concern in the social sciences.

has always been of

This concern is related to

the historical fact that there are two major schools of
thought in the social sciences on how to approach the object
being studied, whatever it may be.
One is positivist —

"positive” knowledge is that,

only that, which can be objectively verified.

and

The other

finds positivism inadequate for or inappropriate to
investigation of social life.

The non-positivist position

can be taken from several standpoints,
interpretive one.

among which is an

As was the case with "scientific

attitude" in Chapter One,

"positivism" has many definitions.

For the purposes of discussing the social sciences,
positivism can be considered to assume that the object being
studied —

whether it is attitudes or the percentage of

population living in urban as compared to rural areas —

is

something that exists like the objects of the natural world.
That is, the object has an existence or a reality of its own

that is not altered by our experience of it.

The physical

object of the natural world, even though it is mediated
through our physical senses in order for us to perceive it,
exists without that mediation taking place.
in guestion need not be a physical object;
object of study,
reached.

a goal of investigation,

But the object
it can be an

an objective to be

Even if the object is attitudes,

it is assumed to

exist in this same manner, and what we must do to gain
knowledge of it is to observe it, and as in the natural
sciences,

to measure it in some way so that it may be

included in calculations which may eventually accumulate and
be theoretically ordered to reveal regularities and behavior
according to general laws.

Then knowledge of the object

will be "positive" knowledge,

and predictions and tests of

the object's behavior will be possible.

Positivism takes

the method of the natural sciences to be to be the only
route to valid knowledge; any other methods are metaphysics,
resulting in unprovable assertions.

Thus the social

sciences must use the same methods as the natural sciences
to achieve valid knowledge.
There are various standpoints from which to criticize
this positivist view, most of them philosophical.

Some

reject positivism entirely, others resist its tendency to
demand its method of all inquiries, but accept its
usefulness for certain purposes.

From within the social
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sciences, the approach that does not accept postivist
strictures can be called an interpretive one.

That is,

it

takes the objects of social science inquiry to be in some
way unlike objects of the natural world, because they cannot
simply be observed and recorded in mathematical
universally valid)

(thereby

terms, but must be interpreted by rules

that are open to argument,

even in the initial stages.

Depending on what version of the interpretive approach
is being used,

this requirement for interpretation may be

posited either because all knowledge is taken to be a
process of interpreting the world,

rather than observing it,

or because things of the social world all occur through
human mental effort,
constructions,

and are thus already interpretive

are already something that has a human

intention in it that must be read rather than recorded.
Each act is already part of a story being told? that story
is the actor's interpretation of the world and of the
actor's self.

The social act, or interaction, has something

beneath its surface appearance that can only be found by an
interpretation that recapitulates the interpretive act that
was part of its making.
recorded,

If just the surface appearance is

that deeper part is missed.

The positivist approach in the social sciences uses
natural-science-like techniques of investigation

(along the

lines of field observation in the biological sciences rather

101

than along the lines of experiment in chemistry and
p h y sics).
science:

Surveys are an example of positivist social

a bounded population is selected for study so that

it can be clearly stated what the object being studied is
and what it is not; statistical theory guides the selection
of representative samples; the questions that elicit
response from the people studied are designed to have
simple,

short answers whose meanings can be coded within a

manageable number of categories; answers are coded so that
they can be quantified,

and thus measured mathematically,

as

is necessary for unequivocal statements in the natural
sciences.
Mannheim's style-of-thought analysis is an example of
the interpretive approach, and ultimately derives from
Dilthey's philosophy of the human sciences
(Geisteswissenschaften) , which he asserted were necessarily
different from the natural sciences.

Dilthey's theory of

worldviews gives a descriptioon of the interpretive
construction we all put on the world,

and through which we

both experience the world and act on it.

Mannheim's thought

styles are partial versions of worldview,

specific and

consciously constructed arguments meant to persuade to a
course of action and to justify an interpretation of life
and society.
These different methods —

positivist and
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interpretive —

are constructed around different theories of

investigation and serve different investigative purposes.
Both recognize,

for instance,

that attitudes have a social

context, but they study the relationship between context and
any individual component of it (such as attitudes)
different ways.

in

Each method can offer description and

explanation of the "object" to be examined here —
environmental argument,

an

but they will do so out of different

traditions of research and with different methods.

Questions about Interpretation

Any interpretive method faces the difficulty that
anyone can ask why one interpretation should be favored over
another.

Aren't interpretations,

after all, different from

facts in that they are not something that can be agreed on
regardless of whether you want to accept them or not?
are two answers to this question,
the interpretive approach:
interpretations;

There

from the two versions of

1) facts are also

2) interpretations too have standards.

The answer that there are standards comes from
hermeneutics,

a theory and practice of interpretation that

goes back to the interpretation of the meaning of Biblical
texts, and the comparison of varying copies of these texts.

Hermeneutics moved from theology to philosophy in the 19th
century,

but the goal of interpretation continued to be

deeper meaning and authenticity.

It would be possible to

reach these goals because reader and writer of texts share,
according to the theory,
human nature)

a common subjectivity

(or common

that allows for one person to perceive the

meaning intended by another.

The hermeneutic method takes

meaning to be contextual; thus,

the part can not be

understood without relating it to the whole,

nor can the

whole be understood without reference to its component
parts.

So a sentence must be referred to the complete text,

the text to its author and social and historical context,
and all of these to the shared subjectivity of human beings.
But just as the meaning of a sentence may be clarified by
knowing the overall intention of the whole text, the
intention of the text may be clarified by key sentences.
This way,

interpretation follows a "hermeneutic circle" to

reach fuller understanding.

This philosophy of

interpretation was developed by Schleiermacher early in the
19th century.
Dilthey's contribution to hermeneutics was to refer
meaning to lived experience,

and to postulate worldviews in

which this experience was a crucial element.

Dilthey took

the non-positivist position that an interpretive method was
essential to the human sciences, which could not use the
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same methods of investigation as the natural sciences,
because human sciences must deal with the subjectivity of
their objects of investigation, while the natural sciences
need not do so.

Another way of saying this is that social

scientists are part of the phenomena they seek to explain,
while natural scientists investigate phenomena that are
external to them.19
In the 20th century, Heidegger saw that the reader or
interpreter brings so much of their own understanding to the
process of interpretation that they remake,
what they are interpreting.

to some extent,

Along the same lines, Gadamer

calls the particularities of one's own understanding the
"horizon" of the interpreter.20
Another answer to the question of the relative worth of
interpretations comes from phenomenology
indirect l ine).

(albeit in an

In this approach, even so-called facts are

interpretations, because we see objects through states of
consciousness.

We can't make a distinction between our

inner experience of an object, and its supposed external
existence.
Husserl,

The goal of phenomenology,

is to explore subjectivity:

live in in our consciousness
of inner experience itself
exploration,

as put forth by

the everyday world we

( Lebenswelt) ,

(Erlebnisse) .

and the workings

In this

the thinker should set aside or "bracket"

assumptions about the causes and consequences of these inner
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processes,

in order to get at their essence.

This

philosophy was brought into sociology by Schutz as a study
of how people comprehend,
everyday life-world
consciousness.

typify, and indeed "construct" the

( Lebenswelt)

as a process of

Rather than begin with social structure as

the determinant of social interactions,

Schutz suggested

that these interactions might be the outcome of our "natural
attitude" by which we take the everyday world for granted,
and make our way through it by "common sense."
In an offshoot from this, the American sociologist,
Garfinkel,

conceived of people as continually constructing a

version of the everyday world which they constantly check
with one another in order to reach some kind of agreement
about what is going on —

an agreement which will enable all

to carry on in a normal manner.

Other non-positivist

sociologies which share some of the predicates of
phenomenology and of Garfinkel's ethnomethodology, although
they are not directly derived from them, take all knowledge
to be socially constructed,

and facts thus to be colored by

the social interactions which accompanied the investigations
and findings by which the facts were arrived at.
even those of the natural sciences,

All facts,

are then results of a

process of interpretation at many levels —

socially common-

sensical,

peer-influenced,

linguistic,

paradigm-influenced

tradition-influenced,

(a paradigm being a body of accepted
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principles and practices within a science or discipline),
and influenced by the material equipment of investigation
(the tools at h a n d ) .
Whether the reference is to the historical and
philosophical concerns of Dilthey, to the hermeneutic circle
from Schleiermacher, the phenomenology of Husserl and
Heidegger,

ethnomethodology, or contemporary hermeneutics,

all interpretive emphases counterpose different forms of
thinking or knowledge: practical reason is counterposed to
theoretical reason;
imposed artifice;
tions;

a natural attitude to the world to

lived experience to conceptual abstrac

intersubjective "cultural" understanding to "scien

tific" methodological understanding; everyday and commonsense knowledge to institutionalized knowledge.

The

problems of interpretation are not entirely resolved by
these theories and methods, but neither are the problems of
positivism resolved by theirs.
problem of induction

These problems include the

(whether observation can be a reliable

basis for knowledge; whether observations can be stated with
words that map exactly to observations; whether we can
predict from finite observations to infinite cases)
denial of the influence of human subjectivity.
interpretive approach,

and the

The

and the positivist one, are

expressions of different worldviews,
antinomical to each other —

and they remain

equally valid on their own

terms but irreconcilable from either side.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

1.
Pierre Bourdieu's work deals with such transmission in
detail.
See Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1977) and Distinction
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984) .
2.
In addition, traditions are not necessarily fixed in
what has gone on before.
The Invention of T r a d i t i o n . Eric
Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1983) gives several examples from British
history at home and in colonial lands of how present
interests shape the meaning and even invent the content of
the past.
3.
The political, economic and social issues raised by
environmental problems can appear to be made for solutions
from the right, or the left, or both
—
whether or not it
is considered possible to characterize the environmental
movement as at either end of the spectrum.
More is said
about this in later chapters.
4.
Or it can be said that the criticism of science is
itself science.
Blumenberg (op. cit., Ch.l, note 23) says
this, and comments: "That the difficulties we have, and will
increasingly have, with science are always integrated into
it as scientific difficulties is only one aspect of the
outlook on the subject of 'theoretical curiosity': the
inevitability of a failure to find an Archimedian point over
against the reality of science... Science integrates into
itself even the responsibility for the consequences of its
consequences, by itself giving the alarm." (pp.229-30)
5.
See Marie Boas, The Scientific Renaissance. 1450-1630
(New York: Harper and Row, 1962).
For Renaissance and
varied beginnings up to the 17th century, see Hugh F.
Kearney, ed., Origins of the Scientific Revolution (London:
Longmans, Green & Co., 1964)
Several such general histories
of science were published in the 1950s and 60s, and remain
standards; recent histories of science are more specialized:
by time period, or discovery, or philosophical or
sociological issues.
6.
The use of the term "form of thought" is for
convenience, to distinguish form from content? it is not
especially related to Mannheim's analysis.
Scheler
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distinguished qualitatively different "forms of thought"
according to their purposes or motivations.
The motivation
of practical control characterizes science.
See "The Forms
of Knowledge and Culture" in Philosophical Perspectives by
Max Scheler (Boston: Beacon Press, n.d. [1958]).
7.
Classical statements of the importance of induction are
made by Francis Bacon in his Novum Oraanum (1620), by J.S.
Mill in his System of Logic (1843), and by William Whewell
in The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (1840, 1847).
For a general discussion of induction and its problems, see
Stewart Richards, Philosophy and Sociology of Science: An
Introduction (New York: Schocken, 1984).
8.
"Thought style" is a direct translation of the original
German for style of thought — "Denkstil."
It was
introduced by Mannheim, and soon after, used by Ludwik Fleck
in Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1979), a 1930s precursor to
Kuhn's paradigm version of scientific development; see p.xv,
p . 168.
9.
Dilthey, the theorist of worldviews, did not rank them
and did not take any one to be superior to or more
comprehensive than another.
One of his comments on this
subject:
"As the botanist classifies plants and
investigates the laws of their growth, so must the
analyst of philosophy hunt for the types of
Weltanschauung [worldview] and recognize the
regularity in their formation.
Such a comparative
procedure raises the human mind above the
conviction, rooted in its finitude, that in one of
these Weltanschauungen it has grapsed the truth
itself."
Wilhelm Dilthey, The Essence of
P hilosophy. Stephen A. Emery and William T.
Emery, trans.
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of
North Carolina Press, 1969), p.41.
However, Dilthey did compare the competition between
worldviews to the struggle among living things for
"existence and room," (p.40) and said that "Worldviews are
shaped by the same process that creates the variety of
organic creatures."
See Wilhelm Dilthev: Selected W r i t i n g s .
H.P. Rickman, ed.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1976), p . 139.
They are fit or not to last because they give
understanding and goals.
10.

Rickman,

ibid., p.25
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11.
Emery and Emery (op. cit., note 9, in their
introduction) trace this translation of "Erlebnis" to
Herbert A. Hodges.
It is widely used to indicate being
"consciously affected" by an event rather than just being
there to observe it, which is the kind of experience
indicated by the German word Erfahrunq.
12.
Though Dilthey did not speak of a scientific worldview
per se, one of his three major types of worldview,
"naturalism," has many of the characteristics of the
scientific attitude, and is taken to its extreme form in the
positivist practice of science.
13.
For example, the scientific literacy surveys referred
to in Chapter One, note 2.
14.
Karl Mannheim, "Conservative Thought," in From Karl
M a n n h e i m , ed. Kurt H. Wolff (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1971), p . 141? and Conservatism, ed. David Kettler,
Volker Meja, and Nico Stehr (London and New York: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1986), p . 51.
15.
See Karl Mannheim, "Conservative Thought," p . 136, and
"On the Interpretation of Weltanschauung," pp. 32-33, both
in From Karl M a n nheim.
16.
Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, n . d . , first published in English in 1936),
p. 2.
17.

Mannheim,

"Conservative Thought," p . 137.

18.
See notes to chapter sixteen for more about these
studies.
19.
Or so it seemed until the revolutions in physics at the
turn of the century, and the attendant proposition that
human intervention affects the object studied as if observer
and observed were one system.
According to the Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum mechanics introduced by Niels Bohr
in the 1920s, entities such as electrons, which have
characteristics of both waves and particles, display one
property or the other according to the nature of the
experiment, and thus can't be said to have a property apart
from our observation of it.
Reality can only be ascribed to
our observations, not to the physical world. (See Brush,
ref. below, pp . 399-407.)
To this has been added Werner Heisenberg's
indeterminacy principle, which states that the experimenter
cannot measure one parameter of a system without disturbing
the value of another parameter.
Statistical laws describe

110

quantum reality, and indetermininsm is a fundamental fact of
that reality.
"There is an uncertainty both of destiny and
identity," says Heisenberg, and "basically it is only our
knowledge of the [elementary] particles alone which we can
make the object of science." (Quoted in Richards, ref.
below, p p . 74-75.)
See Stephen G. Brush, The History of Modern Science
(Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1988) and Stewart
Richards, Philosophy and Sociology of Science: An
Introduction (New York: Schocken, 1984) for summaries of the
"new physics."
20.
This summary of hermeneutic tradition relies in part on
the definition of "hermeneutics" by Ellman Crasnow in &
Dictionary of Modern Critical T e r m s . Roger Fowler, ed.
(London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, rev. e d n . ,
1987).
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CHAPTER FOUR
MANNHEIM AND CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT

The previous chapter introduced Mannheim's interpretive
approach to socially positioned arguments through what he
called "style of thought."

Mannheim studied a style of

thought centered on politics;

I am examining the possibility

of a style of thought centered on science.

This chapter

reviews in detail what Mannheim did in his study of
conservative thought, but begins with a better known work
that also concerns the oppositional development of thought.

Knowledge and Interests

Mannheim's best-known work in the English-speaking
world is Ideology and U t o p i a .

This book introduces the

sociology of knowledge through a series of essays.

Mannheim

observes that we only ask about our knowledge in certain
specific situations,

when social and political change makes

existing verities uncertain.

To query the social origins of

knowledge is a modern phenomenon.

Before society itself was
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recognized as an object of inquiry,

questions about the

roots of knowledge did not include consideration of social
influences.

Knowledge was a topic for philosophy.

the social origins of ideas did become an issue,

But when

it was not

because there was an academic attempt to explain them.
Rather,

"The discovery of the social-situational roots of

thought at first... took the form of unmasking," that is, of
revealing the self interest in an opponent's political
philosophy.1

When religion framed thought,

crises among

the intelligentsia took the form of religious conflict; when
politics frames thought,

the state claims the right to

interpret the world, and "politics...
of the world as a weapon."2

use[s]

its conception

Arguments take increasingly

rationalistic and scientific forms as 'objective'

support is

sought for the justification of political programs.
As the translators of Ideology and U t o p i a . Wirth and
Shils, point out, the German original was published at a
time when only intellectuals were questioning the ideals of
Western civilization

(1929); the English edition appears

when such questions have become much more widespread

(1936).

Mannheim had his own comment on the prevalence of doubt:
"It is imperative in the present transitional
period to make use of the intellectual twilight
which dominates our epoch and in which all values
and points of view appear in their genuine
relativity.
We must realize once and for all that
the meanings which make up our world are simply an
historically determined and continously developing
structure in which man develops, and are in no
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sense absolute."3
It is not just previously accepted truths that are in doubt,
but the motives of those that propound them.

Wirth and

Shils observe that we know very well now that different
social groups have different interpretations of the facts of
social situations,

but that Mannheim goes beyond this

generality and tries to show specifically what the
connections are between knowledge and social existence.
Interest is one of these connections, but not the only one.
Ideology and Utopia makes the connections between
knowledge and society in two ways: with examples of
arguments in modern society,

and with theoretical

propositions about the epistemology and ontology of a
sociology of knowledge.

In this book, Mannheim continues to

speak about the centrality of politics,
earlier work on conservative thought.

as he did in his
But he also both

sharpens the distinctions between the thought of 'In' and
'Out' groups in society —
respectively —

ideology and utopian thought,

and emphasizes the common factor in both

groups as they advance their interests: the attempt to keep
their own blinders on while they "unmask" the thought of
their opponents.

Ideologists, with the intent of preserving

elements of the past that, as part of the status guo,
'maintain stability',

can't see the negatives of the

existing situation; Utopians, with the intent of changing
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the present,

can't see the positives of the existing

situation.

Ideology

In Ideology and U t o p i a . Mannheim has chosen the two
"slogan-like concepts" of the title as symbolic of the
intellectual crisis of the loss of a unitary worldview,

and

of the process of unmasking "situational motivations" behind
thought.4

The tension between stability and change in the

political and social order was the dominant concern of the
Europe in which Mannheim lived.

Born in Hungary in 1893, by

the time he wrote the essays in Ideology and Utopia he had
experienced the upheavals of the First World War, Hungarian
independence from Austrian rule, socialist-communist post
war government,

its collapse,

and the beginning of a

repressive regime which decided him to live in Germany;5 in
Germany he met the shifting political conditions of the
Weimar Republic.

Within four years of the publication of

Ideology and Utopia he would be a refugee from Nazi Germany,
living in exile in England.

These experiences must have

increased his sensitivity to the extremes of political
thought and action.
Despite the separate naming of the two groups in the

title,

it is clear that ideologists and Utopians both

practice what we now consider ideology.
meanings,

"Ideology" has many

quite a few of them derogatory,

but in its most

general sense it refers to the practice of unfailingly and
programmatically

(or unrelentingly and inflexibly)

casting

situations in a light that promotes the interests of those
telling the story, while obscuring or ignoring whatever
information would throw doubt on what is being said.
Mannheim is specific about how this is done on both the
"ideology" aru the "utopia" side.

The social and political

positions of ideologists and Utopians are opposed,

but the

two groups have the same motivated approach to understanding
the world and presenting their view of it.

They both fail

on some point of comprising the whole of the current
situation in their thought,

though they fail at opposite

ends of the pole.6
This polar opposition of groups who wish to maintain
the stability of the past as reflected in the status quo,
and those who want change and a better future,

is a central

concept in the study of conservative thought which preceded
Ideology and U t o p i a .

Mannheim sets out to show,

among other

things, that styles of thought develop oppositionally.

A

necessary precondition for that oppositional development is
a historical period of thoroughgoing change.

Though

Mannheim studies a period one hundred years back from his
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own time when he analyzes conservative thought, his
observations are highly relevant to his contemporary scene.

Stvle of Thought

Mannheim's study of conservative thought,
written in German,
English,

is now available in two versions in

an early one called "Conservative Thought" and a

more recent one called Conservatism.
vary,

originally

Because the versions

it is necessary to say something about them and to

explain why I chose to work from the one I did, the earlier
version.

This background is given in a note to this

chapter.
Mannheim begins "Conservative Thought" with a statement
about "the recently developed sociology of k n owledge": "at
the heart of [its] method," he says,
stvle of t h o u g h t ."7

"is the concept of a

The idea of 'style'

is taken from the

history of art; a style is a distinctive form that
originates at a certain time and place,

and has formal

tendencies which develop in a certain way.

Mannheim's

methodological goal is that it be "just as possible to
'place' an anonymous piece of writing as an anonymous work
of art. . . ."8
Mannheim contends that thought is neither ahistorical,
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as in some philosophies,
personalities,

nor derived from great

as some literary historians would have it.

Thinkers of a given period are representatives of different
styles of thought, which are characteristic of time and
place and comprise more than individual tendencies.

And

just as common elements will be handled differently in
different styles of art,

in styles of thought the same words

will have different meanings for different social groups
within a given period.
be the core of

Thus "the analysis of meanings will

[the] technique"9 for identifying styles of

thought and their connection to the social groups that bear
them.
Meanings cannot be analyzed separately from the social
groups who impart them to styles of thought.

Those meanings

in turn derive from a basic intention which underlies the
thought's development.10

The intention,

group's experience of life,

arising from the

is what it wants for itself in

society.

But the intention is not just narrow self

interest;

it is a view of life as a whole.

desired world

(my term, not Mannheim's).11

It calls up a
"Basic

intention" is used for Grundintention in the earlier
translation of Mannheim's work?12 the more recent
translation13 uses "fundamental design" in most cases,
except where the translators find a more psychological
meaning called for, when they use "fundamental
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inclination."14

They make this choice to emphasize that

the term "can refer to an objective pattern as well as a
subjective undertaking."15
For an example on which to carry out this method of
analysis, Mannheim chooses the development of conservative
thought in Germany in the first half of the 19th century.
In effect,

this means a study of conservatism in Prussia,

Germany's dominant territory at the time.
analytical task to "one period,
group."16

He limits his

one country,

and one social

This limitation gives the advantage that all

published and otherwise accessible utterances of the group
can be acquired.

Also, the French Revolution had produced a

"polarizing tendency" in thought throughout western Europe,
so that just after it, "styles of thought developed in very
clear-cut extremes."17

Any analysis of the thought of the

first half of the 19th century, Mannheim claims, must start
with the fact that the French Revolution catalyzed both
different types of political action and different styles of
thought.
lines —

There was a development of thought along party
liberal and conservative —

and at the same time,

the related development of Romanticism in literature,
arts and philosophy.

the

Reviewing the political and

philosophical differences between France, Germany and
England in the early 19th century, Mannheim asserts that
"Germany achieved for the ideology of conservatism what
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France did for the Enlightenment —

she exploited it to the

fullest extent of its logical conclusions."
provided the stimulus for conservatism,

England

but Germany did the

"'thinking through to the end'."18
Although he has chosen a "paradigmatic" example of the
development of a thought style in early 19th century German
conservative thought19 Mannheim notes:
"Our choice has the disadvantage, however, that it
suggests that political action is always the
centre around which styles of thought crystallize.
This is not necessarily the case.
Our contention
is only that in the first half of the nineteenth
century politics gradually became the centre
around which the differences in both the
fundamental attitudes and the Weltanschauunoen of
various social groups developed. "zo
In other periods, he comments,
might have been religion.

the "crystallizing agency"

A thought-style,

then, will have

a center around which it develops its form, or crystallizes.

The Reaction to Rationalism

Before analyzing conservative thought itself, Mannheim
discusses "Modern Rationalism and the Rise of Conservative
Opposition."

He starts with the historical context of

conservatism as an intellectual trend:

Conservatism was in

part a reaction to modern rationalism, which itself arose in
opposition to medieval Aristotelian scholasticism and to the
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Renaissance philosophy of nature.

Scholasticism emphasized

qualities and teleological aims; Renaissance philosophy
showed sympathy for magic and analogy.

Qualities were too

vague for rationalism,

ultimate aims unprovable, magic and

analogy unscientific.

In turning away from rationalism,

conservatism did not return to magic, but it favored
arguments stressing the uniqueness of qualities.
Mannheim summarizes the basic attitude of modern
rationalism as "not to know more about things than can be
expressed in a universally valid and demonstrable form, and
not to incorporate them into one's experience beyond that
point."

Its "clearest and most radical application" is in

the exact sciences.21

However, modern thought is not

exclusively the growth of rationalism;

forms of thought that

have been repudiated have not altogether disappeared.
"Our problem begins at this point and the study
of conservative thought takes on a practical
importance.
We want to know: what became of all
those vital relationships and attitudes, and their
corresponding modes of thought, which were
suppressed bv the rise of a consistent
rationalism?"22
Here Mannheim extends the history of ideas into the
sociology of knowledge.
observes,

The suppressed modes of thought, he

"did in fact persist," in social and intellectual

strata outside the process of rationalization and
capitalism:

among peasants; within petit-bourgeois groups

descended directly from earlier handcraftsmen; in the
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aristocratic tradition of the nobility;
sects.

in Pietist religious

Their pre-rationalist ways disappeared from public

and official life but not from intimate relationships.

Max

Weber, Mannheim notes, calls such a development the
"recession into privacy."23

In this way "germs" of a style

of thought and life remain dormant until they become
relevant to social struggle —

in the case of conservatism,

to counter-revolution.
Romanticism provided expression to pre-rationalist
thought.

Mannheim discusses its function as

"the historical opponent of the intellectual
tendencies of the Enlightenment, in other words,
against the philosophical exponents of bourgeois
capitalism.
It seized upon the submerged ways of
life and thought... [and lent] them new dignity
and value. . . .1,24
At the same time, however, because Romanticism was
conditioned by the thesis it opposed,
"rescue...

in its attempt to

repressed irrational forces...

the mere fact of

paying conscious attention to them meant an inevitable
rationalization."25

Mannheim repeatedly draws attention to

the dialectical development of thought,

and cautions that

opposed styles are not simple oppositions in which each
completely rejects all elements of the other.
different thought-styles,
complex,

In addition,

situated in the same historical

share certain common concerns.

"No antithesis escapes conditioning by the thesis
it sets out to oppose, and romanticism suffered
the same paradoxical fate; its structure was
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fundamentally conditioned by the attitudes and
methods of that very movement of Enlightenment in
opposition to which it originally developed.1,26

The Emergence of Conservatism

After reviewing this background of the contending
styles of rationalist and pre-rationalist thought, Mannheim
sketches how historical developments enabled conservatism to
emerge in opposition to rationalism and in some sympathy
with pre-rationalism.

Historical developments include

thought as well as events, and Mannheim constructs the
analytical type of "objective mental structure" to explain
how this is so.

The first historical question is, Is

conservatism a new product or does it occur in all times?
The answer is both: There is 'traditionalism' as
characterized by Max Weber —

clinging to old ways of life;

and there is 'modern conservatism', the product of
particular historical circumstance.

What political form

conservative action will take depends on concrete
circumstances, whereas traditionalism is a general
psychological attitude that takes relatively predictable
forms.
But the politics of conservatism includes elements of
the past as well as responses to the present,

and "the
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individual is consciously or unconsciously guided by a way
of thinking and acting which has its own history behind it,
before it comes into contact with the individual.”27
..."Political conservatism is therefore an
objective mental structure, as opposed to the
'subjectivity' of the isolated individual.
It is
not objective in the sense of being eternally and
universally valid...It is not an immanent
principle.... But as compared with the hie et nunc
experience of the particular individual it has a
certain very definite objectivity."28
Mannheim says this type of objectivity is an alternative to
the extremes of nominalism (abstract terms are only names;
e.g.,

conservatism —

or any other style of thought —

is

only a convenient label for the subjective content inside
individual heads)

and realism (abstract terms refer to

things that really exist,

are external to us, and are

independent of our conception of t h e m ) :
"[this type of objectivity is] a dynamic,
historical structural configuration; a concept
implying a type of objectivity which begins in
time, develops and declines through time, which is
closely bound up with the existence and fate of
concrete human groups, and is in fact their
product.
It is nevertheless a truly 'objective'
mental structure, because it is always 'there'
'before' the individual at any given moment, and
because, as compared with any simple range of
experience, it always maintains its own definite
form — its structure.1,29
The structure must not be regarded as static,

though;

it is

dynamic and historically conditioned.
"Within every dynamic historical structural
configuration, we can discern a distinctive 'basic
intention' (Grundintention) , which the individual
makes his own in the measure that his own
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experience becomes determined by the 'structural
configuration' as such."30
Conservatism is just such a configuration?

it is not just

political, but also "implies a... philosophical and
emotional complex...."31

And it takes a particular

historical form of traditionalism and develops it.

This

happens in response to the development of progressivism.
"Traditionalism can only become conservatism in
a society in which change occurs through the
medium of class conflict — in a class s o c i e t y .
This is the sociological background of modern
conservatism. "32
Certain conditions are necessary for the rise of
conservatism.
society,

First, there must be "oriented change" in

in which every event assumes a function affecting

the whole.

The modern era has this dynamic process of

oriented change; by comparison,
though dynamic centers,
specifically,

in the Middle Ages,

towns,

existed within a static world.

More

traditionalism becomes conservatism in a

society in which change occurs through the medium of class
conflict,

as shown by:

- social division into classes,
process,

some forwarding social

some retarding it

- differentiation of ideas along social lines;
antagonistic styles of thought
- social differentiation which takes on political and
economic character;

"the political factor must be

autonomous and must become the primary nucleus around
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which new groupings crystallize."33
A modern,

capitalist class society with politically active

and contending groups is the historical and social context
for conservatism.

Elements of Method

Mannheim now begins a discussion of the method for
studying conservative thought.

Both the final form and the

historical development of the thought-style should be
described.

To achieve this "morphology" of conservative

thought one must identify the "inarticulate group
experience" which provides the basic intention out of which
the style of thought grows.

One must also study

"articulated theoretical statements" to work out what kev
problem "gives this style of thought its theoretical unity,
determines its growth,
possible."34

and makes its interpretation

The discussion of method is interwoven with

examples from conservative thought.

In abbreviated form,

it

is as follows.35

The Basic Intention: Look for "authentic manifestations" in
order to "safeguard against arbitrary constructions."

(This

instruction raises problems of interpretation which have
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been discussed in Chapter Three.)

Such manifestations or

characteristics of the conservative way of life and thought
are:
- It prefers the concrete. the immediate,
details

the actual,

(by comparison, progressive thought prefers

overall structure and consciousness of the p o s s i b l e ) .
- It is especially concrete in its concept of property:
property is bound up with its owner in a nontransferable reciprocal relationship

(e.g.,

rights

of original owner do not transfer to next o w n e r ) .
- It has a qualitative idea of liberty, a feudal
compared to an egalitarian one,
is a matter "concerned

in which liberty

[with] the private and

subjective side of life only, while all external
social relations [are] subordinated to the
principle of order and discipline."36

The basic intention behind all of this,
sequences of thought manifest,
earlier way of life."37

that which these

is "a harking back to an

It is related to traditionalism,

but it is traditionalism become conscious.38

Mannheim

stresses that the point is not to add up all these
characteristics to equal 'conservatism', but to see the
basic intention,

follow its unfolding, and understand its

function in the social process.
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"To see things authentically as a conservative,
then, is to experience events in terms of an
attitude derived from social circumstances and
situations anchored in the past."39

The Kev Prob l e m :

for conservatism is opposition to the

natural-law mode of thought.

This offers a "theoretical

nucleus" around which a self-aware conservative mode of
thought could develop out of an earlier "more or less latent
impulse."

But the opposing types of thought are not "cut-

and-dried systems."

"Conservatism did not merely want to

think 'something different'

from its liberal opponents;

wanted to think it differently.. .. "40

In relation to the Key Problem, Mannheim characterizes
natural law and conservative thought as follows:41

Natural Law Thought:
contents
doctrines of:
state of nature
popular sovereignty
inalienable rights

method
— rationalism for problem
solving
— deduction from general
principles
— universal validity claimed
for individuals
— universal applicabilty of
historical and social laws
— atomism and mechanism
— static thinking (Reason
unaffected by History)

it

128

Conservative Thought:
contents
(attacks on
natural-law
doctrines)

method
— Reason replaced with History,
Life, Nation; i.e., Being above
Thinking
— irrationality of reality
counters deductive thought
— individuality counters
universal validity
— organism counters universally
applied laws
— "We" counters "I"
— dynamic reason counters
static reason

These characteristics are not a checklist for conservative
writers,

however.

No one conservative thinker attacks all

of natural-law thought.
"Thus it is impossible to juxtapose two static,
completely developed systems of thought.
All that
can be done is to demonstrate the two ways of
thinking, the two ways of tackling problems."42
In "Conservative Thought" Mannheim demonstrates one of these
ways of thinking with an analysis of two major authors and
comments on several others.
the German original,

A third author is analyzed in

and there are indications that he

planned a more extensive study.43

His treatment of the

content and context of conservative thought is reviewed in
the next chapter.
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MOTE:
The first available version of Mannheim's study of
conservatism, and the most accessible, is called
"Conservative Thought."
"Conservative Thought" is a
translation of the journal article which Mannheim adapted
from his Habilitationsschrift (the dissertation which
qualifies one to become a university lecturer, but not yet a
D oktor) ; Mannheim did the first draft of the translation
himself, and the draft was later edited by Paul Kecskemeti,
his son-in-law, also a sociologist.
It was published in a
collection of Mannheim's writings called Essavs on Sociology
and Social Psychology (1953), and later in a collection
titled From Karl Mannheim (1971).1
For many years only the journal article, in either
English or German, was available; the original dissertation
was lost.
However, it was recovered, edited by David
Kettler, Volker Meja, and Nico Stehr, and published in
German in 1984.
It was published in English translation in
1986 under the title Conservatism. Conservatism includes
material that was not in the journal article, and in
addition, it displays more of the philosophical and
theoretical tenor of Mannheim's writing than the earlier
version does.
Many authors have observed that Mannheim, in
adapting to his new English home, changed his scholarly
approach from a highly theoretical European style to a less
philosophical one, oriented to the more concrete and
psychological explanations favored by what he considered the
Anglo-Saxon mind.
Some of his abstract sociology is lost in
this change, and his ironic turn of phrase disappears also.
Although the basic outline and argument of the book
Conservatism is like that of the essay "Conservative
Thought," reading it is like reading a different work.
The
two are best discussed, I believe, on different terms; I may
take this position because a comparison would be extremely
difficult to maintain when applying the method of Mannheim's
study to another case, as in this dissertation.
Most of this chapter is based on the earlier version
because it is the one I first met with (in 1986). I
continued to refer to "Conservative Thought," but was not
aware until 1989 that I would use it as the basis of this
dissertation, and thus I did not go beyond my initial
unsuccessful attempts to obtain the more recent and expanded

Since From Karl Mannheim is the more readily
available book, I have used it for page references.
It
reproduces the essay in exactly the same format as in
E s s a v s . ..; deducting 58 pages from From Karl Mannheim
will give the equivalent page numbers in E s s a y s ....
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version.
Most of my notes are based on the earlier work.
The summary I give of Mannheim's method is not greatly
affected by the difference between the two versions; some of
the deeper questions concerning his analysis and its
implications are affected, but they are not crucial to this
chapter.
The more recent version adds subtlety and depth to
Mannheim's analysis; it deserves comment on its own account.
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CHAPTER FIVE
HISTORICAL CONDITIONS OF CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT

The previous chapter introduced Mannheim's approach to the
analysis of a particular type of thought in connection with
social change.

This chapter makes a detailed study of the

historical conditions that Mannheim identifies as the
impetus to conservative thought,

and comments on his way of

relating context to the content of a style of thought.

The Politically Effective Group

Having outlined the form of conservative thought,
Mannheim begins the task of investigating its historical
development, especially its social context.
"The aim of [the] analysis is to find out how
[the]... trend of thought... reflects the
sociological characteristics of the group or
individuals who stand behind it and through whom
it finds expression."1
Mannheim has selected Prussia as "the outstanding
centre of conservative thought."2

In 19th-century Prussia,

Mannheim observes, only the nobility and the bureaucracy had

the level of social organization to be politically effective
in response to the French Revolution; the proletariat was
guild groups rather than a class; the Mittelstand

(middle

class) was not politically a bourgeoisie in the French
sense.3
society.
people,
monarchy

A feudal society had not yet become a class
Instead of the French conflict between king and
there was a struggle between the nobility and the
(represented in Prussia by the monarchical

bureaucracy)

—

the German version of the working out of the

conflict over ruling the state from 'above'
or

(as demanded by the French Revolution)

(the monarchy)

from 'below'.

Mannheim is arguing that because Germany lacked a common
people able to act against the state, Germany in effect had
to substitute part of its nobility in that function in an
era of challenge to the state.4
'above' socially,

The nobility, though

functioned as a 'below' politically.

Yet since the nobility wanted to solidify their
position at the top of the social order while acting to
change the governmental order, Mannheim says that they had a
conservative analogue of the French 'revolutionary impulse'.
They wanted change toward "an 'organic'

society";

"[the

impulse was] a desire to revive the corporative structure of
medieval society"5 which had given them position and power.
The corporative society was the theoretical opposite of the
absolutist state of the 18th and 19th centuries,

in which
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there was
authority,

(theoretically)

a supreme sovereign with final

rather than a monarch who shared power with

representative assemblies.
At the same time that there was a conservative move
toward the past,

there was also a liberal

impulse in Prussia

from those intellectuals who had welcomed Enlightenment
thought.

As Mannheim and others observed,

unlike in France,

in Prussia,

centralizing and rationalist

Enlightenment-like reforms came from 'above7 , from the
absolutist and bureaucratic state, partly against the
interests of the nobility.
from the nobility —

(Although the reformers came

of necessity,

since they held high

bureaucratic positions which only nobles could hold —

they

did not come from Prussia, but from other German states.
They represented an impulse toward a new German nationalism;
Prussian nobles,

in contrast,

inclined toward conservatism

and local rule.)6
The conservative Prussian nobility wanted to revive the
corporatism of medieval society, which organized the clergy,
nobility,

and city magistrates into Stande or corporate

political bodies
in the state.
monasteries,

(the Diet) which had an advisory function

Many medieval institutions at all levels —
ecclesiastical and secular courts, the church,

the kingdom, principal cities —

were each considered as a

coporate body which could act for those it "represented” in
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matters of government.
centuries,

In Germany,

in the 16th and 17th

these corporate bodies participated in the

Imperial Diet and in territorial diets,

some of which even

included the peasantry; there were also some city diets.7
Stande

—

loosely,

standings —

term for recognized social orders

is also a more general

(peasantry and townspeople

as well as clergy and nobility), or the people who are part
of them,

and connotes fixed and hierarchical social

structure with associated rights and obligations.
corporation was,

The

as under modern law, able to act as one

person and have the rights and responsibilities of an
individual; conservatism's attachment to the corporate order
included the sense that the rights,

privileges and

responsibilities of the community were more important than
the rights of its individual constituent members,
particularly as the theoretical basis of a state
constitution.

So the response to the power of a supreme

sovereign took a different turn in Germany than it had in
France;
"The situation [of resistance to the absolutist
state in Germany] found its ideological expression
in a feudalistic reaction... [A] movement.... with
the most advanced ideological weapons... fought
for aims which were determined by the social
position of the nobility."8
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Political and Social Structure of Prussia

Mannheim could assume a familiarity with the late
18th/early 19th-century period on the part of the German
speaking reader of his original written work on
conservatism,
delineate it.

and perhaps for this reason he does not
Some background,

however,

is necessary for

the American reader.9

After the French Revolution of 1789,

as Mannheim indicates,

all of Europe's ruling classes were

sharply conscious of the political effects of Enlightenment
thought.
were,

The countries of Europe

(as we now know them)

like pre-revolutionary France, mostly monarchies,

the exceptions of a few republics.

with

What is referred to as

the Germany of the time was larger than today's Germany and
was fragmented into about 300 sovereign divisions or
territorial states,

ruled by princes or bishops.

It was

part of what was still called the Holy Roman Empire.

The

Empire, which included much of what would later be Germany,
Poland, Austria,

and Switzerland, was under the rulership

(sometimes nominal,

sometimes effective)

of the Holy Roman

Emperor, who had for centuries been elected almost entirely
from the Hapsbutg

(Austrian) dynasty by a handful of high

nobles and archbishops
Germany.

(electors), including those in

The nobility's status as electors provided a base

for their power in competition with the monarchy.

The Holy
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Roman Emperor ruled the Empire as a whole, but nobles ruled
their own territory within that empire

(and the Hapsburg

emperors also had their own family territories).
In Germany,

besides the 300 sovereign states,

there

were approximately 1500 manorial estates belonging to
nobility who had no intermediate sovereigns between them and
the Emperor,

and some 50 free cities with the same

unmediated relationship.
rulers in Germany.

Thus there were nearly 1,900

Customs were local,

and what was 'local'

was circumscribed by a day's journey when journeys were made
by foot or on horse.

Kings,

archbishops,

counts, dukes, and

margraves at the head of the states, and other nobles in
their own small estates,

in effect continued a feudalistic

social system (though having dispensed with the personal
ties of feudalism at the level of the territorial state).10
A few states dominated in this

'Germany', either because of

success in trade, or size, or, as with Prussia, both size
and military power.
The rise of Prussia had begun in the 17th century,
after the Thirty Years War had weakened the Hapsburg
dynasty.

Prussia began to grow around the core of the state

of Brandenburg

(whose court city was Berlin), as the

Hohenzollerns began successfully to make alliances and
military gains of territory under Frederick William the
Great Elector.

He and his successors encouraged immigrants
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to build up the undeveloped territory.
Prussia,

The landed nobles of

colonizers of border lands which were added to the

state, were militaristic and pragmatic,

and their alliance

with the Hohenzollerns solidified Prussian strength.
this alliance,

the nobles

For

(collectively called Junkers)

were

given absolute control over the peasants who worked their
land.
Prussia became known for its military might.
18th century,

In the

the Prussian army was a feudal-entrepreneurial

system in which nobles, as salaried army officers of the
Prussian state,

ran military companies that owed occasional

service to the Prussian ruler, but whose finances were
otherwise under the company commander's control, with any
profit he could make on maintenance of his soldiers his to
keep.

The rank and file soldiers were a combination of

peasant draftees or recruits,

and hired foreigners —

mercenaries who could only be controlled by the most rigid
military discipline.

Prussia vied with the Austrian

monarchy for control over Germany and other parts of the
Empire.

The central bureaucratic administration that was

necessary to a military state continued after its high point
under the "enlightened despot" Frederick the Great in the
mid to late 18th century, but had limited control over the
nobility's privileged rule of its own lands.
Prussia's nobility, which provided the state's high
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bureaucrats

(although not its reformist ones)

military officers,

as well as its

were basically exempt from taxes, which

were borne disproportionately by the thin middle class of
tradesmen and artisans.

Peasants were still serfs,

tied to

the land they were born on and owing so much labor to their
lords that they had difficulty farming their own land.
While hereditary serfdom had disappeared in many German
states during the 18th century,
into the early 19th.

it remained in Prussia even

Until the emancipation of the serfs,

the peasants on the nobles' estates had to have the lord's
permission to marry,

to move off the estate,

children learn a trade or go to school.

to have their

Peasants owed

varying amounts of unpaid labor to their lords,

and their

children had to perform domestic service for the lord.11
Some of Prussia lay outside the boundaries of the Holy Roman
Empire,

remote from traveled areas.

Prussian nobility,

unlike their counterparts in western Germany, were not just
landlords.

They did not live in town or at court, but on

their estates,

managing them for agricultural production and

exercising authority over their peasants.

Nobles had laws

and courts pertaining only to them, and they dispensed
justice and their own law enforcement on their own lands.
From the mid to the late 18th century,

Prussia had been

ruled by Frederick the Great, an Enlightenment figure who
was also a brilliant military general.

He doubled the size

142

of the army, and through years of war he almost doubled the
territorial size of the state.

He died shortly before the

French Revolution and was succeeded by other Prussian kings
who were pale leaders by comparison.

Following the

aftermath of the French Revolution, Napoleon began the
military expansion of a new French Empire.
Austria in war,
Emperor,

He defeated

refused to acknowledge the Holy Roman

and rearranged German states east of the Rhine.

With this change,

the Holy Roman Emperor had to abdicate.

Prussia then declared war against Napoleon in 1806,
alliance with Russia and Saxony,
a decisive battle at Jena.12

in

and only a week later lost

Napoleon's victory there was

so devastating that Prussian forces at some remaining
fortresses surrendered without firing a shot.
entered Berlin,

Napoleon

Prussia's capital city, took the horses-and-

chariot victory monument from the top of the Brandenburg
Gate,

and carried it off to Paris.13

half its territory,

Prussia lost nearly

and owed a huge indemnity to France.

What had been the Holy Roman Empire was now divided into
three parts: a reduced Prussia; Austria; and the
Confederation of the Rhine.
consolidated to about thirty.

Germany's 300 states had been
Prussia,

whose militarism was

its main claim to reputation, was humiliated.
Prussian state was going to regain power,
change.

If the

it would have to
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Reform and Resistance

As Mannheim observes,

the same set of historical

conditions gave rise to both liberalism (progressivism)
conservatism.
Germany;

and

There had been many contradictions in

it had been home both to a backward feudalism and

to enthusiasm for the Enlightenment.

Even in Prussia there

were reforms,

but they were reforms motivated from above,

from a ruling

(and mostly non-Prussian)

noble class of

government administrators who sometimes wished to strengthen
not just Prussia,

but a greater Germany.

To achieve

economic strength they planned to eliminate obstacles to
capitalist development.

Reform ministers in the

administration of the Prussian state after Napoleon's
victory abolished serfdom and guilds in the first decades of
the 19th century.

These reformers

were not native Prussians.

Army recruitment and discipline

were also reformed under officials
Gneisenau)

(Stein and Hardenberg)

(Scharnhorst and

who were not native Prussians.14

These reforms,

if they were effective, would take from Prussian nobility
their feudal privileges and their profit-making positions of
military leadership.
The reforms and the increasing centralization of
government administration, which, except for taxes, had
previously been parceled out among the estates of the

144

nobles, were opposed by the conservative nobility.

Prussia

was still mostly agricultural; until its boundaries were
extended after the defeat of Napoleon,
city of any size

Berlin was its only

(about 150,000 inhabitants in 1800,

whom were soldiers or their dependents;
had a population of 1.1 million,

20% of

London at the time

Paris about 600,000).15

Though Prussian peasants had been emancipated from serfdom,
it cost them much of their land, which they had to give as
compensation to the nobility for loss of the peasants'
services.

Meinecke explains why this compensation came

about:
"...it would never have been possible to impose
reforms against the opposition of the landowners.
They still constituted the wealthiest and most
powerful group in society, and Prussia lacked a
socially and economically strong middle class that
might have helped the state to defeat the nobles.
The true opponent of the nobility was the higher
bureaucracy. .. ."16
Social positions

(S t a n d e . estates) had been basically

hereditary until the 1800s; burghers could only rarely
become nobles

(by virtue of ennoblement by a ruler), nobles

could not take up middle class occupations without losing
their status and privileges; peasants could not become
burghers.

The reforms changed this, and "Estates turned

into classes...."17 but while some burghers and well-off
peasants were able to move upward

(and buy estates of the

n o b l e s ) , the nobility did not take up another style of life.
It "retained the character of an Estate,"18 attached to its
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old forms.

Before the reforms,

nobles could not incorporate

peasant land into their estates; afterward the Junkers
increased their holdings,

by receipt of land as compensation

and by purchase of other lands.
estates,

With their now larger

and the need to re-establish productivity after the

war, the Junkers more than ever needed agricultural labor to
work the land, and managed to get exceptions to the freedom
of landed peasants from obligatory services.
In practical terms,

the abolition of serfdom was a

temporary phenomenon in some areas.

Alongside these still-

serfs, a rural proletariat began to form as some peasants
became landless because their remaining holdings were too
small to be productive and had to be sold; these peasants
worked as paid labor for the nobility.

The reformer Stein

in time "regarded the Prussian nobles as a burden on the
nation:

there were too many of them, most of them p o o r . ..

undereducated and too demanding."19

Max Weber,

a hundred

years later, still regarded the Junkers as a recalcitrant
class, and said that though they might have been landed
nobles,

they were never aristocrats.20

The nobility's authority over lands and people was
imbued with the concept of Herrschaft. translated as
dominion or rule, but literally lord-shaft

(as in the shaft

of a sp e a r ) , and similar in sense to the English word
"lordship".

The exerciser of Herrschaft was der H e r r , the
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lord and master.

Sheehan comments:

"The nobility's claim to political power was
rooted in their Herrschaft. a concept which...
fused various forms of authority with the person
of the individual...."21
Herrschaft had both legal and cultural meaning.

It

established jurisdictional rights of rulers, though not
without room for contention between competing parties.22
In the 18th century,

centralized government, with its

written rules and legal codes "replaced the complex of
customary law and tradition upon which the world of
Herrschaft had depended."23

Culturally, Herrschaft

supported a patriarchal system of both family and
government:
"As a Herr im H a u s . the father's authority, his
H e r r s c h a f t . was linked with a hierarchy of other
authorities, ranging from the noble lord to the
prince to the divine source of all legitimate
rule."24
The emperor, princes, bishops,
part of Herr s c h a f t .

nobles,

the guilds, were all

With the changes at the end of the 18th

and beginning of the 19th century:
"In Prussia, as in other German states, the
conflict between the reformers and their enemies
continued a longstanding struggle between the
advocates of state sovereignty and the defenders
of Herrs c h a f t ... To its enemies, reform endangered
religion, property, and authority."25
Why, under these circumstances,
conservatism,
at all?

so favorable to

were there any attempts at reform in Prussia

For one thing, the cities had very different
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economic interests,

and different social

countryside and its nobility,

forms from the

and wanted reforms

the most part they did not get t h e m ) .

(though for

For another,

Prussia

was not just a rigidly bureaucratic and militaristic state;
it had also experienced Enlightenment ideas and progressive
administration under Frederick the Great.
different regions,

It also had

not all of them Junker-ruled.

With

Napoleon threatening to rule all of Europe, there were hopes
that Prussia,

though temporarily defeated, would yet be the

"protector of German freedom and culture....
military glory,

energy,

Heroism,

enlightened Protestantism —

these

were the forces that made Prussia appealing in
G e r m a n y . . .. "26
Both the conservatives and the liberals hoped for a
Prussia restored to its former strength,

and an alliance

with Russia against Napoleon from 1813 to 1815 made possible
the "Wars of Liberation," followed by Napoleon's defeat at
Waterloo.
Vienna,

Prussia came out of the subsequent Congress of

as part of the new German Confederation, with

boundaries that increased its share of western Germany.
Confederation included Austria,

the Netherlands and Denmark.

Prussia continued to struggle with Austria
consolidated reactionary forces)

The

(where Metternich

for control of central

Europe.
The early 19th century was a period of emerging

nationalism in Germany.

In an attempt to build a nation

state out of centuries of fragmented,

personally-

aggrandizing small rulerships, German thinkers drawing on
idealism and Romanticism conceived of a national feeling
residing in the people as a whole —

the V o l k s t u m .

This

encompassing spirit was held to be an immanent quality of
all the sharply divided German estates and classes —
peasants,

the Buraertum (bourgeoisie,

rather than subjects,
craftsmen,
century,
Herder,

townspeople,

the

citizens

the middle class)27, the nobility,

the proletariat.

In the late 18th and early 19th

romantically nationalistic works came from Novalis,
Fichte, the Grimms,

Schelling,

Schleiermacher, and

reached a high point in Hegel's philosophical marriage of
spirit and the state.

But the nobility still distrusted the

bourgeoisie; the bourgeoisie feared the proletariat and a
rootless peasantry.

Conservatism and Intellectuals

Here we can pick up again on Mannheim's analysis.

He

has said that the reformist bureaucratic state is acting in
part against the nobility.

The conservative nobility are

looking for a way to re-establish the world they knew only a
generation before.

An alliance,

as Mannheim puts it, now
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forms between Romanticism and feudalistic conservatism.
Romanticism,

intellectually opposed to the Enlightenment,

shares conservatism's social base: those outside of the
current of modern capitalism and rationalization

(previously

mentioned by Mannheim in connection with "suppressed modes
of t h o u g h t " ) .
bourgeoisie and
in Prussia)

Aside from the nobility, these are the petit
(lacking institutionally-strong Catholicism

Pietist Protestants.

(Peasants,

earlier identified as 'outside' by Mannheim,

although also
are not

specified as part of Romanticism's social base.)
By the time Romanticism becomes a movement,

however,

its exponents are chiefly 'socially unattached
intelligentsia'28 from the same stratum that provided
proponents of the Enlightenment.

But while Enlightenment

writers had the ideological support of the bourgeoisie,
"conversion to romanticism meant for the intelligentsia an
increasing social and philosophical isolation."29

The

German bourgeoisie was not politically conscious; newspapers
were few and not independent of the ideology of the state;
the profession of independent writer was a new and insecure
one.

Although there had been an upsurge in the publication

of books and the founding of journals and newspapers in
Germany at the end of the 18th century30, they promoted a
literary culture rather than political commentary.

This

literary public was probably less than 5% of the total

150

population.31

Early 19th-century Germany "lacked a

political or cultural center like London or Paris."32
Under Frederick the Great, poets and scholars wrote of the
spirit,

not of the politics of the state, and nobles gave

them patronage without concerning themselves with what these
thinkers wrote.

But as the 19th century begins,

the

intellectuals "sell their pens";33 on the negative side,
Mannheim says, they become "mercenary pamphleteers"; on the
positive side they raise questions as they speculate on
history and philosophy.

Their observations could be astute,

but lacking social roots,
"...they defended causes which had their social
basis elsewhere — in strata of greater social
vitality.
Their fate is typical of the fate of
the intelligentsia in the modern world — clearly
traceable since the eighteenth century."3*
Now,

in a Germany on the edge of the industrial

revolution,
"The fate of the world of thought is in the care
of a socially unattached, or barely attached,
s t r atum.... This fact is of the greatest
importance for modern thought...."
because ultimate aims of ideological movements derive from
their social background.

In the hands of intellectuals who

don't share this background,

aims can be "frittered away."

But, on the other hand, without intellectuals to speculate
on philosophical questions and to perceive and discuss
qualitative differences,
"it might easily happen that all spiritual content
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would disappear from our increasingly capitalistic
society and leave nothing but naked interests.
For it is the latter which are at the basis of
ideas as well as ideologies."35
Mannheim examines the thought of some of these "socially
unattached" intellectuals.
"free-floating"

They are freischwebende —

(or free-soaring)

—

because they are

neither of the class of their birth nor of the class of
their aspiration as they move across the social order in
their attempt to establish their living.

They still,

however, have the personal history of their class origins to
influence their actions,

as well as their ambitions.

They

are not unrelated to the social order, but are in a position
of suspension

(another meaning of Schwebe) , of hovering.

Earlv Conservatism

As examples of precursors of such unattached
intellectuals in early German conservatism,
discusses the writings of Adam Muller
Moser

(1720-1794),

Mannheim

(1779-1829)

and Justus

and compares them to the English

conservatism of Edmund Burke

(1729-1797), whose attack on

the French Revolution influenced Muller.

In German social

thought, Mannheim says, Muller stands at the "juncture" of
intellectual Romanticism and feudal conservatism.36

Like

Burke, Muller is the nobility's "middle-class" interpreter,
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whose distance from the nobility gives him perspective on
their social conditions, while his interest in becoming one
of them gives him solidarity with some of their views.37
Muller,

the son of a minor official, was a tutor to families

of the nobility; he gained a noble title a few years before
his death.

Moser was another middle-class interpreter, the

son of a lawyer who had risen to an important government
position alongside aristocrats; the younger Moser's career
followed a similar path.38

He is analyzed by Mannheim as

an influence on Muller; he was himself a late 18th-century
writer and government official,

and a Westphalian,

not a

Prussian.
Like Burke, Muller emphasizes gradual historical
development and continuity,
actor in history.
past.

and makes nobility the prime

Like Burke, he is romantic about Europe's

Mannheim traces Muller's romanticism to the attitude

of pantheism,

another pre-rationalist remnant.

Pantheism is

so attuned to the rhythms and fluctuations of the world that
it reaches the point where,

in Mannheim's words,

must not portray the world;

it must accompany its

movements."

"thought

This is an important development and "from this

tendency," Mannheim says,
'dynamic thinking'."39

"arises everything we call

Muller's Elemente der Staatskunst

(Elements of Statecraft), prepared as lectures for German
nobility who were government officials,

is "a plea for the
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nobility and the whole feudalistic attitude."40

It was a

response to a pamphlet by a liberal writer and was
"encouraged" by Friedrich von Gentz, Muller's friend and a
writer and politician who spread Metternich's reactionary
views.41

The influence of Burke, Mannheim says, can be

verified by Muller's own references; there is also an
influence from Moser, Mannheim claims,

though he is not

quoted by Muller.
Moser, Mannheim says, doesn't romanticize like Burke,
he simply "lives in the remnants of the past which still
exist in the present";42 the past is not yet an object of
reflection.

He wrote a history of his home district,

Osnabrvick, and many newspaper essays.

The history put forth

the theory that traditions and custom contribute to the form
of government.

Even a sympathetic observer notes that

Moser's theory is more consistent than his history;43
Mannheim,

in a footnote,

calls the Osnabruckische Geschichte

"largely a tissue of more or less gratuitous
e x p l a nations."44
Moser's writing, Mannheim says, praises

'practice'

in

contrast to 'theory', and favors 'qualitative' thinking
against universals

(an element of Romanticism, Mannheim

points out, which was already in feudalism and its local
differences of custo m s ) .
opposes general laws.

Moser justifies serfdom,

and

Moser's theme (what a critic would
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call the good old days of feudalism)

is also in Muller,

Mannheim finds, but more as a type of thought than as a
direct influence from Moser.
ideas...

"Moser's...

reappear on a romantic 'level'

older feudalistic
in Muller."45

In

drawing on both feudalistic and romantic sources, Muller
gave "internal consistency to the ideological struggle" of
counter-revolutionary thought.46
romanticism" saved the old,
experience,

"revived them,

The "alliance with

feudalistic forms of thought and
and eguipped them with a modern

theoretical foundation."47

The Historical Determination of Thought

Mannheim analyzes how the writings of both these
authors exemplify the characteristics of conservative
thought listed earlier —
extreme individualization;

concreteness against abstraction;
qualitative thinking that is

against generalization and uniformity
bureaucracy) .

(thus anti

Conservative German thought, he says,

started

out in opposition to the Enlightenment tendency to
bureaucratic centralization,
Romanticism,

then after allying with

also opposed the natural law thought of the

revolutionary bourgeoisie.

It thus opposed two forms of

rationalism: bureaucratic rationalism, which 'equalizes'
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territorial and social differences in a narrow sphere; and
bourgeois rationalism, which "wants to rationalize the whole
social order...

in a systematic manner."48

France had had a ready-made counter-revolutionary
metaphysics in Roman Catholicism; northern Germany,
Protestantism,

home to

had to formulate its opposition and did so by

attacking the logic and method of liberal thought.
Enlightenment thought, Mannheim notes,

is unilinear -- the

unfolding of single principles is its 'progress',
'rights of man'.

Muller opposed static

with dynamic thinking,

its

(rational)

thought

and the "historical school" opposed

rationalism with irrationalism (the not always reasonable
course of actual even t s ) .

In Muller's Elemente der

Staatskunst
"grows up that phenomenon which, under the name
of 'philosophy of life' (Lebensohilosophie^ ,
has ever since, and today with renewed vigour,
assailed rationalism in all its diverse
forms.1,49
All these different tendencies become unified in a single
Weltanschauung.
The conservative opposition to rationalism is a
historically determined one.

A p r i o r i . Mannheim says, we

would speculate that progressives would emphasize Life

(and

its accompanying activity, movement and c h a n g e ) , and that
conservatives would rely on norms and rigid, unchanging
abstractions.

But empirically, historically,

it is the
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other way around,

because the progressive thought of the

bourgeoisie arose in alliance with rationalism
universal norms).50
key theoretical

(and its

Romantics and conservatives,

issue to challenge,

needing a

made the natural-law,

rationalistic thinking of the Enlightenment that issue.
Responding to that core theoretical problem unified
conservative thought.
"In bourgeois natural-law thought the state is
established by a settlement (contract) between
the contracting parties recognized for all time
as just.
In feudalistic, romantic thought the
state is an ever-fluctuating dynamic settlement
between antagonistic groups.
Something in that
conception sounds familiar to us."51
The familiar emphasis on the dynamic,

according to Mannheim,

has since been taken over by the Left.

Content and Context

In his essay on "Conservative Thought" Mannheim
examines both the content of knowledge
epistemological assumptions)
knowledge.

(including

and the social context of

His sociology of knowledge is not just about the

social position of the knower, but is also about the ideas
themselves,

as in a history of ideas.

The summary below

breaks out what Mannheim says into these two areas;

in

brackets

[like this]

is my way of phrasing when it is very

different from Mannheim's
Thought").

[see columns below]

(as translated in "Conservative
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CONTENT/EPISTEMOLOGY

SOCIAL

Intellectually, rationalism
arose in opposition to
Aristotelian scholasticism
and to Rennaissance
philosophy of nature.

French Revolution polarized
thought as well as action.

Rationalism assumes true
knowledge is only that which
can be shown to be
universally valid.

context

Politics became the center
of crystallization for
styles of thought in the
first half of the 19th
century.

Intellectually, Romanticism
arose in opposition to the
rationalism of the
Enlightenment.

Social groups outside of the
bourgeois movement for
rationalization and
capitalism are groups which
continued the thought that
rationalism suppressed —
Romanticism and feudal
conservatism.

Traditionalism is a general
psychological attitude,
transhistorical.

Conservatism is a specific
product of class society.
Traditionalism can become
the historically-specifc
conservatism given the
necessary juncture of
events, which includes the
need to oppose another style
of thought.
This happens in
a class society, a society
in which change occurs by
class conflict.

Ways of thinking or acting
can have their own history;
they pre-exist the
individual and are
[relatively] objective
mental structures.

Objective mental structures
are bound up with the fate
of human groups.

Each style of thought works
out a kev problem that: a)
gives the thought its
theoretical unity b)
determines it growth
c)
makes its interpretation
possible.
(E.g. key problem
for conservatives is to
oppose natural-law mode of
thought — not just its

Behind each style of thought
is a basic intention out of
which it grows, the
"inarticulate group
experience" [derived from
social circumstances].
(E.g.
basic intention of
conservatives is to hold
onto a traditional way of
life [which they still to
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CONTENT/EPISTEMOLOGY

SOCIAL CONTEXT

content but also its
[epistemological
assumptions]. They oppose
Reason conceived of in
static fashion.

some extent practiced before
conservative thought went
forward in its
development].)

Opposing styles of thought
will have different
intentions but may have the
same impetus, and share
characteristics.
(E.g.
"excessive subjectivism"
of both romanticism and
rationalism in the
nineteenth century.)

Left and right political
positions may derive from
the same basic opposition to
a preceding style of thought
[depending on social and
political circumstances and
e v e n t s ] . (E.g. Marxist and
vitalist conceptions of
dynamic reality develop from
romantic opposition to
bourgeois rationalism.)

Content or epistemology
cannot be assigned to
political positions a
priori.
(E.g, a priori,
Life would seem to go with
progressive thought, and
norms and rigid abstractions
with conservative thought,
but it is vice versa because
revolutionary thought of the
bourgeoisie arose in
alliance with rationalism.)

Right wing opposition to
capitalism initiated
criticisms that were later
taken over by the left.
The
structural difference
remains, however, that left
opposition (proletariat)
grew out of capitalism,
right did not.
A social group must have
acquired a certain degree of
organization to effectively
respond to [pressure on
their way of life], both in
political action and in
thought.
Exponents of a style of
thought who are socially
unattached intelligentsia
will not have a cause of
their own and thus will not
understand [or theorize]
ends; this typifies the
intelligentsia today and is
traceable to the 18th
century.
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The content of a style of thought is a response to
social context; that context also includes already existing
styles of thought, which may either be opposed or adapted by
the developing style.
however —

It is the oppositional dynamic,

two different arguments competing to define

meaning and social purpose —

that generates consciously

articulated styles of thought.
inherently

(by its content)

political position.

A style of thought is not

suited to a left or right

Historical circumstances determine the

political favor attached to ideas.
interests
process,

The shaping of ideas by

(and of interests by ideas)

is not a mechanical

but one which reaches deeply into lived experience,

traditions,

and desires.

After a close analysis of the writings of Adam Muller
and Justus Moser, with asides on Burke, Ranke,
Savigny, de Maistre,

Stahl,

Hegel, and other, more minor,

authors,

Mannheim concludes:
"It is not necessary to go into all the
d e t a i l s . ...Our purpose was merely to show that not
only the content of thought, but even the
conceptions of reality of the twofold opposition
against bourgeois rationalism were formed in
direct reaction against it; that the product of
the struggle was a concept of life which was
characterized by movement, by dynamics; and that
both the vitalist and Marxist conceptions of
reality developed in clear continuity from this
romantic opposition."52
For the most part, Mannheim's account of the
development of the conservative style of thought is an
account of contents.

Context plays a background part in his
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description,

though not in the theory which is meant to

support his method.

An overview of context

(as given here)

supports his argument that the social conditions,
experience,

and historical place of a particular social

group provided the substance out of which conservative
thought was built.

But as Mannheim's critics complain,

mechanism of connection is not specified.

However, Mannheim

argues that the connection is not mechanical —
is an interpretive process.

the

finding it
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CHAPTER SIX
FROM CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT TO ENVIRONMENTAL THOUGHT

The previous chapters have discussed how knowledge functions
in society,

considered questions about what scientific

knowledge contributes to worldview,

and discussed how

Mannheim investigated the influence of worldview by giving a
developmental account of a "style of thought."

This chapter

turns to the comparison of different centers of contention
for styles of thought —
example)

and science

namely,

politics

(as in Mannheim's

(as I find central to arguments about

the e nvironment).
Together,

Chapters 1-6 form Part I of this study.

They

introduce the concepts used for the analysis of
environmental thought.

Part II summarizes major

environmental books of the 1960s and 70s, analyzing their
concerns and underlying worldview.

The last two chapters

compare scientific and political frameworks for
understanding social action,

and evaluate the use I have

made of Mannheim's method for analyzing the relation of
worldview and argument,

and the relation of social origins

to the content of arguments.

167

Scientists as Environmental Voices

After I first read Mannheim's "Conservative Thought" I
thought it would be interesting to see how left and right,
or conservative and liberal, are now positioned on
legislative issues before the U.S. Congress,

and whether

those positions accorded with any of the 19th-century
conservative and liberal goals.
turned to environmental issues,

To narrow the inquiry,

I

but soon found that a left

and right characterization of stances was not easily made.
I wondered if this was because politics itself was not the
center of contention where environment was concerned, but
scientific data and opinion that was the focus of
disagreement.

I then began to think about science as an

organizing center for an emerging style of thought,
"environmental" style of thought.

an

My understanding of

environmental issues had come out of a feeling for nature
and an appreciation of its vitality, beauty and diversity.
That nature tradition,

I thought, might be like the

persistence of feudal tradition among 19th-century
conservatives —

a "suppressed mode of thought" that now,

under new and threatening conditions, was finding its voice
in a new way.
Thus I had two parallels to Mannheim's study of
conservative thought: a concept-organizing center

(science)
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for contended issues, and a group with a neglected worldview
who felt both the obligation and the opportunity to speak.
The nature lovers,

I thought, would have appropriated

scientifc arguments to make their case while developing a
specific voice of their own, just as conservatives
appropriated Romantic rhetoric —

a third parallel.

In my

memory of the 60s and 70s, when environmentalism sprang up,
it was those who cared about nature who were carrying the
flag and getting people to listen.

Behind

environmentalism's sudden appearance,
tradition of conservation.

I knew, was a long

But when I tried to list the

books that I remembered from that period,
remember books by nature writers.

I could not

After some research,

I

found that the books that most captured the public
attention,

that were most widely sold

of copi e s ) , were,

(some in the millions

for the most part, books by scientists.

Scientists might seem to be likely authors where arguments
have science at issue, but in fact, there are many
constraints against scientists speaking out on public
issues.

The objectivity that science aims for is

pragmatically coupled with neutrality, while environmental
issues call for taking sides.
Perhaps,
voices —
way.

I thought,

the two types of environmental

scientific and nature-oriented —

combined in some

I do think that this combination happens,

but I did
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not find much of it in the leading books of the period.
(Rachel Carson is an exception to this general rule; her
feeling for nature illumines Silent Spring.1
there are many avenues to public opinion,
one.

of course,

and books are only

The nature-oriented organizations that had long been

active in conservation were not silent during the 60s and
70s.

But the voice that captured attention was the voice of

warning, and that warning was made most convincingly by
people with scientific training.
So the works that are reviewed here are mostly books by
scientists,

although articles and books by non-scientists

are also included.
they achieved,

The works were chosen for the notice

evidenced either by sales figures or by

frequent mention in other environmental literature.
Although only these works are mentioned,
others —

poetry,

reflections,

meditations on nature.
all into one study.

I read many

fiction, polemics,

To my regret,

I could not bring them

With my source material at hand,

I

considered how to apply Mannheim's study of conservative
thought to this narrowed-down study of environmental
thought.
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Summarizing Mannheim

Mannheim selects a particular example of conservative
thought, what he calls "early or old conservatism" in
Germany in the first half of the 19th century, because this
is a particularly "paradigmatic" case for his analysis of
style of thought.

He notes that the theoretical divisions

of conservative thought,
class divisions,

and their corresponding social

are not so clearly marked in England, where

in fact conservative thought of the political type began.
An essential part of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge
is that a consciously-developed ideological argument must
have a particular social location,
least in the initial stages.

some "bearing strata," at

Thus he locates the early

conservativism of Germany in the Prussian nobility, but
notes that conservative thought assumes different forms
depending on whether it is borne by aristocracy,
estates,

bureaucracy,

small

or monarchy.

The way in which Mannheim identifies the social
location of an ideological position is not to go into detail
about socioeconomic status
social status,

(landholding,

relative wealth,

occupation, hereditary privilege,

etc.), but

is instead to trace currents of thought along a line of
development that follows historical events.

He does a

history of ideas in which the ideas are related to material
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developments.

The principle of his sociology of knowledge

as he applies it to conservative thought is that "thinking
reflects existence."
In his analysis of conservatism, Mannheim identifies
several key elements in the development of a style of
thought.

I have abstracted these key elements from what

Mannheim says; he does not provide a summary of this method
as I give it here.
quotes.)
term)

(Where I use his terminology it is in

Mannheim identifies a polarizing event

(not his

that gives impetus to the style of thought.

conservativism,

(For

the polarizing event was the French

Revolution.)
He locates the polarizing event within a sphere of
social activity,

and names that activity the point or agency

of "crystallization"
oppositionally.

for styles of thought that develop

This point is a center of contention around

which groups develop their differences in the form of
arguments meant to persuade.
He identifies an effective g r o u p , (my term)

one with

sufficient social organization to mount the response to the
opposing style of thought.

The actual authors of the

response may speak for that group rather than being of it.
(For 19th-century German conservatism the effective group
was the Prussian nobility.
He identifies a "basic intention" that comes out of the
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group's social situation.

The individual can match this

intention to his/her own experience, which is unarticulated
until the style of thought articulates it.
conservatives,

(For

to hold on to a traditional way of life.)

There is a polarity

(my term) by which opposing styles

of thought can be characterized, and which stands for the
fact that styles of thought develop oppositionally.
(Conservative/liberal.)
There is a "kev problem" (epistemological issue) which
is related to the group's intent,

as Mannheim says,

not only

to think about different things, but to think about them
differently.

(For conservatives,

to resist the abstract

universals of Enlightenment thought.)
These elements must be situated within a context of
"oriented change” —

extensive society-wide change which is

the matrix within which polarization can take place.
Mannheim's example,

(In

restructuring of the monarchical,

European nation-state, the growth of capitalism,

and class

society.)

Following Mannheim

There are three major points to remember in analyzing a
style of thought according to Mannheim's method: that the
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overall method is an analysis of meanings
validity,

(not of veracity,

or a c curacy); that arguments express and derive

from a basic intention related to a desired world; that the
arguments are structured around a kev problem that gives
theoretical unity to the thought-style.
The basic intention is the intention of a group or
class,

not of any single thinker, and no single thinker will

express all of it, but some "authentic manifestations" of
this intention will be in any one individual author's work.
"Authentic manifestations" are characteristics of the
argument related to intention; they are authentic in that
they come out of the experience of life shared by the group
with the intention.
Similarly,

there are characteristics of the argument

related to the key

(epistemological)

problem, which come out

of opposition to an already formulated argument for a
desired world, one that the newly raised voices wish to keep
from happening,

or from developing further.

In conservative thought,

for example,

characteristics

of the argument which are related to the intention to
maintain or return to a traditional form of living are its
emphasis on details rather than on overall structure,

on a

concrete notion of property rather than an abstract one, and
on a qualitative idea of liberty rather than a
universalistic one —

all related to an older feudalistic
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structure of property ownership,

rights, and obligations,

with its local peculiarities and personal relationships.
Epistemological characteristics,

formulated in

opposition to revolutionary Enlightenment thought,

are that

History replaces Reason as a legitimating explanation —

it

is the supposed principal mover of human events; the
irrationality of reality is emphasized,

rather than its

adherence to universal laws; universalistic statements are
countered by descriptions of individual cases; and finally,
dynamic reason replaces static reason.
reason,

or dialectic,

(This dynamic

counters the static character of

Aristotelian or formal logic, which relies on fixed
identities for the progression of its reasoning.

Fixed

identities allow for the timelessness of universal laws, and
for natural law as found in Enlightenment thought.)

Analyzing Individual Authors

All of these characteristics are Mannheim's summation
of a body of conservative thought.

He uses individual

arguments to illustrate these characteristics,

but he does

not say how he went about evaluating each separate argument
itself.

Instead, he talks about how he treated the body of

work as a whole.

For my investigation,

I have found it
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necessary to ask the question,

How may an individual

author's work be investigated for its possible participation
in a thought style?
hermeneutic:

The overall process of investigation is

individual arguments with a similar theme point

to a thought style; an apparent thought style gives meaning
to the utterances of individual arguments.

In order to

piece together the whole thought style out of its individual
elements,

one needs an overview from reading many arguments,

and a methodical way of approaching the individual works.
For the works considered in this study,

I had an overview as

a result of having read many of the environmental works of
the 60s, and some of the 70s, as they appeared.

Of each

individual work, after reading or re-reading it, I asked:

- What does the author praise? Criticize? Emphasize?
Justify?
- What is the author's main argument?
- What other types of argument does the author ally with or
adopt?
- How does the author define differently something that has
already been given a definition by an existing and opposing
thought-style?

From my overview of the works I listed provisional
characteristics related to intention in environmental
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thought as it comes from scientists:

- Emphasis on system complexity and interrelatedness.
- The frequent citing of facts and the use throughout of
quantification.
- The use of prediction as warning or an emphasis on
prediction as a requirement of responsible action.
- Speaking out in the context of moral responsibility.

The citing of facts and the use of prediction
conceivably come out of the professional,
experience of all scientists,

occupational

out of empirical

investigation, out of the requirement that science be
predictive to prove itself.
emphasized by all scientists.

Interrelatedness is not
In the life sciences —

whose

subject matter has a direct connection to environmental
issues —

an emphasis on system complexity is particular to

ecologically-oriented scientists,

and it is counter to the

reductionist discipline of molecular biology.

Speaking out

is another characteristic not common among scientists, who
have been traditionally expected to stand apart from
politics.

Yet there has been, since the development of the

atomic bomb, an ethic of speaking out as a moral
responsibility under grave circumstances;

it is the gravity

of the situation that makes the scientist speak out —

a
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case of no longer being able to keep quiet.
The key epistemological problem for scientist
environmental writers in this period appeared to be holism
vs reductionism.

Some characteristics of the related

arguments are:

- Wholes replace parts as elements of analysis.
- Interrelatedness counters isolated elements.
- Multiple causes,

or cyclical causes,

replace single or

linear causes.
- Time-awareness replaces atemporality; the present is not a
timelessly representative moment of universal laws, but is
projected into a future which will change it.
- Behavior constitutes structure

(as in ecology), rather

than structure determining behavior

(as in molecular

b i o l o g y ) ; this is a choice of perspective,

not a final

either-or statement.

These "authentic manifestations" and epistemological
characteristics of the environmental style of thought are to
be found in the totality of the arguments made in the major
environmental books of the 60s and 70s.
observed,

As Mannheim

no one argument will include all elements.
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Politics and Science as Centers of Contention for Thought

Mannheim's reading of European history is that politics
became the center of crystallization for styles of Western
thought in the first half of the 19th century,

when the

growth of the modern state made all social struggles
political

(i.e., gave them political relevance in the

apportionment of power between and among government and
governed.)

Today, we could say that state intervention

plays the part of state growth; all struggles are
politically relevant because of the pervasiveness of the
state.
In addition,

today the growth of science

(also a site

of state intervention) provides a new center for styles of
thought because it makes for new struggles:

over the use of

nuclear power; over the control of the processes and
ownership of one's own body
drugs,

(and because of psychoactive

thus over one's m i n d ) ; over the environment, which

transcends political boundaries; over the collection,

use,

distribution and control of information; over the meaning of
ethical values themselves,

not just over any particular

values.
With science as the center of contention for styles of
thought

(arguments intended to persuade and legitimate), the

fulfillment of Mannheim's categories can be hypothesized as
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follows for the 1960s and 70s in the United States,

the

developmental period for a new environmental style of
thought.

Polarizing event
Atomic bomb.
This began the re-evaluation of science.
Center of contention
Science
Effective group
Critical responses to science are located in varying groups.
For environment as the issue which elicits or provides the
opportunity for this critique, and for critique which
appears as coherent theoretical or persuasive argument in
written form, one group is notable: relatively independent
life scientists. Nature-oriented writers also present an
environmental argument, but not as theoretically or
pragmatically attuned to science.
Basic intention
To preserve the environment and protect human health and
life.
Polarity
Science truster/science skeptic.
Kev theoretical problem
To resist reductionism with holism.
Scientific rationalism
and technological growth suppress holism until the holistic
view becomes relevant to the misuses of science/technology,
whereupon it takes the form of "environmentalism."
Oriented change (issues in the United States, 1960s-70s)
atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons
population explosion
pollution
"Silent Spring" and subsequent environmental warnings
oil spills
extinction of species
loss of wilderness
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Positioning the Analysis

The environmental works of the 1960s and 70s that have
been chosen are reviewed in chronological order, to give a
sense of the development of the environmental argument.

I

give a much more detailed account of content than Mannheim
does with the works he considers.
results of his analysis,
"Conservative Thought"

Mannheim presented the

not the process of it.

The form of

is critique as much as analysis.

Mannheim "unmasks" conservative thought, but does not do it
oppositionally.

In fact, some have argued that Mannheim

intentionally reproduced the conservative approach in his
insistence on the importance of concrete circumstances,
local conditions, and dynamic change.1

Yet since Mannheim

points out that this emphasis was later taken over by
Marxist thinkers, this characteristic of his work cannot
definitely be used to position him politically.

As Mannheim

himself says, content cannot be assigned a political label
a p r i o r i ; historical circumstances will determine whether a
given content will have a left or right meaning.
Since all analysis must be made from some position,

and

since Mannheim himself is subject to the same analysis that
he applies,

it is reasonable to ask where he stood, what his

background was, and whether he could achieve some stance of
neutrality in his work.

That question requires much more

investigation than this study can provide.

However,

the

same question can be asked also of me, and can be at least
partially answered.

In the environmental debate,

I am on

the side of those who are convinced that not enough is being
done to make the changes that are necessary to preserve the
environment and assure the future security of our own lives
on the planet.

In my own terms,

I am a science-skeptic,

one

who does not trust that science and technology will be used
for ecological balance, while at the same time depending on
science to provide the information that warns of danger and
makes environmentally positive action possible.

In this

study I am reviewing the works of people who mostly share
that view.

This study is not an account of both sides of

the argument, but of one side —
its own diversity.

although that one side has

By being detailed about content,

I

attempt to give a balanced account of the development of
that argument,

as I believe Mannheim attempted to do in the

case of conservative thought.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX

1.
See the Introduction by David Kettler, Volker Meja and
Nico Stehr, editors of Conservatism, by Karl Mannheim
(London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986).
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PART II

CHAPTER SEVEN
THE ARGUMENT FROM SCIENCE - SILENT SPRING

Part I introduced knowledge in society and the question of
how science,

as a particular form of knowledge,

in society.

The environmental debate has been identified as

a place where this question is prominent.

is to 'be'

That debate was

used as a case in point for a "conceptual shift" toward the
use of a scientific framework for legitimating social
action.

Mannheim's study of conservative thought was

reviewed and taken as a model to follow for the study of
environmental thought.
arguments.

Part II analyzes environmental

This chapter reviews the book that set off the

environmental debate in the United States,

Silent S p r i n g ,

and the questions it raises about the uses of science.

Developing a Stance

We can see the concern about science in the
environmental arguments that began developing in the United
States in the 1960s.

As environmental concerns were voiced,

a stance began to develop toward science in society that
would engage not just occasional critics,
public.

but a large

There was a century-old tradition of nature

appreciation and conservationist ethic in American society,
but this tradition did not contain positions on the
activities of science.
argument —

For that was needed a new type of

itself scientific —

that would act as a banner

for environmentally concerned people to hold up and rally
around.

That banner argument appeared with the publication

of the book Silent Spring.1

The Banner Argument

Rachel Carson's Silent S p r i n g , published in 1962, was
the first "environmental" book to capture public opinion.
Her graphic account of the environmental damage done by the
indiscriminate use of the newly synthesized pesticides,
especially insecticides, was not only a best seller in the
United States but was widely read elsewhere,

being

translated into twelve languages within a year of first
publication.2

Before the changes brought about by World

War II, books about what we would now consider the
environment were "Nature" books —

books about a natural

world that was not a problem to be solved as "the
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environment"

is.

There were many postwar changes in the United States:
an expanding economy,

a baby boom, the growth of suburbs,

the spread of technology,

the increasing importance of

science across many domains of activity —
medical,

agricultural,

industrial.

military,

There were increasing

encroachments on nature as a result of population pressures
and new methods of farming and forestry.

In this era of

progress, voices critical of "gains" produced by science and
technology had small audiences.
Trained in science,

Carson was an exception.

she wrote a book that warned of the

heedless use of scientific invention and, at the same time,
of the urgent need for scientific study of the effects of
new methods of controlling insect and plant life.
Silent Spring is both a moral tale and a scientific
commentary.3

Carson wrote an impassioned book, yet one

committed to science and scientific evidence.

Her

description of the natural world shows a love of its beauty
and its achievements; she combines this with a harsh account
of the destruction of both life and balance that has
resulted from an attitude of conquest toward nature.

It is

this interplay of lyrical and cold prose that gives the book
much of its power.

Silent Spring is an attention-holding

tale of death and destruction at the hands of unthinking and
unheeding conquerors;

it is also a documented record of

environmental damage.

At the end of the book, a chapter-

length series of notes on the author's sources
every page of the book)

(for almost

shows the thoroughness with which

she has gathered her evidence, the spirit of science which
underlies her effort.
The book begins with a vision of an Eden past —
imaginary town set among farms somewhere in America,
harmony with its natural surroundings.

of an
in

Here people notice

and enjoy the beauty and variety of the life that surrounds
them —

plants,

animals, birds,

fish.

But a change takes

place.

Some "evil spell" settles on the community; people

become ill, wildlife sickens, plants wither.

No newly born

life survives among domestic or wild animals,

no plants bear

fruit,

no birds sing.

Barely noticed,

a white granular

powder still lies in places where it had fallen on the town
"like snow."

Though the change seems incomprehensible,

Carson explains that "No witchcraft,

no enemy action had

silenced new life... The people had done it themselves."4
This "Fable for Tomorrow," as Carson calls it,

is based on a

present in which pesticides are spreading death beyond their
intended targets.

It is a warning to us, a portent of a

future in which the voices of spring are no longer to be
heard.

Though the town is imaginary,

the past in which

spring brought beauty and rebirth to towns across America is
not.

It is the desolation of the future which is fabled,
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not the Eden of the past.
imagined one,

And yet, though the future is an

it is imagined on the basis of scientific

evidence.
In Carson's story of the imaginary town, the plants and
animals are named or identified by familiar terms; they are
specific lives to her.

Not just trees,

but "oak and maple

and birch set up a blaze of color in autumn across a
backdrop of pines."
viburnum,

Not just roadside plants,

but "laurel,

alder, great ferns and wildflowers delight...

traveler's eye through much of the year."

the

This feeling for

nature is the blood that courses through the body of
Carson's argument.

The Scientific Report

Setting prophecy aside for reporting,

Carson goes on to

explain that while no one real town in the United States has
suffered all the disasters of the fable, the disasters are
real and have all occurred somewhere, with many towns
suffering a substantial number of them.

The "imagined

tragedy may easily become a stark reality we shall all
know," Carson warns, and her book,

she says, will attempt to

explain how the silencing so far has come about.5
that and more.

It does

It indicts the practices and attitudes that
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have caused such damage,

and urges other actions more

cognizant and more appreciative of how nature works.
The chapter that follows the fable starts immediately
with a direct attack on the way chemicals have been used to
alter nature.

In the long history of living things,

has occurred slowly as species were molded,
by their environment.

No one species —

change

in interaction,

until now —

has

alone had the power to change the networks and cycles of
nature's interactions as man does with his interventions.
This power to change nature has already become what
Carson calls an assault on nature.

A "chain of evil and

death" has been initiated with new, synthetic chemicals.
The new postwar insecticides are made by rearranging
molecules into new structures.6
substances,

not known in nature.

were inorganic,
organic,

The result is new
Most pre-war insecticides

but the postwar synthetic insecticides are

or carbon-compound chemicals.

ability to link with other elements.

Carbon has a high
This means that many

new arrangements can be produced in the laboratory.
nature uses millenia of time to achieve balance,

While

Carson

observes, man is hasty and heedless in his introduction of
new substances into the environment,

and the quantity and

variety of chemicals to which life must now adjust is
staggering.

Most of these synthetics not only act as direct

poisons, but also alter the biological processes of
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oxidation and enzyme production on which normal functioning
of body organs depends.
The new synthetics fall into two main groups:
chlorinated hydrocarbons
organochlorines)

(now sometimes also called

and organophosphates.

The residues from

the spraying or dusting of hydrocarbons are long-lasting in
their toxicity.

Probably most well known among the

hydrocarbons is DDT —

now banned in this country as a

result of the outcry following Silent Spring but still
manufactured here and exported to the third world; dieldrin
and aldrin, more toxic,

remain in use.

Organophosphate

residues decompose more quickly than those of hydrocarbons,
but are poisonous in miniscule amounts.

The organophosphate

malathion was still being

spread from the skies in

California up until 1990,

and is currently applied by

spraying on the ground.7
Carson's writing gives a striking picture of
insecticides in the hands

of the "control men" as an

force in nature and in human life.8

active

Comparing the

unrecognized threat of insecticides to the recognized danger
of radiation,

she warns that

"Chemicals are the sinister

and little-recognized partners of radiation in changing the
very nature of the world."9

Throughout the book she uses

phrases that repeat the theme of hovering danger unheeded:
"chain of poisoning and death";

"impetuous and heedless pace
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of man";
truth";

"a mesmerized state";
"elixirs of death";

menacing shadow";

"tranquilizing pills of half

"ingenious manipulations";

"the enchanted forest of the fairy tales

has become the poisonous forest";
invisible";

"a

"pollution is unseen and

"the shadow of sterility";

"mission of death";

"habit of killing";

"sinister touch of the poison";

"Their

presence casts a shadow that is no less ominous because it
is formless and obscure."10
Carson's,

"Poison," in this account of

becomes an actor in the drama of a threatened

environment.
Carson warns that "insecticides" are in fact biocides,
potential killers of any life,

not just insect life.

There

is only a fraction of time in which to adapt not only to a
great number of chemical poisons, but to an array never
before experienced biologically.
health is threatened,
depend is endangered.

We are at great risk: Our

and the natural world on which we
And yet our goals are unexamined,

and

even our immediate reasons for the use of these chemicals
collapse upon examination, when we see that engineering our
environment with pesticides has allowed the most troublesome
insects to establish themselves in areas chemically stripped
of their natural enemies.

In Carson's judgment it is not

that there is no insect problem, no need of control,

or that

pesticides are never justified, but that the destruction is
out of hand.11

We have much of the necessary ecological

191

knowledge for achieving balance,
use it.

Carson asserts,

but do not

We accept inferior solutions as though we were

"mesmerized," and settle for a changed and unsatisfactory
natural world.

Control agencies and specialists show

"fanatic zeal" and exercise "ruthless power" in pursuit of
an insect-free world.12

"This is an era of specialists...

intolerant of the larger frame...."

The use of chemicals

has been indiscriminate and without advance investigation of
their ecological effects —

an outcome of reliance on these

specialists dominated by profit-driven industry.
the public that takes the risk of this use,

Yet it is

and the public,

Carson says, that should decide whether to continue in the
same direction.13

Environment and Science

This basic argument of Carson's —

that the

indiscriminate use of pesticides that we practice is
ecologically unsound and a danger to human health —

is

buttressed by chapters in her book which provide case
studies of the postwar approach to nature,
criticize that approach.

and which

The record of damage accumulates

in one area of the environment after another:

rivers and

groundwater polluted by seepage and runoff of pesticides;
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contaminated soil that kills plant-assisting organisms as
well as passing on poisons to crops;

fatal damage to trees

and beneficial plants as well as, or even instead of, to
weeds; kill-off of birds,

fish,

livestock,

wildlife and pets

along with insect pests; among humans, permanent damage to
the nervous system and vital organs, sometimes resulting in
death; alteration of life at the cellular level that
threatens both human and non-human genetic heritages;
changes in the environment as a result of chemical attacks
on it that increase the populations of pests; the rapid
evolution of insecticide-resistant insects that threaten
food crops and human health as much as or more than ever
before.

Dangerous chemicals are everywhere,

beings can avoid contact with them.
and water,

in fish,

and no human

They are in the soil

insects, and animals; they are in our

food; they are stored in most human bodies.
Throughout all of this,

science has a dual role.

It is

both "good science" and "bad science," although Carson does
not use these terms or outline an argument about science
separate from her account of the misuse of its inventions,
which follows the misdirection of the attitude of conquest
toward nature.

Science as good science does detailed

ecological studies,

and makes use of the environment itself

and natural biological controls to manage pests.

In

exploring life in cells and at the molecular level, good
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science is an effort of patience and ingenuity and an
achievement of wonder.
awesomeness,

It is humble before nature and its

and is itself awe-inspiring in its reach into

nature's mysteries.

It offers us the knowledge that we must

have so that we may meet our "obligation to endure."14
As bad science,
proud of,

in a history that is not one to be

it develops pesticides out of the death- and

destruction-purposed chemical warfare research of World War
II.

(Insects were used to test the efficacy of the weapons,

and the commercial development of insecticides followed
after the war.)

Bad science is more ingenious in devising

poisons than in studying their effects.
effects is done,
precautionary.

When research into

it is post mortem rather than
This inadequate science specifically

neglects the ecology of the soil;

in its narrow

specialization of applications it ignores ecological
principles in general.

It is complicit in the profit-driven

motives of the chemical industry.

It announces "safe"

levels of toxins as if they could be compartmentalized,

and

leaves "little understood" their "interactions,
transformations,

and summations of effect."15

This

science acts as if it had no knowledge of its own theories
of evolutionary change and adaptation and is taken by
surprise by new generations of insects that no longer
succumb to the killing chemicals science has synthesized.
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It remains intractably in the "Stone Age" of scientific
concepts when it arrogantly asserts that we can control
nature.16

Responses to Silent Soring

The publication of Silent Spring set off a public
debate on environment and health that engaged industry,
government,
safety.
event.
chemical

nature lovers,

and citizens worried about their

Silent Soring was not just a book;

it was a public

The first response to Silent Soring came from the
industry, before publication of the book in

September,

1962, but after condensed excerpts had appeared

in The New Yo r k e r .

A manufacturer of insecticides tried to

discourage publication by telling the publisher that
Carson's statements about chlordane and heptachlor were
inaccurate and disparaging, and

(matching the cold-war,

anti-Communist temper of the times)

added that the chemical

industry was under attack from groups who wished to decrease
the food supply in the United States to the same levels as
in Iron Curtain countries.17
Silent Spring was widely sold, highly criticized,
highly praised.

After its publication,

and

there were many

disparaging reviews from industry sources,

and many positive
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reviews in major newspapers.

The book had a large advance

sale and was a Book of the Month Club selection.
a number one best seller,

It became

and since its first publication

has been through several printings with the original
publisher,

been translated into at least a dozen languages,

won at least eight awards,
million copies.18

and has sold approximately two

When Silent Spring first appeared,

the

chemical industry mounted a public relations campaign
against it, sending out fact kits, press releases,
reviews.19

and book

In a rush to get its point of view known by the

time of the book's publication, Monsanto had a parody
written of Carson's "A Fable for Tomorrow," called "The
Desolate Year," about destruction visited on the land by
insects and plant diseases unchecked by pesticide
controls.20

It was, as feminist scientist Patricia Hynes

later characterized it,

"a hostile parody... written in a

style which mimics and banalizes Carson's writing."21

In

imitation of Carson's naming of the now silent voices that
had once brought pleasure,

it names the swarming,

insects that deform and kill plant life.

unopposed

Carson writes,

"On

the mornings that had once throbbed with the dawn chorus of
robins,

catbirds, doves,

jays, wrens and scores of other

bird voices there was now no sound; only silence lay over
the fields and woods and marsh."22
reads,

The Monsanto article

"[Insects] came creeping and flying and crawling into
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the open.... They were chewers,
spongers,

siphoners and chew-lappers,

progeny were chewers —

rasping,

worms and caterpillars.
poison,

and pierce-suckers,
and all their vast

sawing,

biting maggots and

Some could sting,

many could kill."

some could

As Hynes comments,

this criticism

of Carson exemplifies the view that "Women write life's
poetry while men handle its hard prose."23
The debate over Silent Spring was news.

The

documentary series "CBS Reports" planned a program on it for
April,

1963.

letters —

Before the program was aired,

a thousand

what executive producer Fred Friendly called an

"unprecedented volume" of advance mail —

came in to the

network protesting the forthcoming broadcast.
program sponsors withdrew —
products,

Five of the

among them producers of food

animal feed, and household disinfectants

(all of

which depend on the use of the types of chemicals Carson
d i scusses).

The program aired; Eric Sevareid summarized the

book and interviewed Carson,
officials,

as well as government

and a spokesman for the large chemical

corporation,

American Cyanamid.24

Countering official and

industry claims that the book overstated the problems,
Carson asserted that the public had heard very little about
the hazards and failures of pesticide use, and that her
information would make it possible for them to see the whole
picture.25
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Silent Spring was the catalyst for Congressional
reviews of federal programs related to pesticide use.
executive branch, under President Kennedy,
review, beginning in the fall of 1962.
this committee as well as in the Senate.

The

had its own

Carson testified to
The President's

Science Advisory Committee issued a report, The Use of
Pesticides, in the spring of 1963, that recommended staged
reduction of the use of persistent pesticides until their
use was eliminated.26

The report, coining after an initial

period of strong attack on Silent S p r i n g , was widely seen as
vindicating Carson.27
The debate that centers on Carson,
pesticides,

is not yet dead.

let alone on

A symposium on Silent Spring

was sponsored by the American Chemical Society some twenty
years after the book's publication,
participant,

C. F. Wilkinson,

in 1984.28

A

a specialist in public health

and toxicology, commented:
"In Silent S p r i n g . Carson used pesticides
symbolically to illustrate her view of the dire
consequences of our continued efforts to master
nature through technology.
Despite numerous
scientific inaccuracies and broad unsubstantiated
conclusions, Silent Spring had an enormous impact
on the way pesticides were viewed.
For the first
time, people were made aware of the hidden costs
of pesticides and their potential for causing
adverse effects on human health and the
environment.
The public felt betrayed, and
science and technology, previously considered
valuable allies, were seen as nature's
enemies. ',29
At the same symposium, Shirley Briggs, a longtime
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colleague and friend of Carson's,
Carson Council,

now head of the Rachel

recalled that

"Many reviews [of Silent S p r i n g ! included pat
phrases, such as, 'Of course she exaggerated and
made, mistakes, but in general she was on the right
t r a c k ' . These face-saving phrases have taken on a
kind of immortality; they turn up again and again
from people who admit, when guestioned, that they
do not know of any inaccuracies or mistakes, but
'so many people said there were some'.
We at
Rachel Carson Council have yet to be shown a valid
example, despite the sketchy state of much of the
information available to her at that time.
This
accuracy shows the value of her very conservative
a p p r o a c h .... "30

Changes Since Silent Spring

What changes have there been in pesticide use since
Carson wrote her book?
in 1972

The use of DDT in the US was banned

(with exceptions)31, after years of litigation by

the Environmental Defense Fund.32

Five basic chemical

ingredients of pesticides have been banned for all use,
26 have been restricted.33

and

The testing of toxicity has

increased in quantity of studies and precision of
techniques.34
developments.

But these gains are overshadowed by other
Fifteen years after Silent Spring

(by 1977),

pesticide use by American farmers and gardeners had
increased two and half times.35

David Pimental,

entomologist at Cornell University,

an

notes that "on average,
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crop losses due to Insects have Increased nearly twofold
from the 1940s [to the late 70s]
increase in insecticide use."

in spite of a 10-fold

Among the causes is a change

in farming to monocultures and no-till methods that both
require higher pesticide use and make crops more vulnerable
to pests.

Pimental's judgment is that "Progress has been

made on pesticide problems, but Silent Spring is not
entirely behind us."36
The Environmental Protection Agency estimated in 1984
that approximately 600 basic pesticide chemicals have 45,000
to 50,000 formulations for market use.37

As of 1986, eight

years after the EPA review of the 600 chemicals was begun,
preliminary assessments had been completed on just 124 of
them; no final assessments had been completed.3*
Though chemicals may stay in use while under review,
researchers with the EPA state that "the vast majority of
pesticides produced and used for agriculture when Silent
Spring was published have either been discontinued because
of efficacy problems or environmental concerns or restricted
to specific nonagricultural uses."39

What is meant by this

is that the DDT-type of insecticides

(hydrocarbons or

organochlorines), sometimes called the "old pesticides," are
declining in use.

But because they are persistent in the

environment and in body tissues, they are not gone.
organophosphates,

And

also dating from the 60s, are still in use
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(e.g., m alathion).

The new pesticides

(especially the

carbamates introduced around 1970, similar in action to
organophosphates), though less persistent than the old, have
an increased potential of leaching into the groundwater
through the soil.40

There is a further possible effect on

groundwater from the increasing practice of adding
pesticides to irrigation water; effects have not been
studied.41

Also, the organophosphates and the newer

carbamates are more highly toxic in direct effect on humans
and animals and more dangerous to users applying them.42
"When agriculture and public health services switched from
the organochlorine to the organophosphate and carbamate
insecticides,

human and animal pesticide poisoning increased

worldwide," concludes one of the scientists participating in
the American Chemical Society symposium.43
The agricultural chemist who notes this change also
gives this summary:

"Despite the continuing and spreading

controversy over the use of pesticides,

the use of such

chemicals has increased since the publication of Silent
Spring.

The average annual increase in pesticide use

[as of

the mid-80s] has been about 4 to 5% on a global basis."

The

developed nations use more than half; exact amounts used in
developing countries are difficult to determine.44

But

pesticides are relied upon in the third world for both the
heavily agricultural economies,

and for control of pests
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even in urban areas because of their year-round presence in
tropical climates,

and pesticide use is increasing.

Although direct effects of pesticides on wildlife have
been much studied since the 60s,

less attention has been

paid to effects on human health,45 and according to Russell
Hall,

a researcher with the US Fish and Wildlife Service,

"effects of pesticide use on ecosystems have scarcely been
investigated."46

Research that has been done concerning

human health shows that, since Silent S p r i n g , "the list of
pesticides that have been recognized as a part of the human
body burden has g r o w n . ..

All forms of life have been shown

to contain trace amounts of DDT."47

The Success of Arguments

Much of what Carson argued against —
of pesticides,

the heedless use

the lack of scientific studies of effects,

the turning of a blind eye to ecological complexity, the
overweighted influence of the chemical industry,
bureaucratic self-promotion —

continues as before,

and is

quantitatively intensified.
Four major problems of pesticide use are sometimes
identified: poisoning of humans and animals; persistence in
the environment and as residues on food; resistance
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developing among target species; disposal of wastes and
containers.4®

Scientific knowledge of poisoning is limited

mostly to direct effects, and much remains unknown about the
"secondary" or indirect effects of interactions of different
chemicals on organ function and neurophysiology.

In

addition, human health did not initially receive as much
attention as wildlife poisoning,

and there is an information

lag in this area, particularly with regard to carcinogens,
for which symptoms take years to develop and human testing
is not ethically acceptable.49

Information on persistence

of pesticides in the environment is still coming in for the
"old" pesticides; new pesticides can be used while their
toxicity is still under review,

and the contentious problem

of what tolerances are safe in both direct application of
pesticides and in residues on foods is at present an
unresolved tangle of fact and assumption.

Insect and plant

species continue to develop resistance to insecticides and
herbicides,

and new and untested formulations are thus

developed and introduced into the environment.50

Disposal,

and "Superfund" cleanup, has not progressed beyond the
concept of "safe management" of hazardous waste to the
intent to reduce, detoxify and destroy it.51
At best,

the record is mixed; at worst it is alarming.

But the tenacity of an argument,
public consciousness,

and the impact of it on the

is not simply a matter of the success
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achieved in reaching the intended goal.

The technical

nature of Carson's argument gave a new legitimacy to
"speaking for Nature,"52 and its impassioned commitment set
a high standard of moral purpose that attracted supporters
of conscience,

and those who believe that science has a

moral responsibility to society.
Carson's main argument is that the unthinking use of
new technologies derived from scientific knowledge endangers
the balance of nature and the future of human health.

What

has been praised as a great advance in agricultural
productivity she criticizes as a threat to life.

She

redefines the wonders of science as figures that cast
shadows in which another,
efficacy emerges.

and frightening,

effect of their

She is technical in presenting her

evidence, poetic in her description of the world that can be
lost.
Two years after Silent S p r i n g , a technical and
thoroughly researched book by Robert L. Rudd,

Pesticides and

the Living Landscape.53 also made a strong case that
pesticides threaten all life, not just harmful insects.
Rudd's book, written and completed at about the same time as
Carson's, was delayed in publication as first a trade
publisher and then an academic one wrangled over its
controversial conclusions.54

It is a much less passionate

book than Silent Sp r i n g , drier and more conventionally
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scientific.

It contains information that Silent Spring does

not, but was eclipsed by Carson's book, though it received
many reviews and was published in four countries.
a wildlife biologist,

a Professor of Zoology at the

University of California,
control.

Rudd was

and did work on vertebrate pest

His book cost him a position at the state

agricultural experiment station.55
What Rudd did not do that Carson did was redefine the
meaning of science and its advances in the life of the
ordinary citizen.

Carson did this by touching the ordinary

person's appreciation of nature.

She allied her argument

both with the scientific tradition and with a nature
tradition; she is, like Muller in Mannheim's example of
conservative thought,

at a "juncture" of two ways of

thinking.

Political and Scientific Frameworks

In Silent S p r i n g . Carson emphasizes that it is the
public that takes the risk of the indiscriminate use of
chemicals,

and the public that should decide whether to

continue in the same direction.

She insists that not all

experts are "qualified witnesses," because some have
specialties too narrow to enable them to assess damage to
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wildlife, while others have specific interests in
maintaining the very use of chemicals that needs alternative
evaluation.
Carson's stand on public choice in this specific case
lends support to the more general proposition
her) that in matters of science,

(not stated by

the citizen may judge,

the citizen is given enough information.

if

In fact she also

suggests that the citizen must judge when it is the
citizen's interests

(and life) that are at stake.

experts disagree, who should we believe?
it,

"Which view are we to accept?"

When

Or as Carson puts

Her guiding principle is

that "the credibility of the witness is of first
importance."

Entomologists specialize in insects,

wildlife as a whole,

not in

and they are not "disposed to look for

undesirable side effects" of their control programs.
Wildlife biologists, however, do have the necessary broad
view.56

Many issues concerning choice are untouched here,

but basically,

citizens are to make rational decisions based

on valid testimony.

Since Carson wrote her book the

environmental argument has expanded, and the question of
what scientists to believe, what action to take, and who
should decide on action has appeared across a great variety
of situations.
The relationships between science,
politics keep growing in complexity.

environment,

and

For both scientists
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and environmentalists,

taking sides, being politically

implicated or politically active,

and trying to keep facts

separate from values are issues for which the guidelines are
unresolved.
Two frameworks of understanding contend when we try to
resolve these issues as citizens,
environmentalists.

scientists,

or

We use one framework for our

understanding of politics in a democratic society,

another

framework for our understanding of science as part of our
modern,

technologized world.

The political framework has

been in use for some two centuries,

and has ancient roots in

Greek thought and the Roman emphasis on law.
framework is more recent,

less well-formed,

The scientific
and though it

occurs more and more frequently in our public discourse,
use is not as readily recognized.

its

It is like a relatively

new person who is efficiently active among an established
group of people working together, but who has not yet
established an identity with them —

it is not yet greeted

as a known quantity or acknowledged as a given type.
Both the political and the scientific frameworks are
conceptual frameworks —
society,

one for thinking about politics and

the other for thinking about science and its uses;

both for handling information and making sense of events.
Each framework can also be used
in everyday life,

(as here) more formally than

as an analytical device to see change that
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is occuring in society.
Because the frameworks are popular —
people in general —

that is, used by

they have an element of consensus that

means they are presentations of the way things are
conventionally said to be, not necessarily the way they
actually are.

In order to hold a place in common

understanding,

each framework is a simplified model of

things.

Many elements of actual relationships are left out.

For this very reason, a close look at the frameworks reveals
the conflicts that we experience as a society when complex
changes meet simplified expectations.
Take,

for example, the issue in Silent Spring of

whether goals shall be specialist-determined or citizendetermined.

The idea of citizen participation fits in the

political framework of understanding,

in which the state and

its citizens are linked by rights and obligations.
the liberal

(Enlightenment)

In both

and conservative views that have

influenced American government, human nature itself
determines the nature of this relationship.

Depending on

the conception of human nature, government is
correspondingly either optimistic about or dubious of human
goodness —

emphasizing,

welfare or law and order.

in today's terms,

either social

In this framework of

understanding, material sustenance is provided through the
economy, which supports the state,

and which is in turn at
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least partially safeguarded by the state.

Each of us is a

citizen in respect

to the state, but an individual on his

or

her own in respect

to the economy.

in

the framework; the

framework pre-dates the central role of

science.

rights and obligations are between

What the

Science per se is not

citizen and science are therefore not clear.
have a role like that of the state,
the voice of citizens?

Should science

in which it attends to

Should it be a "representative

government" wherein the public decides?

Or are citizens not

competent to judge scientific matters?
When the emphasis shifts to science itself in the
question of how we shall use science, we are shifting to the
science framework for understanding,

in which the major

relationship is between science and its users or recipients
rather than between the citizen and the state.
is sidelined,

Human nature

and the natural world replaces it as a

determining force, but the natural world does not determine
the relationship between science and its users or recipients
as human nature determines the relationship between citizen
and state.
be.

Instead,

it determines only what science should

Science must answer to the natural world

(its truth

must match that w o r l d ) , but it is not clear whether or not
science must answer to those who receive its effects.

The

rights and obligations between science and its users and
recipients are not clear.

The economy remains as a flanking
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force, with science providing technology to support it.

The

science framework does not include the state or government
or their corollary,
recipient,

the citizen.

The individual,

as user or

is entirely on his or her own with science as

well as with the economy.

Without the presence of the

state, no institution is charged with safeguarding the
citizen.
Of course,

in real life, science and the state cohabit,

and there are many restrictions, permissions,

and

assistances which connect them and redound on citizens and
users.

But no convenient conceptual framework ties together

these arrangements for science matters, which have arisen
pragmatically,

and not also as a result of theory,

occurred in the political sphere.

as

Thus there are heated

arguments over what scientists do or do not owe to citizens
who do not like what they do;

confusion over whether

scientists should give political opinions; debate over how
government influences scientific endeavor and how it makes
use of its fruits.

The ground on which decisions about

these issues should be made is not clear, and we switch
between the political model and the scientific one, when
neither one is adequate.

We are in the midst of a

conceptual s h i f t , trying to find our way to a new framework
of understanding in which science dominates as surely as the
state, but in a different way.

The intellectual awkwardness

of this situation is a sign that we are rearranging the
concepts that guide our actions,

under pressure from another

guiding influence on those actions,

events themselves.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
SCIENCE,

ENVIRONMENT, AND POLITICS

The previous chapter reviewed Silent Sp r i n g , the book that
made environmental damage a public issue.

This chapter

continues consideration of the questions Carson raised about
the uses of science in the context of today's environmental
debate.

Scientists and Environmentalists

If (as suggested in the Introduction)

environmentalism

expresses the view that science should often be viewed with
skepticism,

and institutionalized science expresses the view

that science should be trusted,

are scientists and

environmentalists opposed actors in our society?
Science and environmentalism can be distinguished along
many lines —

institutional, political,

ideological —

but

scientists and environmentalists are not so easy to
separate.

An environmentalist is someone who has already

taken sides in the debate over the seriousness of
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environmental problems.
comparison,

The label

'scientist', by

does not tell us where its owner stands on this

debate or whether he or she has taken any position at all.
There are scientists whose work analyzes or even
improves the environment, but who are not active
environmentalists;

scientists doing this kind of work who

are active environmentalists;

scientists who have been

trained in a non-environmental area but who are active in
arguing environmental causes;

scientists who serve in

environmental agencies of government; scientists who work
for environmental organizations.

Only some of these

scientists go over a line that separates scientist from
environmentalist.

In the ethos of science,

objectivity resembles neutrality,
on objectivity.

Understandably,

because

non-neutrality casts doubt
scientists are not

occupationally disposed to activism or outspoken stances.
Sometimes scientists and environmentalists stand apart
on issues,

sometimes together.

Environmentalists rely on

scientific data to give warning about the state of the
environment.

Conflicting interpretations can be found among

scientists about the meaning of data,

so that some

scientists will be aligned with environmentalists on the
direction in which the facts are said to be leading,
some will not.
the environment,

and

Scientific disagreement over the state of
and what,

if anything,

to do about it,

is a
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constant in the environmental debate.

But it is the

exception rather than the rule for scientists to take
activist stands.

Taking Sides

In a forum on man and nature sponsored by Harper's
magazine, April,

1990, participants were given a

hypothetical situation:

an elderly resident has willed

several hundred acres of farmland and woodland to a
community with 15% unemployment, where there is pressure for
land development.

Most of the participants have tried to

come up with ways to conserve much or all of the land as is.
The discussion continues:

Michael Pollan [Executive Editor of H a r p e r ' s i :
"Well, I have decided that you guys have your
heads in the clouds.
I am going to develop the
entire square mile by selling five-acre plots.
You've tried to stop me but everything —
petitions, lawsuits, protests — has failed.
The
political process is over.
It's America.
It's
democracy.
Do you go home now?"

Dava Foreman [Founder of Earth First!, known for
espousing "monkey wrenching," or sabotaging of
construction or resource-use projects that are
opposed by environmental g r o u p s ] : "I never go
h o m e ."

Pollan: "What do you do?"
Foreman: "Conservationists have a fully equipped
toolshed and use the proper tool for the proper
job at the proper time."

Robert D. Yaro [Senior Vice President of the New
York City area's Regional Plan Association]: "Are
hatchets in your toolshed?"

Foreman: "Lots of things are in there!"
Pollan: "And after politics are exhausted?"
Foreman: "Oh, you might start by pulling up survey
stakes.
And you might want to engage in some
paper monkey-wrenching, to slow things down.""

Yaro: "Paper can be one of the most effective
tools.
You know, this society can't do things
very quickly, but it is brilliant at slowing
things down."

Pollan: "Suppose Dave called you the night before
the bulldozers showed up.
He's planning to pour
something in the gas tanks.
Will you help him?"
Frederick Turner [Founders Professor of Arts and
Humanities at the University of Texas, Dallas]:
"People do what they are best equipped to do.
I'm
not a politician.
My inclination would be to use
art, theater, poetry, and song.
The power of a
good song, like the coal miners' strike songs, is
terrific."

Daniel B. Botkin [Professor of Biology and
Environmental Studies at the University of
California, Santa Barbara]:
"I agree with Fred.
What I bring to the environmental area is my
reputation as an objective scientist who can
evaluate the land.
To pour something in a gas
tank — "
Foreman: "—

grinding compound — "

Botkin: "— would destroy my credibility.
must play different roles."

We all

James Lovelock [Biologist who developed the Gaia
theory that the earth as a whole fine-tunes the
balance of minerals, plants, animal life, and
atmospheric chemicals in the manner of a self
regulating s y s t e m ] : "Dave, it just so happens
that my main line of work is as an inventor.
I
can think of a lot of things I could do to those
bu lldozers."
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Foreman: "Let's talk."
Lovelock: "See, if I really felt strongly about
this issue, I would be obliged to act, even at the
risk of losing credibility."1
In this discussion,

one scientist says radical action would

compromise his objectivity; another says he might take that
risk for issues he feels strongly about.

One is willing to

mix science and social values under certain conditions;
another is not.

According to the conventional view,

science

must be free from supporting this value or that one in order
to maintain its objectivity; by extension,
individual scientists.
indicates,

Scientists,

so must

as this brief example

are not of one mind about what appropriate

scientific behavior is under all circumstances.
And on environmental issues themselves,
take different positions.

scientists also

For example, a scientific

conference gives an alert on environmental peril:
"At a forum on 'Global Change and Our Common
Future' organized by the National Academy of
Sciences and the Smithsonian Institution, speakers
repeatedly urged that major economic, scientific
and political resources be immediately committed
to solving problems like global warming and the
depletion of the earth's protective ozone layer...
[Also mentioned were] prospective food
shortages, possible on a catastrophic s c a l e . ..
A main message of the forum, said Martin
Holdgate, director of the International Union for
the Conservation of Nature and former chief
science advisor to the British Government, was
that 'we would be incredibly stupid not to take
these dangers as real.'"2
But Dixy Lee Ray,

former head of the Atomic Energy
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Commission,

former Governor of Washington,

biologist by training,

and a marine

takes another stance as a strong

proponent of technological development.

In an article

entitled "Who Speaks For Science?" she gives her views on
environmental threats:
"Repeatedly... the American public has been
subjected to a litany of catastrophe — to
predictions of impending disaster...: The oceans
are dying, the atmosphere is poisoned, the Earth
itself is losing its capacity to support l i f e . ..
It's all pretty heady stuff, but is it true?..
False, exaggerated, or misleading information
persists... [through] dissemination of...
factoids. Examples... are: PCB's cause cancer;
any level of radiation is harmful; acid rain is
caused by sulfur dioxide from burning coal...
It is up to good scientists to w e e d . ..
[scientific] phonies out, but we don't do it.
Rather, we allow, by our silence, such renegade
organizations as the Union of Concerned Scientists
to present itself as the 'voice of the scientific
community'.
They back up the Helen Caldicotts,
Barry Commoners, Paul Ehrlichs, Amory Lovinses,
and other pretenders."3
The named "pretenders" have warned,
health hazards of nuclear radiation,
poisoning of the environment,

respectively,

of the

of technology-driven

of overpopulation leading to

famine and possibly war, and of the misguidedness of "hard"
fossil-fuel and nuclear energy production compared to "soft
energy" alternatives.

221
The Voice

of Science

Are these contrasting scientific opinions 'scie n c e '
speaking?

If there is a voice of science,

organizations,

scientific conferences,

Or is it individual scientists?

is it scientific

government agencies?

Is the voice of science in

pronouncements on issues, or is it in the day-to-day work
and the highly specific and technical reports that never
reach a general,

layperson public?

Is science a

collectivity that is more than the sum of its parts,

or is

it a collection of disparate pieces that just happen to go
by the same name?
Science obviously does not have one voice, because it
does not have just one character.

Science is an ideal in

the sphere of knowledge as well as an economic undertaking.
It has locations in the worlds of business, government,
academia.
not)

It is present in our technology and

in our science fiction.

and

(accurately or

The voice of science that

reaches the general public comes through many channels:
newspapers and news magazines; news, science, medical,

and

nature programs on TV; popular science and environmental
magazines; newsletters; books; events such as Earth Day and
entertainment benefits with environmentally-committed movie
stars and musicians;
practitioners.

and person to person through medical

This voice of science is not primarily the
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voice of scientists, yet scientists themselves are the
original source of this mediated information.

It's

therefore important to find out what happens to the voice of
the scientist.

Scientists

What is a scientist?

Miriam Rothschild is a self-

taught naturalist known for her research on fleas.
writes:

"Looking back on my childhood,

naturalists are born and not made.
naturalist,

She

I am convinced that

My father was a keen

but although we all shared the same upbringing

[in her early childhood,

in pre-World War I Hungary], my

siblings were not hooked on plants and insects in the way I
was."

Her father died when she was young,

and Rothschild

was educated at home by a governess "with absolutely no
knowledge of the natural world.

At the age of 17,

I

insisted on attending evening classes at the Chelsea
Polytechnic,

but up to then I was entirely self-taught."

After "75 years as a passionate naturalist," she concludes:
"I am a naturalist, not a scientist.
I have a
vivid emotional love of the natural world from
rain clouds to tapeworms, and my enthusiasm has
lured me into varied investigations.
Furthermore,
I love discussing my favorite topics, be they
birds or flowers, trees or fleas, and burning the
midnight oil, enthralled, while reading about
other people's observations and discoveries.
This

has resulted in my publishing 300 papers and
books, which some might glorify with the title of
scientific research.
But have no illusions — curiosity, a keen eye,
a good memory and boundless delight and enjoyment
of the animal and plant world, with perhaps a
little intuition thrown in, do not make a
scientist; one of the outstanding and essential
qualities required is self-discipline, a quality I
lack.
A scientist requires not only selfdiscipline but hard training, perseverance,
energy, determination, judgment and a goal.
If
you can combine the two, you get the best of both
w o r l d s .1,4
Another view on what a scientist is comes from the
joint writings of Richard Levins, a population biologist,
and Richard Lewontin,
University.

a zoologist, both at Harvard

"Modern science," they state,

"is a product

capitalism" and its needs to expand and to transform
production.

And

"scientists have become 'scientific manpower'...
The creative parts of scientific work are more and
more restricted to a small fraction of the working
scientists, the rest are increasingly
proletarianized."
"The class divisions that plague our society as
a whole also cut across the ranks of science... In
between [class] extremes [of proletariat and
bourgeois investors] is the group of petty
bourgeois professionals working alone or in small
groups in universities and research institutes.
Although they may be motivated by a great
diversity of concerns, their activity depends
increasingly on obtaining funding from government
agencies, private foundations, or corporations."5
Despite the diversity of concerns and beliefs among
scientists,

Levins and Lewontin say, there is an implicit

ideology that all scientists receive.

Among its

characteristics is the separation of thought from feeling
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Their comments on this separation throw additional light on
Rothschild's self-description:
"The supposed superiority of thinking over feeling
implies that those who withhold feelings are
superior to those who express them.
One result is
that women, socialized in our society as the
custodians of feeling, must either suppress
themselves in order to do science or must be
systematically underestimated, as if 'more
emotional' meant less rational."6
The non-scientific-ness of emotion is a repeated theme
of the criticism Rachel Carson received for her book,

Silent

S p r i n g . and it reoccurs in a comment made by the editors of
Silent Spring Revisited, a volume based on a symposium
sponsored by the American Chemical Society.7
"In one respect at least, our book is likely to
fail: we cannot match Rachel Carson's language and
imagery.
These chapters were written by
practicing scientists, schooled in the need to be
conservative in their interpretation of data, to
write directly, and to avoid emotionalism."8
By this the authors imply that Carson, who was trained as a
marine biologist, was, because of her passionate commitment
to a cause, not a scientist,

or not scientific.9

It may be

that Miriam Rothschild is right, and that naturalists are
born,

and scientists are made, but scientists are made not

just by characteristics of their personality

(such as the

self-discipline Rothschild ci t e s ) , but by a social process.
This process includes educational opportunities and a
division of labor in which class,
implicated.10

race and gender are

The state of the economy and the politics of

funding for scientific research are equally part of the
process.

Science is not just scientists carrying out their

research.

Science and Politics

The possibilities of social action on environmental
problems necessarily involve all parties in politics,
a politics that is being redefined by science.
science is doing to politics

but in

To see what

(and politics to science), we

can first take some vignettes from events on the
environmental front from the past few years.
Joshua Lederberg is a Nobel laureate in biology and
past president of Rockefeller University.

In a newspaper-

sponsored roundtable discussion in 1983, he talked about
science and politics:
"Q: To what extent do you think that science today
has been politicized?
There was, for example, the
trial in Salt Lake City where scientists disputed
whether radioactivity from atomic tests in the
1950s caused subsequent disease among Utah
citizens.
It seems that science asks people to
believe in the reliability of results.
Yet here
was conflict.

Dr. Lederberg: Why do you call that
politicization?
Q: Radioactivity is a politically charged issue.

Dr. Lederberg: In Utah, at least, a large part of
the controversy concerns the amount of
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radioactivity released and the extent of human
exposure to it.
The answers have a lot to do with
the records that were kept and the credibility of
the institutions involved.
Of course, people's
institutional affiliations will have a lot to do
with what they say about the authenticity and
veracity of records of past events.
Q: Isn't that politics?

Dr. Lederberg: Yes, but it may not be politicizing
s cie n c e .
Q: There is an interesting conflict here, since
policymakers must pass legislation... and they
turn to scientists for a basis for rulemaking..
But scientists don't always have the experimental
data to provide such a basis.
How should they
deal with the legislators' demands?

Dr. Lederberg: The scientists' job is to tell them
the health risks; value judgments belong to a
larger sphere.
That's a naive theory of
separation, but it's something we ought to aspire
to."11
Whatever the merits of Lederberg's aspiration to the
separation of fact and value,

scientific findings and

political policy do interact.

The debate over global

warming provides an example of a political attempt to change
the meaning of findings presented by a scientific
researcher.

James Hansen is an atmospheric physicist who is

the director of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration's Goddard Institute for Space Studies.
Rolling Stone put him in their Earth Day Hall of Fame
because he "first called America's attention to the
greenhouse effect with his dramatic testimony before
Congress during the torrid summer of 1988."12

That
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testimony included the statement that he was "99%" sure that
the warming trend he found in the 80s was not a chance
event,

and that it was time to stop "waffling" about the

contribution of greenhouse gases, mostly the product of
human activity,

to global warming.

His certainty became a

media event.13
The year after his Congressional testimony on global
warming,

in 1989, Hansen charged the Office of Management

and Budget

(part of the executive branch of the U.S.

government) with changing his written testimony before it
was delivered to Congress.

The change was made "over his

protests, making his conclusions about the effects of global
warming seem less serious and certain than he intended.”14
Hansen's computer models of the global environment sparked
disagreement within the scientific community as well as
within the Administration.
Stephen H. Schneider is a climatologist and head of
Interdisciplinary Climate Systems at the National Center for
Atmospheric Research, which is sponsored by the National
Science Foundation.

He is a publicly active scientist who

has testified before many government committees,
books on global warming for the layperson.

and written

Commenting on

Hansen's assertions about global warming, he says that
Hansen's statistical methods don't warrant a "99%" certain
conclusion.

"Despite these qualifications," he says,

"I
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fully agree with Jim that it is much more likely than not
that the greenhouse gas buildups in this century have
contributed to the observed global warming.

It is simply

impossible to assign formal probabilities without making
intuitive assumptions."15
Schneider draws this distinction for scientists who
advise the government:

it was not acceptable for the Office

of Management and Budget to alter Hansen's scientific
conclusions,

but it would have been acceptable if they had

altered his policy opinions.16

Also, Schneider observes,

scientific conclusions require full disclosure about
uncertainties and what is not known; policy conclusions
often require simple and dramatic statements in order to
capture media and thus public attention.17
leaves plenty of room for misunderstanding,

Simplification
and "Scientists

who go public with their work, particularly if it could
potentially affect policy, often meet with a mixed reception
from their own colleagues."18
Hansen himself has had this to say:
"I am not an environmentalist...
I think an
environmentalist knows what his objectives are and
tends to cite evidence that supports his
conclusions.
Environmentalists are not interested
in evidence that minimizes these conclusions.
A
scientist has to report his results whether they
support his conclusions or not.
A scientist has
to give the full relevant caveat.
I am and want
to be a scientist who looks at problems without a
prior inclination.
But on the other hand, I also
think I should be allowed to say what I believe
without interference."19
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Separate Frameworks

Because we have two separate frameworks for thinking
about scientific matters and political matters, while in
actuality science and politics combine, we have difficulty
establishing how it is that science should
society.
events.

'be' in our

This difficulty is equally caused by conflicting
Both intellectually and materially,

science and

politics are in a contradictory relationship as well as an
interconnected one.
The ambiguous role of science in the public arena
it separate from politics or not?),

(Is

and the conflicts this

ambiguity engenders are not a major theme of the first best
seller environmental warning, Silent S p r i n g .

It appears

that for Carson good science is half the solution to the
problem:

science that is comprehensive and thorough,

science

that is not held hostage to bureaucratic promotion of
government programs and economic self-interest.
knows

(and comments)

Yet Carson

that science is not independent from

government funding and government manipulation of scientific
intentions in specific programs,

so citizens must take up

the other half of the solution.

The framework for thinking

about science is as much a part of her analysis as the
political framework is: Citizens have been made passive
recipients of scientific ingenuity,

and there's no mechanism
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in place for making either scientists or the government take
responsibility for the effects of scientific invention.
if citizens speak and government acts,

But

things can be

righted; the political framework is still a major point of
reference.

Yet this political framework alone is not

enough; the word of science must be added to it.
addition raises difficulties,

however.

Citizens must hold the state to its promise
contract)

Such an

(or its

to behave according to certain values given to

human life,

liberty, and well being.

In the framework for

politics, values reside with the state as well as with the
citizen,
actions.

and both are expected to carry out appropriate
In the science framework, however, values do not

reside in science,
of the state

although it occupies a position like that

(central to collective a c t i o n ) .

Science fends

off the explicit attachment of values to its purpose and
activities;

it separates itself from value-motivated action.

There is supposed to be a separation between fact and value,
between science and public policy.

Values are located only

in the public policy sphere, not in the domain of science.
So Stephen Schneider could say it would be alright to change
James Hansen's public policy recommendations,

but not his

scientific conclusions, and Joshua Lederberg can aspire to
separate fact from value in the matter of assessing the
risks of radiation.

But in actuality,

science supports
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prevailing bureaucratically-established values by not
examining them when it gives its findings and accompanying
recommendations to government panels.
loses its voice.20
explanation,
separate,

In this respect it

As guides to understanding and

the political and scientific frameworks remain

and scientists cannot speak across the gap.

The Direction of Scientific Activity

Because of the political and economic supports of and
restrictions on science,

even though many leading voices of

environmental concern are those of scientists,

the direction

and outcome of scientific activity in modern society does
not work toward ecological balance in the natural world.
Rather,

scientific activity is channeled toward

environmentally destructive technologies and policies,
toward an environment that is considered to be external to
the science and productive activities that are,
within the environment and part of its ecology.

in fact,
Scientific-

technological activity is still directed more toward
manipulating and dominating the natural world than toward
the responsiveness to it that is necessary to prevent
environmental destruction.

Manipulation of the natural

world has been the source of much human power and progress,
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but this manipulation is now up against natural limits.

Our

power to change nature now includes the power to destroy the
web of life that supports our own life, totally.
This recognition of possible impending death for
humankind is a scientific recognition,

but whether we are

close or far from such a fate is much argued in the world of
science,

and out of it.

Not everyone shares a sense of

alarm, but some individual scientists would like to see the
current direction of scientific activity changed.

Some

twenty years ago, on the occasion of the first Earth Day
(1970),

Rene Dubos, a microbiologist and author of many

popular books with scientific themes,

indicated the need for

a means by which individual concern could act.

In a

handbook prepared for an environmental teach-in on Earth
D a y , Dubos w r o t e :
"I do hope that [the teach-in] will help alert
public opinion to the immediacy of the ecologic
crisis... I know that many scientists and
technologists would welcome a form of public
pressure that would provide them with the
opportunity to work on problems of social
importance.
The colossal inertia and rigidity — if not
indifference — of social and academic
institutions makes it unlikely that they will
develop effective programs of action or research
focused on environmental problems.
Two kinds of
events, however, may catalyze and accelerate the
process.
One is some ecological catastrophe that
will alarm the public....
Another... is the
emergence of a grassroots movement, powered by
romantic emotion as much as by factual knowledge,
that will give form and strength to the latent
public concern with environmental quality..."21
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Science and Social Goals

An argument for the environment is not simply either
scientific or 'environmental';

it is likely to be both.

The

differences come over how science is to be used or to be
done.

Few scientists would disagree that science should be

used to the benefit of society, but when it comes to
directing scientific activities to specific social goals,
scientific caution intervenes.
find a "cure" for cancer,

While it is a social goal to

this social goal can be worked

toward through specific scientific activities —
instance,

for

research into the structure and behavior of cells.

"Society" will then put the findings to use,

reducing the

incidence of cancer and stopping or slowing the course of
the disease once it occurs in the individual's body.

It

will do this through care given by private physicians,
through public health clinics,
public,

use of medicinal drugs,

through education of the
and possibly,

lifestyle

changes.
The scientist provides the information; society goes
into action.

This is the model which accompanies the

objective or ideal of separating fact from value.
course,

Of

society must make the research possible through

private and government funding, and provide the institutions
of education and communication that support scientific work.
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But the scientist,

in this model, does not do the follow-

through, and does not even push hard for the follow-through
to happen, although she or he may make recommendations to
government panels and private-sector nonprofit
organizations.

The scientist continues to do still more

scientific research, while other specialists —
lobbyists, administrators,

social workers,

politicians,

outreach people -

- provide funding to disseminate recommendations,

put health

programs into place, and make the new therapies available.
This separation enables the scientist to maintain the stance
of objectivity through silence.
speak out.

But sometimes scientists do

Why?

Voices are raised to be heard where issues are
contested; American society is already committed to fighting
cancer

(although researchers in the field probably feel it

is not committed enou g h ) .
environmental action

It is not committed to

(although it has become politically

popular to act as though it w e r e ) , and is inactive on the
environment at a time when inaction itself is seen as a
threat.

The danger of inaction provides scientists with the

condition for speaking out.
The question of how science should 'be' in society —
connected to our values or totally separate from them —

is

also a question of how scientists should act in society and,
conversely,

a question of what society should demand of its
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scientists or allow them to do.

We come here to the problem

mentioned in Chapter One, that of speaking of society as
though it were a unitary actor, and of scientists as if they
also amounted to a unitary actor.

To phrase the situation

as if it were this way is only to use a shorthand.

The

polarity of science-skeptic and science-truster which is
found in contemporary American society cannot be understood
simply as antagonistic actors located in specific
occupational and social positions.
abstractions,

Theoretical

centered on concepts which guide thought and

influence action,

are necessary to identify the polarity,

both in thought and in society.
The question of whether science should

(or can)

remain

separate from social values is sometimes expressed as the
question of scientific autonomy:

Is science to remain

autonomous,

free from the political sphere of social values,

or must it,

in the face of the environmental threat to our

survival,

adopt specific social goals

population control)

(for example,

as also priority scientific goals?

Is science to be autonomous science or servant science?
At the National Academy of Sciences conference on Global
Change and Our Common Future, mentioned above, speakers said
that the economy,

science, and politics must all be

committed to solving environmental problems.

This is

science serving society, but it is not science in service to

society.

It is science bestowing the gift of knowledge,

science forced to adopt a political ideology.
this role is not a servant;

Science in

it is master in its role of

solving the problems of material life.
sense,

not

In a very broad

science that serves society by bestowing knowledge is

some form of servant science, but there is an ideological
debate about autonomous science/servant science in which the
issue is not this type of service.22

The debate is about

ideal types, about a particular kind of autonomy and a
particular kind of servant role.

The argument for autonomy

ignores the dialectical complexities implied in the
autonomous/servant dichotomy,

and assumes that science can

stand solely on one side of the relationship,
the characteristics of that side.

having only

The argument that denies

either the possibility or the desirability of autonomy
claims that science is dependent on the society from whose
values it wishes to stand aloof, even while it is dominant
in that society epistemologically and insitutionally.
"Science," as objectivity,

is itself a value in society,

science wants to be valued by society in this way.

and

By this

argument there is no complete autonomy from social values
for science,

only a particular kind of autonomy,

respect to certain requirements and not others.

autonomy in

Tacit Trust in Science

Environmental

issues are conventionally debated on the

level of specific problems and remedies,
level of underlying issues.

and not on the

Some of the topics from a

collection of "opposing viewpoints" on the environmental
crisis exemplify this positivist approach of only dealing
with the facts in front of us:

"Environmental Pollution

Causes Cancer"/"Environmental Pollution Does Not Cause
Cancer";

"Rigorous Testing Protects Consumers From

Pesticides"/"Rigorous Testing Does Not Protect Consumers
From Pesticides.1,23

There are many arguments of this type

being constantly offered in reports, books,
conferences.

news, and

There are other arguments made about the roles

of industry and government, about population growth,

and

sometimes about the global interconnections of economy and
environment.

There are very few arguments directly about

science, however.

Such arguments still circulate mostly in

the academic world; some reach a wider,

nonfiction-reading

audience.24
These arguments are,
response to critique.

for the most part, critique and

There are few scientists outside of

the academic debate who feel it necessary to speak in
support of science.

There is no need; science already has

legitimating power.

It is particularly difficult to find
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scientists urging trust in science in the environmental
debate.

In the terms that I have used, there are few

prominent science-truster voices.

One could take this to

mean that there are few scientists who have that argument to
make,

but the seemingly inexorable movement of science along

the path that science skeptics warn against suggests that
that is not the case.

Instead, these voices are few to be

found because of the characteristics of science in society,
and because of the fact-centered level of the debate.
The relevant characteristics of science in society are
that,

first,

since science bestows legitimacy on action,

stance of trust in science is implicit,

rather than

articulated.

scientists are

Second,

as already noted,

occupationally disposed to silence
interests of neutrality.

(in public)

the

in the

Third, they are themselves well

aware of the complexities and imperfections of science as
practice and as institutional pursuit, and unless thrust
into a polarizing situation,

have little reason to mount an

argument for the public which glosses over those
complexities.

And finally, when scientists do speak,

they

confine themselves to the specifics of their specialty,
again being professionally inclined to restrict their
speech.

Only as the public's challenges to the uses and

direction of science become more insistent will voices that
urge trust be as prominent as the ones that now warn against
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the course our science and technology are now taking.

That

this challenge will increase, and that the debate will
sharpen,

is indicated,

I believe, by the growing centrality

of science to our collective and personal concerns.

Skepticism of Science

A fully-developed argument about the directions,
and epistemological suppositions of science,
intersection with politics,
debate.

uses

and their

is not yet evident in public

There is no argument centered on science which is

yet comparable to the conservative style of thought as
retrospectively analyzed by Mannheim —

an argument

developed over time with many individual contributors, which
coalesced within a group with a particular social location.
That argument about science is still developing;
noticeable in its public form,
arguments that I call
style of thought.

it is most

I maintain,

in environmental

(following Mannheim)

an environmental

Murray Bookchin and Barry Commoner, to be

discussed in later chapters, have both contributed to
building an argument which penetrates through surface issues
to the underlying dynamics of environmental crisis.
Bookchin finds the root of our problems in hierarchical
society: where man dominates man

(and particularly,
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dominates w o m a n ) , man will dominate nature.

Commoner argues

that the reductionist direction of today's life sciences
atomizes our knowledge of the environment and our action
toward it, in contradiction with the holistic reguireraents
of ecological balance.

The developing field of

environmental ethics will also contribute to a sciencecentered argument,

as will debates over medical technologies

and genetic engineering.
The first crack in the picture of a perfect science
perfect in neutrality and beneficial effect —
atomic bomb.

came with the

The next came with the environmental crisis.

The perfect picture,
were knowledgable,

of course, was never held by those who

but it was held by the public,

and it was

environmental warnings that reached the public which began
to build, directly and indirectly,
about science in society.

a case for skepticism
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CHAPTER NINE
SCIENCE QUESTIONED

The previous chapter discussed the voices of science and the
question of how science should 'be' in society.

This

chapter reviews a book that followed a few years after
Silent S p r i n g , which warned of scientific ingenuity
misapplied to the environment.

This later book questioned

science itself, and claimed that environmental problems were
in part the outcome of a theoretical bias in the biological
sciences and of trends in scientific practice which
threatened scientific integrity.

Science Out of Hand

Barry Commoner's Science and S u r v i v a l , published in
1966 but including writings going back to 1963, begins:

"The

age of innocent faith in science and technology may be
over."1

Throughout the book Commoner develops the argument

that science,

though it has brought us many benefits in

medical knowledge,

new products,

and innovative methods of
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production,

is getting out of control.

make science more responsible;

Commoner wants to

in particular he wants

scientists to take the responsibility to provide information
to the public about new scientific knowledge.
One of the reasons for having doubts about science and
technology is that our ability to build sophisticated
automatic systems has outstripped our ability to control
them.

As example, Commoner recalls the electric power

blackout of November 1965 in the northeastern United States
and Canada.

A complex network linking power facilities over

an 80,000 square-mile area enabled one facility to take over
when another failed.

But when the failure of a relay switch

at one station sent power surging to another,

safety

switches there shut it down? in a chain reaction,

safety

switches shut down one plant after another as power surged
through the system.

As each part of the system shut down,

another part of the northeast was abruptly covered in
darkness.
Commoner does not bother to paint the picture that many
of his readers would remember: Traffic lights stopped
functioning,

street lights went out; elevators halted in

their shafts and passengers remained immured in the dark for
hours;

lights went out and refrigerators went off in homes

and businesses; emergency generators switched on in
hospitals,

and staff nervously wondered if the emergency
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electrical supply would be adequate.

TV was gone; you got

your news from a "portable" radio or from people who had
heard the news on the car radio as they drove home from work
in a darkened world.

The constant activity of modern life

was brought to a dead stop in some places;
on in others.

it went crawling

Most people had no idea that such a total

blackout could happen; power failures were usually local,
the result of damage from storms.

Clearly,

the designers of

the power network had not foreseen the possibility that the
system that was designed to prevent just such an occurence
had instead speeded its happening.
But Norbert Wiener,

the cybernetician who had died just

the year before, would not have been surprised,
says.

Commoner

In 1960, Wiener stated that machines could be built

which "'escape from the complete effective control'" of
their makers.2

The power failure was a "blunder," as

Commoner puts it, and he goes on to tell of another of equal
magnitude,

although its chain reaction took place over years

rather than minutes.

Radioactive fallout from nuclear tests

in the atmosphere in the western states in the 1950s,

in

which the Atomic Energy Commission saw no hazard, by the
late 1960s appeared to be the cause of thyroid problems in
the region's children.

The AEC had overlooked the

possibility that radioactive iodine, though only lightly
deposited on the ground, would be concentrated in the milk
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of the dairy cows that grazed the area, and further
concentrated in the developing glands of young children who
drank the milk.

"In both cases," Commoner observes,

"the

process was over and the damage done before we understood
what had happened."3

Both cases

"have cast a shadow — small, but deeply troubling
— over the brilliance of... scientific successes.
Is it possible we do not know the full
consequences of the new power grids and the new
bombs?
Are we really in control of the vast new
powers that science has given us, or is there a
danger that science is getting out of hand?"4
Twenty-five years later we are well aware that we did not
know the full consequences of many of our new, postwar
technologies,

but in the early 1960s this awareness was not

widespread.
Commoner titles his second chapter "The Sorcerer's
Apprentice."

He is not alone among scientists in referring

to the story in which new found expertise practiced without
wisdom and foresight brings serious trouble.
post-war world,

As he sees the

advances in scientific knowledge have been

great, but simple necessities of life are becoming
problematic.

The environment is polluted.

The burning of

fuels is producing a greenhouse effect in the atmosphere;
automobile exhausts are creating smog.

Leaded-gasoline auto

exhaust also contaminates water and crops.

Despite the

nuclear test ban treaty of 1963, as Commoner writes this
book nuclear explosions are still occurring in the

247

atmosphere and spreading radiation across thousands of
miles; people are found to have radioactive strontium-90 in
their bones and teeth.

Groundwaters in the United States

are polluted by industrial wastes,

sewage,

and fertilizer

runoff; detergents choke streams and foam out of water taps
until a ban on their non-biodegradable,
hydrocarbon ingredient in 1965.

synthesized

Insecticides such as DDT

kill more life than they are intended to, again in chain
reactions.

Commoner cites the case of a Bolivian town where

DDT killed most of the domestic cats as well as the malarial
mosquitoes; with the cats gone the town was invaded by a
rodent that carried black typhus, which killed several
hundred villagers before cats were once again brought in.
Again and again,

Commoner cites examples of ecological

complexity and interrelationships where harmful consequences
of chain reactions are not foreseen.

Some, such as the

indiscriminate killing by DDT, are foreseeable; some,
the effects of radiation could,
dissemination,

not be foreseen.

like

for lack of knowledge or its
Detergents were another

"massive intervention into nature" which were a
technological mistake.5
The problems engendered by detergents, nuclear tests,
automobile exhausts, pesticides and fertilizers "have a
common scientific background.

Each of them springs from a

useful technological innovation."6

Should we then pull
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from this type of

scientific development?

The

scientific revolution at the turn of the century, coming
from the discovery of the physics of the atom, brought
"the great flowering of modern science —
including the new energy sources and synthetic
substances which have covered the earth with
pollution.
We are today witnessing the inevitable
impact of the tidal wave created by a scientific
revolution more than half a century old.
It is
simply too late to declare a moratorium on the
progress of science.
The real question is not
whether we should use our new knowledge, but how
to use it."7
Further,
"Since the scientific revolution which generated
modern technology took place in physics, it is
natural that modern science should provide better
technological control over inanimate matter than
over living things.
This disparity is evident in
our environmental problems."8
There have always been risks in the advance of science,
Commoner allows, but with the increase of the power of
science there is also an increase in risk,
brief events —

from local and

such as exploding steam boilers —

and persistent problems —

such as fallout.

error has become very much reduced."9

to global

The "margin for

In all the examples

Commoner cites, he points out, risk was taken before it was
fully understood what the risk was.

We are in danger, he

says, not just from the hazards we risk, but from "an
incipient abdication of one of the major duties of science - prediction and control of human interventions into
nature."10

Both scientist and citizen should be concerned
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about this duty,

and we must understand how it is that this

near-abdication has occurred.
Commoner is already,

in the first pages of his brief

book, discussing science itself,

and its role in society,

much more than was done in Carson's book —

though she also

stresses the lack of prediction and foresight.

The Direction of Science

"Many of our recent technological mistakes crop up as
an unexpected biological aftermath of a new advance in
physics or chemistry," observes Commoner.

Yet at the same

time there are claims of "sweeping advances in our basic
understanding of life."11

This paradox is the outcome of

the practice of two kinds of biology:

classical —

the study

of the cell as the basic unit of life; and molecular —
which "assumes that the separate, chemical constituents of
the cell....

account for life."12

Commoner notes that

molecular biology is considered new, and cell biology old,
with the implication that the old must give way to the new
as science advances.

But both types of biology, he says,

have nearly 200-year old histories.
Classical biology began with description and
classification; this classificatory achievement still
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stands.

With the development of the microscope,

the cell

was found to be the "universal unit" of living things.
"Separated from the organism the cell still
retains the features of vitality: metabolic
transformations of food substances, responsiveness
to environment, energetic activity, reproduction,
and inheritance.
But when the cell is
dismembered, these capabilities are lost, even
though certain isolated parts, such as enzymes,
are able for a time to carry out one or another
chemical reaction."13
While classical, or cell, biology studies the structure of
the cell, another approach,

in which most constituents must

be removed from the cell for analysis,
chemistry.

studies its

The biochemistry of the cell, which has branched

off in one direction into molecular biology,
the discovery of hemoglobin

has gone from

(a protein which enables blood

to carry oxygen throughout the body)

to the discovery of DNA

(nucleic acids whose molecular structure encodes
'instructions for life').
great discoveries,

Molecular biology has achieved

but in its necessary procedure which

kills the cell, Commoner says, a subtle property is lost.
Commoner is not making a claim for vitalism —

the idea of a

life force added to "otherwise lifeless substance"; he is
presenting a systems-view of emergent properties of the
whole not discernible in isolated parts.
In the argument between molecular and cell biology,
cell biology considers itself holistic,
biology atomistic.

and molecular

Molecular biology considers cell biology
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dated; the cutting edge and the funding money is in
molecular biology.
published,

In 1966, when Commoner's book was

the discovery of DNA was thirteen years old, and

the field that was built on it was still new.

Commoner

argued that the results of experiments with DNA and RNA had
been too greatly generalized, to come to mean that DNA bv
itself controls heredity.
cell does this,

Commoner claimed that the whole

in complex interactions of its constituents.

The debate still continues, but at a muted level, with
molecular biology the current winner.

The "central dogma"

(the scientists' own term)u of molecular biology is that
DNA determines the structure

(order of amino acids)

proteins, but not the other way around —
affect the structure

of

proteins can't

(order of nucleotides)

of DNA.

Commoner says that "experimental observations d e n y . .. this
assumption."15

But the hierarchical image of the master

DNA molecule is mirrored in the theoretical dominance
claimed by molecular biology; DNA is what counts,
is only an accessory.

the cell

DNA alone determines heredity,

and

heredity is a defining element of life, the subject of
biology.

Molecular biology,

knowledge of the discipline.

then, owns the essential
"There is, I believe," says

Commoner
"a crisis in biology today.
The root of the
crisis is the conflict between the approaches to
the theory of life."16
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One of the outcomes of the conflict is that
"The dominance of the molecular approach in
biological research fosters increasing inattention
to the natural complexity of biological
systems. "17
This is especially true,

Commoner feels, of "the living

environment into which all animals, plants,
or perish."18

and man must fit

Since the "free inguiry into nature that we

call basic science" is the source of the knowledge which
gives us technological innovation,

Commoner observes,

a

basic theoretical crisis in biology "may help to explain why
new technological innovations are so frequently troubled by
biological failures."19

Commoner goes behind the problem

to find causes at a theoretical level.
In an interview given a few years after the publication
of Science and S u r vival. Commoner refers to himself as a
"biologist,

a biochemist,

and a biophysicist" whose research

"has been to do with the way chemical processes take place
in living cells."20

As he became concerned about

environmental problems, he proposed the Center for the
Biology of Natural Systems at Washington University in St.
Louis.

He recalls:

"The university administration thought I was off
my rocker.
At that time everyone was saying, the
wave of the future is molecular biology, we don't
have to worry about organisms in their natural
state any more because it's all going to be done
with test tubes.
Now, I am a molecular biologist;
I organized the first training programme in the
United States in molecular biology.... But while
all that was going on, I realized that was not
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really where its at.
We're learning more and more
about smaller and smaller parts of the cell, while
terribly important theings were happening out
there in nature about which we were totally
ignorant. "21
Commoner is also critical of ecologists at this time,
not speaking out about environmental problems,

for

and he points

to himself and Ren£ Dubos as non-ecologists who did.22
Commoner goes on to speak of holding a philosophical
conviction in holism which conflicted with the mechanistic
approach of molecular biology.

It was around 1960, he says,

when
"although I had been doing essentially molecular
biological work, I realized that it was going the
wrong way so I began marching the other way.
But
I did not give up or reject my molecular work.
I
tried to find ways of relating data about the part
to the properties of the whole."23

Scientific Integrity

There are other difficulties in basic science now,
Commoner states in his book; the problem of diverging
biologies is only one.

While scientific research is growing

to be a very large endeavor,

important traditional

scientific practices are on the decline.

The free

dissemination of knowledge is being blocked by military and
profit incentives; competition for national prestige is
overcoming the principle of being blind to national
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boundaries; the scientist's freedom to choose his own
problem is being limited by patterns of research support.
These are "serious disparities between the traditional
principles of science and modern realities."24
Commoner sees an erosion of scientific integrity.

That

this erosion was taking place was also the conclusion of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science in a
report by the Committee on Science in the Promotion of Human
Welfare,

in 1965.

definition,

The integrity of science,

by their

is the totality of its processes of discovery

and discussion,

and the organization which makes it possible

for these processes to take place.

The "pressure of

insistent social demands" has eroded the process,

the report

stated.
"'Under these conditions, the laboratory of basic
science inevitably loses much of its isolation
from cultural effects, and becomes subject to
strong social demands for particular results.
Despite reducing the time, between discovery and
application.... this, has resulted in
technological application before the related basic
scientific knowledge was sufficiently developed to
provide an adequate understanding of the effects
of the new technology on n a t u r e
,,t25
As Commoner reminds us, examples of this premature
application occurred in nuclear explosions in the atmosphere
and in the intensive marketing and use of detergents and
pesticides.

The Nuclear Question

In a chapter entitled "The Ultimate Blunder," Commoner
discusses the possibility of nuclear war —

an issue that

was intensely debated during the cold war era in which the
book appeared.

The question he puts is whether having

nuclear weapons is a real defense

of a nation's security.

full-scale nuclear attack on this nation,

he states, would

destroy a large proportion of its people,

animals,

vegetation,

and what is now called infrastructure.

economy would be largely destroyed,
and doctors and hospitals few.
would be contaminated,

A

The

survivors would be ill

At the same time, water

sanitation facilities destroyed.

Rebuilding under such conditions would be extremely
difficult.

Effects on fertility would bring birth rates

down while cancer rates would go up.
contaminated,

and the kill off of

increase of the insect population

Soil would be

birds would mean an
(which dies only at higher

doses of radiation than b i r d s ) ; agriculture could not
achieve the levels of production that existed before the
attack.
The intricate system of the biosphere would be
disrupted.

Pine trees, being especially vulnerable to

radiation, would die, and the soil protected by their
watersheds would erode —

causing loss of retained water,
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floods,

and finally,

to grow in.

the lack of enough soil for new trees

Even if people can be protected,

"agriculture,

the biological balance of the land, and the climate"
cannot.26

Thus,

like the New England power grid,

a war

machine with its automatic targeting and release of
missiles,

and the subsequent retaliation,

could have

unexpected reactions and effects once it is set into motion.
Such arguments about advanced weaponry,

familiar now,

were hotly contested in the 1960s, and a source of great
tension in American society.

Much information about nuclear

weapons and the effects of nuclear fallout had been kept
military secrets,

and only piece by piece did the complete

picture of a possible nuclear holocaust become public.
Commoner deplores this secrecy:
"Had the nature of nuclear warfare been fully
described in the scientific literature, biologists
could have explained to the generals — long
before 1961 — that they could not guarantee that
the delicate balance of life-relationships on the
earth's surface would survive a major nuclear
war."27

Scientist.

Citizen and Government

The dissemination of information, Commoner stresses,
especially important.
scientists,

With Commoner, as with many other

recognition of the immense power of the atomic

is
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bomb and becoming alert to the horrors that would follow in
the train of a nuclear war was a decisive experience.28
There will always be risk in the application of scientific
knowledge; what we need to do, Commoner argues,

is to

balance risk and benefit in a way acceptable to the public.
Scientist and citizen should communicate with each other.
Commoner believes that questions of risk and benefit are all
"subject to objective scientific and technological
analysis";

it is the balance between them that science can't

d e c i d e .29
"Scientific method cannot determine whether the
proponents of urban superhighways or those who
complain about the resultant smog are in the
right, or whether the benefits of nuclear tests to
the national interest outweigh the hazards of
fallout.
No scientific principle can tell us how
to make the choice, which may be forced upon us by
the insecticide problem, between the shade of the
elm tree and the song of the robin."30
Science can't make the balance,
judgment" —

because that is a "value

not based on science.

instance, are social problems

Pollutant levels,

for

(Commoner's emphasis) which

"must be resolved by social processes."

Scientists must be

involved in these judgments, but they must also "reflect the
demands,

opinions,

and ethics of citizens generally."31

This brings in the government as mediator,
of scientist,

citizen,

it, administration).

and government

in a triad

(or, as Commoner calls

The relationship between government

and citizen doesn't come in for any special discussion in
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Commoner's work, but the role of scientist in relation to
government does.

The scientific community,

is divided about what this role is.

Commoner says,

Some scientists

"try to keep their political views separate from
their scientific duties.
To other scientists such
rigorous objectivity seems to imply a disregard
for the nation's defense, or for the numerous ways
in which science can serve human welfare.
They
seek
to play a part in directing the power that
they
help to create.
The second of these positions is relatively
new and originates in scientists' intense concern
with such dangerous issues as nuclear war."32
Scientific issues,

Commoner observes,

now "appear with a

strong admixture of political views."33 Is there harm in
"exploiting political interests to further a scientific
goal?" he asks.34

His judgment is that there is, that the

pressure of political goals damages the ability of science
to understand nature in the ways he has already discussed.
Thee is already a
believe.
citizen,

problem of knowing which scientist to

This is the most troubling question for the
in Commoner's experience.

"The citizen has begun

to doubt what he used to take for granted —
closely connected to the truth."35

that science is

Commoner connects this

problem with the position, taken by some, that scientists
have a special competence for judging social issues —
because they are in possession of the facts and are trained
in analysis and rationalilty.
position.

He does not favor

Commoner rejects this
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"a statement in which a number of distinguished
scientists argued for a particular space
experiment partly by supporting its scientific
value, and partly by describing its special
usefulness as a vehicle of international
propaganda for the United States."36
"When scientists voice their social judgments with
the same authority that attaches to their
professional prounouncements, the citizen is bound
to confuse the inevitable and insolvable
disagreements with scientific disputes.
If
scientists attach to their scientific conclusions
those political views or social judgments which
happen to provide support for these conclusions,
scientific objectivity inevitably comes under a
cloud. "37
Commoner believes strongly in an informed citizenry.
scientist,

he affirms,

The

has a "profound duty to impart as

much knowledge as he can to his fellow citizens."38

Science and Social Action

What is at issue for us now, Commoner warns,
survival.

is

About all the related problems, he says, he can

speak only for himself.

As a scientist, he arrives at his

own judgments about scientific and technological issues.

As

a citizen he decides what course he wants his government to
pursue,

and acts to get that course taken.

As a human being

he thus expresses his moral convictions.
"As a biologist, I have reached this conclusion:
we have come to a turning point in the human
habitation of the earth.
The environment is a
complex, subtly balanced system, and it is this
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integrated whole which receives the impact of all
the separate insults inflicted by pollutants.
Never before in the history of this planet has its
thin life-supporting surface been subjected to
such diverse, novel, and potent agents... I
believe that continued pollution of the earth, if
unchecked, will eventually destroy the fitness of
the planet as a place for human life."39
Most urgently,

there is a need for the scientific community

to establish a way to report on hazards in advance
(Commoner's e m phasis).
"The costs of correcting past mistakes and
preventing the threatened ones are already
staggering, for the technologies which have
produced them are
now deeply embedded in our
economic, social,
and political structure."40
The problems of pollution can be technologically corrected,
but the effects of nuclear war cannot —

the biosphere could

not be protected from catastrophic effect that would be
unrepairable#

Nuclear

war "would be a blunder from which

there would be no return";

prevention by disarmament offers

the only solution to its problems.41
We must find a way to use science intelligently.

Our

ignorance of the effects to come from our innovations is a
fault which
"signifies that the capability of science to guide
us in our interventions into nature has been
seriously eroded — that science has, indeed, got
out of hand."42
To restore the integrity of science,

"scientists need to

find new ways to protect science itself from the
encroachment of political pressures."43
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"If science is to perform its duty to society,
which is to guide, by objective knowledge, human
interventions with the rest of nature, its
integrity must be defended."4*
Scientists have a responsibility for the technological use
of scientific developments that they carry out when they
inform the public.

This is an "involuntary obligation";

to

ignore it is to withhold information from fellow citizens.
Because

much of the substance of science is

not

understood

by most

citizens,

the

issues of

"the technical content of

the modern world shields them from moral judgment."45
Commoner concludes with a strong statement:
"The political crisis generated by scientific and
technological, knowledge is upon us.
Science can reveal the depth of this crisis,
but only social action can resolve it.
Science
can now serve society by exposing the crisis of
modern technology to the judgment of all mankind.
Only this judgment can determine whether the
knowledge that science has given us shall destroy
humanity or advance the welfare of man."46

*

*

*

Commoner takes on science directly in this book, and
connects a practice and a worldview to environmental
consequences.

The main argument of Science and Survival

is that postwar technology is destroying the environment,
and that the science associated with that technology is on
the way to being out of control.

Commoner defines postwar
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technology differently from the conventional wisdom of the
time,

as a threat rather than as unalloyed benefit and

progress.

Change in the scale and power of science make it

mandatory for us to take control of its direction.
Otherwise,

the continued intervention into nature through

technological innovation without awareness of future effects
will damage the environment to the point where it is no
longer fit for human survival.

This analysis rests on an

understanding of complex systems, both human and man-made,
and the chain-reaction effect of small changes in them.
Events in the natural and social worlds are explained as
expressions of cycles, not as outcomes of linear
developments.

This systems view,

in turn,

is a part of

Commoner's commitment to and experience with studying whole
organisms,

and organisms in the context of their

environment,

rather than analyzing solely their molecular

structure as discovered through methods that must destroy
the functioning of the whole.
Scientific knowledge,
powerful and is risky
benefit and h a r m ) .

in Commoner's appraisal,

is

(meaning that it can lead to both

Science is under political pressure and

must maintain its objectivity and integrity by resisting
this pressure,

by maintaining its apartness.

are not separate from their society,

Yet scientists

and have a

responsibility to fulfill both the demands of science and of
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citizenship by disseminating information and by making that
information understandable and accessible to the public.
When science does not resist political pressure,
scientists do

not communicate with the public,

of science is diminished,
truth is doubted,

the integrity

the connection between science

and

and science, unrestrained by the cross

checking processes among scientists themselves,
control —

and when

gets out of

generates technological interventions and

proceeds with

atomistic assumptions that damage the

livability of

our world.

The need is to control what is

happening in science; the issue is survival.
Because science guides our interventions into nature,
divided science —

physics and chemistry unattentive of

biology, biology itself theoretically split —

results in

the disregard of needed information and counterbalancing
views to the detriment of the environment and our health.
In this book Commoner thus traces the problems of the
environment not simply to the demands of the profit-driven
economy —

although he emphasizes the reliance of the

economy on environmentally-destructive technologies —
to a theoretical division in scientific knowledge.

but

He does

not develop this argument at length, but in a 150-page book
that mostly describes environmental problems in detail,
gives it a significant place.

he

Commoner criticizes the lack

of foresight on the part of both scientists and government

a
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administrators,

and relates that lack of foresight to a

split in the life sciences which encourages a reductionist
and narrow focus which gives little attention to farreaching effects of current technological developments.

He

speaks out against the loss of scientific integrity which
results from the mixing of science and politics.
Commoner repeatedly states that social problems require
social solutions —
ones.

not technological,

and not biological

In this he is referring to what he conceives of as a

necessary separation between scientific knowledge and social
values,

in the interests of objectivity.

Scientific

conclusions should not be socially colored;

science itself

does not have the answer to questions of social values.
This is the conventional view, which Commoner takes despite
his criticism of the course of science.

His solution to the

inevitable intersections of science and social issues is the
cooperative involvement of scientist and citizen on issues
of public concern.
In Commoner's examples, citizens,

afraid for their

lives, demand better information of government and
scientists,

and then decide what they want.

He hasn't an

answer for what happens when they don't get it —

that is,

hasn't an analysis of their limited power of intervention —
nor does he speculate on citizens stopping scientific
development,

as in the case of the movement to close nuclear
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power plants.

What he's doing is suggesting a grass-roots

start to change.
Science here is the traditional science —
objective knowledge —

a body of

distorted by growth and by outside

pressures but not fundamentally unrepairable.

Its

epistemological possibility of objectivity is not in
question,
damaged,
all,

and its institutional capacity for it, though
is recoverable.

The sorcerer's apprentice,

after

is in trouble because his knowledge is truly effective?

his problem is that it is partial.
good science —

The wise sorcerer —

will restore the balance.

Though Commoner

acknowledges the doubt the public has formed about the
wisdom or accuracy of science,

he does not go so far as to

suppose that the public may suspect that all the sorcerers
are apprentices.
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CHAPTER TEN
THE LOGIC OF NUMBERS —

POPULATION

The previous chapter reviewed a book that critiqued science
and warned of the environmental danger of scientific
knowledge applied without caution.

This chapter reviews a

book that warns of the environmental danger of government
inaction in the face of a global population explosion.

Population Growth

Paul Ehrlich's The Population Bomb was published in
19681; a paperback edition made it widely available,

and it

sold nearly a million copies in its first two years in
print2, three million by 1990.3

Ehrlich,

a biologist known

for his field research in ecology, was then
professor at Stanford University,
biology.
research.

(and is still)

a

specializing in population

He had previously written books on his ecological
The Population Bomb is written in a direct,

punchy style, with chapters broken up into short sections.
The organization of the book is simple:

"The Problem" —
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overpopulation,
possible

(and horrible)

unchecked;
Done";
Carson,

in Ehrlich's view;

"The Ends of the Road" —

outcomes if population growth goes

"What Is Being Done" about it; "What Needs to Be

"What Can You Do?";

"What If I'm Wrong?".

Like

Ehrlich opens his book with the vision of a

frightening future,
happening now.

and like Carson he works from what is

Unlike Carson,

however,

he does not have to

imagine one place that will experience overwhelming problems
in the future.

He finds it now,

in India,

on a "stinking

hot night in Delhi" in a crowded slum.
"The temperature was well over 100, and the air
was a haze of dust and smoke.
The streets seemed
alive with people.
People eating, people washing,
people sleeping.
People visiting, arguing, and
screaming.
People thrusting their hands through
the taxi window, begging.
People defecating and
urinating.
People clinging to buses.
People
herding animals.
People, people, people,
people."4
"Old India hands will laugh" at his shocked reaction,
Ehrlich acknowledges, but all the same, he says,

"since that

night I've known the feel of overpopulation."5
In underdeveloped countries,
late 60s),

Ehrlich states

(in the

food production falls behind population growth a

little more each year.
starvation."

The "logical conclusion: mass

The rich will get richer, the poor poorer.

Three and a half million poor will die of starvation in the
year that The Population Bomb is published; most of them
will be children.

In a decade or so, this number will look

like a "mere handful."6

The basic fact of population

growth is that the more people there are, the more rapidly
population doubles, other things being egual.

Doubling time

varies with the economic status of the population:

poor

agricultural populations add to their numbers more quickly
than industrialized urban ones, but overall the world's
population in the late 1960s doubles about every 37 years
(approximately 35 years in poor countries,
rich o n e s ) .
observes,
Earth.

50-100+ years in

At that rate, after 900 years, Ehrlich

there would be sixty million billion people on

He dismisses the possibility,

popular press,
other planets.

discussed in the

that large populations could be moved to
Even if all planets were habitable

(and

logistical problems overcome), as population continued to
grow,

it would take only about 250 years to fill up the

solar system.

Also,

since it would take generations to

reach the outer planets, passengers would have to practice
strict birth control.
responsible people,
Earth to breed."7

"Thus we would have to export our

leaving the irresponsible at home on

The irresponsibility of overbreeding

(more than two children per couple)

is a continuing motif of

Ehrlich's book.
Even in developed countries, population growth causes
problems,

and Ehrlich attributes to it the "headaches" of

"garbage in our environment...

overcrowded highways,
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burgeoning slums, deteriorating school systems,
rates,

riots, and other related problems."8

rising crime

On population

growth, he repeatedly emphasizes that it is the relationship
between the birth rate and the death rate that is the most
important,

since if births exceed deaths then population

will grow.9

With about 40% of the population of the

underdeveloped countries being under the age of 15 in the
late 1960s, the likelihood of the "greatest baby boom of all
time" is an "ominous" fact.10
We got to this brink of a population explosion,

Ehrlich

says, because the urge to reproduce has been fixed in us by
billions of years of the evolution of all life in the
direction of reproductive success,

and because human culture

has developed around human biological needs.

"Our urge to

reproduce is hopelessly entwined with most of our other
urges."11

For most of human life on earth, the prevalence

of death from disease,
numbers low.

starvation and accident kept total

Ehrlich dates the first population increase to

a time when agriculture replaced hunting-gathering.

Changes

that came with industrialization, along with later medical
advances
smallpox,

(particularly "victory over malaria, yellow fever,
cholera and other infectious diseases"12 in the

underdeveloped countries)

greatly decreased the death rate

and contributed to population growth.

"Death control" of

population has decreased, but birth control has not
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increased correspondingly.
Ehrlich says,

Biologically and socially,

"death control goes with the grain, birth

control against it."
"In summary, the world's population will continue
to grow as long as the birth rate exceeds the
death rate; it's as simple as that...
Basically,
then, there are only two kinds of solutions to the
population problem.
One is a 'birth rate
solution', in which we find ways to lower the
birth rate.
The other is a 'death rate solution',
in which ways to raise the death rate — war,
famine, pestilence — find u s .1,13
At the time of writing,

Ehrlich felt that the next nine

years would tell the extent of the population crisis,
primarily because of the likelihood of famine in
underdevloped countries.

World wide,

food production kept

pace with population increase until about 1958 when

(as

others estimating the approach of famine put it ) , "the stork
passed the plow."
disasters,

In 1965-66, because of agricultural

there was no increase in worldwide food

production at all, although world population kept
g rowing.14

Ehrlich and others saw escalating food problems

in India and Latin America.
on American food aid,

Ehrlich finds India too reliant

Latin America too much in the grip of

Roman Catholic doctrine that the rhythm method is the only
acceptable method of birth control.
on Colombia,
which

He refers to a report

where population doubling time is 22 years,

(although he does not draw attention to it)

counteracts his references to irresponsible overbreeders:
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"The average mother goes through a progression of
attempts to limit the size of her family.
She
starts with ineffective native forms of
contraception and moves on to quack abortion,
infanticide, frigidity, and all too often to
suicide.
That's the kind of misery that's
concealed behind the dry statistic of a population
doubling every 22 years."15
Before World War II, such a woman "could expect two or three
children to survive to reproductive age if she went through
ten pregnancies."

Now seven or eight will live, and 80% of

the family's income will be spent on food.16
enough food today, Ehrlich states,

There is not

and there will be even

less tomorrow.

The Environment

Food production that doesn't keep up with population is
a massive problem in itself,

"but in the long view the

progressive deterioration of our environment may cause more
death and misery than any conceivable food-population
gap."17

Population growth places a great pressure on the

environment:

erosion as the result of poor farming

practices, destruction from strip mining,

salinization from

overirrigation, decreased productivity of soils where huge
dams stop silt-rich annual floods (as with the Aswan on the
N i l e ) , pesticide use which changes the ecological balance
and persists throughout the food chain.

By such intervention in the environment we change
complex ecosystems to simple ones, and "one of the basic
facts of population biology," Ehrlich tells us,

"...is that

the simpler an ecosystem is, the more unstable it is."18
Complexity in an ecosystem allows one element to take over
the function of another when change occurs.
foxes who hunt a forest die of disease,
taken over by weasels or owls.
we destroy complexity.
populations,

If most of the

their role can be

But when we use pesticides,

Pest insects, which have large

are statistically likely to contain pesticide

resistant strains, but animals higher up the food chain,
with smaller populations, can be significantly killed off by
pesticides.
insects,

Fewer of them will be available to eat the

and again more pesticide will be used, killing

other life along with the non-resistant insects.
also reduce diversity of life in the soil.
ecosystem becomes less stable —
with change.

Pesticides

The simplified

that is, less able to deal

Some simple ecosystems are directly created —

fields of single crops,

for instance,

like wheat or corn.

These are highly vulnerable to insect attack, not only
because they present a large, attractive target to feed
rapidly reproducing insects, but because their natural
insecticides have been bred out to improve their taste.
"One could go on with pesticide horror stories galore,"
Ehrlich states.

"The scientific literature is replete with
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t h e m . .. It is a record of ecological stupidity without
parallel.1,19
As a result of our productive activities even the
vastness of the ocean is being poisoned,
becoming depleted of oxygen.

and the air is

Air pollutants kill vulnerable

plant life, and can disrupt climate by affecting the amount
of heat from the sun that both comes to the earth and is
radiated back from it.
rapidly.

Rivers and lakes are deteriorating

Ehrlich tells of reminiscing with a friend about

field research they had been doing together ten years
earlier:

a study of natural selection in water snakes living

at the western end of Lake Erie.
guestion,

Still fascinated by the

they would like to continue the research,

cannot, because most of the snakes are gone,
on which they fed.

the lake,

as are the fish

"The once beautiful lake is now a septic

tank," Ehrlich states bluntly,
to their research,

but

and while a few years prior

75 million pounds of fish were taken from

"no one in his right mind would eat a Lake Erie

fish today."20

This loss of edible fish, a familiar story

now, could still raise incredulous responses in the 60s.

A

deteriorating environment threatens us physically and
perhaps mentally as well, and may have something to do,
Ehrlich suggests, with "rising crime rates, disaffection of
youth, and increased drug usage."
Ehrlich points out to his readers that he's taking a
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limited piece of the environmental problem to talk about:
"You will note that my discussion of man's
environment has not dwelt on the themes that
characterize the pleas of conservationists.
I
haven't discussed [redwoods]... I've shed no tears
here for the passenger pigeons, now extinct, or
the California condors, soon to join them.
No
tears for them, or for the great auk, or the
mammoths, or the great herds of bison, or the
California grizzly bears, or the Carolina
parakeet.
I haven't written about them, or of the
pleasantness, beauty, indeed glory of many natural
areas.
Instead I have concentrated on things that
seem to bear most directly on man."21
The conservation battle,

says Ehrlich,

is being lost,

first

because nothing can remain undeveloped under the pressure of
population growth,

and second because "most Americans

clearly don't give a damn."

Ehrlich's evaluation of most

Americans may or may not have been accurate in 1968; twentyfive years later most Americans say they are worried about
the environment.

Ehrlich concludes his review of

environmental problems with this analysis of their cause:
"Too many cars, too many factories, too much
detergent, too much pesticide, multiple contrails,
inadequate sewage treatment plants, too little
water, too much carbon dioxide — all can be
traced easily to too many p e o p l e .1,22

Disaster Scenarios

Too many people brings us to the "verge of the 'death
rate solution'," and Ehrlich outlines both general

possibilities and more specific scenarios for how that
solution might work.

Generally, disease could increase as

population density does,

especially malaria, yellow fever,

and typhus.

(still not fully understood, he

Or, viruses

says) may become more potent with large populations to
circulate in.

In 1918-1920,

people in a global epidemic.

a flu virus killed 25 million
A more lethal flu would do

still worse; the virus could occur naturally or escape from
biological warfare research strains.

Death and incapacity

from illness would disrupt all areas of society,
food production and transportation.
every seven people might die

including

As many as one out of

(which Ehrlich compares to one

out of 200 people dying in battle in World War II) .23

Any

crisis would exacerbate differences between rich and poor
nations, especially the balance of food.
Specifically,

Ehrlich offers Scenario I, in which China

has catastrophic floods and famine in the early 1970s, and
is shaken by food riots.
Thailand,
China,

The United States, at war in

is blamed for Canada's refusal to sell wheat to

and Chinese troops move into Thailand as anti-Americn

feeling increases.

Escalating war leads to rationing of

food and water at home for the United States; pressure to
end the war quickly leads the U.S. to use tactical nuclear
weapons.

China strikes back from nuclear submarines along

the U.S. west coast,

and more than 100 million Americans die
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from

fallout.

Scenario II has all of Latin America
communism at the end of the 70s,

under the grip of

a decade in which ithas

suffered repeated famine, as have Asia and Africa.

"Food

riots have often become anti-American riots, as our enemies
claimed we were withholding food

from the starving."24

Continuing war in Southeast Asia has brought massive
casualties and economic crisis.

Americans and Soviets would

be at war in the Mediterranean if it were not for "a
particularly virulent strain of bubonic plague killing 65%
of the starving Egyptian population...."

India has fallen

apart into "starving, warring minor states."25

Food and

water rationing are standard throughout the U.S., and riots
are common in the cities.

Ninety-thousand people have died

in Los Angeles as the result of two years of killer smog.
The decline in Atlantic and Pacific Ocean fishing due to
pollution is found to be irreversible.

Government advisors

recommend compulsory restriction of births to one per couple
to prevent famine in the United States by the year 2000.
1980 begins,

As

the Chinese and Russians establish missile

bases in Latin America.

America makes a pre-emptive nuclear

strike; there is nuclear war.

Monster fires, high radiation

levels and climatic change follow.

Sterilized soil and

erosion make the northern two-thirds of the Earth
uninhabitable.

Squeezed into the Southern hemisphere,
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posioned by radiation, human beings die off as crops fail,
livestock perish and plagues spread.

Only the cockroach

survives.
The third and more "cheerful" scenario still has
shortages,

rationing,

and population control.

In the mid-

1970s the United States withdraws from war and also from
sending food aid abroad.

It decides its food production

will be increased only so much as can happen without "damage
to the environment of the North American continent."26

The

Pope gives his blessing to birth control and abortion;
cheap,

long-term contraceptive drugs become widely

available.

But famine and food riots are sweeping Asia,

Arab world, Africa and Latin America.
China and India,
countries.

the

Governments fall in

local warfare breaks out in other famished

The United States,

Canada,

the Common Market,

Russia, Japan and Australia formulate "area rehabilitation"
plans to be carried out, beginning in 1985,
sections of Asia, Africa,

in "selected

and South America...

will eventually cover the entire world";

The plan

its goals include

reduction of world population to 1.5 billion by 2100.27

In

this scenario, as many as half a billion people —

one-fifth

of the world's population —

Ehrlich

die from starvation.

challenges his readers to create a more optimistic scenario
than this.

2 80

Pppulatipn Control
In Ehrlich's evaluation,
to control population growth.

next to nothing is being done
The United States budgets

very little money for population control at home or abroad:
"The population budget of all the agencies would not buy
more than a dozen sophisticated military jets.

It is

roughly the same amount as the government appropriation for
rat control."28

Meanwhile, biomedical research on cancer,

circulatory diseases,
Ehrlich's words,

and organ transplants amounts,

in

to "preoccupation with death control."29

"The establishment in American biology consists primarily of
death-controllers..."30

Successful death control without

successful birth control, he repeats, must lead to disaster.
The underdeveloped countries are ahead of the developed ones
in recognizing the problem, but "In summary,

the world

population control situation is dismal."31
Can improvements in agricultural production help fend
off the problems of growing population?
hold out much hope.
cultivation;

Ehrlich doesn't

Most arable land is already under

irrigation of dry lands to the extent necessary

is economically impossible.

Desalinization of ocean water,

'farming the sea' for food, and food from petroleum, popular
futuristic remedies,

are disposed of by Ehrlich with

technical and economic arguments.

More promising is the
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development of grains with favorable amino acid balances,
and the manufacture of high protein food and beverage mixes.
Getting people to alter their eating habits, however,

is as

difficult as getting them to change their views on family
planning.
Most hopeful is the development of high yield crops
which give more food per acre on land already being farmed.
However,

many of these require more irrigation and

fertilizer than existing grains,

so only a limited number of

farmers in underdeveloped countries will be able to adopt
their cultivation.

In addition,

they present ecological

problems: new and simplified varieties of plants can be very
susceptible to disease and insects; the increased use of
pesticides and fertilizers degrades the environment.

They

are a risk we need to take, and we can only hope for
positive results in the long run.

But "we already know that

it is impossible to increase food production enough to cope
with continued population growth."

Even positive results

"can do no more than delay the day of reckoning unless
population control is successful."32

A Sick Environment

Ehrlich makes a strong,

in fact an exaggerated,
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evaluation of the state of the environment.

His

exaggeration is in keeping with the colloquial style that
marks many pages of the book.

"It is pretty hard," he says,

"to ignore the stench that exudes from most of our
open bodies of water, or the tears streaming down
our cheeks as we inhale the mixture of poisonous
gases and solid particles that passes for air in
many of our cities."33
He quotes newspaper headlines and journal titles on the
environment? they sound like those of today:
Water Possible at a Price';
Peril';

"'Clean Air,

'Pollution Called Multiple

'Toxic Substances and Ecological Cycles'."34

reviews the problems of smog and the automobile,
pesticides,

He

of

of tolerance levels for toxic substances and of

synergistic combinations of effects.
and benefits,

We need to weigh risks

he says, and the risks must be made clear.

But the government agencies that are responsible for
protecting us are at best inadequate,
side.

In particular,

at worst on the wrong

"the Department of Agriculture

(USDA)

has had a long history of pushing pesticides, displaying a
high level of ecological

incomptence in the process."35

The Department of the Interior,

under Stewart Udall in the

Johnson administration attempts to clean up lakes and
rivers,

but laws are inadequate.

Ehrlich recalls the Mississippi fish kill of the early
60s (another subject treated by Carson).

The unexpected

killing of an estimated 10 to 15 million fishes between 1960

and 1963,

after a highly toxic insecticide was used on the

cotton and cane fields along the river, put Mississippi
fisheries out of business.

Like the Mississippi,

the

Missouri suffers from pollution, but from slaughterhouse
wastes rather than from pesticides.

New Jersey's Raritan

River is polluted by sewage, and the clamming industry in
Raritan Bay is shut down.
River,

Lake Michigan,

New York's Hudson

and Pennsylvania streams are similarly afflicted.

Ehrlich says of our "sick environment":

"The patient

continues to get weaker."36

The Cure

What needs to be done?

"A general answer...

is simple.

We must rapidly bring the world population under control,
reducing the growth rate to zero or making it go
negative."37

Ehrlich envisions an international program

"to set optimum population-environment goals for the world
and to devise methods for reaching these goals."38
United States,

as the most influential superpower and the

richest nation in the world, must take the lead.
remain affluent and isolated."
economy,

The

It "cannot

It is part of a global

and has an "inflated position," using over half of

the world's raw materials every year, although it has less
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than l/15th of the world's population.

Its proportion of

world population will go down as population grows,
share of raw materials is likely to increase.
countries," Ehrlich asks,
starvation and anarchy,

but its

"Will other

"many of them in the grip of

still happily supply these materials

to a nation that cannot give them food?"39
As well as being part of a global economy, we are part
of a global ecology.
production,

Every attempt to increase food

as population grows, will have an attendant

environmental cost,

and/or an economic one.

be other costs that we should think about.
the reality of the threat,
a homely example:

And there could
We have to see

Ehrlich insists, and he provides

"Will we be willing to slaughter our dogs

and cats in order to divert pet food protein to the starving
masses in Asia?"

To avoid coming to such choices,

"Obviously our first step must be to immediately establish
and advertise drastic policies designed to bring our own
population size under control."40

This will provide us

with the kind of future we want, and set an example for
others.
What kind of measures would reduce population?
offers some suggestions.

Reverse tax policy,

Ehrlich

and tax

children rather than granting exemptions for them.
"Parents... who had ten children would pay for their
reproductive irresponsibility ...."

Impose luxury taxes on
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cribs, diapers,

and expensive toys,

"always with the proviso

that the esentials be available without penalty to the poor
(just as free food now is)."41

Give "Responsibility

prizes" to couples for each five years of childless
marriage,

or to each man who accepts irreversible

sterilization after fathering no more than two children.
Have lotteries which only the childless can win.

Subsidize

adoption and make it simple.
Once on the right track at home, the United States must
take international action.

Ehrlich recommends the 'triage'

system of classifying other nations.42

Some nations will

make the transition to self-sufficiency without drastic aid
from us

(e.g., Libya); others may become self-sufficient

with our help

(Pakistan); finally, the "tragic category —

those countries that are so far behind in the populationfood game that there is no hope that our food aid will see
them through to self-sufficiency"

(probably India),43

Using such a system of classification,

the United States can

proceed to lead the way in the "area rehabilitation" Ehrlich
mentioned earlier:

"simultaneous population control,

agricultural development, and where resources warrant it,
industrialization of selected countries...."44
to say," Ehrlich acknowledges,

"Needless

"the sociopolitical problems

of initiating such a program would be colossal."45 There
are no sugarcoated solutions,

he says;

"the time for them is
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long gone.

A cancer is an uncontrolled multiplication of

cells; the population explosion is an uncontrolled
multiplication of people."46

Surgery is necessary.

What optimum population is, is yet to be decided, but
it should allow,

Ehrlich feels, both the choice to be

crowded and the choice to be alone,
set by nature.

and be within the limits

Natural limits are not known,

any more than

social ones are, but Ehrlich estimates that a population of
one to two billion people could be "sustained in reasonable
comfort for perhaps 1,000 years."47
course,

(This number is, of

less than the approximately 3.5 population existing

at the time that Ehrlich wrote his book.)

If we stabilize

at four or five billion, we still have a chance, but our
lives will be less pleasant.

*

*

*

Ehrlich's main argument is that population growth
threatens human survival.
as inescapable.
problems,

He presents the logic of numbers

He traces social and environmental

not to social causes, but to a biological one —

the urge to reproduce.
than multicausal.

His argument is monocausal rather

The types of social policies he favors

are top-down government regulation,

extending to an
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international scale, but he does also recommend that
everyone lobby both friends and officials for control of
population,

beginning at home.

His recommendations favor

industrialized nations with a large middle class that can
carry out and benefit from birth control; the triage
approach to aid eliminates the world's poorest people from
even being considered to receive help.
Ehrlich criticizes existing government policies,
quiet scientists, voluble politicians,
Catholic dogma,

keep-

'family planning',

"reproductive irresponsibility",

attitudes

of the developed world toward the need for population
control and toward use of resources.
numbers,

likely disasters, current dismal situations,

deteriorated environment,
crowding.
policies,

He emphasizes sheer

and the social problems of

He favors hard-line government population
birth control,

availability of abortion,

education, worldwide effort on population control,
for population control from biologists,

riots, wars, disease.

support

and the

environmental evaluation of economic actions.
famines,

sex

He predicts

He recommends as necessary a

neoimperialism under the name of "area rehabilitation."
Ehrlich's desired world is one in which situations are
evaluated realistically rather than ideologically.

It is a

world in which individuals may choose their living space,
and can, when they want, get away from it all to a world of
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nature which is still intact.

Science Trust and Science Skepticism

Ehrlich and Commoner had an ongoing and sometimes
acerbic debate during the 60s and part of the 70s,
particularly after Commoner formulated his argument in The
Closing Circle that it is not population pressure but our
choice of productive technologies that is the source of our
environmental problems.
solutions.

They differ also on the politics of

Ehrlich supposes solutions through top-down

regulation by government agencies; Commoner supposes
solutions through citizen-scientist cooperation.

Ehrlich

takes his regulatory view even though he finds existing
government action entirely inadequate because it is
uninformed and misdirected.

Like Commoner,

believes that scientists should speak out.

though, he
Unlike Commoner,

he seems to think that scientific expertise is necessary for
solving social problems.

Ehrlich is critical of scientists

for their aloof stance, and does not (unlike Commoner)
hesitate to mix his scientific opinions with his social
policy ones.
Ehrlich's analysis of how science is directed in
society cannot bear much weight; he simply does not theorize

289

much in The Population Bomb about science.

Ehrlich offers

no critique of the scientific enterprise as a whole,
does he suggest that it needs to be defended.

nor

He does not

analyze why we have a technology that gives us environmental
problems, though he does cite Lynn White, who traced an
attitude of subduing Nature to doctrines of the Christian
church.

His argument needs no such explanation, because the

root of our environmental problems,
many people.

in his analysis,

is too

In my terms, Ehrlich is a science truster,

not

a science skeptic; Commoner is a science skeptic.
Ehrlich's is a warning voice.

He startled the public,

and made the previously dry topic of population growth a
topic of immediate interest and everyday conversation.

The

condition of society and the condition of nature are
inseparably linked through the pressure of human numbers.
Ehrlich is not a theorist in this book;48 he is, or
presents himself as, a pragmatist, as a man of action much
more than as a scientist.

Bomb is a polemic.

Its overall

theme is the inevitability of disaster if the current course
is followed.

Ehrlich,

as an ecologist,

knows that "human

beings are embedded in and supported by natural ecosystems,"
and he knows that human beings can destroy these systems and
thus themselves.49

Out of concern,

he speaks out.

As a

population biologist, he uses his specialty to make a very
focused argument, meant to have political impact.50

Ehrlich gives his readers dramatized doom.

His

scenarios for the future seem in retrospect to be extremist
fantasies,

but they were matched by other cold-war scenarios

at the time.51

And he made the public aware that the

balance of food and population could easily be upset by
natural disaster or social disturbance.

He uses simple

statistics to show the inexorable logic of numbers
(recalling M a l thus), and buttresses his argument with
scientific legitimation:
us the urge to breed.

it is evolution that has fixed in

His argument is reductionist —

overpopulation is the root of all the most pressing social
and environmental problems, and there are only two
solutions:

birth control or death control.

Ehrlich

recognizes and describes complex interactions in the natural
world,

but not in the social world.

He often uses a

colloquial style to get his point across quickly and
directly.

Like Carson, he is dramatic in his presentation

of material.
Science and Survival and The Population Bomb share some
characteristics that could be called

(using Mannheim's term)

"authentic manifestations" of the environmental style of
thought:

a reliance on quantification and facts,

out as a moral response,

giving warning

speaking

(predicting).

These

derive from the occupational experience of science and from
its ethos.

Both Commoner and Ehrlich express the
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ecologist's feel for system complexity and
interrelationships in the natural world, but Ehrlich does
not extend this understanding to the social world.
Epistemologically, in relation to the key problem of
holism vs reductionism,

Commoner exemplifies an anti

reductionist stance: wholes replace parts as elements of
analysis,

and causes are cyclical and multiple rather than

single and linear.

Ehrlich is holistic about ecosystems but

reductionist in his perception of and solutions to social
problems.

The Ability to Speak

Commoner and Ehrlich,
scientists,

as university-situated

in what is not yet in the 1960s and 70s a 'big

ticket' scientific discipline

(biology)

heavily subsidized

by federal funding,

are relatively independent scientists

who can speak out.

Carson, as a trained but non-practicing

scientist, was in a similar position.

A comment on this

type of position was made by Alice Stewart,

a British

epidemiologist who found statistical evidence

(in the 1970s)

that radiation was killing workers at the Hanford nuclear
plant in Washington state.

As reported on years later

[Dr. Stewart's published finding] drew immediate
and vitriolic criticism from other scientists,
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many of them under contract to the weapons
industry... Even before the Hanford finding was
published, the Government cut off funds for the
study, prompting a Congressional committee to
investigate allegations of a scientific coverup. . .
At hearings in 1988 and 1989, [Dr. Stewart]
told Senate and House committees that the Energy
Department's program for assessing radiation
hazards at nuclear weapons plants was badly
flawed, hindering the free exchange of scientific
i d e a s ...
'If I was a coward and afraid of my job,' [she
said], 'I wouldn't say a thing.
But I am retired.
I have no department that anybody's dependent on
for work.
I speak out because I think there are
not a lot of people in such a good position.
I
have nothing to lose.
A lot of people do.
This
area of research can be shut down.
I've watched
it happen.'"52
The most widely read environmental books of the 60s and 70s
were science-based,

and the authors were scientists who by

virtue of structural position or reputation were able to
speak out.

In this freedom,

they are something like

Mannheim's free-floating intellectuals, but unlike them,
they do have their own goals, their own desired world.
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population growth at home and abroad.
Among other things,
he recommends sex-determination enabling first-born children
to be male, the right of physician-approved abortion, a
challenge to Catholic doctrine on birth control and
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51.
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early atomic weapons plant from which material came for the
Nagasaki bomb.
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p p . 6-22) summarizes how the combined industry (General
Electric) and government management of the Hanford plant
withheld important scientific data on radioactive wastes
from public view.
The article lead reads: "For forty years
scientists knew that radionuclides from reactors along the
Columbia River accumulated in body tissue.
They decided to
keep it to themselves." (p.6)
Other, airborne, wastes were
taken in by plants, ingested by cows, concentrated in their
milk, and passed on to children in the farming area around
the plant, who thus became a high-exposure group.
Science magazine reports that the U.S. "Department of
Energy confessed that leaks from its plant in Hanford,
Washington, may have seriously affected U.S. citizens."
Sources were airborne leaks from fuel tanks in the 1940s,
and radionuclides in the river, contained in drinking water
from the river and concentrated in its fish.
The
"reconstructed estimates" of radiation doses haven't been
correlated with sickness rates, but Centers for Disease
Control and DOE studies will be made. (August, 1990, p.474).
A preliminary study of Hanford radiation, released in
1992, affirms that in the 1950s and 60s, the plant dumped
radioactive water, used to cool the reactors, into the
Columbia River.
"The radiation reached the Pacific Ocean
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the river and exposing as many as 2,000 people to
potentially dangerous doses." ("Radiation Flowed 200 Miles
to Sea, Study Finds," (AP), The New York T i m e s . 7/17/92,
p.A21.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
HOBBESIAN, ANARCHIST,

AND HISTORICAL ARGUMENTS

Of the many books and articles written on environmental
problems in the 60s and 70s, three works which were not
best-selling books,

but which were influential in the

environmental debate,

stand out.

They are discussed in

this chapter.

The Tragedy of the Commons

Originally published in Science magazine in December,
1968, Garrett Hardin's "The Tragedy of the Commons" has been
much cited and reprinted since.1

Hardin,

a biologist,

takes population to be the key factor in a finite world,

and

provides a rational-choice type of analysis of the
interaction of people and resources.
The article opens with the question of whether there is
a class of problems with no technical solutions,

affirms

that there is, and puts the population problem in this
class.

Technological solutions to overpopulation,

like
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farming the seas, developing new strains of wheat,

or

escaping into space, will not really solve the problem,
Hardin asserts.

In 1968,

it is still necessary for Hardin

to ask if ours is a finite world; this is not yet a given in
the discussion of global problems.
says,

It is finite, Hardin

and "A finite world can support only a finite

population; therefore population growth must eventually
equal zero."2

But even then, our difficulties do not end,

and the 'greatest good for the greatest number' still cannot
be realized.
Hardin cites von Neumann and Morgenstern's game theory
to explain that the first reason we can't have the greatest
good for the greatest number is that it is mathematically
impossible to maximize for two or more variables at the same
time.

Then,
"The second reason springs directly from
biological facts.
To live, any organism must have
a source of energy (for example, food).
This
energy is utilized for two purposes: mere
maintenance and w o r k . .. Work calories are used not
only for what we call work in common speech; they
are also used required for all forms of enjoyment,
from swimming and automobile racing to playing
music and writing poetry.
If our goal is to
maximize population it is obvious what we must do:
We must make the work calories approach as close
to zero as possible.
No gourmet meals, no
vacations, no sports, no music, no literature, no
a r t ."3

Avoiding such sacrifices means that the optimum population
is less than the maximum population.

If the maximum good

per person is wanted for an optimum population,

there must
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be a way to weigh the value of goods, despite different
values —
factories,

for example,

some want land to be used for

some want land to be kept as wilderness.

Differences in values, however, according to Hardin,
only a theoretical problem;

are

"in real life incommensurables

are commensurable," as when in Nature, natural selection
makes survival the criterion for having one thing rather
than another.4

"Man must imitate this process,"5 and to do

so, we must stop believing in Adam Smith's idea of an
invisible hand that leads individuals pursuing their own
interest to contribute to the common good.
Following this introduction, Hardin goes on to the
"Tragedy of Freedom in a Commons."
"Picture a pasture open to all.
It is to be
expected that each herdsman will try to keep as
many cattle as possible on the commons."
At first this presents no problem,

for

"tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the
numbers of both man and beast well below the
carrying capacity of the land.
Finally, however,
comes the day of reckoning, that is, the day when
the long-desired goal of social stability becomes
a reality.
At this point, the inherent logic of
the commons remorselessly generates tragedy."6
Each herdsman still,

"as a rational being...

maximize his gain."

Hardin calculates two results,

utilities,

seeks to

of adding one more animal to the land.

or
One is

the proceeds of the sale of the additional animal, almost
all of which goes to the herdsman,

so the positive utility
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for him is almost +1.

The other is the overgrazing created

by one more animal; however, the effects of this are spread
among all herdsmen,

so the negative utility for the example

herdsman is only a fraction of -1.
"Adding together the component partial utilities,
the rational herdsman concludes that the only
sensible course for him to pursue is to add
another animal to his herd.
And another; and
an o ther...
But this is the conclusion reached by
each and every rational herdsman sharing a
commons.
Therein is the tragedy.
Each man is
locked into a system that compels him to increase
his herd without limit — in a world that is
limited.
Ruin is the destination toward which all
men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a
society that believes in the freedom of the
commons.
Freedom in a commons brings ruin to
all."7
Hardin says that although we learned this thousands of
years ago,

"natural selection favors the forces of

psychological denial," which benefits the individual even
though the society of which he is a part suffers.

National

parks provide another example of the tragedy of the commons,
Hardin observes, being
limit.

As a result,

(at that time)

open to all without

"the values that visitors seek in the

park are steadily eroded."

(National parks are still open

to all to visit on a day basis, but campsites and trailer
sites for overnight and longer stays are limited,

and quotas

are imposed on trips into wilderness areas of the larger
parks.)8

Pollution is another example, but rather than

something being taken out of the commons,
is added in.

something noxious

"The pollution problem is a consequence of
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population,” Hardin states,

for in earlier times "how a

lonely American frontiersman disposed of his w a s t e ” did not
matter.9
This leads Hardin on to a section titled "Freedom to
Breed is Intolerable."

"If each human family were dependent

only on its own resources," Hardin speculates,

then

overbreeders would leave fewer descendants,

not more,

because some of the children would starve.

But because we

are committed to the welfare state, we face another tragedy
of the commons.

"To couple the concept of the freedom to

breed with the belief that everyone born has an equal right
to the commons is to lock the world into a tragic course of
action."10

Appeals to conscience won't work to control

population growth, because "Those who have more children
will produce a larger fraction of the next generation than
those with more susceptible consciences.

The difference

will be accentuated, generation by generation."

This

assumes hereditary transmittal of conscience, Hardin allows,
but "only in the most general formal sense," not necessarily
through germ cells —

it could happen "exosomatically," he

says, borrowing a term from A.J.
biologist.

Lotka,

a mathematical

Conscience is thus "self-eliminating."

Hardin

speculates a little on the "pathogenic effects of
conscience," brought on, he believes,

by a double bind of

being damned if one does the wrong thing, but also damned as
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a simpleton who can be exploited if one doesn't.11
conscience is really of no use.

So

Definite social

arrangements are more use f u l .
Thus we must mutually agree to coercion,

that is, to

laws against certain actions and penalties for
transgressions of the law.

"An alternative to the commons

need not be perfectly just to be preferable," Hardin states.
For example,

we have such an alternative in private

property, which "as a genetically trained biologist," Hardin
says,
"I deny [is just].
It seems to me that, if there
are to be differences in individual inheritance,
legal possession should be perfectly correlated
with biological inheritance — that those who are
biologically more fit to be the custodians of
property and power should legally inherit more...
We must admit that our legal system of private
property plus legal inheritance is unjust
— but
we put up with it because we are not convinced, at
the moment, that anyone has invented a better
system.
The alternative of the commons is too
horrifying to contemplate."12
"The commons," Hardin says,

"if it is justifiable at all,

is

justifiable only under conditions of low-population
density."

He gives a brief historical sketch of how the

commons has had to be abandoned as population has grown:
first we enclosed land for farming, pastures and hunting,
and 'enclosed' the sea for fishing —
in food gathering.

abandoning the commons

We have begun to abandon the commons as

a place for waste disposal.

"In a still more embryonic

state is our recognition of the evils of the common in
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matters of pleasure" —

e.g., blaring radios and mindless

piped music in public areas, billboards, commercials,
planned supersonic transport.13

the

Enclosing the commons

infringes on personal liberties,
"But what does freedom mean?
When men mutually
agreed to pass laws against robbing, mankind
became more free, not less so.
Individuals locked
into the logic of the commons are free only to
bring on universal ruin; once they see the
necessity of mutual coercion, they become free to
pursue other goals."14
Freedom is the recognition of necessity,

and what is

necessary now is to abandon the commons in breeding,

for

"Freedom to breed will bring ruin to all."15

The Theme of Rational Calculation

Hardin,

in this essay,

is the technician whose

technical analysis shows him there is no technical solution?
technique is up against the limits of a finite world.

In

the environmental problem as he presents it, population is
the key to the solution,

but because population is an

outcome of human behavior,

it cannot be managed by

technology in the way that the environment
view)

can be.

(in Hardin's

The population/environment problem is a

quantity/quality problem —
quality of life.

the quantity of people vs the
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On the issue of individual choice vs common survival,
morality,

Hardin believes,

situational.

is "system-sensitive"; ethics are

(At this point, the text of Hardin's argument

has gone from seemingly objective analysis of mathematical
certainties to criticism of morality; the population issue
has moved to the background.) As an alternative,

he proposes

biological fitness as a basis for the ethics of ownership.
Hardin's argument relies on the application of a
scientific outlook to guestions about population growth,
which he takes a mathematical

(and Malthusian)

to

approach, but

which he does not explicitly characterize as either
biological or social.
of numbers,
people,

The issue is taken to be one solely

of the distribution of goods across numbers of

with an assumption that any kind of good can be

quantified.

The essay has the tone of inescapable facts and

unarguable mathematical calculations.

The difficult issue

of competing human values is dealt with by making a direct
analogy to the operation of a single criterion —

survival -

- as the determining force in natural selection.

A

scientific theory —

evolution —

is thus applied to the

social world as if the social world were not different in
any relevant respect from the natural world.
analysis that calculates costs and benefits —
weighing of alternatives —

A rational
a scientific

is the way to determine the

solution to our environmental and social problems; science
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shows the way to society.
Hardin's central image, that of the commons,

is

constructed more for the purposes of his argument than in
the light of history.

His commons is an unenclosed space to

which individuals apparently have unlimited access,

from

which they can derive benefit without paying out
obligations.

Overuse of the space grants short-term benefit

to the first overusers; late comers get no benefit at all,
because the commons has been depleted.
happen,

Overuse is bound to

because it has positive utility for the rational

calculator

(so call e d ) .

This dynamic, Hardin claims, has

caused us to progressively abandon the commons throughout
history,

to fence in land, make rules about the sea,

legislate protection of the environment.

Another View of the Commons

Hardin's understanding of the commons,
backwards.

I think,

His misappropriation of this term,

is

and

misrepresentation of the concept behind it, disregards a
tradition of intelligent land use.
historically,

The commons,

is not governed by rational choice —

individual calculators do not hold sway.

The commons was

never a free-for-all space like the mythical American

frontier,

and its use was regulated precisely because its

limits were understood.
unowned land,

It was not

nor land owned jointly by its users, but was

land with one owner, a person or a corporation —
landlord or an American town.

an English

There were a variety of legal

and customary rights giving access to the commons.

The

commons are used in common, within commonly understood
limits; they are not an anarchic space.
Britain,

In medieval

the peasants who had tenancy rights administered

the commons through a council.

The number of animals that

could graze was jointly decided upon.16
(not necessarily a commons)

Where open land

has been subjected to the type

of overuse that Hardin describes,

it is not because common

people have been rational calculators bent on everincreasing gains, but because the unequal distribution of
wealth has made no other resource available to them.
them,

it has been use or starve, not use and gain.

modern examples —
overfishing —

In more

strip mining, deforestation,

it is not common use, but individual use by

the modern individual,
depletion.

For

the corporation,

that has caused

The mismanagement of resources is not a tragedy

of the commons,

it is a policy of individualistic profit-

seeking.
Hardin is closer to the mark on the overuse of parks,
the particularly American version of the commons,

yet here

again it is not rational calculation for profit that is at
work for the individual user,

for the users have no direct

control of use the way herdsmen have control of —
and obligations regarding —

commons use.

or rights

The inexorability

of every person's calculated use of common space for gain,

a

central idea of Hardin's, does not evenly apply to public
open spaces historically or contemporaneously,
reference to economic structure.

and lacks any

But the idea that the

environment as a whole is a commons —
the soil, and their interactions —

the air, the water,

is a powerful one,

for

in fact we are all affected by the uses made of the
environment by others.

The problem,

though,

must abandon the environment as a commons;
in fact treat it like one.

is not that we

instead, we must

Subjecting the use of space to

regulation is not the abandonment of the commons —

it is

the making of the commons.17
Hardin's use of the terms "positive utility" and
"negative utility" scientizes the discussion,

as does his

appeal to the word "exosomatic" for his claim that
conscience can be,

in the most general way, hereditary.

His

eguation of the commons with the welfare state politicizes
it; in Hardin's world,

social interdependency did not appear

until the welfare state did.

He then scientizes his

politics; The current system of property ownership is
unjust,

not on a social or economic basis, but on a
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biological one —

those biologically "more fit" to own

property do not inherit more than those less fit.

Yet

private property ownership is preferable to the alternative
of the commons
contemplate.

(read socialism), which is too horrifying to
Freedom is the rule of law, and law,

in

another of Hardin's historically inaccurate constructions,
is "mutual coercion."
genetics —

Hardin's argument is Hobbes with

not only are his hypothetical social actors

driven only by self interest,

they are biologically

unworthy.

Post-Scarcitv Anarchism

Around the same time that Commoner was writing Science
and S u r v i v a l , and Ehrlich was writing The Population B o m b .
Murray Bookchin was writing Post-Scarcitv A n a r c h i s m , a group
of essays dating from 1965 to 1968.18

An earlier book, Our

Synthetic Environment, appeared in 1963.19
is deeply searching;

Bookchin's work

it takes on theoretical questions that

are absent in Commoner and Ehrlich.

Bookchin's left

analysis has kept him from being a widely published author,
and he has never achieved the popular fame of Ehrlich in the
late 60s or the widespread recognition of Commoner since the
70s.

Additionally,

he is not a scientist,

so his work is
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not in the category which is being most closely analyzed
here.

However, because Bookchin addresses central issues in

the environmental debate

(and has often been the first to do

s o ) , and because he has responded to arguments made by other
environmental thinkers,

it is valuable to take a brief look

at his work.
The starting point for Post-Scarcity Anarchism is that
the world is changing profoundly;
around scarcity,
scarcity —

instead of developing

society is on the threshold of pos t 

a condition that offers not just material

abundance but social and cultural abundance.

Bookchin

observes an increasing tension "between actuality and poten
tiality," evidenced by black, women's,
and gay liberation movements.
tension "rising expectations."
social agitation with ecology:

youth, children's,

Liberals, he notes, call this
Bookchin connects this
"The tension between

actuality and potentiality, between present and future,
acquires apocalyptic proportions in the ecological crisis of
our time."

He argues that the environmental crisis can't be

saved "within the bourgeois framework";
inherently anti-ecological"20

"Capitalism is

because it is production for

the sake of production.
We are schizoid about technology,

Bookchin says,

because it could liberate us in a society organized around
the satisfaction of human needs, but destroy us in a society
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organized around production for the sake of production.
It's not technology itself that has this dualistic
character,

but hierarchical society, with its negative and

positive features.

Marx may have been right that

hierarchical society was historically necessary to dominate
nature,

Bookchin allows, but "we should never forget that

the concept of 'dominating' nature emerged from the
domination of man by man.

Both men and nature have always

been the common victims of hierarchical society."21
is a key idea of Bookchin's —

This

that human beings dominate

Nature because they already dominate each other;

it is not

that they must come to dominate each other in order to
dominate nature as argued by Marx and Engels.
"The notion that man must dominate nature emerges
directly from the domination of man by man." ...
"The patriarchal family planted the seed of
domination in the nuclear relations of humanity
.... "22
We are at the end of hierarchical society's
development,

Bookchin says, and its positive and negative

aspects can no longer be reconciled.
necessary functions are over —
patriarchy,
state.23

Its historically

property,

classes, monogamy,

hierarchy and authority, bureaucracy and the

Its domination of man by man has brought us

competitive capitalism's ineguality of wealth and the
domination of nature.

The time has come for us to build a

communitarian and ecologically balanced society.
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Environmental problems are not new, but "the very nature of
the issues has changed...

[for] the decay of the environment

is directly tied to the decay of the existing social
structure"; the ecological crisis is a social crisis —

thus

the need for revolutionary change.24
The environmental problem is rooted neither in
technology nor in population growth.25
improve or degrade human life —
with it are what's important.

Technology can

the attitudes associated
On population control,

"It is supremely ironic that coercion, so clearly
implicit in the neo-Malthusian outlook, has
acguired a respected place in the public debate on
ecology — for the roots of the ecological crisis
lie precisely in the coercive basis of modern
society. "26

social Ecology

The coming revolution and its utopia "can leave no area
of life untouched that has been contaminated by domination."
This utopia can be described as "anarchism" or "anarchocommunism" —

a "stateless,

classless, decentralized society

in which the splits created by propertied society are
transcended by new, unalienated human relationships.1,27 In
anarchist praxis

(compared to socialist)

based on voluntarism and self-discipline,
and command."28

"all acti o n . .. is
not on coercion

And it emphasizes spontaneity —

praxis as
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inner process,

not external manipulation.

"Every

development must be free to find its own equilibrium."
spontaneity comes "authentic order and stability."

With

Then

"spontaneity in social life converges with spontaneity in
nature to provide the basis for an ecological society."
"Natural ecology [which shaped organic societies]
social ecology

[which shapes utopia]."29

becomes

"Social ecology"

is the concept for which Bookchin has become best known,

the

idea that attracts his young followers among the Greens.
Bookchin further argues:

"The very development of the

material preconditions for freedom makes the achievement of
freedom a social necessity."30

When we reach the point

where scarcity can be eliminated, we find that a post
scarcity society is necessary for our survival.
In a chapter on "Ecology and Revolutionary Thought,"
Bookchin asserts that "Ecology is intrinsically a critical
science."31

Air pollution, heat pollution (now called

global w a r m i n g ) , pollution of the earth's waterways and
groundwaters,

are now on a different scale from historical

examples, which were local in extent.

Modern society has

logistical problems of urbanized and centralized form, but
these problems go even deeper than problems of the physical
structure of mass society.

Their roots are in the

presumption that hierarchy is a necessity,
dynamics of capitalism.

and in the

"Owing to its inherently competi
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tive nature,

bourgeois society not only pits humans against

each other but also pits the mass of humanity against the
natural world."32

We see how we have set ourselves against

the natural world in problems of wastefulness
society)

and waste disposal.

(the consumer

Bookchin's alertness to these

linked consumption and disposal issues was unusual
60s —

in the

this analysis would not become mainstream for another

twenty years.
Bookchin argues against great urban centers because
they destroy quality of life, and against the simplification
and chemicalization of modern agriculture because of it is
ecologically destructive.

He takes the physical form of

society today be a "reversal of organic evolution," a
reversal that is the result of contradictions between town
and country,

state and community,

industry and husbandry,

between the bureaucratic scale and the human scale.33

The

ancient Greeks, he says, would have been horrifed by a city
whose size would have precluded a face-to-face relationship
between citizens.

He believes that telephones,

telegraphs,

radios, TVs should be used as little as possible to mediate
relations between people.

Bookchin sees an "intuitive

anarchism" among young people who react against the
synthetic quality of urban life with a love of nature,
against standardization with informal dress and manners,
against centralization with a predisposition for direct
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action.

In their tendency to drop out to avoid the rat

race, he finds a de facto decentralization of social life.
Bookchin notes that it is a principle of ecology that
stability is a function of diversity.

Diversity was lost

when the industrial revolution overwhelmed and destroyed
regional energy patterns, which used different resources,
such as wind and water power,
wood,

peat, coal, animal fats.

and a variety of fuels —
The industrial revolution

replaced these fuels first by coal and then by coal and
petroleum.

"Regions disappeared as models of integrated

energy patterns.1,34
of energy resources,

If we are going to make ecological use
he argues, we're going to have to

decentralize and have truly regional social organization.
The diversity that is a part of natural ecology
suggests for Bookchin the "free interplay" of elements,
which in a social situation, means diverse possibilities for
the individual to develop his potential.
"Just as the ecologist seeks to expand the range
of an ecosystem and promote a free interplay
between species, so the anarchist seeks to expand
the range of social experience and remove all
fetters to its development."35
In our schizoid society,
seem mutually exclusive,

Bookchin observes, some goals

such as urban and agrarian life,

physical and mental activity,

sensuality and spirituality,

communal solidarity and individual development.
is our social logistics that divide these things,

However,
not

it
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inexorable contradictions.
In the ecological community to come,
"the cast of mind that today organizes differences
among humans and other 1ife-forms along
hierarchical lines, defining the external in terms
of its 'superiority' or 'inferiority', will give
way to an outlook that deals with diversity in an
ecological manner.
Differences among people will
be respected, indeed fostered..."
"Freed from an oppressive routine, from paralyzing
repressions and insecurities, from the burdens of
toil and false needs, from the trammels of
authority and irrational compulsion, individuals
will finally, for the first time in history, be in
a position to realize their potentialities as
members of the human community and the natural
world."36

Technology.

Biology.

Society

Bookchin's utopianism is coupled with a well-informed
analysis of the causes of environmental crisis.

His thought

is directed toward social justice and harmony with the
natural world as the certain outcome of human spontaneity
and human-scale living and working.

He has a harsh critique

of modern society and economy.
By comparison,

Commoner criticizes the choice we have

made of technologies,

but does not critique

(in Science and

Survival) the fundamental goal of our captialist economy —
endless growth and profit.
prevailing circumstances.

He offers a solution suiting the
Ehrlich ignores social and
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economic structure almost entirely —

he sees our

environmental problems as the outcome of a basic biological
activity,

reproduction.

Bookchin does not rely on

quantitative data and appeals to scientific fact, as do the
Commoner and Ehrlich,

but he does share with them a holistic

view about inter-relationships —

in his case,

in society

rather than in the natural world.
Commoner's argument is about technological choices,
Ehrlich's is about biological behavior,
social structure.

Bookchin's is about

Bookchin defines the root of the

environmental crisis differently from those,

like Commoner

or Ehrlich, who single out particular aspects of economic or
social activity as the ones that get us most into trouble.
These aspects,

for him,

are just surface phenomena of the

underlying social structure, whose dominative basis,

unless

changed, will continue to produce environmental and social
problems even if (or especially if) controls of various
kinds are placed on particular activities.
Bookchin criticizes the liberalism which hides the
structure and dynamics of hierarchical and ecologically
destructive bourgeois society.

He allies his argument with

Marx on the dialectic of change through development by
opposition,

and in his critique of propertied society, but

does not agree with Marx that the domination of man by man
is fundamentally necessary for the productive use of nature
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(although he allows it a historical r o l e ) .
world is (as expressed in later writings)
"libertarian municipalism" —
citizenship,

His desired

that of

a return to face-to-face

but with the recognition that there is a new

possibility of abundance through technology that can make
the natural world flourish.

The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis

Another non-scientist,

Lynn White, J r . , then Professor

of History at UCLA, writing in 1967,
reason for environmental problems.

finds a different
In his much cited essay,

"The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,"57 he traces
the ecological crisis to the Christian view that Nature was
made to serve man.5®

This view, White claims, provided

ground for a Nature-dominating technology in medieval Europe
even before the scientific revolution,
Christian religion shaped thought.

at a time when the

Because the

environmental crisis is rooted in a religious worldview,

it

cannot be solved simply by the application of more science
and technology.

Instead, a religious change,

or a

rethinking of values is needed.
"People have often been a dynamic element in their own
environment," White observes.

He is commenting on Aldous
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Huxley's description of the loss of grassy English glades to
unsightly brush because the rabbits that kept them clear
have been killed by a disease purposefully introduced by the
local farmers. The grassy glades themselves are a humaninfluenced artifact, however, White notes,

since rabbits

were introduced in the 12th century to improve the diet of
the peasants.

The Romans and the Crusaders denuded

Mediterranean hills of forests; the Egyptians tamed the
Nile;

the Frisians and Hollanders pushed back the North Sea.
"...but in the present state of historical
scholarship we usually do not know exactly when,
where, or with what effects man-induced changes
came. "39

We have an "ecologic crisis" and many calls to action, but
we don't know what to do.
"Specific proposals... seem too partial,
palliative, negative: ban the bomb, tear down the
billboards, give the Hindus contraceptives and
tell them to eat their sacred cows... The
'wilderness area' mentality invariably advocates
deep-freezing an e c o logy... as it was before the
first Kleenex was d r o p p e d . .. But neither atavism
nor prettification will cope with the ecologic
crisis of our time."40
To begin with, White suggests, we should take a
historical look at "the presuppositions that underlie modern
technology and science."

The fusion of science, previously

aristocratic and speculative, with technology,
and action-oriented
says,

(in White's summation),

lower class

is related, he

to "democratic revolutions which, by reducing social

barriers,

tended to assert a functional unity of brain and
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hand."41

What is historically noticeable are two things:

the certainty that "Both modern technology and modern
science are distinctively occidental." despite borrowings
from China and the Islamic world; and the less-recognized
fact that
"the leadership of the West, both in technology
and in science, is far older than the so-called
scientific revolution of the seventeenth century
or the so-called industrial revolution of the
eighteenth century."42
Water power was applied to "industrial processes other than
milling grain" as early as A.D.

1000; wind power was

harnessed in the late 12th century; the weight-driven
mechanical clock,

"the most monumental achievement in the

history of automation," was a 14th-century development.
Alongside this technological progress there was an
intellectual movement:
"The distinctive Western tradition of science, in
fact, began in the late eleventh century, with a
massive movement of translation of Arabic and
Greek scientific works into Latin.
A few notable
books... escaped [notice]... but within less than
200 years effectively the entire corpus of Greek
and Muslim science was available in Latin, and was
being eagerly read and criticized in the new
European universities.... By the late thirteenth
century Europe had seized global scientific
leadership from the faltering hands of Islam."43
Since it was the Middle Ages that saw this development,

it

is the Middle Ages we must examine for assumptions
underlying science and technology.
Both technological developments and religious thought
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supported the exploitation of nature in the Middle Ages.
The 7th-century invention of a plow that cut and turned over
the soil,

rather than just scratching it, made possible much

more efficient and extensive cultivation and meant that
"Man's relation to the soil was profoundly changed.
Formerly man had been part of nature; now he was the
exploiter of nature."44
Judeo-Christian teleology gave the West an "implicit
faith in perpetual progress" that still dominates our daily
actions

(or at least seemed to do so in the late 1960s when

this essay was w r i tten).

Christianity, White asserts,

the world's most anthropocentric religion,
Western

(as compared to Eastern/Greek)

is

especially in its

form.

Man is not

just part of nature, but is made in God's image, and so
shares in God's transcendence of nature.

Besides having

"established a dualism of man and nature," Christianity
"insisted that it is God's will that man exploit nature for
his proper ends."45
Nature,

having been made by God, could reveal His

purpose, and White notes that the study of this purpose in
the discipline of "natural theology" turned away from the
symbolic —

"the ant is a sermon to sluggards" —

to the

empirical investigation of how the natural world operates,
by the 13th century.

Yet the connection to divining God's

purpose was sustained into the 18th century,

and though one
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can wonder whether such claims are "real reasons or merely
culturally acceptable" ones, White says,

still

"The consistency with which scientists during the
long formative centuries of Western science said
that the task and the reward of the scientist was
'to think God's thoughts after him' leads one to
believe that this was their real motivation.
If
so, then modern Western science was cast in a
matrix of Christian theology."
And further,

since "somewhat over a century ago science and

technology...

joined to give mankind powers which,

by many of the ecologic effects,

to judge

are out of control," then

"Christianity bears a huge burden of guilt."
"Despite Darwin," reflects White,

"we are n o t . in our

hearts,

part of the natural process.

We are superior to

nature,

contemptuous of it, willing to use it for our

slightest whim."46
"The fact that most people do not think of these
attitudes as Christian is irrelevant.
No new set
of basic values has been accepted in our society
to displace those of Christianity.
Hence we shall
continue to have a worsening ecologic crisis until
we reject the Christian axiom that nature has no
reason for existence save to serve man."47
Saint Francis,

"the greatest spiritual revolutionary in

Western history," tried to replace this view with one in
which all creatures are equal; though he failed, his purpose
should be taken up again.
"Since the roots of our trouble are so largely
religious, the remedy must also be essentially
religious, whether we call it that or not.
We
must rethink and refeel our nature and
destiny.1,48
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The call to rethink,

to change our attitudes,

has

become a ubiquitous chorus in the environmental literature
in the twenty-five years since White offered his analysis.
Others,

too,

(Western)

in the 60s, were making similar judgments of

society's imperious bent on technological progress

without regard tc other values —

human and/or ecological.

Jacques Ellul and Herbert Marcuse became available in
English;

Barry Commoner and Murray Bookchin critiqued

American science,

economy, and social goals.

Linking Action and Thought

White,

a historian,

is as aware of the complexity of

ecosystem interrelationships as are the scientificallytrained Carson, Commoner,

Ehrlich,

and Hardin.

like ecologically minded scientists,

Historians,

are inclined to see

multitudinous causes and effects playing off of each other
in a larger system.

But

(like scientists)

they also try to

link a particular cause and a particular effect.
scientists,

they can carry out their investigations at a

high level of generality.
analysis,

Unlike

Writing large

(or doing macro

in today's terms) White links Christian theology

to the domination of nature and the consequent environmental
crisis.

White has a different version of the out-of

control argument —

we started steering in this direction,

not with the atomic bomb,

not after World War II, not at the

onset of the Enlightenment,

but in the Middle Ages,

because of the Church.

like the scientists,

warning —

it will get worse —

and detailed warning;
quantities,

He,

and

has a

but his is not a specific

it doesn't name pollutants and their

or count population and its geometrical growth.

He does not lay out inescapable facts; he offers what will
certainly be seen as an interpretation subject to argument
and competing interpretation.

Although scientific data is

also open to interpretation, as different evaluations of
environmental danger show, there is at least theoretically a
resolution point at some future time.

Not so with such

matters as whether Christianity must bear the guilt of
responsibility for environmental destruction.
But just as the success of an argument does not depend
on the successful realization of its recommended course of
action

(as in the case of Cars o n ) , neither does it depend on

its provability —

at least not outside the narrowest

confines of science.

Carson's argument succeeded because it

uncovered and explained a world of actions unknown to most
of the public but vitally important to all of them,

and did

so in a way that engaged both intellectural concern and
emotional attachment to nature.

White's argument provided

an explanation for academics of relationships between the

324

social and the natural world at a level of generality that
made it useful across a variety of concerns.

It linked

action and thought in a historical framework and tied them
to present consequences that were a frequent topic of
investigation and debate.

At a time when alternative

lifestyles and Eastern religion were providing Americans
with an implicit critique of the Western approach to life
and nature, White had a compelling explanation of where the
loss of our connection to nature
self)

(and thus ultimately to

came from.
It helped that White's analysis was itself in the

tradition of philosophizing about the relationship between
man and nature,
Edenic self.

of wondering how and when we had lost our

It could even be said that White's analysis

was in the Christian tradition of reflecting on the
expulsion from paradise, of turning back on to Christians
the maxim that in Adam's fall we sinned all, and turning it
into a historical account of Christianity's responsibility
for, and thus guilt for, the wrong behavior in the garden.
(It thus had a ready made audience in both guilt-accepting
Christians and anti-religionists.)

The success of White's

article must also rest on its being one of the most clearly
presented and skillfully condensed arguments for the
influence of ideas ever made available for the general
reader.

325

In an article written six years later, White comments
on his earlier essay:
When I published this hypothesis in 1967, a bishop
wrote to me: 'I agree with you completely, and I
am deeply troubled by i t . ' Others were less
acquiescent.
I was denounced, not only in print,
but also on scraps of brown paper thrust
anonymously into envelopes, as a junior AntiChrist, probably in the Kremlin's pay, bent on
destroying the true faith.
The most common charge
was that I had ignorantly misunderstood the nature
of 'man's dominion'
and that it is not an
arbitrary rule but rather a stewardship of our
fellow creatures for which mankind is responsible
to G o d . ...
The Christian wants to know what Scripture
says to him about a puzzling problem.
The
historian wants to know what Christians in various
times and places have thought Scripture was saying
to t h e m . ...
So, if one points to the fact that
historically Latin Christians have generally been
arrogant toward nature, this does not mean that
Scripture read with twentieth-century eyes will
breed the same attitude."
White cautions that "no sensible person could maintain that
all ecologic damage is, or has been,

rooted in religious

attitudes...." but maintains that "a man-nature dualism is
deep-rooted in us" and that it is "a change of value
structures that will make possible measures to cope with the
growing ecologic crisis.

One hopes that there is enough

time left."49

The 1960s

Besides Silent S p r i n g . Science and S u r v i v a l , and the

326

works mentioned in this chapter,

the 1960s saw the

publication of many other books about environment,
technology, man and nature,
the 1970s, however,

and ecology.

It was not until

that many such works would be indexed

under the heading "environment" in standard reference
guides;

"environment" was still an emerging category in the

1960s.

Notable books included Marston Bates' The Forest and

the Sea

(ecology and the biosphere for the ordinary reader)

in 1960, and the Sierra Club's Wilderness: America's Living
Heritage

(promoting wilderness preservation)

in 1961; these

books present nature as it was before the environmental
warning.
Ninteen-sixty-two saw the beginning of environmental
warnings with Carson and Bookchin,
Udall's The Quiet Crisis
the Interior)

followed by Stewart

(a statement by the Secretary of

in 1963, Rudd's Pesticides and the

Environment. Leo Marx's Machine in the Garden

(technology

and the pastoral ideal), Herbert Marcuse's One Dimensional
Man (man dominating nature means man dominating m a n ) , and
the English translation of Jacques Ellul's The Technological
Society came out in 1964.

By this time the warning was

gaining acceptance; Commoner had summarized the warnings in
1966, and there was a search for underlying causes, heralded
by White's article in 1967.

That same year saw Roderick

Nash's Wilderness and the American Mind

(history of ideas of
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nature and wilderness)
Rhodian Shore

and Clarence Glacken's Traces on the

(nature and culture in Western t h o ught)•

There was a mass-market hit in the combination of Eliot
Porter's photography with Thoreau's words in In Wildness is
the Preservation of the World
of wilderness,

(the aesthetics and scarcity

also published in 1963, but now made popular

in a coffee-table format).
In 1968, Ren£ Dubos responded to the critical trend in
the man-nature argument by emphasizing the benefits of human
activity to the environment in So Human an A n i m a l .

That

year, Ehrlich and Hardin reintroduced Malthus and offered
lifeboat choices as a result of population pressures;

Lynn

White published essays on technology and Western values in
Machinia ex D e o : Aldo Leopold's classic of nature writing,
Sand Countv A l m a n a c , which sets the terms of a land ethic,
was reissued after some twenty years; and a new type of
nature writing appears in Edward Abbey's Desert Sol i t a i r e ,
to become a classic on wilderness solitude for the dropout
generation.

The change continued in 1969 in Theodore

Roszak's Making of a Counter Culture

(youth against

technocracy), Ian McHarg's Design With Nature

(the

aesthetics and practice of being in tune with n a t u r e ) , and
Gary Snyder's Earth House Hold
lifestyle nature poetry) .50

(New Age alternative
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CHAPTER TWELVE
TECHNOLOGY QUESTIONED

The 1970s saw environmentalism ascendant as an issue and
increasing in reach as a social movement.

April 1, 1970,

Earth Day —

protest,

teach-in —

an environmental celebration,

and

brought the environmental movement to nation

wide notice.

In 1970, Charles Reich wrote about youth,

alternative lifestyle, and a new consciousness transcending
technology in The Greening of A m e r i c a ; Scott and Helen
Nearing,

from the previous generation of alternative voices,

rejected technologized society, went to live selfsufficiently in the country,

and told others how to do the

same in Living the Good L i f e .
In 1971, Francis Moore Lapp£ connected the environment
and personal decisions through a critigue of the production
and consumption of food in Diet for a Small P l a n e t , a guide
still in print in the 1990s; Stewart Brand's marriage of
technology and caring for nature in The Last Whole Earth
Catalog started on its way to becoming a best-seller;
Commoner and Bookchin reiterated the need to rethink economy
and society —

Bookchin in Post-Scarcitv A n a rchism. Commoner

in The Closing C i r c l e : economists entered the picture with
Kenneth Boulding's The Economics of Pollution.
The global dimension of the environmental crisis was
detailed in Barbara Ward and Ren£ Dubos' Only One E a r t h , and
the industrialized nations were startled by the predictions
of Meadows et al in The Limits to G r o w t h , both books
appearing in 1972.

In the remaining years of the decade,

E.F. Schumacher went against the political and technological
current with Small is Beautiful; Herman Daly rethought
economic growth in Toward a Steady-State E c o n o m y ; William
Leiss examined attitudes toward nature and critiqued
theories about them in The Domination of N a t u r e ; Horkheimer
and Adorno's critique of instrumental rationality was
published in English as Dialectic of the Enlightenment:
Ernest Callenbach imagined the political and lifestyle
consequences of the emerging environmental movement in
E c o topia: James Lovelock gave a new vision and a scientific
explanation of the earth as a living system in G a i a . 1

The Circle of Life

The Closing Circle; N ature. Man. and Technology
(1971 )2 , was Commoner's best known book until his recent
Making Peace With the Planet.3

In it he argues that it is
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the type of productive technology we have that causes our
environmental problems.

Commoner begins by listing the

different ways in which the blame has been laid for the
environmental crisis:
poverty,

on population,

on affluence,

on

on the public's demands, on man's innate

aggressiveness,

on learned inhumanity,

technology, politicians,

on profits,

religion,

capitalism.

At the same time, he identifies some of those who gave
the warning on the environment while attributing the crisis
to different causes; several are biologists,
But cause, Commoner points out,

as is Commoner.

is not a simple linear

phenomenon:

"in the ecosphere every effect is also a

cause...."

This cyclical nature of events in the ecosphere,

however, has become unfamiliar to us in a technologized age;
in synthesizing new products we have converted natural
cycles into man-made linear events, at the end of which are
toxic chemicals,

sewage,

and heaps of rubbish.

"We have

broken out of the circle of life," he says, and the purpose
of his book is to try "to discover which human acts have
broken the circle of life, and why."
will trace "ecological stresses...
productive technology —

He indicates that he

to...

faults in

and in its scientific b ackground...

and finally to... economic,

social and political

forces...."4
To explain what he means by the circle of life,

Commoner offers a brief version of the basic scientific
account of life: An organic soup developed out of
atmospheric gases billions of years ago under the influence
of light and/or heat.

The first living things simply used

the store of organic food; this would have been a
nonrenewable resource

(and no future for life)

if

photosynthetic organisms had not evolved to convert
inorganic matter and carbon dioxide to fresh organic matter
using sunlight.
is established —

With this development,

the circle of life

the materials of the planet can be cycled

through different states to sustain life. All living things
are now part of an interdependent network,
them other interdependent networks.

and have within

But science is not

dealing with this complexity, Commoner asserts;
atomistic in outlook and method.

it is

Its specializations and

disciplinary divisions do not foster an ecological outlook.
There is the simple example of soil humus.
substance can have two roles:
nutrient)

to the plant;

This one

it supplies nitrogen

(a

it gives porosity to the soil, which

aids the efficient absorption of nitrogen by the plant.
of these cycles describes the movement of nitrogen atoms;
the other is a more abstract set of dependencies.
Biologists may be experts on plant nutrition or on soil
structure, but do not specialize in both.

But

"the natural tendency to think of only one thing
at a time is a chief reason why we have failed to

One
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understand the environment and have blundered into
destroying it." 5

The Laws of Ecology

Commoner names the three "great global systems" —
air, the water,

and the soil —

the

and calls the study of their

relationships to life the "young science" of ecology.
Ecology does not have the same kind of cohesive
generalizations about the processes it studies as physics
does, but Commoner offers an "informal set of 'laws of
ec o l o g y ' ."

First Law: Everything is connected to everything else.
8econd Law: Everything must go somewhere.
Third Law: Nature knows best.
Fourth Law: There is no such thing as a free
lunch.6
For examples of the first law, the connectedness of
everything, Commoner briefly describes the theory of
cybernetic systems: energy whicn precipitates a certain
behavior is counterbalanced by effects of that behavior.
(Standard engineering examples are simple feedback systems
like thermostats and steam-engine governors.)

A classic

example in a natural system is predator-prey fluctuations of
population.

When there are many rabbits,

their predator,
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the lynx, prospers;

in time,

there are so many lynx that

there are not enough rabbits to feed them; the lynx begin to
die off, the rabbits begin to increase as their predators
decrease,

and the cycle begins again.

Oscillations that

swing too far, however, may destroy the balance of the
system and bring about its collapse.

(Too many lynx or too

many rabbits die to be able to reproduce on the next swing
of the cycle.)

This is particularly likely to happen with

effects introduced from outside the system,

for then the

cycle's self-governing mechanisms will not apply to the
effect.

Effects from outside the system become new and

ungovernable causes in the system.

This is an important

recognition in cases of technological intervention into
nature.
The second law, everything must go somewhere,

is

another version of the "matter is indestructible" of
physics.
"One of the chief reasons for the present
environmental crisis is that great amounts of
materials have been extracted from the earth,
converted into new forms, and discharged into the
environment without taking into account that
'everything has to go somewhere'."7
Harmful materials accumulate.
On the third law, Nature knows best, Commoner observes
that if you take the back off your watch and poke a pencil
into it with your eyes closed, you will almost certainly
damage the watch.

This is because the watch is a very
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restricted selection of a large number of possible
arrangements, most of which do not work as well as the
chosen one.

Any random change in the watch will probably

fall into the large class of non-useful or harmful
arrangements.

So it is with nature's ecosystems.

"The third law of ecology suggests that the
artificial introduction of an organic compound
that does not occur in nature, but is man-made and
is nevertheless active in a living system, is very
likely to be harmful."8
The fourth, no-free-lunch law, Commoner says,
from economics.

comes

Every gain has a cost, and whatever we

extract from a natural ecosystem must be repaid to it.
"Payment of this price cannot be avoided;

it can only be

delayed."9
The four laws express ideas that have been widely held
by non-scientists, Commoner notes,
writers.

including poets and

But while in an earlier time, understanding of the

natural world could be gained from personal experience

(the

Walden t y p e ) , now, with nuclear bombs and pollution,
understanding "needs help from the scientist."10

Air. Soil, and Water

Having given a basic description of life and of the
ecological study of it, Commoner goes on to a discussion
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organized by ecosystem categories:

air,

soil, water.

A

chapter on "Nuclear Fire" recounts how awareness of the
danger of radiation grew during the 1950s.

Nuclear

explosions were being made in the atmosphere at the time,
with resulting fallout and the deposit of strontium 90 in
human bones.

Until this time Commoner,

had "taken the air, water,

soil and our natural surroundings

more or less for granted."11
ecology.

though a biologist,

He had no training in

Word of high "background" radiation counts first

circulated among scientists; then an accident in 1954 in
which Japanese fishermen in their boat got a high dose of
fallout from a U.S. test,

some dying from it, made the

danger known to the public.
"It became clear that tests of nuclear weapons had
unwittingly set off the first global environmental
experiment in human history."12
Scientists spoke out repeatedly about the dangers of
fallout,

and the need for citizens to get involved in

evaluating their risk.

Commoner refers to the St. Louis

Committee for Nuclear Information,
of the scientists'
unexpectedly,

the beginning,

information movement,

the U.S.-U.S.S.R.

he says,

in 1958.

In 1963,

Limited Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty was approved by the Senate; Commoner considers this a
result of the scientists' efforts to inform the public.
calls it "the first victorious battle in the campaign to
save the environment —

and its human inhabitants —

from

He
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the blind assaults of modern technology."13
To explain air pollution,

Commoner traces the history

of Los Angeles air pollutants, beginning in the 1940s with
dust from smokestacks.

The later occurrence of smog was

caused by the interaction of nitrogen oxides
automobile engines,

(from

power plants and oil refineries)

other organic compounds already in oil, gasoline,
(hydrocarbons,

with

or coal

also in car exhaust-pipe emissions) when

activated by sunlight.

The main polluter was automobiles,

major industry in both consumer and military sectors,
politically difficult to bring under control.

(brown)

and

After

emissions controls were placed on new cars in 1966,
smog went down, but

(yellow)

nitrogen dioxide pollution went

up, because auto exhaust controls were on hydrocarbons, but
not on nitrogen oxides.

The nitrogen oxides that had

combined with hydrocarbons still had to go somewhere,
the result was smog in another color.

and

Commoner uses this

course of events to illustrate the inadequacy of studying
chemical reactions in isolation.
"'scientific method'

"Nevertheless," he says,

is, at present,

closely bound to the

notion of a singular cause and effect,

and most studies of

the health effects of air pollution make strong efforts to
find them."
pollution,

The poor, young, and old suffer most from air
Commoner observes,

destroys social progress."14

a

and therefore "air pollution

341

A chapter on "Illinois Earth" explains how fertilizer
nitrates in the soil were becoming poisonous nitrites in the
body,

especially in infants,

in the 1950s and 60s.

As news

of pollution and health hazards came out in the late 60s,
there was much controversy over the use of fertilizers,

and

agricultural scientists who had developed fertilizers did
not like the criticism.

Commoner emphasizes that the

objectivity of science can not come out of personal
objectivity when a lifetime of research has been spent in a
certain direction;
publication,

it must come from open discussion and

and from more data

(which in this case was the

chemical analysis of nitrates in the water supply to
determine if their origin was natural or synthetic).
The agricultural consequences of fertilizer were higher
yields, but the ecological consequences
distinction)

(to make Commoner's

were damage to water supplies.

ecological consequences foreseen?
Commoner says,

Why weren't the

Scientific research,

is not directed toward finding out.

The

problem with research in agricultural universities is that
it is aimed at agricultural rather than ecological gain.
The problem with basic research in other universities is
that,

(as of the early 70s),

it has gone to finer and finer

detail, which in biological research,

cannot be studied in

living systems, but only in test tubes.

But this molecular

biology approach may be "inapplicable to the actual

biological processes that occur in nature."15

In fact, at

the independent university where the Illinois nitrates were
studied,

there were departmental objections that "pure"

research was not being done in this work.
Commoner's example of the environmental state of water
is Lake Erie,

"the most blatant example of the

environmental crisis in the United States."16
clogged and mucky water,
are the (early 70s)

Algae-

and dead fish decaying on the shore

symptoms of its impending death.

The

lake is so polluted that one of its tributary rivers caught
fire after an oil spill.
used to have clear waters,

A huge, glacier-created lake that
just enough algae to support a

variety of life, and many kinds of fish, Lake Erie began
changing at the turn of the century.
of waste disposal

A complex interaction

(industrial and agricultural)

into the

waters, the stratification of waters in the lake, and
chemistry of algae growth resulted in an oxygen deficit in
the lake, and in the lake's becoming a waste trap rather
than a channel for taking wastes to the sea.

Some said Lake

Erie was naturally "aging"; Commoner disposes of this
argument.

"Human intervention,

"The guilt is all ours."17

" he argues,

is responsible.

He then recounts instances of

people trying to find first one and then another possible
single cause of algal growth as a way of evading
interconnected responsibility among detergent manufacturers
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(phosphates), agriculturalists

(fertilizer nitrates),

producers of carbon dioxide in the air.
writing,

and

At the time of

no one knew if Lake Erie could be restored;

it

seemed it might become an example of irreversible
environmental degradation.18

Ecosphere and Social Sphere

Commoner argues that the environmental crisis is not
only an ecological problem, but a social one.
both an ecosphere and a social sphere.19

We inhabit

In both the

ecosphere and the sphere of human activities, modern science
is poorly prepared for the task of finding the cause of the
crisis,

because the task is "the analysis of an

intrinsically complex system."20

In the ecosphere,

production depends ultimately upon the ecosphere itself.
Since the ecosphere doesn't grow, human activity must
accomodate to it.21
Some of a chapter on "Population and 'Affluence'" is a
response to Ehrlich's arguments about population.
Commoner's basic position is that pollution is not primarily
a problem of too many people unavoidably fouling too small a
nest.

Instead,

it is a problem of how we manage our

productive system.

He reminds us that "Many pollutants...
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made their environmental debut during the war years:
man-made radioactive elements...
synthetic plastics...."

s m o g . ..

DDT... detergents...

There was a postwar revolution in

science and technology preceded by a prewar "revolution in
basic science,

especially in physics and chemistry, upon

which so much of the new productive technology is based."22
In physics, understanding of the atom led to nuclear weapons
and the hazards of radioactivity,
electronics and thus computers.

and also to solid state
In chemistry, understanding

of the molecular composition of natural organic substances
led to their synthesis in the lab, and then to the further
synthesis of theoretically possible combinations not found
in nature.
"Only later was the potentially fatal flaw in the
scientific foundation of the new technology
discovered.
It was like a two-legged stool: well
founded in physics and chemistry, but flawed by a
missing third leg — the biology of the
environment.1,23
The burst of technological innovation and the upsurge
in environmental pollution both came in the postwar years,
and so Commoner puts the question:

"Is it possible that the

new technology is the major cause of the environmental
crisis?"24

The asking of this question indicates a

difference between the 70s and now, when this idea is too
commonplace to appear as a question.
Besides technology,

Commoner allows,

major cause is increase in population.

another possible

However,

pollution
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has risen much more sharply than population since the war,
and Commoner argues that it has not risen as a result of
demands on production by greater numbers of people.
Although the country produces more pollution for the size of
its population than it used to,

it is misleading to think of

this as pollution produced per person,

as if it were greater

affluence per person that is responsible.

GNP per person

has increased, but not as much as pollution,

and per capita

production of food, clothing and shelter has increased
little; per capita energy use is up, but again,
to account for the rise in pollution.

not enough

So it is neither

population nor affluence that explains the environmental
crisis.
It is how the economy has grown that has made
environmental problems.

For instance,

the product with the

highest postwar growth rate, as of 1970
analysis, with others)
53,000%.

(Commoner's

is the nonreturnable soda bottle, up

Synthetic fibers are up 5,980%, mercury for

chlorine production up 3,120%,

fertilizer nitrogen and

electric housewares both up a little over 1000%, etc.
Growing more slowly than the population,

or declining,

are

railroad freight, cotton fiber, wool, soap, work animal
horsepower.

It is kinds of goods, and technologies used to

produce goods that have changed drastically,
output.

not overall

Detergent replaces soap; truck freight replaces

rail freight; synthetic fibers replace natural ones;
aluminum, plastic and concrete replace lumber and steel;
nonreturnable bottles replace returnable ones.
replace the cultivator for controlling weeds;
their waste disposal problems)

Herbicides
feedlots

(and

replace range feeding.

"This pattern of economic growth is the major reason
for the environmental crisis."25

Its sudden emergence is

no longer a mystery, Commoner states,
technology pollutant by pollutant.

if you look at postwar

Levels of environmental

pollution have increased about ten times faster than growth
of GNP

(itself about 126% in postwar years).

has been a big contributor to the crisis:
fertilizers,

synthetic pesticides,

inorganic

feedlots.

success has been ecological failure.

Agribusiness

Its economic

Thus Commoner sets up

the theme of ecology vs economy.
Feedlots, detergents,

and fertilizers pollute; the

production of synthetic fibers does also, because chemical
processes at high temperatures release pollutants to the
air.

Also, the fibers do not biodegrade like natural ones,

and they come from nonrenewable resources.

Automobile

emission pollution is the outcome not just of more
automobiles,

but of engine design,

preference to roads over rails

fuel typo, political

(railroads require heavy

initial capital investment, but haul freight much more
cheaply and with more energy efficiency).

The energy cost
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of producing aluminum and concrete is far higher than that
for steel and lumber.

Additionally,

overpackaging of

consumer goods results in a waste disposal problem.
Commoner concludes we are "blind... about the environmental
effects of modern technology."26

The "chief reason" for

the postwar environmental crisis is the postwar change in
productive technology.

Scientific Knowledge.

Public Knowledge

The environmental crisis,

Commoner argues,

is not the

result of natural catastrophe or human biological activities
(population growth and nest-fouling behavior)
in origin.

but is social

"[The] same fault lies behind every ecological

failure of modern technology:

attention to a single facet of

what in nature is a complex whole."27

(Among examples of

such failures, Commoner cites the building of the Aswan dam
and the resultant schistosomiasis contracted from snails in
waters deprived of free flow.)

It is not inadequacies in

the new technologies that has produced problems, but their
successes.
success,

If the failure of technology lies in its

then the fault, Commoner reasons,

is in its aims.

But it is not that we need to abandon technology; rather,
technology needs to be derived from an appropriate
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scientific analysis.

Technology's present fault derives

from "the fragmented nature of its scientific base."28
The fault in science is reductionism.
biology is an example;

Molecular

it tries to understand life by

finding a molecular event that is the mechanism of a
biological process.

Soil biology or the nitrogen cycle,

"which are not reducible to simple molecular mechanisms,

are

now often regarded as uninteresting relics of some ancient
craft."

Reductionism is not limited to biology but is "the

dominant viewpoint of modern science as a whole."

It

results in isolated specialties that cannot communicate with
one another.

Science is also isolated from society's

problems because scientists are attempting to maintain their
intellectual independence by avoiding "all problems that do
not arise in their own minds."29
But scientists must make known information that bears
on society's environmental problems.

"Public knowledge is

essential to the solution of every environmental
problem."30 The hidden costs of our technologies are
social,

they are met by the public.

In the attempts to

balance benefits and hazards of technology, who will do the
balancing?

Scientific experts can evaluate benefits and

hazards, but scientific principles cannot guide moral
choices.

"No scientific principle can guide the choice

between some number of kilowatt hours of electric power and
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some number of cases of thyroid cancer...."
judgments, matters of morality.

These are value

"In a democracy,

they

belong not in the hands of 'experts', but in the hands of
the people and their elected representatives."

Scientists

must get and give information to the public; that is their
"unique responsibility."31

Here, the conventional

scientific separation between fact and value is affirmed.
Commoner reiterates that scientist-citizen interactions
can work.

Successful scientist-citizen partnerships have

helped lead to the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963;
the detoxification of nerve gas in Colorado which was at
first stored near the Denver airport and then slated for
transport to the Atlantic Ocean; the abandonment of
biological weapons production; the end to the use of DDT in
the U.S.; the defeat of the ozone-layer-threatening U.S.
version of the SST; various local environmental watchdog
victories;

legal actions by various conservation groups,

Ralph Nader's consumer protection information.
Concerning the idea that the public can't evaluate
risks, Commoner says the public already has a notion of what
risks it wants to take —

it doesn't like to take

involuntary risks from pesticides,
production, air pollution, etc.
risks,

some studies indicate,

fertilizers, power

Involuntary and voluntary

fall on separate curves of

similar shape, but with the acceptable level for involuntary
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risks 10,000 tines lower.

The public now rejects a risk

from environmental pollutants that it previously accepted
because,

Commomer believes,

it now understands that it is

not only involuntary living victims who suffer, but future
ge n e r ations.
Commoner questions the rationality of an economic
system that forces people to fight for jobs to support
production processes that can damage their health and the
health of their children.

The influence of Marxist and

critical analysis can be seen in this stance.
crisis is not just a safe "motherhood" issue

Environmental
(motherhood was

still a safe issue in the 1970s) or a diversion from social
problems;

it is linked to war and peace by nuclear weaponry,

by the use of herbicides

(ecological warfare)

in Vietnam;

it

"reach[es] to the core of our system of social justice and
challenge[s] basic political goals."32

Population

When Commoner was writing,
overpopulation was high.

concern about worldwide

Paul Ehrlich's 1968 book, The

Population B o m b , had published the message that too many
people was the single most influential cause of
environmental deterioration. Commoner,

however,

argues that
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technology has a much greater effect on the crisis than
population does.

Conservatively,

he estimates,

technology

has five times the effect of rising population on pollution.
To prevent the postwar rise in pollution we could have
allowed population to grow

(as it did from 1914 to 1968) by

43%, while reducing the environmental impact of productive
technology by 30%.
environmental

On the other hand,

impact to increase

if we allowed the

(as it did)

by about 600%,

to prevent the rise in pollution would have required an 86%
reduction in population.

(Since the environmental impact of

production has increased six-fold,

population must drop by

about five-sixths if total pollution level is to remain
constant.)
Clearly,

Commoner argues,

effective factor.

technology is the more

Reducing the population would help, but

that argument can be used for all social problems,

Commoner

says: with fewer people we could have less unemployment,
more adequate jails, etc.
to altering the economic,

Reducing births is an alternative
social and political priorities

that have led to our problems.
not voluntary,
repression,

However,

if birth control is

population control can only be by political

a solution that is no advance over the misguided

politics we already have.

Commoner asserts that the

environmental crisis penetrates the screen of "evasions,
excuses,

and... technical details" that has long obscured
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the social crisis of the United States —

its inability to

use its great wealth to give all citizens a decent life.
We have an environmental crisis so extreme that the
guestion has become,

how much time do we have?

own judgment is that if the present course
environmental degradation continues,
will not be possible.

Commoner's

(1970s) of

civilized human society

This is a strikingly pessimistic

warning.
Commoner reiterates that population control is often a
political rather than a scientific response to social
problems.

The view that the United States should insist on

population control in the poor countries it aids is not
simply a scientific judgment,

but is also a political

judgment about relationships between rich and poor nations.
Population growth in the third world was encouraged under
colonialism for a supply of labor to extract raw materials;
the extracted wealth was transferred to the colonial powers,
which were then able to undergo the "demographic transition"
of lowered birth rates that accompany a raised standard of
living, while the colonized countries were not able to reach
this transition
Indonesia).

(Commoner's example is the Dutch and

Commoner calls this "a kind of demographic

parasitism."33

Now former colonial powers use synthetics

rather than raw materials,

further limiting the chances of

the third world for wealth and transition.

But a change in
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productive technology for ecological reasons could change
this.

Then we would require the third world's natural

products rather than their requiring our technology.
Population control looks like an easy solution,
Commoner says, but it is another reductionist attempt to get
around complex problems,
not work.

this time social ones,

that will

It is an attempt to solve a social problem with a

biological process —

the control of reproduction.

War is a

similar biological solution,

Commoner points out, another

kind of population control.

Neither form of population

control is an acceptable goal.

Commoner sees the main

lesson of the environmental crisis and population problem to
be that to survive and maintain our humanity we must solve
social problems by social means.

Ecology and Economics

Environmental concerns have been far removed from the
"central problems of conventional economics," Commoner
observes,

and only now is a change occurring.34

Environmental factors have been referred to as "external
economies and diseconomies"

(benefits or harms received).

"Externality" is a concept for dealing with exchange that is
neither mutually beneficial nor voluntary

(i.e., not meeting
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the paradigm of the basic economic process of the m a r k e t ) .
The critique of externality is that the cost-benefit
analysis which decides that the beneficial outcome "growth"
has occurred,

fails to measure actual costs.

Furthermore,

the costs are "shifted to the shoulders of others...

[and]

the traditional cost-benefit calculus serves as an
institutionalized cloak for large-scale spoliation...."35
Pollution is linked to profit through the productivity
of modern technology.
innovation,

And profit accrues especially to

because of the innovative producer's early-

stages monopoly over process? when competition increases,
edge decreases,
found.

price drops,

In general,

and a new innovation must be

new technologies have been more

polluting than old, and pollution costs have not been borne
by producers but by society as a whole,
enterprise is free but not private.
Commoner affirms, must be changed.
attention to its own 'no free lunch'

so private free

These relationships,
Economics should pay
law.

Production

processes will have to be governed by social thrift —

which

will conflict with private gain. Ecology gives a logic of an
economic system where production meets social rather than
private criteria.

However,

the need for new, ecologically

acceptable technologies could transform reductionist
science/technology and in turn speed the transformation of
the productive system.
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The economics of ecology will require radical change.
Economic readjustment would have to spread beyond the
industrialized nations; thus there would have to be sweeping
political changes.

The huge capital resources needed will

not be available unless we give up our large-scale military
spending.
"The lesson of the environmental crisis is, then,
clear.
If we are to survive, ecological
considerations must guide economic and political
o n e s .”
"The world will survive the environmental crisis as a
whole, or not at all."36

The Closing Circle

While the environmental crisis is palpable in the air,
water,

and rubbish heaps,

Commoner says,

it has a kind of unreality,

because the ecological explanation of all the

interconnections that cause it remains in the realm of
concepts.

The inertia of the economic and political system

is, in contrast,

real in our lives.

"Everywhere in the world there is evidence of a
deep-seated failure in the effort to use the
competence, the wealth, the power at human
disposal for the maximum good of human beings.
The environmental crisis is a major example of
this failure."
"The present system of production is self
destructive; the present course of human
civilization is suicidal."
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"Now that the bill for the environmental debt has
been presented, our options have become reduced to
two: either the rational, social organization of
the use and distribution of the earth's resources,
or a new barbarism."37
These are severe warnings,

but Commoner still finds

cause for optimism in the new view that ecology will give
us, offering new solutions for productivity and
international economic relations.

Another source of

optimism is that the cause of the environmental crisis is
not the product of our biological capabilities
not change in time to matter)

(which could

but of our social actions.

Commoner refers back to the beginning of the book, and the
beginning of life, which was at first embarked on the linear
course of consuming its nutritive base as it grew, but then
evolved into a new life form, which instead of converting
organic matter into unusable wastes,
fresh organic matter.

"By closing the circle,

what no living organism,
The parallel is clear:
circle of life....

converted wastes into
they achieved

alone, can accomplish —

survival."

"Human beings have broken out of the

to survive, we must close the circle."38

*

*

*

In The Closing Ci r c l e . Commoner contrasts linear and
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cyclical views of how things work.
that, cyclically,

He quickly establishes

effects are causes.

Yet science takes an

atomistic approach to the study of the world,
linear notion of cause and effect,

suited to a

not a cyclical one.

Another type of science, however, shows us that life is a
cycle of interdependencies.

In his examples of

interdependencies in the living world,

Commoner consistently

refers to "the environment," saving "nature" for occasions
when he wants to make a contrast with artifice.

This

structuring of the living world as "environment"

is, I would

argue,

a scientific approach, whereas calling it "nature"

recalls a tradition of essential relatedness to living
things that pre-dates science.

Environment is an object of

scientific study; Nature is a subject,

something with being

that resists being made an object.
The environment,

in Commoner's writing,

lawlike in its behavior;
are immutable,

its laws,

is an ecosphere

like all laws of science,

and though the system described is complex,

the laws are simple.

We must change our scientific approach

to the environment; science in the lab cannot take the place
of science in the field.
In this book, which follows Science and S u r v i v a l .
Commoner makes a more extensive analysis of the economy than
he has before.
ecosystem.

The emphasis shifts from science to the

Concerning the ecosystem,

science is incomplete,
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but the economy is incompatible.

Saving the environment is

a battle against economic and political
ecology against economy.

interests;

it is

The environmental crisis is a sign

of our inability to use our wealth and power for the good of
all.

The environmental crisis and social justice are

linked; the environmental crisis and the fate of
civilization are linked.

The environmental crisis is a

social problem; while it needs scientific solutions, these
must be socially initiated.
The postwar change in productive technology is the
immediate cause of damage to the environment.
this technology —
scientific basis,

its damaging effect —

The fault of

lies in its

in the linearity of scientific assumptions

and the atomism of scientific methods.

And yet Commoner has

more to say about changing this technology than changing the
science that,

in his analysis,

lies at its base.

Perhaps

this is because he evaluates the need for new social choices
as the more pressing one, since scientific principles in any
case cannot guide moral choices.
amoral; however,

Science is in this sense

scientists need not and should not be.

They have a responsibility to the public to speak out —
Commoner himself is consciously acting on this
responsibility.
Economic and social systems have not recognized any
limits to growth; ecosystems are known to have such limits.

Ecology,
politics.

Commoner says, must now subsume economy and
By ignoring the wholeness of systems, with their

limits to total growth and the circularity of cause and
effect within the whole, we have broken out of the circle of
life.

To survive, we must return to and close the circle

which, when unbroken,

continually renews our existence.
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES

The previous chapter discussed a book that connected economy
and ecology,

and gave specific examples of how choices on

productive technology have environmental effect.

This

chapter reviews a book that makes the economy-ecology
connection more generally,

and on an international scale.

Summarizing Issues

Only One Earth; The Care and Maintenance of a Small
P l a n e t , by Barbara Ward and Ren6 Dubos, was published in
1972.1

It is an unoffical report,

kind of working document,

originally intended as a

commissioned by the United Nations

Conference on the Human Environment,
Stockholm later that year.

which was held in

The book was to provide a

conceptual framework for conference participants and the
general public.

The two authors,

the other a biologist

one an economist

(Ward),

(Dubos), prepared their summary of

issues with the assistance of 152 corresponding consultants
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in 58 countries: scientists, engineers,
academics,
writers,

institute directors,

clergy, bankers,

journalists and diplomats.

simultaneously in Arabic,

industry executives,

Danish,

lawyers,

The book was published

Dutch,

Italian, Japanese, Spanish, and Swedish.

English,

French,

The conference,

and its associated book, gave official notice to the
emerging global perspective on environmental problems.
was the first major international conference,

It

and it set the

tone for many such meetings, on a smaller scale,

for years

to follow.
Two concepts that are now familiar are noted as word
coinings in this book: one is the earth as a spaceship -

an

idea presented by Adlai Stevenson in 1965 to the Economic
and Social Council of the U.N.

in Geneva2? the other is the

biosphere - a term invented by Vladimir Ivanovitch
Vernadsky,

for the emergence on a lifeless planet of the

covering of living things.3

"Spaceship Earth" conveyed the

fragility and vulnerability of life on a planet suspended in
space, whose inhabitants have no recourse to anything other
than what they are already supplied with.

The "biosphere"

came to stand generally for the recognition that life on the
planet is one interrelated whole, and as much a matter of
concern as the atmosphere.

While pollution of the

atmosphere was evident in the early 70s, a potential crisis
of the biosphere was not.4

Ward and Dubos explain that the
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experts consulted for criticisms of and suggestions for the
preliminary draft of the book differed greatly on what
should be stressed and how material should be presented.
(Some seventy comments were received.)
proposed text was pessimistic,
them,

indeed,

Some felt the

a "'fear story'."

"One of

sees in the style all the defects he violently

objects to in Silent Spring —

'emotional and non-factual'."

Others wanted a more forceful warning,

and one urges against

just a "mere recital of facts because salvation will
ultimately depend on an emotional awakening."5
In commenting on the process of summarizing and
weighing many different arguments, Ward

and Dubos take

the

conventional scientific position on the

separation of fact

and value, using as an example nuclear energy:
"Experts rarely disagree on the validity of facts
themselves; they differ only with regard to the
interpretation and use of these facts...
But while all scientists agree on [certain] facts
[about mutations resulting from radiation],
individually they differ as to the levels of
radiation [from nuclear power plants] they
consider tolerable, because this involves social
considerations based on value judgments.
For
example, the biological hazards... must be
balanced against the advantages... from...
economic development."6
When a scientific fact enters the social arena,
mutates into something else,

it

something that is now arguable

because it is subject to values.

Ward and Dubos will try to

recognize values but provide only facts, not
recommendations.

The authors were in fact required not to

365

suggest any policy actions,

as these could "prejudge the

work of governments of the United Nations."7

Social and Natural Worlds

The scheme of the book is to present a picture of a
world of social unities and of a world of natural unities,
and then to show how technological and economic developments
affect them both.

There is a unity of social,

economic and

political interconnections; and a "unity of science" —
characterized both as a unity of matter and energy,
unity of the physical world and its laws.
economic,

and a

The social,

and political unity the authors refer to is the

unity of a system with interdependent parts —
unity of agreement.

it is not the

This is a holistic sense of unity.

Man, the authors say,

(sharing Commoner's observation),

inhabits two worlds - natural and soc i a l .

Ward and Dubos

take a scientific view of the social world —

it is the

"extraordinary" development of man's brain that separates
him from his animal ancestors and that "is at the root of
his creativity and his destructiveness."8

The authors'

argument is that we live in both worlds, but on only one
earth, and we need to recognize that the two worlds join
whether we intend them to or not.
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"Something fundamental and possibly irrevocable is
happening to man's relations with both his
worlds... Men seem, on a planetary scale, to be
substituting the controlled for the uncontrolled,
the fabricated for the unworked, the planned for
the random."9
This technoprogressive theme is notably at odds with the
out-of-control critiques of Carson,

Commoner,

and Ehrlich.

Ward and Dubos make their case mostly by concentrating on
the substitution of "the fabricated for the unworked."
They sketch in a few pages the rise of man by means of the
use of nonhuman energy and technology.
chronologically,
animal power,

More or less

major achievements are the use of fire, of

of metals; the development of river valley

civilizations and bureaucracies; money,

commerce,

mathematics,

The tempo of

astronomy,

and alphabets.

development increases in the 17th century,

and "in the

twentieth centu r y . .. every index takes off for the
stratosphere.

Energy use, the consumption of foodstuffs and

raw materials,

urbanization,

above all, population...."10

The authors now give the warning that they have been
leading up to.

Though there are different evaluations of

the possible benefits and disadvantages of this great
change,
"What is certain is that our sudden, vast
accelerations —
in numbers, in the use of energy
and new materials, in urbanization, in consumptive
ideals, in consequent pollution — have set
technological man on a course which could alter
dangerously and perhaps irreversibly, the natural
systems of his planet upon which his biological
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survival depends."11
As an example of consumption pressures,
"Suppose seven billion

the authors ask,

[the projected population for the

year 2010] try to live like Europeans or Japanese?"
"The two worlds of man — the biosphere of his
inheritance, the technosphere of his creation —
are out of balance, indeed potentially in deep
conflict.
And man is in the middle."’2

Science. Technology,

and the Market

After the 16th century,

say Ward and Dubos,

there was a

change in western Europe to an emphasis on useful knowledge
(they cite B a c o n ) , thus on repeatable controlled experiment,
and on analysis

(as specifiec by Descartes —

reducing

fields of study to discrete objects or ultimate el e m e n t s ) ,
on observation, and measurement and mathematics.
economics,
powerful,

Knowledge,

and political power "became more interrelated,
and self-reinforcing with each advance in

technology and organization."13
"The vast range of scientific achievements that
has flowed from the precise measurements of energy
and the study of closely delineated 'discrete
objects' makes up one of the most remarkable
odysseys of the human mind."
"[These achievements have] reduced the crushing
burdens of physical w o r k . .. freed men for other
pursuits, and extended to millions a wealth and
opportunity formerly enjoyed by the smallest
elite."H
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The authors do not mention the new burdens of these
achievements,

the crushing work in mines that this

technology first demanded, or the work in its factories near
dangerous mechanical equipment.

Their understanding of the

individual's gain or loss from science and technology
compared to society's or the planet's)

(as

is almost entirely

positive.
Ward and Dubos also present their triad of knowledge,
economics and political power as science,
the nation.
analyzes.
with the

the market,

and

It is this triad that rest of the book
Knowledge is thus equated with science,

(free) market,

economics

and political power with the nation,

as if these were their natural identities.
Science,

the authors say, has emphasized division and

specialization; only recently has it attempted to explain
wider relationships;

it still risks making too little of

connections and relationships.
"On the one hand, it [science] is dedicated to the
highest standards of objectivity and enslaved to
the sternest mistress — the spirit of truth.
But
once the results are known — the horsepower
measured, the atom bombarded, the nucleus split —
vastly increased powers of use and misuse fall
into men's hands.
Energy and matter have, as it
were, been torn out of the restraints imposed upon
them by the natural system."15
It now seems old fashioned,

at best, to say that science is

enslaved to the truth; the authors hold an idealistic view
of science,

which allows as criticism only the possibility
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that it has overstepped its boundaries.
Scientific advance requires us to have more wisdom,

to

be able to provide checks and balances on this released
energy and power, but "It has not been restraint or
reflection that has chiefly presided over the emergence of
the new scientific,

technological order."

technological order," the authors assert,

"The new
"is solidly rooted

in man's desire for goods and his willingness to work and
plan and invest to get them."16

Ward and Dubos are saying

that though technology is an achievement of science,
sustained by desire.

This bases the technological order on

individual acquisitiveness

(although the authors include

nationalism as an influence)
universal,
option,

it is

as if this acquisitiveness were

equally practiced and equally available as an

even though the authors'

later comments on rich and

poor nations show that they know this is not so.

As a

theoretical stance it is inadequate, because it lacks
recognition of structural supports for technology and of
power relations that impose technologies.
Ward and Dubos briefly review mercantilist commerce,
and the shift of investment from financing long journeys to
building factories and workforces once steam engines and
other tools became available.
raising of capital,

They quickly outline the

and the large scale production and

distribution of goods,

and conclude that "As a decentralized
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way of satisfying a million different tastes and needs, the
market system could hardly be matched."17
balances supply and prices.

Again,

Demand

(need)

individual

acquisitiveness is considered to be the basis of the system;
nothing is said about how the needs of the buyers
urban housing)

(e.g.,

are themselves produced by the constraints of

a system over which the individuals have no power.
The authors acknowledge that the market system has also
had "unintended,

fragmented,

effects," particularly

and destabilizing side

"the gap between rich and poor."

Another effect has been damage to the environment.

Ward and

Dubos observe that economic theory, growing out of the early
conditions of the growth of capital,
accepting this damage.

inclines toward

Since the early entrepreneurs took

high risks, they did not want any unavoidable costs laid to
their account, and "The definition of c o s t s ... took on a
minimum content which it has to some extent retained.
were what the entrepreneur could not avoid paying."
heaps

(one of which,

Costs
Slag

in Wales, slid downhill and buried a

schoolhouse with its children a century later —

a

contemporary incident for Ward and Dubos), air pollution,
water pollution,

dangerous machinery —

the remediation of

any of this was a cost the entrepreneur would not accept.
"Natural systems were treated as 'free goods'...." and the
poisoning of the water that affected someone else downstream
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was considered an "external diseconomy."18

The Nation

In the "trinity of forces —

science,

the market,

the

nation," the market has been decisive as "a stimulus to the
development of our disturbed,

fragmented,

and powerful

modern order," but the nation state has been still more
potent as an agent of change. The
"modern nation-state has developed the authority,
the organization, the will and the energy to do
three critical things": create an internal market;
create, with other nation states, a world market;
"[bring] science and state together in the pursuit
of w ar."19
Though all this has impacts on the human environment,
statehood has not been reconciled with a shared planet.
nation's infrastructure is designed to deal with

No

the

environmental effects of production and consumption.
"If all man can offer to the decades ahead is the
same combination of scientific drive, economic
cupidity, and national arrogance, then we cannot
rate very highly the chances of reaching the year
2000 with our planet still functioning safely and
our humanity securely preserved."20
It is time, Ward and Dubos say, to rethink the triad.
have to rethink science
nation

We

(make it more integrative), the

(it must fit into a morally and socially responsible

world order as well as a world that is physically o n e ) , and
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the economy

(revise management of incomes,

environments,

cities).

Scientific Knowledge

Like Commoner in The Closing C i r c l e , the authors feel
that it is necessary for the reader to take in some basic
science.

They have already evaluated the contribution of

science as a whole,
Science,

and reiterate its influence for unity.

in its "dissection of the seamless web of

existence" and its increasing precision and specialization,
has paradoxically given a vision of the unity of the entire
cosmos.21
Ward and Dubos begin their account of life with physics
and the knowledge gained within the last century that energy
and matter are interchangeable.
time,

Like many others at the

they grapple with the subject of atomic power and its

dangers, which they try to convey with a scientific
comparison.

The thermonuclear fusion process at the heart

of the sun is what releases the energy which comes to the
Earth —

but Earth receives just one two-billionth part of

it.
"We can, it is clear, stand only so much of the
sun's vast radiance.
Yet we have already repeated
on earth the process which flings it forth... The
hydrogen bomb... first exploded in 1952...
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releas[es] the kind of energy which is generated
by the sun.
All other environmental risks, it is
clear, fade into insignificance compared with the
possibility that this terrible weapon might ever
come to be used in all-out war."22
Having described the basic constituents of matter,

the

authors turn to the appearance of life, occuring in stages
over great periods of time.

As the Earth developed,

mechanisms took shape to "protect it from the
destructiveness of solar radiation,
life-giving energy."

yet enable it to use its

First there is a lifeless planet on

which solar radiation pours down "through unimpeded space";
then the covering of living things —
emerges over billions of years.
one surrounded by clouds,

the biosphere —

First a molten globe,

then

then a cooling of the crust,

whereupon the clouds turned to water and
"The rains began to fall.
They fell for years,
for centuries, for millennia in a continuous,
global downpour, filling the crevices and the
gulfs.
They covered the lower lands.
They
climbed up the mountains.
They all but filled the
Southern Hemisphere.
The oceans were born and
became the cradle of life."23
With this description, Ward and Dubos convey the immensity
of time that passed in preparation for life, and give a
sense of how impossible it would be to retrieve the
conditions for life if we damaged it severely on a planetary
scale.
The rains ended about three billion years ago;
chemicals combined under the influence of the sun's
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radiation and electrical discharges in atmosphere; carbon
compounds appeared; then primitive bacteria; then living
cells capable of photosynthesis

(sea plants at first)

transforming light energy into carbohydrates,

—

pulling in

carbon dioxide and letting off oxygen.
The reader's scientific education continues through the
"random process" of evolution.
creep up onto rocks,

DNA is mentioned.

fish creep up onto the land,

Plants
in a

"flood" of land life about 350 million years ago; everything
begins to adapt.
getting develop,

The energy chains of food-giving and foodecosystems form.

About 100,000 years ago

begins "the unexplained and unparalled enlargement of the
human brain, which resulted in Homo sapiens, thus bringing
into play on earth a type of force different from other
natural forces. . . .1,24
This long-in-the-making balance of life is a delicate
one.

Though ecosystems are self-repairing,

they can be

overloaded and damaged to the point of no return.

But how,

ask Ward and Dubos, can we achieve the necessary caution
toward the environment in an age of extreme nationalism and
extreme material expectations?

(Or put another way, how can

we integrate state and economy with scientific knowledge?)
The authors find hope in science.

Knowledge of the

atom and of evolution are
"master intellectual achievements of modern times
[and] have provided a solid basis for a completely
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new appreciation of the unity, interdependence,
and precariousness of the human condition.
And
since this reality comes to us with all the weight
of scientific proof and cogency, we can hope that
it will be more convincing than was the earlier,
less scientifically substantiated knowledge."25
"There is... something clarifying and irresistible in plain
scientific fact," they conclude.
So there is a paradox.

Scientific knowledge gives us

both the power to annihilate ourselves and the perspective
to avoid this suicide.

All traditions have warnings against

"arrogant and unheeding power" but they are particularly
urgent in Western tradition, Ward and Dubos note, perhaps
because the West is "responsible for opening up the furnaces
of nuclear power and for penetrating to the most intimate
mechanisms of life."

Thus the legends of Prometheus,

punished for stealing fire, and of Faust —

"the man of

science who sells his soul to secure all knowledge and
power."

This does not mean we should retreat from science.

In fact, we need to know more about the interconnections of
the environment.

"But the warning remains...

If man

continues to let his behavior be dominated by separation,
antagonism,

and greed, he will destroy the delicate balances

of his planetary environment.
destroyed,

And if they were once

there would be no more life for him."26

Here

Ward and Dubos establish a moral basis for the environmental
problem,

yet they use the remoteness of the subjunctive to

express it —

perhaps as a way of appearing scientifically
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dispassionate.

For them,

it is scientific dispassion that

promises to overcome the passions they see as the problem.

The Balance of Resources

In this world of accelerating change,
of resources is a major uncertainty.
problems of calculation:
resources,

the availability

There are many

in projecting population,

and consumption when trying to figure out if

there's enough to go around; they are all interdependent.
Projections of population growth are based on current rates
of increase.

A small rate of population increase can result

in rapid total population growth.
a population in 70 years
years;

3%, 2 3 years.

(other things being equal); 2%,
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While population is growing fastest in

the underdeveloped countries,
the developed ones.

A 1% increase will double

resource use grows fastest in

Thus the sufficiency of resources

cannot be estimated from total world population alone.

The

American child in his lifetime will "run through the
biosphere's available supplies at least five hundred times
faster than an Indian baby."
escape the dilemma.

"Developed lands [do not]

Something has to give —

family size,

standards of living, or the biosphere's survival."27
"But," the authors observe,

".... all modernized

377

societies conduct their economies on the basis of rising
material standards for all citizens."28
"Where along the escalator is the exit to a level
floor?
Is there a kind of biological limit to man's
desire for food, shelter, leisure, entertainment,
talking by telephone, moving about in a motor car,
flying in airplanes, visiting distant lands?...
We do
not know.
But clearly we have not reached it yet."29
Once again,

the authors see individual acquisitiveness

driving the economic system.
The availability of resources is not simple to predict,
because nothing stays the same —

for example,

the

possibility of use of low grade ores changes with
technology; there are new uses for existing materials; new
materials are synthesized.
however,

require energy,

energy availability.
fuels —

All such transformations,

and so we can try to estimate

The world relies greatly on fossil

coal, oil, and natural gas —

and Ward and Dubos

review questions about reserves, political problems,
pollution,

and as-yet unharnessed alternative energies.

Nuclear energy ("Promethean Fire," as the authors call it)
is the most immediate alternative.

But

"To generate this power on earth is, almost
literally, the Promethean act of stealing fire
from the gods.
And we should remember with an
uneasiness born of a sense of sacrilege that the
first use of this fire was to wipe out two cities,
without care for individual guilt or innocence,
man or woman, youth or age."5"
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Citizen and Science

Is this energy worth its hazards,
is here, well into the book,
noticeable before)

including cancer?

that the citizen

It

(not much

is introduced as a risk assessor.

"In all this debate, one thing is certain.
The
ordinary citizen cannot judge the scientific
facts.
What he can and must do is bring his
reason and common sense to bear on his country's
whole approach to the problem."31
The citizen gets very busy using common sense to protest
nuclear stations near big population centers,

to insist on

monitoring systems set to the lowest contamination rate
possible,

to make sure that reprocessing fuels and

transporting and disposing of them are closely inspected.
Then,

"Should the citizen go further and simply say that he

prefers to do without the Promethean fire? That nuclear
energy is simply too risky and too expensive?"32

The

question is left unanswered.
We can't go on with economic growth, population growth,
and inadequate controls on pollution and untrammeled energy
use without ending in ecological disaster.

But "Growth and

environment are not in necessary opposition."
"If population becomes stabilized, basic
injustices are redressed, effluent charges
imposed, new technologies of nonpolluting
technologies evolved, the pressure of arms
relaxed, and citizens persuaded, by education and
example, to widen the range of their
nonconsumptive joys, societies can still 'grow',
yet still preserve and enhance their
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environments."33

The Underdeveloped World

A section on developing regions ties the global economy
to the impending environmental crisis and social problems.
The authors offer a profile of the developing nation: annual
per capita income is low; investment comes largely from
abroad; exports are primary materials,

imports are machines

and skills; population is heavily rural; school enrollment
and literacy rates low; population growth rate is high.
"Population and work force explode ahead of industrial
ization"34 instead of behind,

as in the 19th-century West.

The exit from poverty requires greater productivity, which
means impact on the environment
industrialization,

(agriculture by new methods,

urbanization).

Population:
Developing nations have about 2 5% of the resources of the
global economy,

and 75% of its population.

century's control of major epidemics —
smallpox, plague, malaria —
sharply.

The 20th

yellow fever,

has brough death rates down

"The general rate of population increase —

over 2.5 per cent a year —

of

is... unprecedented in human
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history."

Two billion peoples in the developing world at

writing must reach 5.5 billion by the year 2000.

(These

projections remain approximately the same twenty years
l ater).
Productivity can't increase if consumption claims on
resources

(population growth)

outstrip it.

There are two

important factors in slowing down birth rates:
transition'

(the shift to lower birth rates)

'population

due to

attainment of modern industrial productivity and lifestyle,
and government policy.

Policies for Growth:
Agriculture is the basis of everything else in developing
countries.

Calorie intake is usually less than 2000

calories a day, and protein intake is low, sometimes
deficient.

In Africa, Asia,

and Latin America,

growth means more people to feed per acre;

population

less land lies

fallow as acreage is increased, but this means that this
traditional method of restoring soil fertility is bypassed;
abandoned land erodes, deserts form.

Overgrazing has a

similar effect.
Green revolution rice and wheat strains
grow fast and successfully with fertilizers,

(since 1967)
increasing

crops in some places at a rate faster than the increase in
population.

But there are special environmental problems in
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much of the third world: soils are thin, dependent on rain
forests for humus.
cultivation area,

When forests are cleared to increase the
rain leaches out soil nutrients; when the

rain ends, the wind blows away topsoil or the sun bakes it
to brick.

Tropical climate has extremes of rain and heat;

regular water supply is a problem;

irrigation is necessary,

but must be kept in balance with the water table and
evaporation rates.
Also,

the green revolution requires heavy fertilizer

and pesticide use,

and is a monoculture method not related

to local conditions;
challenges.

it is thus susceptible to environmental

The green revolution is capital intensive

rather than labor intensive,

as agriculture traditionally is

in Asia; people will get turned off the land, migrate to
cities,

increase urban problems.

"it is not only the balance of nature that will be
endangered.
It is the balance of the villages,
the balance of the cities, the balance of the
whole social order."35
Djakarta has a population of five million but is basically
"a vast agglomeration of rural villages" without sewage
systems,

reliable drinking water, transport links.

The

shantytowns surrounding Rio grow by 5000 migrants a week.
So the green revolution needs a framework of land reform,
extension services,
(ecological)

cooperatives,

local wisdom.

and traditional

Unfortunately,

the authors note,

the necessary trained people are not available.
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The development of industry also has such "social
diseconomies."
benefits elites,

Debt is owed to foreigners;

reinvestment

not the national economy; exports are

primary materials which do not bring in enough foreign
exchange

(except oil); technology is imported and not suited

to local conditions,
condition,

especially the abundant labor

so unemployment goes up.

On the other hand, developing countries have energy
options that the industrializing West did not; they can
decentralize industry,

and could learn from mistakes of the

West concerning urbanization and its social and
environmental problems.

Yet the environmentally acceptable

technologies and strategies demand high capital inputs,
scientific skills.

and

The special problems of the third world

will be very hard to overcome.

All strategies for

improvement face the guestion of population growth.

To

mobilize for this growth requires something like a nation
state.

For developing countries the nation-state is also a

symbol of escape from servitude,

but it is inadequate where

the nation is "too small for effective sovereignty"36 or
lacks the necessary resources for change and growth —
common condition of developing countries. Also,

a

separate

sovereignties but interdependent technosphere and biosphere
present problems for unity.
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The Shared Biosphere:

Interdependence of nations and of technosphere and biosphere
is especially evident in the atmosphere.

The authors

discuss the possibility of a greenhouse effect from carbon
dioxide gases

—

on the rise in recent decades because of

the burning of fossil fuels and of deforestation

(fewer

leaves are available to remove carbon d i o x i d e ) .

This

combines with what may be a natural warming period at the
end of an ice age (the Pleistocene).
decision-making;

We need global

local decisions are inadeguate.

Oceans are another area of interdependence.

They

provide the water vapor which becomes rain; their
phytoplankton provide oxygen; they cool warm regions and
warm cold ones; they provide protein
mineral and biological debris.

(fish); they dissolve

But they are not endless.

All refuse dumped into the sea accumulates there in one way
or another; the sea has no outlet.

Biological life is

concentrated near the surface of the ocean,

and concentrated

near land, where it is most vulnerable to human activities:
runoff pollution; oil spills; toxic dumping; sewage dumping.

Coexistence in the Technosphere:
We also have an interdependent technosphere,

"the

constructed world order of technological innovation,
investment flows, and commercial exchanges."37

To keep
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pace with population growth,

national economies need to grow

at 6% per year in developing countries.

Aid or trade

concessions from developed countries are needed; half the
amount spent on arms would be sufficient.

Some nations are

still testing nuclear weapons in the air at the time of Ward
and Dubos' writing.

Environmental problems are not

unsolvable, but "fear and doom are truly appropriate" when
it comes to warfare.

Strategies for Survival

Once again the authors rely on the power of science as
truth:
"If men have not hitherto realized the extent of
their planetary interdependence, it was in part at
least because, in clear, precise physical and
scientific fact, it did not yet exist."3®
There are three fields in which to act: science, markets,
nations —

matching the "thrusts" which have brought us to

our present predicament.

1) Knowledge

(science): "Nations

[should] accept a

collective responsibility for discovering more" about
human/nature interactions.
research,

This would involve monitoring,

study, exchange of information.
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2) Sovereignty and decision-making:
institutions are necessary.
conventions,

Intergovernmental

(International organizations,

and forums have already multiplied rapidly,

authors note.)

the

Air and ocean pollution, climate are obvious

areas to start environmental cooperation.
"A strategy for planet Earth must, then,
explicitly take account of the fact that the
natural resource most threatened with pollution,
most exposed to degradation, most liable to
irreversible damage is not this or that species,
not this or that plant or biome or habitat, not
even the free airs or the great oceans.
It is man
h i m s e l f ."39
"The first global environmental agreement [was] the Test-Ban
Treaty [of] 1963."
"We have lacked a wider rationale of unity.
Our
prophets have sought it.
Our poets have dreamed
of it.
But it is only in our own day that
astronomers, physicists, geologists, chemists,
biologists, anthropologists, ethnologists, and
archaeologists have all combined in a single
witness of advanced science to tell us that, in
every alphabet of our being, we do indeed belong
to a single system, powered by a single energy,
manifesting a fundamental unity under all its
variations, depending for its survival on the
balance and health of the total system.
If this vision of unity — which is not a
vision only but a hard and inescapable scientific
fact — can become part of the common insight of
all the inhabitants of planet Earth, then we may
find that, beyond all our inevitable pluralisms,
we can achieve just enough unity of purpose to
build a human world."40
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*

•

Ward and Dubos want their readers to care about the
scientific account of the biosphere and the technosphere;
the ecology of production, consumption and waste; a global
perspective on economy and politics; the positive
possibilities of science and technology,

and the cautions

against their misuse; science-based unity.
Their main argument is that the world is an inter
connected whole —
—

physically,

economically,

and politically

and that we cannot ignore the facts of the physical world

that science shows us

(ecological d a n g e r ) , nor ignore global

imbalances in economic and political power.

They both

praise and criticize science but never fail to eguate it
with truth,

even in its overspecialization and its

overreaching technology.
More than any major book that has gone before,

this one

gives a global definition of the ecological crisis.

In

preparation for a United Nations conference the authors
extend environmental concerns planet wide,
political policy,

economic action,

and scientific and

technological developments to one another.
was on the human environment,
emphasis,

and connect

The conference

and Ward and Dubos keep this

harldly mentioning wildlife or problems of species

extinction.
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This emphasis is common to Commoner,
Hardin as well.

Ehrlich,

and

It was the threat to human life that

galvanized their science-based environmental arguments.
Bookchin shares this human-oriented concern.
Ehrlich are aware of, and indicate threats to,

Commoner and
fish, plant

life, and some mammals, but give them limited space in their
arguments.

Carson alone among the much-read authors giving

environmental warnings in the 60s and 70s starts from the
loss of nature.

Yet a deep felt concern for nature may

drive much of the public's voiced support of
environmentalism.

The connections of environmental crisis

to choices of production technology and international
politics and economics, by which the fate of nature is
played out,

requires an analysis that contrasts with the

empathy of relating with nature.

The analysis and the

empathy combine in the movement of environmentalism,

but

successful environmental arguments were increasingly framed
by rational calculation, whatever individual motives might
have been.
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN
A FINITE WORLD

The global

interconnections of economy and environment were

detailed in the book reviewed in the previous chapter; this
chapter reviews the book that put numbers on the global
limits of natural resources and a time limit on the capacity
of the environment to support the world's growing
population.

Modeling the World System

The Limits to G r o w t h , published in 1972, was based on a
report made for the Club of Rome's Project on the
Predicament of Mankind.1
Aurelio Peccei,
consultant,

The Club,

founded in 1968 by

an Italian industrialist and economic

had as its purpose to understand interdependent

world problems, bring them to the attention of policy
makers,

and encourage action.

scientists,

educators,

Its members were businessmen,

and national and international

government professionals.

What the Club termed the "world
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problematique" included poverty, environmental degradation,
urban sprawl,
youth,

insecurity of employment,

inflation,

and the rejection of traditional values.

alienated

The Limits

to Growth dealt only with the economic and environmental
aspects of the problematic.

The team who worked on the

report began at MIT in 1970, where Jay Forrester had used
systems theory to develop a global model of economic and
population trends.
Dennis Meadows, a former graduate student of
Forrester's,
members,

led the project.

Donella Meadows,

one of its

along with Jorgen Randers and William Behrens,

prepared the book on the findings for a general readership.
The authors don't explain that the mathematics of their
model are run on a computer, perhaps because this technique
was not familiar to a general readership in 1972.2

But it

is the power of the computer that gives systems theory,
Forrester's system dynamics,
models workable.

and

the capacity to make such

The model is itself an outcome of the age

of technology which generates the problems that the model
studies.
The MIT project team constructed a mathematical model
in which economic,

population,

trends intersect and interact.
manipulates data,
the results.

resource use,

and other

It sets assumptions,

lets development run, and then reads out

The results, as interpreted and reported by
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the MIT group,

showed that allowing capital and population

to grow to their 'natural'

limits would produce a pattern of

overshoot of environmental carrying capacity and collapse of
further growth, within the next century.

They conclude that

human-determined limits must be set in order to preserve a
functioning world system.

Five basic factors were

identified as those that "determine,
ultimately limit,

growth on this planet"3: population,

agricultural production,
resources,

and therefore,

industrial production,

natural

and pollution.

The Limits to Growth was first published in 1972; a
second edition came out in 1974, and millions of copies were
sold in many lang u a g e s /

The Introduction quotes U Thant,

head of the United Nations:
"I do not wish to seem overdramatic, but I can only
conclude from the information available to me as
Secretary-General, that the Members of the United
Nations have perhaps ten years left in which to
subordinate their ancient quarrels and launch a global
partnership to curb the arms race, to improve the human
environment, to defuse the population explosion, and to
supply the required momentum to development efforts.
If such a global partnership is not forged within the
next decade, then I very much fear that the problems I
have mentioned will have reached such staggering
proportions that they will be beyond our capacity to
c o n t r o l ."5
The authors comment little on this strong warning,
stating only that U Thant refers to long term problems that
concern us all.

They stress the necessity to extend our

perspective beyond the next few months or years, to decades
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and centuries, and introduce the idea of using a model
"ordered set of assumptions about a complex system")

(an

as a

means for sorting through information as it increases in
quantity and complexity of interactions.6
authors say,

is unavoidably "imperfect,

The model, the

oversimplified,

and

unfinished," but it is the only formal model they know of
"that has a time horizon longer than thirty years,
and that includes important variables such as
population, food production, and pollution, not as
independent entities, but as dynamically
interacting elements, as they are in the real
world."7
Their assumptions about the five factors of growth are
that they show these trends:
widespread malnutrition
industrialization,

rapid population increase,

(agriculture),

accelerating

depletion of nonrenewable resources,

a deteriorating environment
growth trends in population,

(pollution).

and

All the data on

food, capital,

nonrenewable

resources, and pollution are combined in a "world model."
The effect of numerical changes in the basic assumptions is
tested on the world model to see what behaviors or
interactions result.
There was strong reaction to the publication of this
report, both accepting the conclusions and rejecting them.
There is still argument about the practical impact of
limits,

and resistance to any economic program of scaled-

down growth.

But it is no longer unusual to have an

economic projection time-span of over thirty years,

or to
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compute multiple interactions instead of discrete paths of
projected change.

The Limits to Growth startled people in

the same way that Silent Spring did, and like Silent Spring
became an exemplar for subsequent accounts.
The conclusions of the study, as summarized in the
introduction are:

1) If present trends continue,

the limits

to growth on the planet will be reached in the next one
hundred years, with a consequent sudden decline in
population and industrial capacity? 2) The trends can be
altered toward a state of global equilibrium which satisfies
each person's basic needs and offers each person equal
opportunity;

3) The sooner the world's people start toward

such a goal, the greater are the chances of success.
authors foresee "a period of great transition —

the

transition from growth to global equilibrium."8

Many

The

critics associated Limits with the goal of "zero growth";
this term is not used in the book, but the equilibrium it
recommends comes to that.

The Club of Rome,

for whom the

report was made, never recommended zero growth,

but was

linked with the idea anyway.9

Exponential Growth

Exponential growth is a key idea of the Limits report.

All five elements of the model —
production,
resources,

industrialization,
and pollution —

population,

food

consumption of nonrenewable

are growing exponentially.

Instead of a linear increase by the same amount each year —
as in adding one hundred dollars at regular intervals to
one's savings —
percentage,

there is an increase by a constant

as in adding to savings or investment earnings

by the same percentage each year.10

The authors give two

examples of the surprising results of exponential growth.
One comes from the story of the game of chess,
invented and presented to a Persian king.

newly

In return for

devising the game, the inventor asked only that he be given
one grain of rice for the first square of the board,
grains for the second,
through the 64 squares.

four grains for the third,

two

and so on

This doubling reached more than 500

grains at the tenth square, more than a million at the
twenty-first square, a million million at the fortieth
square.

The rice storehouses of the king were exhausted

before the last square was reached.
instructive,

in the 20th century,

(This example is more

with pennies.

If pennies

are substituted at the rate of one-fiftieth of a penny for a
grain of rice —

approximating the retail price —

the

inventor has 200 million dollars by the time the fortieth
square is completed.)11
The other example is a riddle:

You have a pond on which
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a lily is growing, doubling in size each day.

If the lily

is allowed to grow unchecked it will cover the pond, choking
all other life,

in thirty days.

seems to remain small,

so you decide not to cut it back

until it covers half the pond.
(The twenty-ninth —

For a long time the lily

On what day will that be?

you will have just one day to save the

p o n d . )12
Exponential growth is not difficult to understand,

but

when many different elements grow concurrently, at different
rates, and in interaction,

analysis becomes complex.

The

dynamic behavior of a system is marked by positive and
negative feedback loops; with positive feedback there is an
increase in quantity? with negative feedback a decrease.
population, which grows exponentially,

In

the positive feedback

is births; the negative feedback is deaths.

If fertility

(the percentage of the population that gives birth each
year)

remains constant at a level above replacement, and

mortality remains constant, then the larger the population,
the more babies are born, making a still larger population
from which still more babies are born.
births,

If there are no

and mortality remains constant, population

diminishes, but slowly,

since each year there is a smaller

base quantity on which the percentage of deaths operates.
The decrease is not linear, but instead of the change in
quantity being faster for not being linear, as in the case
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of growth,

it is slower.

Other things being equal,

reducing

the positive feedback of births to zero acts like taking
your foot off the gas pedal,
With population,
loop,

not like putting on the brakes.

there is a delay in each feedback

since the age of giving birth is many years away from

the time of being born, as is the age of death on average.
For this reason, the authors of this 1972 report noted that
population could not level off before the year 2000, when it
would reach about 7 billion,

since the majority of that

year's prospective parents had already been born.
the 1992 United Nations Population Fund report,

(As of

the most

likely level-off year has been moved to 2150, when 1 9 9 2 's
estimated 5.5 billion people will have more than doubled to
a projected 11.6 billion.

This rate of growth is slower

than the 3 5-year doubling period mentioned in Limits —
in Ehrlich's Population Bomb —

and

but growth will still be

steep for another 50 years after 1992, and will take more
than a century to level off.)13
Growing even more rapidly than population,

industrial

output increased at 7% a year from 1963 to 1968, or 5% per
year per capita.14 [p.45]

(When the growth rate is 1% per

year, doubling time is 70 years; when it is 2%,

it is 3 5

years; 7% gives a doubling time of ten years.)

Positive

feedback loops operate on industrial capital and output in
very much the same way as they do on population, the authors

argue.

Some fraction of output is investment; more

investment makes for more capital stock, which makes for
more output.15 Depreciation acts as negative feedback.
Although industrial output is growing faster than population
at the time of the report, distribution of wealth is
unequal,

and problems of poverty are not solved.

Industrial

growth is greatest where population growth is lowest; there,
GNP per capita can increase.

In developing countries, where

population growth outstrips industrial growth, GNP per
capita cannot rise.
nations is widening.
poorer,

The gap between the rich and poor
The rich get richer and the poor get

and the authors ask whether this pattern of growth

rates for industrial capital and population around the world
can be sustained.

Resources

Much of the future will depend on physical resources,
many of which are not renewable.
report,

(At the time of the

non-renewable resources were thought of as

extractives —

coal, oil, gas, minerals;

it has now become

evident that ancient forests are nonrenewable,

as are other

complex biosystems whose evolutionary synthesis can never be
recreated.)

There are renewable resources,

such as food,
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but the arable land on which food depends is limited.
resources are social —
employment,

social stability,

education,

technology; Limits to Growth does not try to

model these.

Instead,

it sets the assumption that either

current or better social conditions prevail.
if the best social conditions prevail,
is under cultivation;
each person

Other

For instance,

and all arable land

if 0.4 hectares is required to feed

(the world average; eating at U.S.

standards

requires twice as much l and); if population growth continues
at the existing rate, then "desperate" arable land shortages
occur before the year 2000.
doubled,

the shortage occurs about 2 5 years later.

situation,
pond;

If agricultural productivity is

the authors observe,

for a long time,

The

is like that of the lily

everything seems in balance, but in a

very short period of time the whole system can fail.
The example of food production is illustrated with a
graph that projects trends into the future.
the bottom left of the chart, one curve —

Beginning at
arable land

needed at the present agricultural productivity level —
begins to rise steeply after having been first nearly level
and then only gradually climbing; similar curves,

further

displaced into the future, show land needed at higher
productivity levels.

A flat line above the climbing land

curve shows total arable land; part of it drops off into a
descending curve as land is taken for urban-industrial
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purposes.

Where the available-land and needed-land curves

intersect,

need has outstripped supply —

there is no longer

enough land to produce the food that the world needs.

All

the factors of growth analyzed in the book have such charts,
and all are of this type —
intersect,

rising and falling curves

although not always with such simplicity —

and

even if all supporting conditions are made optimistic beyond
current conditions and anyone's expectations,

the crash when

growth meets its limits is only delayed about 25 years.
Depending on the factor under consideration,

failure

comes as early as 2000, or as late as 2070, but within a
century of the date of the report.

Exponentially growing

industrial production depletes natural resources and
increases pollution until the lack of land and materials,
along with health damages from pollution,
bring the population rapidly downward.

cause deaths which

Approximately 7 5

graphs and other graphic devices in Limits show how this is
so (given the assumptions of the m o d e l ) .

The mathematical

evidence of the limits to growth is before the reader's eyes
every few p a g e s .
The text is mostly an explanation of what is displayed
on the charts; the language is simple and the argument is
made easy to follow.

A very brief summary appears in long

legends below each graph.
resources,

Explaining nonrenewable

the authors take chromium as a test case, because
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it has one of the longest static reserve indices of 19 inthe-earth resources listed in the report.

The legend below

the chart reads:
"The lifetime of known chromium reserves depends on the
future usage rate of chromium.
If usage remains
constant, reserves will be depleted linearly (dashed
line) and will last 420 years.
If usage increases
exponentially at its present growth rate of 2.6 percent
per year, reserves will be depleted in just 95 years.
If actual reserves are five times present proven
reserves, chromium ore will be available for 154 years
(dotted line), assuming exponential growth in usage.
Even if all chromium is perfectly recycled, starting in
1970, exponentially growing demand will exceed the
supply after 235 years (horizontal line)."16
The effect of the simplicity and irresistible factuality of
these presentations repeated throughout the book gives the
report an immediate impact.
sums up this effect:

A blurb for the second edition

"If this book doesn't blow everybody's

mind who can read without moving his lips, then the earth is
kaput."17
Limits is one long warning that says "watch out,

slow

down, change course," not with those words, but with one
encapsulated trend report after another.

Data and graphs on

"Energy consumption and GNP per capita" complete the section
on nonrenewable resources.

Pollution is described with such

examples as "Carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere;
Waste heat generation in the Los Angeles basin; Nuclear
wastes; Oxygen content of the Baltic sea; Lead in the
Greenland ice cap; DDT flows in the environment;
fat."

DDT in body

We have many such reports now, but there was nothing
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else like The Limits to Growth when it came out —

all the

major elements of productivity and pollution brought
together,
form,

projected into the future,

explained in condensed

and stating incontrovertibly that we cannot continue

going on as we have been.
The authors caution that the output graphs that show
values for population,

capital,

etc.,

from 1900 to 2100 "are

not exact predictions of the values of the variables at any
particular year in the future.

They are indications of the

system's behavioral tendencies only."18

They explain that

knowledge of the causal relationships between the factors
they consider varies in degrees of completeness.
resource use,

for example,

Per capita

is fairly well understood;

fertility is not so well understood; and the effect of
pollution on life expectancy is not well understood at all.
The authors' basic stance on these difficulties is that we
have to work with what we've got;

"there is no perfect model

available for use in evaluating today's important policy
issues."19

They believe their model is useful despite its

deficiences.

It will, they hope, generate discussion and

research and it can "generate valid basic behavior modes for
the world system."20
All the computer runs of the behavior of the world
system under varying conditions of productivity,
availability,

resource

and population show some form of overshoot of
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carrying capacity and subsequent collapse.

If the trends of

1900-1970 don't change, collapse of growth comes before
2100.
"Food, industrial output, and population grow
exponentially until the rapidly diminishing
resource base forces a slowdown in industrial
growth.
Because of natural delays in the system,
both population and pollution continue to increase
for some time after the peak of industrialization.
Population growth is finally halted by a rise in
the death rate due to decreased food and medical
services."21
The authors comment:
"The exact timing of these events is not
meaningful given the great aggregation and many
uncertainties of the model... We can sav with some
confidence that, under the assumption of no maior
change in the present system, population and
industrial growth will certainly stop within the
next century, at the latest."zz
A major change,

such as doubling the resources allows

industrialization to reach a higher level, but pollution
rises so steeply that it increases the death rate;
industrial production still has to fall as resources do, and
capital-intensive agriculture can thus no longer be
sustained; population falls as food production does;
collapse occurs as before, and not much later than with the
no-major-change scenario.

Even with "'Unlimited' Resources

(unlimited nuclear power doubles the resource reserves that
can be exploited, but there is still some actual limit to
the resources that can be mined from the e a r t h ) , Pollution
Controls,

Increased Agricultural Productivity,

and 'Perfect'
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Birth Control," "industrial growth is halted,

and the death

rate rises as resources are depleted, pollution accumulates,
and food production declines."23

There is no avoiding the

limits that the planet places on our productive activity —
the productive system that we now have cannot go on growing
endlessly into the future.

setting Limits

"The unspoken assumption behind all of the model runs
we have presented," say the authors,

"...is that population

and capital growth should be allowed to continue until they
reach some 'natural' limit."24
determined limits,"

The alternative is "man-

but if we wait too long,

limits will be gone."25

"the choice of

The authors recommend a change

toward a world system that is "1. sustainable without sudden
and uncontrollable collapse; and 2. capable of satisfying
the basic material reguirements of all its people."26

To

reach this goal, both population and capital must be
stabilized.

In the model that follows such policies,

the

economy is shifted away from goods and toward services,

food

production and soil enrichment is given priority, pollution
is reduced and recycling carried out.

With all this, the

demand on nonrenewable resources is reduced.

If such
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policies are instituted in 1975,
2100;

stabilization is reached by

if we wait until 2000 to institute the same policies,

the equilibrium state cannot be maintained,
resource shortages occur before 2100.
alternatives,

the authors conclude —

and food and

Of the three
"unrestricted growth,

a self-imposed limitation to growth, or a nature-imposed
limitation to growth —

only the last two are actually

p o s s i b l e ."27
In the the equilibrium state,

"Population and capital

are essentially stable, with the forces tending to increase
them in a carefully controlled balance."28

The behaviors

of population and capital that are necessary to maintain
equilibrium depend on how long the equilibrium is to be
maintained.

With a time horizon of 70 years, the levels of

population and capital of the 1970s could be maintained,
the rates would have to change —

but

birth rate and rate of

capital investment and depreciation would have to drop.
For a long time-horizon, minimum requirements are:
birth rate equals death rate, and the capital investment
rate equals the depreciation rate; all rates are kept to a
minimum; capital and population levels and their ratio "are
set in accordance with the values of the society," and can
be revised as "technology creates new options."

"Population

and capital are the only quantities that need be constant in
the equilibrium state."

"Education, art, music,

religion,
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basic scientific research,

athletics, and social

interactions could flourish."29
equality,

There are two barriers to

the authors state; population is one.

While the

equilibrium state will keep population growth down,
not assure equality of distribution of goods,

it will

but at the

very least everyone could be maintained at subsistence
level, which is not the case once overshoot and collapse
happen.

"The other effective barrier to equality —

promise of growth —

the

could no longer be maintained.1,30

On the transition from growth to global equilibrium,
the authors have little to say.

"Neither the world model

nor our own thoughts have been developed in sufficient
detail to understand all the implications" of that change.
But there is a "great need for more facts —

for numbers

that are scientifically measurable but which have not yet
been measured."31

"Every day of exponential growth," the

authors conclude,

"bring the world system closer to the

ultimate limits of that growth.

A decision to do nothing is

a decision to increase the risk of collapse."32

criticism

Within about a year, the publication of The Limits to
Growth was followed by the publication of Models of Doom; A

Critique of The Limits to G r o w t h .33

The authors, who,

like

the authors of L i m i t s . constitute themselves as a "project
team," were members of the Science Policy Research Unit at
the University of Sussex.

Much is made of the computer

model used by the MIT group; all the critics stress that you
get out of a computer what you put into it.

"The critique

of a computer model is not just a question of looking at the
structure,

or conducting mathematical tests.

Far more

important is the examination of the underlying
assumptions."34

A common objection is that the model

doesn't model the real world becuase it deals only with
physical limits and does not consider social limits and
possibilities.

Malthus is recalled,

and his failure to

anticipate technological progress is pointedly remembered.
A frequent criticism is that the authors of Limits are too
"pessimistic.”35

The authors are compared to idealist

reformers:
"Much of the moral idealism which in earlier times
found expression in various movements of social
reform appears now, particularly in the USA, to
seek an outlet in the environmental movement.
It
is this environmentalist critique of
industrialism, rather than the socialist critique
of cupidity, which finds explicit representation
in the MIT m o d e l .',36
Further on, this author remarks:
"One is tempted to be persuaded by [their]
predictions that Adam Smith's benevolent 'hidden
hand' has been replaced by a malevolent 'hidden
boot'.
Today's dismal science is no longer
economics but ecology.
It is not surprising that
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the leading ecological Cassandras and the MIT
system dynamics group quote each other with
appro v a l ."37
Another author says,

"Surely one might have expected people

to be sceptical about such an apocalyptic thesis....," and
concludes that a "new pessimism" is at work.

Also,

"Having abjured any particular political or
ideological viewpoint, carefully dissociating
themselves from politicians... it is quite clear
how anxious [the authors] are to appear to be
above politics... It is precisely because the
world dynamics model says nothing about the means
necessary to achieve the stable system ... that it
appeals to the 'intellectual technologists' of the
Club of Rome as well as to ordinary citizens."3®
As do other authors in the book, this one compare the MIT
team to Marxists:
"In common with other chiliasts, the new
scientific chiliasts are Utopians at heart.
Like the great phrophet of world salvation through
world breakdown, Karl Marx, their apocalyptic
visions of the immediate future are tempered by
the glittering image of utopia barely discernible
through the fire and brimstone that rages in the
historical foreground."39
Several authors complain that it doesn't take a computer to
reach the conclusion that limited resources will eventually
be used up.
In a response appended to Models of D o o m , the Limits
authors assert that their theory of growth has been made
explicit,

but that the Sussex authors' has not.

"The

training and professional expertise of the Sussex group is
predominantly in economics and the physical sciences," they
state.
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"Both of these fields have evolved modeling
philosophy that is directed primarily toward
precise, short-term prediction and is based on a
reductionist view of the world... System dynamics
models are general and h o listic...[and are]
designed for the exploration of the long-term
dynamic properties of complex systems."™
"The Sussex criticisms apply micro reasoning to macro
problems," choosing selected evidence on local resources and
pollution,

"while ignoring both the evidence for and the

causes of negative global trends."41

Furthermore,

say the

MIT group, the Sussex authors don't really seem to
understand the basic dynamic properties of the world system,
which,

as reviewed by the Limits authors are:

1. Exponential growth is an inherent property of the
population and capital systems.
2. There are physical limits to population and capital
growth.
3. There are long delays in the feedback processes that
control the physical growth of the world system.
4. There are two possible social responses to the
limits to growth: weaken growth forces or remove the
symptoms of impending limits (build more highways,
import more copper, build nuclear power plants,

buy

fertilizer).
5. The equilibrium state may be a desirable option,
wherever the limits to growth may be.
Finally,

the Limits authors say that they and the Sussex
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group have contrasting "concepts of man."

While some would

call theirs "pessimistic," about mankind's technological
capacities,

they simply call it "humble."42

In Bevond the Limits to G r o w t h . Eduard Pestel,
founding member of the Club of Rome,
original book,

differences,

looks back on the

criticizes some aspects of the

considers the problems of

a

model,

nationalism, North-South

and the environment,

and has both optimistic

and pessimistic things to say about the present.

Pestel

says he has "been asked repeatedly when the Club of Rome
would again startle the world with a report like rLimits 1";
the Club would

have liked to do so, he says.

But

"there is
a time for everything, and The Limits to
Growth came at the right time, when the first
doubts were gnawing at the expectations for
unceasing progress and prosperity, sooner or
later, everywhere on earth.
Once this time has
passed, there will be no repeat performance for
such an equally shocking message of monumental
simplicity, be it by The Club of Rome or anyone
else."43
Pestel is probably right.

Donella Meadows,

Dennis

Meadows, and Jorgen Randers have written a sequel,
Bevond the L i m i t s , published in 1992.

titled

It has not been much

noticed,

although it is mentioned in a Business Week cover

story on

"Growth vs. Environment" which appeared about a

month before the June 1992 meeting of the United Nations
Conference on Economics and Development —
conference."

the "Rio

"In 1972," the article begins,
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"Donella and Dennis Meadows set off a furor with
their book Limits to G r o w t h . They argued that the
earth's resources and its ability to absorb
pollution and regenerate are finite.
Using
computer models, they also predicted that
population and growth would bump up against these
constraints within a century... The book sold 9
million copies.
But the subject was guickly
eclipsed by more pressing concerns and derision of
their Malthusian alarms.
Now the Meadowses are
b a c k . .. [and] they argue that human activity
already has overshot earth's ecological limits,
and that unless corrective steps are taken soon,
their original scenario is more certain."44
In Bevond the L i m i t s , however,

the authors temper the

flatness of their findings somewhat,

and are careful to

emphasize that disaster is not foreordained.

Some options

have closed since the 1972 report, but others have opened.
A sustainable society can still be built, they say,
changes begin now,

if the

in the 1990s.

*

*

*

The Limits to Growth is the culmination of the
scientific presentation of environmental arguments that
began,

in a much different form, with Silent S p r i n g , ten

years earlier.

It follows the scientific model of

hypothesis and test, with evidence in the form of
mathematical expressions.

It is almost devoid of social

comment or sociological observation;
and offers no political criticism.

it conveys no emotion,
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Its authors would fit well on a profile of "new class"
techno-bureaucratic professionals derived from Gouldner's
description of those who share the "culture of critical
discourse," in which arguments are putatively self-grounded
and do not rely on the status of the speaker for authority.
Gouldner contends that although such self-grounding makes
the discourse 'scientific'
themselves),

(letting the facts speak for

critical discourse is also ideological,

because

it does what ideologies do: presents a map of 'what is' in
society; a 'report' of how it is working or failing;

and a

report on how it could be changed that functions as a
'command' or call to action.45
Donella Meadows, now a professor in Environmental
Studies at Dartmouth, has a Ph.D.

in biophysics,

and is

described as a systems analyst in the publicity for her
recent book.

Dennis Meadows has a Ph.D.

in management,

is a

professor of Systems Management at the University of New
Hampshire,

and is the Director of the Institute for Policy

and Social Science Research.

J®rgen Randers has a graduate

degree in solid state physics and a Ph.D.

in management.

is chairman of the Norwegian Bank for Industry.46
Gouldner's new class is not exactly like Mannheim's
socially unattached intelligentsia, but it shares the
capacity to use its wordsmithing skills for either side of
an argument; there is nothing in its social position,

for

He
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instance, that inclines this 'class' of professionals toward
one side or another of the environmental debate.

(For

comparison, consider industry executives or workers in
extractive industries.)

The Models of Doom group, who

opposed the Limits argument,

is similar in training and

social position to the Limits group

(despite the

distinctions between them drawn by the Limits a u t hors).
Limits has no particular argument about science;
simply itself scientific in its presentation.

it is

Its analysis

is not directed to the guestion of science and society;

it

is about limits, especially limits to capital and population
growth in a finite world.

The book's presentation is

oriented toward systems and wholes;

it is the first use of a

computer model reaching a large public;
outlook

it is global in

(appearing the same year as Only One E arth! ; it

gives a warning.

The authors caution against technological

fixes, but do not critique, only point out that technology
just delays collapse,

and sometimes complicates

environmental issues.
Limits does not engage directly in the science-insociety argument,

but it is a major book for the development

of the environmental argument.

It insists that resources

are limited and damageable, and that we must think about
them in a different way or suffer severe consequences.

It

links economy and environment in mathematical expressions
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and fact-laden but simple prose.

It is as successful with

its lack of emotion as Silent Spring is with its impassioned
account of the destruction of balance in the natural world.
Economic growth,

not out-of-control science,

is the problem,

yet science/technology is not, as with many other analyses
of growth problems,

the taken for granted solution.

Since

so much of our scientific research is directed toward growth
in productivity,

however,

the warning that we must change

our productivity goals means that we must rethink the uses
of science.
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CHAPTER FIFTEEN
CRITICIZING SCIENCE,

SAVING THE ENVIRONMENT

This chapter presents general conclusions about the
environmental argument made in the writings of the 60s and
'Ttd which have been reviewed in previous chapters.

The

following chapter presents conclusions about the
applications of Mannheim's method to the analysis of
environmental thought.

Nature and Environment

It was scientists who made nature into the environment.
Nature, the presence that had its own being, became the
environment, the problem-place of human activity.

The

environmental style of thought gives nature another meaning,
defines it differently from those who argue for the
preservation and protection of nature from an empathetical
standpoint.1

From 1962, when Silent Spring was published,

to 1972 when The Limits to Growth was published,

there was a

tremendous increase in the range of what was covered by

discussion of environmental problems.

When Carson's book

came out, only experts in agricultural chemistry and some
professional naturalists were discussing the problems of
environmental degradation and threat to wildlife
life)

stemming from the use of pesticides.

Carson gave was startling —
that ordinary,

(and human

The warning that

because it was put in language

non-expert readers could understand,

and

because for non-experts the information was new and the
warning was sudden.

Ten years later, the problems of

pesticides and fertilizers were a commonplace topic in
newspapers, magazines and books, along with myriad other
topics relating plants,
air, soil, water,
species,
policy,

animals,

the atmosphere,

industrial growth,

insects, whales,

people,

forests, endangered

agricultural practices,

economic

energy production and use, all to one another.

When

Carson insisted that a whole network of effects followed on
the spraying of pesticides,
exaggeration.

she was criticized for

Ten years later, the range and intricacy of

environmental problems in public view had expanded worlds
beyond what Carson spoke of.
"Nature" has an ontological status;
does not.

"the environment"

Nature is a subject, with its own quality of

being; the environment is an object of study.

With nature

there is an empathetical relationship; with the environment
there is an analytical relationship.

One stands outside the
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environment to study it as a scientific object,
recognizing —

analytically —

part of nature —
us.

But we are

we are inside of it and it is inside of

It has long been recognized that human beings have a

dual nature —
it.

human inclusion.

though

we stand both inside of nature and outside of

We need,

with nature,

for our survival, both to be able to attune
and to go beyond being entirely subject to it.

We need both an analytical and an empathetical relationship.
The nature/environment distinction appears in the
environmental movement as two different types of writing,
two different types of argument,

one oriented toward nature

as spiritual sustenance, the other oriented toward the
environment as a multiplicitous object requiring scientific
understanding.

Nature is spiritually sustaining because it

is humanity's ancient home, even though a dangerous one, and
to lose an empathetical relationship to it is to lose
something that is part of our being.

It is this concern,

this sense of existing loss and greater impending loss,

that

motivates the nature-oriented part of the environmental
movement.

The science-oriented part of the movement,

the

writings that seldom mention nature, but examine the
environment in detail, presents itself as more informationdriven, more alerted to danger by the facts than by
empathetical unease.

What the motivations of individual

writers are can hardly be determined,

and must certainly be
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a mix of fact and feeling, but in the arguments that are to
be found in the environmental movement,
distinct types —
For scientists,
—

there are two

nature-oriented and science-oriented.
nature is an object of scientific study

it is the environment;

environmentalists,

for nature-oriented

nature is a subject or a totality that

has aspects of being if not absolute beingness.
In the United States,

in the 1960s and 70s, an argument

about the environment developed that reconceptualized the
relationship between man and nature as the relationship
between scientific society and the environment.

It was

scientists who brought what had been "Nature" to the
attention of the public as the problem of "the environment."
It was not that nature-oriented writers weren't writing,
that nature-oriented organizations weren't active.

or

But it

was scientific argument that captured public attention.

It

was when scientists sounded the warning that people
listened.

Science has become the signal of importance,

the

flag that alerts us to pay heed.

The Environmental Stvle of Thought

Environmentalism is a diverse movement in which there are
many different arguments about environmental crisis and
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ecological balance.

I have chosen to call one of these

arguments the "environmental style of thought" because it is
the one that dominates the current environmental debate.
This argument is as much about science as it is about the
environment,

and it is part of a developing science-in-

society debate.
The environmental style of thought has particular
characteristics.

It is:

- holistic
- science skeptical but science dependent
- quantitative/statistical
- science based
- evidence supported
- future oriented or aware.
The argument began taking shape in the 1960s and developed
quickly in the 70s.

Since then, even the nature-oriented

groups have had to adopt the "science says so" stance of
this argument.

The nature arguers,

emphasis on the critique of science,
scientists and Greens.

though,

place less

leaving this to

Greens have tried to combine both a

concept of nature and a critique of science, but their
political efforts to further this vision,
Europe,

so prominent in

have had limited effect in the United States, where

third parties have no established place in the political
structure.

In the 60s, when the civil rights movement,
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countercultural revolt,

and the Vietnam war disrupted

politics as usual, enivronmental arguments were tied in to
nuclear protest,

which had a political intensity that

environmentalism,

for all its popularity,

has not arrived at

in this country.

The dominance of the scientific form of

environmental argument, with its claim to objective
neutrality,

may keep such intensity at bay until a Bhopal-

scale accident afflicts the United States.2
In the 1990's the environmental argument remains highly
science dependent;

its critique of science sometimes seems

blurred.

then, the environmental style of thought

Perhaps,

is simply science-dependent,
a simpler case to make;
case at all.

not science-critical.

in fact,

That is

it hardly requires making a

Warnings about the environment depend on

scientific information —

the very construction of nature as

"the environment" already shows the presence of science.
But the environmental argument, at the same time that it
exemplifies the necessity of providing scientific evidence
for a recommended course of action,

is also the major

example known to the public of the criticism of science.

Science Skepticism

The issue of environmental crisis polarizes attitudes
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of trust in and skepticism toward science.

There are groups

and individuals who reject all scientific intervention and
who adopt a back-to-nature philosophy and lifestyle; there
are scientists, businessmen and women, and technical
professionals who are occupationally committed to trust in
science.
Both trust and skepticism are expressed along three
lines —
- the uses of science
- the direction of science as practiced and
institutionalized
- the theoretical orientation of science.
While environmentalists display skepticism along any or all
of these lines,

it is a mistake to make a simple eguation

between environmentalists and science skeptics.

In any

specific person or intellectual position there will be a mix
of trust and skepticism.

Scientists themselves may be

skeptical or trusting and are usually both.

The dichotomy

of science-truster and science-skeptic cannot be understood
simply as antagonistic actors located in specific
occupational and social positions.
stands for a division in thought.

Rather,

the polarity

It is experienced by

ordinary citizens wondering if their food is safe from
pesticide residue, or indeed if anyone knows what is safe,
while at the same time trusting that the body of chemical
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and biological knowledge which invents pesticides can also
provide medical remedies for physical ills.

The same people

who distrust the scientists who proclaim the safety of
nuclear energy may be convinced that if science is only
turned in the right direction, better solutions for
providing energy can be found.
The science trust/science skepticism polarity is not
yet fully developed in public debate, but it underlies
argument that has been going on for some time.
doubt about science —
progress —

The first

science that can be trusted to bring

came with the atomic bomb,

and further doubts

about science as the source of truth have come with the
environmental crisis.
Compounding our vacillation between trust in science
and skepticism about it is the existence of two separate and
non-congruent frameworks of thought for understanding what
authority to use to legitimate social action.

The

conceptual framework for science does not include a place
for politics,

since fact and value must be kept separate;

the one for politics does not include a place for science,
since its philosophical foundations predate the
institutional rise of science and the permeation of
technology into every aspect of life.

The inadequacy of

either conceptual framework used alone, and the concern over
how far to trust science,

can be followed through the
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environmental arguments of the 1960s and 70s.

The Written Arguments

1962
Silent Spring :
the argument from science
Silent Spring was the book that catalyzed the environmental
debate by making a scientific argument that went beyond the
plea for nature.

It gave scientific documentation of

environmental damage.

It was a banner argument that

environmentalists could display as the emblem of their
cause.

Like all the major subsequent works,

strong warning.

it sounded a

The book was a media and political event

that had enormous impact on public consciousness.
science-based,

Its

technical content gave new legitimacy to the

cause of protecting nature and safeguarding human health
from new,

synthetic products developed in scientific

laboratories.
Carson criticizes science for its irresponsibility in
failing to study the effects of its inventions,

for its

complicity with the profit-driven chemical industry,
arrogance in asserting that we can control nature.
application in the use of pesticides,

for its
In its

goals are unexamined,

the pace is heedless, the use is indiscriminate and without
forethought.

At the same time that Carson critiques
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science,

she is committed to science as a way of reaching

the truth.

She is skeptical of the way science is being

carried out, but trusting of the value of scientific
inquiry.
Carson's recommendations for citizen participation in
deciding goals for the use of chemical pesticides fits into
the political

framework in which citizen and state are

linked by rights and responsibilities.

Yet such goals must

include the natural world as a determining force in human
behavior; the natural world becomes as important a reference
point as human nature is in political thought.

We are left

with the problem that rights and obligations between science
and its users are not determined by the natural world in the
way that rights and obligations between citizen and state
are presumed to be determined by human nature.

There is a

gap between science and its uses that is not bridged
philosophically or practically.

The dimensions of that gap

only begin to be visible in Silent Sp r i n g .

1966 Science and Survival;
science questioned
Science and Survival criticizes science for being out of
control.

Commoner argues that we have created technologies

whose possible modes of behavior exceed our capability to
predict that behavior,

and that there is a biological

aftermath of this failure.

Part of the responsibility for
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damage to life can be traced to a crisis in biology,
theoretical conflict between molecular and classical,

a
cell

biology that has hampered research into and vision of the
system-wide results of piecemeal interventions into the
natural world.

We have come to fear scientists who seem to

be sorcerer's apprentices.
Besides this problem at the theoretical level, there is
one at the level of institution and practice.

The process

of scientific discovery and free discussion is hindered by
nationalism and by military demands.

Patterns of research

support limit scientists' choice of problems,

and

technological application outstrips scientific knowledge of
outcomes.
Despite this extreme skepticism of science,

Commoner

trusts science as a method of inquiry, as truth-seeking at
its base, and wishes to defend its integrity.

He maintains

the traditional separation of fact and value which keeps
science per se outside of the political framework even while
individual scientists fulfill their responsibility as
citizens to provide information to the public.

Scientists

should not decide specific social goals, and should not use
politics to reach scientific goals.
in politics,

When scientists engage

Commoner says, citizens begin to doubt the

connection of science with truth.
triad of citizen,

science,

Commoner tries to make a

and government,

but must
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acknowledge that scientists are divided over their role in
relation to government.

Again, there is a conflict between

two conceptual frameworks,

one for politics and interests,

one for science and objectivity.

1968
The Population B o m b :
the logic of numbers
The Population Bomb offers the vision of a frightening
future brought on by biological imbalance between population
and environment.

Ehrlich brought population into the

environmental debate; he added to its "science says"
content.

Unlike Commoner,

Ehrlich does not hesitate to mix

science with social policy, to recommend specific social
actions on the basis of his scientific judgment.

The book

does not critique science or analyze how science is carried
out in society.

On the whole,

Ehrlich is a science-truster,

trusting not only in science as objective inquiry, but in
the application of science to social problems.

His

preference for direct government action fits into the
political framework.

He perceives no contradiction between

scientific objectivity and political action because there is
no dispute to resolve —

Ehrlich is convinced that the

source of the environmental problem has been located and
that the solution, population control,

is clear.

The

difference between the conceptual frameworks becomes
important only when one recognizes differences in scientific
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evaluations of the problem,

and a need to resolve those

differences in the political sphere.

1968
"The Tragedy of the Commons":
Hobbesian argument
"The Tragedy of the Commons" is too brief an essay to be
used to characterize Hardin's position as science trust or
science skepticism,

although his reliance on quantification

of social interaction and the use of mathematical
calculation to explain social dynamics is scientific in
tone.

He states that there is no technological solution to

the problem of overpopulation,

but this is not because he

doubts the value of technologies, but because technique is
up against finite limits.

This essay presents a concept of

human nature as a scientific evaluation rather than as a
philosophical judgment.
solutions —

Hardin calls for political

curtailing the freedom to breed —

and like

Ehrlich presents his scientific judgment as if there were no
contending scientific explanations and no conflict to
resolve in a political sphere that has no established method
for resolving scientific disputes.

In not criticizing

science or expressing doubts about it, Hardin is in a
minority among environmentally concerned voices.

1971
Post-Scarcitv A n archism:
anarchist argument
Bookchin,

in Post-Scarcitv A n archism, doesn't accept the

conventional political framework.

Arguing that politics and

economics structured around scarcity are outdated,
the ecological crisis as an example,

he sees

one of "apocalyptic

proportions," of the tension between the actual present and
the potential future.

In his judgment,

there is no solution

to the crisis within the bourgeois-capitalist framework —
the framework that gives formal authority to government and
pragmatic power to an exploitative economic system.

The

dichotomy science truster/science skeptic applies to those
choosing between the conventional political framework and
the conventional view of science; Bookchin's thought falls
outside of these conventions.

However, his thought is

congenial to those who distrust science as a servant of
industry or as hostage to politics.

1967
"The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis":
historical/ worldview argument
White's "Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis" finds
these roots in the Christian view that nature was made to
serve man.

Both science and technology,

their development in the Middle Ages,

says White,

begin

in a context of the

Judaeo-Christian faith in perpetual progress.

Particularly

in Western Christian thought, man is both part of nature and
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transcends nature; he can exploit nature.

To avert worse

ecological disaster than we have already brought upon
ourselves, White concludes,

we must change our values.

White is referring to a view of human nature in his
argument,

a view that is not entirely absent from the

Enlightenment conception of human nature that influences our
traditional political framework.

In White's analysis,

science is put to use according to our worldview.

It is not

so much that science is to be doubted as it is to be seen as
a historical creature.

It may discover timeless laws but it

is not free of the influence of its time.

This analysis

denies the total separation of science from values which is
part of the conventional scientific view,

and contributes to

a revised evaluation of science.

1971
The Closing Circle;
technology questioned
In The Closing C i r c l e . Commoner argues that the cause of our
environmental problems is the type of productive technology
that we have.

In synthesizing new products, we have

converted natural cycles into man-made linear events.
Reductionism,

the "dominant viewpoint of modern science as a

whole," is unequipped to deal with natural complexity.

The

environmental crisis is both ecological and social, and
science is poorly prepared for finding causes of the crisis
in either sphere.

The crisis is extreme,

and Commoner

states that his judgment as a biologist is that if we
continue on our current course,
not be possible.

civilized human society will

Ecology, he says, must now subsume economy

and politics.
In this conclusion,

Commoner takes the science

framework as the chief guide to deciding on social action.
This does not mean that he would put science in the role of
making social decisions,

for he maintains the necessity of

the separation between fact and value,

and asserts that

science is not a guide to moral judgments.
our check on reality,

But science is

our point of reference for what will

or will not occur given certain conditions.

He remains

critical of the uses, direction and theoretical orientation
of science as it is now, while continuing to posit science
(as ecology)

as the source of solutions to our problems.

Commoner aims for a less reductionist science and for joint
scientist/citizen participation in deciding on the uses of
science.

He tries to connect the two conceptual frameworks,

one for science,

one for politics.

1972
Only One E a r t h ;
global perspective
More than any other book before it, Only One Earth brings
the third world into the environmental equation,

reviewing

how its population, economy, and agriculture are linked to
the industrialized nations.

Barbara Ward and Rend Dubos have
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a technoprogressive theme rather than an out-of-control
critique of science and technology like Carson and Commoner,
or a behavioral emphasis like Ehrlich and Hardin.

They

recognize that the acceleration of technological progress
now threatens life on the planet,

but they explain this

acceleration as the result of consumption pressure.
technological order,

in their analysis,

The

is rooted in the

individualistic desire for goods.
They give little attention to structural connections
between government and institutionalized science,

even

though they construct a triad of science/market/nation to
explain the global nature of the environmental crisis.

They

find that the triad has to be rethought, but suggest
individual solutions for each element of it, not
rearrangement of their connections.
more integrative,

Science should become

the market should factor environmental

costs into its cost-benefit analyses,

nations should

recognize the imperative of a socially and morally
responsive world order.
Ward and Dubos criticize science but hold it as the
route to truth.

Like Commoner,

they maintain the separation

between fact and value, but unlike him they don't try to
connect the frameworks for science and politics.
they say, cannot judge scientific facts

Citizens,

(although it is

implied that they can evaluate risks revealed by those
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facts).

They recognize the political complexities of global

environmental crisis,

but rely on the truth-giving power of

science to indicate essential goals.
frameworks for their thought,

They use both

but keep them separate.

They are very much science trusters, who envision that
moral sense combined with scientific dispassion will
overcome the materialist desires that are at the root of
environmental excesses.

Yet at the same time they harbor a

deep doubt about the scientific enterprise,

a fear of hubris

that is discussed below.

1972
The Limits to G r o w t h :
finite world argument
The Limits to Growth presents economy and environment
according to a mathematical model of growth trends in
natural resource use, population, agricultural production,
industrial production,

and pollution.

The authors make

long-range predictions facilitated by computer calculations.
This method,

and the use of systems theory, made it possible

to include complex interrelationships that had previously
eluded systematic summary.
Silent Spring and,
subsequent reports.

Limits was as startling as

like that book, became an exemplar for
Meadows et al concluded that if current

growth trends continued,

the natural limits to growth would

be reached within 100 years.

They explained exponential

growth and introduced the notion of overshoot and collapse,

436

with the resultant extreme difficulty or even impossibility
of recovery under greatly reduced circumstances:
population,
Thus,

less production,

smaller

less material well being.

they said, man-determined limits must replace natural

ones in order to divert disaster.
Limits itself follows the scientific model of
hypothesis and test with evidence in the form of
mathematical expression;
comment.

it is almost devoid of social

In its scientificity it is the culmination of the

science-documented environmental arguments that began with
Silent Spring ten years earlier.

It is so neutral in tone

that it offers no basis for classification as either
science-skeptical or science-trusting.

That style of

neutrality is itself scientific, but it is not evidence of a
position on science.
authors,
world.

For Meadows et al, as for all the

science is the route to truth about the natural
Its argument is almost entirely within the

scientific framework.

All the major environmental books of the 60s and 70s are
warnings.

Most are skeptical of some aspect of science in

society —

its uses,

orientation,

its direction, or its theoretical

but all accept the epistemological authority of

science.
As the decade from 1962 to 1972 progresses,

the
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argument about the environment expands from the relatively
narrow issue of pesticide use to warnings about diverse
technologies, multiple pollutions and health threats,
environmental overload through population pressure,

and

finally to the planet-wide dangers of interventions into the
environment.
With each warning about our current course and future
danger,

the complexities of matching an ideal scientific

disinterest with the interests inherent in political and
economic,action become increasingly apparent.

The

environmental argument tacks back and forth between reliance
on science and criticism of how it is carried out in
society, between trust in its power to get at the truth,
skepticism about the goals it actually serves.

and

Inside the

cool logic of science is perceived the heated impatience of
the sorcerer's apprentice.3
The power that science gives us can now change nature
itself; the first unequivocal recognition of this came with
the splitting of the atom.

Ward and Dubos compare this

power to split the atom to Promethean fire.
Titan,

son of Ge, the Earth and Uranus,

from Zeus

(king of the gods)

Prometheus

(a

the Sky)

stole fire

and gave it to men.

The angry

Zeus chained Prometheus to a rock where he endured what was
meant to be endless torment until he was rescued by the hero
Heracles.

Zeus further retaliated with manipulations that
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caused Pandora to open the box that released all the ills
that plague mankind; only hope remained in the box.
Promethean fire stands as a symbol of all the bold
interventions into nature made possible by science ambitious
for mankind.

At a level deeper than reasoned argument,

there exists a profound unease about the power and outcomes
of science,

along with a sense of the impossibility of ever

again living without it.
At a more mundane level, the natural world that for a
time seemed only a backdrop to our political activities is
now felt as an uncertain terrain on which all our activities
are played out.
poisoned,

Its land may become desert,

its waters

its atmosphere fail to protect us, but we can no

longer blame capricious gods or unknown forces.

The natural

world has become the constant reminder that we must live up
to our scientific knowledge.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER FIFTEEN

1.
On the change in meanings given to nature that has
accompanied the scientific and industrial revolutions, see
Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women. Ecology and
the Scientific Revolution (San Francisco: Harper & Row,
1980).
Merchant chronicles the shift from an empathetical
relation with nature to an instrumental relationship.
2.
Bhopal, a city in central India, is the site of an
industrial accident in 1984 which killed approximately 4,000
people.
Poison gas (methyl isocyanate, more toxic than
cyanide) was released in an explosion at a Union-Carbide
chemicals plant that produced pesticides; the escaping gas
covered the slums and residential areas of the city.
Besides those who died as a result of exposure to the gas
(about 1,500 within three days, the rest in the years up to
1992), another 20,000-40,000 suffered injuries.
(Sources:
"Indian Court Seizes Union Carbide Dividend," (Reuters), The
New York T i m e s . 5/23/92, p . 37; Sanjoy Hazarika, "Court in
India to Seize Union Carbide Assets," The New York T i m e s .
5/1/92, p.D7.; Barnaby J. Feder, "Carbide to Sell India
Assets to Build Hospital for Bhopal, The New York T i m e s .
p.Dl.; "Extradition Bid on Bhopal," The New York T i m e s .
3/28/92, p.40.; Edward A. Gargan, "Settlement on Bhopal is
Accepted," The New York T i m e s . 10/4/91, p.D4.)
3.
The complexities of the relationship between the
environmental movement and the scientific ecology which is
emerging at the same time are explored by Wolfgang Sachs in
"Environment and Development: The Story of a Dangerous
Liaison," The Ecologist. 21 (6), November/December 1991.
pp.252-57.
Sachs notes that for those committed to
development, "attributing absolute value to nature for its
own s a k e . .. would have barred the w a y . .. to the exploitation
of nature." (p.252)
Both environmentalists and the
"development elite" draw on scientific ecology, the
environmentalists using it to make a case for holistic
approaches, the development supporters using it to make
claims for techno-control of the environment.
Of
environmentalism, he observes:
"As a movement highly suspicious of science and
technical rationality, it plays anew the counter-melody
which has accompanied the history of modernity ever
since romanticism.
But as a science-based movement, it
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is capable of questioning the foundations of modernity
and contesting its logic in the very name of science."
(p.254)
Sachs sees the environmental movement as basing its
challenge on ecosystems theory, which gives it scientific
credibility, but also "opens the way for the technocratic
recuperation of the protest." (p.255) "Ecosystem
technology," he concludes, "turns finally against ecology as
a worldview." (p.256)
I thank Narahya Jolly for bringing this article to my
attention.
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CHAPTER SIXTEEN
SCIENCE AND POLITICS:
ENVIRONMENTAL THOUGHT AND CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT COMPARED

This chapter evaluates the use of Mannheim's style of
thought analysis as applied in this study.

Mannheim's Method

Using Mannheim's terms,

I have defined an environmental

style of thought focused on science.

I took Mannheim's

"Conservative Thought" as a model to follow in analyzing
environmental thought because that essay led me to see that
the environmental debate does not fit easily into our
conventional political framework.

In following Mannheim,

found both similarities and differences between his case —
conservative thought —

and mine —

environmental thought.

To review, Mannheim's method relies, he says, on the
analysis of m e a n i n g s : it does not judge the veracity,
validity or accuracy of arguments.

Whether or not Carson

was accurate in her argument does not determine its

I
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influence on a developing style of thought or its success in
capturing the experience of some group of people.
holds true for Commoner,
Furthermore,
"science",

The same

Ehrlich, and all the others.

changed meanings are given to familiar terms;

"technology",

and "scientific advances" are

reconsidered in the environmental argument,

and viewed from

a skeptical angle which diminishes the positive value that
postwar society has given these terms.

Nature is

reconceptualized as environment.
Mannheim identifies elements of the conservative style
of thought by referring to the events, people,
contributed to the development of conservatism.
abstracted out these elements,
to any style of thought
Six).

or ideas that
I have

and take them to be general

(as previously discussed in Chapter

These are in brief form below, with Mannheim's

conclusions for conservative thought,
environmental thought,

compared.

epistemological problem,

and mine for

The key theoretical or

and the characteristics of "basic

intention" are the major elements of Mannheim's aralysis.1

A polarizing event gives impetus to the style of thought:
the French Revolution for conservatism,

the atomic bomb for

env ironmenta1 t h o u g h t .
An organizing center can be identified —

the center of

contention around which groups develop their already

existing differences: politics for conservatism,

the uses of

science for environmentalism.
A polarity characterizes opposing styles of thought:
conservative/liberal,

science truster/science skeptic.

An effective group mounts an oppositional response to a
prevailing mode of legitimating social action:
for conservatism,

the nobility

relatively independent scientists for

environmentalism.
A "basic intention” is articulated by the style of thought,
a previously unarticulated purpose which comes out of the
group's experience: harking back to an earlier way of life
for conservatives,

preserving and protecting the natural

world and human health and life for environmentalists.
A "kev p r o b l e m .” an epistemological issue, unifies the
thought and shows how the group thinks things differently:
opposition to natural-law thought for conservatives,
opposition to reductionist thought for environmentalists.

"Basic intention" and "key problem" are Mannheim's
central categories in his analysis of style of thought; each
category contained characteristics specific to the thought
style.

The characteristics,

or "authentic manifestations"

of the basic intention of conservative thought were its
preference for details rather than for overall structure,
for concrete situations rather than abstract ones,

for a
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qualitative

(qualified)

universalistic one.

concept of liberty rather than a

For environmental thought these

characteristics are an emphasis on system complexity and
interrelatedness,
quantification,

the frequent use of facts and

the giving of a warning or stressing the use

of prediction as necessary responsible action, and a moral
imperative to speak out.

"Authentic manifestations" are

related to life experience —
environmental writers,

in the case of the scientist

to what we call occupational

experience.2
The characteristics related to the key problem of
conservative thought —
thought —

the opposition to Enlightenment

were the substitution of History for Reason as

the crucial force in human affairs,
the universal,

of the individual for

of the irrational for the rational,

dynamic for the static.

For environmental thought,

problem is the opposition to reductionism,

of the
the key

and its

theoretical characteristics are that wholes replace parts as
elements of analysis,
elements,

interrelatedness counters isolated

multiple or cyclical causes replace single or

linear causes,

time awareness replaces atemporality.
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On Basic Intention and Authentic Manifestations

Basic intention (Grundintention) and its "authentic
manifestations" in the style of thought are related to a
group's life experience in Mannheim's theory.

I think of

basic intention as the desire for a particular kind of world
which underlies the argument or style of thought.
Kettler,

For

Meja and Stehr it is the basic design of the

argument.

The difference between these two interpretations

seems to me to be a matter of emphasis on either the
motivation for or the intellectualization of the group's
purpose.

Mannheim can be read to include both meanings.

Either way, the point is that social situation and style of
thought are connected.

The connection is not a strictly

deterministic one; ideas reflect their place of origin, but
class origin does not determine a predictable content
independent of other circumstances.
As noted at the end of Chapter Five, while Mannheim
makes a convincing connection between the life experience of
the nobility and the conservative argument, he does not
"prove" that the connection must occur or could not be
otherwise.
method.3

This is an inevitable outcome of an interpretive
Like Weber, he finds that historical conditions

make certain ideas relevant or not.

Furthermore,

the same

ideas can be taken up by different groups, as when Marxist
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thinkers applied the concept of dynamic reason previously
formulated by conservatives.

A documentary analysis reveals

the basic intention in the argument; a historical survey
shows the conditions that make this intention of some
moment.

Documentary analysis was introduced by Mannheim as

a method of describing worldview.4

We document

(give

evidence of) our understanding of a worldview with example
"objects"; we illuminate the meaning of each object by
seeing it as a "document" of the wider frame of reference of
the worldview.5
Mannheim's analysis of the concepts of conservative
thought is altogether deeper and more complex than mine of
environmental thought.

He had exceptional insight into the

intellectual currents of social and political life, and in
addition, he considers authors who were consciously
ideological, who opposed specific conservative concepts to
specific Enlightenment concepts.

Of the authors I consider,

only Bookchin is attuned to concepts in this way in his
writing; the others are writing at a much more direct,
empirical level.

I am attempting to apply Mannheim's method

beyond the consciously ideological type of argument that was
his example.
Mannheim did not consider all aspects of the experience
of the nobility in explaining the basic intention of
conservative thought.

He left out the militarism of

447

Prussian life, and its crudity.

Similarly,

I have not

considered all the aspects of the experience of being a
scientist —

I have left out,

for instance, what it is like

to work in large, hierarchical, bureaucratic organizations.
Mannheim offers no explicit criteria for selecting some
experience over others.

He may have done as I have,

selected what fits by working back from the argument to the
experience,

and left out both some experience that fit and

some experience that didn't.6

While some critics find this

direction of analysis theoretically objectionable,
keeping with Mannheim's theory,

in which the linking of

ideas to experience is not a deterministic one.
historically specific —
Enlightenment thought,

it is in

The link is

without the French Revolution and
Prussian nobles would have had

different arguments to make, different elements of their
experience to emphasize.

Content of a style of thought,

as

Mannheim points out, cannot be decided a priori from social
circumstances.

Again the example is that both the wealthy

and later the working class made dynamic reason a conceptual
element of their styles of thought.
The basic intention of the environmental argument is to
achieve a world where there is a balance between humans and
nature.

Specifically,

as argued by scientists,

it is to

preserve and protect both nature and humans through the
knowledge of science —

a science that must be carefully
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watched so that its results are not misapplied.
Environmentalists,

like Mannheim's conservatives, want a

world in which they feel at home.
environmentalists,

this is not just having nature preserves

and better pesticide laws —
solutions.

For the nature-oriented

those would only be patchwork

In the desired world there will be a whole

different attitude toward nature.
the scientist environmentalists,

In the desired world of
there will be a different

attitude toward the uses of science and the philosophy that
directs it.
The characteristics,

or manifestations of the basic

intention of environmental thought,
nature,

to balance humans and

I have given as emphases on:

- system interrelatedness
- complexity
- quantification
- factuality
- prediction/warning
- moral responsibility to provide information.
All of the scientist-authored works analyzed display
these characteristics.

Those of Bookchin,

a social thinker,

and White, a historian, do not emphasize system
interrelatedness,

quantification,

or prediction.

The

systems-analyst authors of The Limits to Growth share in the
scientific model of argument, but convey less sense of moral
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alarm than the sclentist-authors.
I have indicated that the scientific training and
practice of the scientific authors is reflected in their
environmental arguments,

and I have thus related this

experience to the "basic intention" of the argument.

But

Mannheim does not relate basic intention to the people who
make the argument; he relates it to the class they argue
for.

Mannheim found a basic intention in the Prussian

nobility, who had a predisposition to traditionalist views.
Moser and Muller and others formulated the nobility's
arguments but did not share their experience
may have wished t o ) .
"new class" —

(although they

Scientists, by comparison,

act like a

technical intellectuals who begin to

formulate their own aims and speak for themselves.
Tc say that the characteristics of an argument for an
ecological world, when that argument is made by scientists,
share elements with arguments that scientists are trained to
make is not surprising, but neither is it a given.
Scientists may argue in a humanistic mode, not a sciencebased one, as Rend Dubos did in his many books,

or as C.P.

Snow did in his essays.

A scientific argument needs a

scientific opportunity.

The environmental crisis was the

opportunity for this type of argument to reach a wide
public.
Why did these scientific arguments of the 60s and 70s
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become best-selling books?

It does not seem likely that it

is their literary style that made them popular; all are well
written but none is a "good read."

And only the most

environmentally committed of readers will attend to all
their content.

What made them sell?

is that they had news,

The simple explanation

it was bad news, and bad news sells.

Furthermore,

they had unarguable bad news —

scientific.

(That, at any rate,

because it was

is how the reports are

presented; arguments of course followed.)

While government

and industry were pushing scientific good news,
environmental authors told a different story.

But there is

more to the reception of the environmental argument than an
interest in disaster.

The response includes the very

element that the scientists do not articulate —
for nature and a desire to keep nature whole.

a feeling
Though

scientific arguments for the environment do not usually
display this empathetical impulse, the holistic worldview
that they express makes them resonant with the concern for
the wholeness of nature.

The Effective Group

Mannheim does not go into detail about what I call the
"effective group," the group that stands behind the style of
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thought.

In Mannheim's example,

the effectiveness of the

group exists potentially, because of its social position;
the group does not necessarily achieve its program.
effectiveness of scientists,

The

I think, exists potentially

because of their position in the social structure of
knowledge;

they have a voice of authority,

not on a

political or class basis, but on epistemological grounds.
They too, do not necessarily achieve their goals.

The

danger of pesticides is acknowledged after Carson's book,
but the use of many pesticides increases; the ecological
crisis is recognized but production technology does not
change and exploitation of nature continues;

19th-century

German conservatives do not keep reforms from going ahead.
It is not yet clear who the effective group is (or will be)
in the environmental movement overall, but the effective
group for making the environmental argument has been
scientists —

life scientists holding relatively independent

research positions.
Mannheim's conservatives were not only effective in
getting their argument into public discussion,
those primarily affected by what they opposed.

they were
The same is

not exactly true of the scientists who oppose environmental
destruction.

In fact, part of the environmental argument is

that we are all equally affected,
happens in the environment.

in the end, by what

The social reality is that some
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are more affected than others —

those too poor to be able

to change how their environment is treated and too
uneducated to recognize dangers to themselves.

Yet,

if

scientists can be said to be making an argument for a larger
class affected by the environmental crisis,

then like Moser

and Muller they are an educated class (an intellectual elite
though not a social one)

articulating the case for those who

cannot fashion the argument themselves.
In what way can scientists be considered greatly
affected by the environmental crisis?

One possible answer

is that their specialized knowledge of its extent and
effects puts them in the front line of awareness,
necessarily of vulnerability,

to its dangers.

if not

Another way

to answer the question is to see if the environmental crisis
was an opportunity to respond to something else that was
greatly affecting them.

In the case of biologists,

this

could have been the change in biology that shifted research
from the cell as a unit of analysis to the molecular
structure of its chemical components.
seen by those involved,

This change has been

and others, as a contest between

holism and reductionism as methodological

imperatives.7

Just as the Prussian nobility was in danger of losing the
rights and status of hereditary lordship,

the non-molecular

biologists were in danger of losing the tradition in which
they had been trained and a future direction for research
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which would recognize their holistic goals.
tradition,

behavior constitutes structure;

reductionist approach,

In the holistic
in the

structure determines behavior.

These

are two very different ways of looking at the world.

Class

In Mannheim's theory, groups with opposing styles of
thought should have opposing social positions.

But this

does not seem to be true for (holist) environmental
scientists and

(reductionist)

non-environmental scientists,

for they are similarly situated in a professional class.
The groups are opposed on theoretical grounds within the
world of science, but not socially opposed within the wider
society.

(A social opposition may be true of

environmentalists and non-environmentalists generally,

as

studies by Dunlap, Van Liere, Cotgrove, and Milbrath
indicate.)8

It is also now the case that conservatives and

liberals may be of the same class, although that was not the
case at the time of the formation of the opposed arguments.
Styles of thought express already-existing differences among
social groups,

said Mannheim, and he construed these

differences as class differences,

but this dynamic may be

particular to an era of class formation.

One of the most noticeable differences between
Mannheim's example of conservative thought and mine of
environmental thought is that the 20th-century United States
does not have a class structure remotely comparable to 19thcentury Prussia.

The United States did not ever have the

equivalent of the 19th-century European class system with
its clearly marked divisions and clearly divided interests.
Our classes are more amorphous, more numerous, more
overlapping,

more mobile,

less identified with,

antagonistic to one another.

less

Class differences would always

be significant differences in the European society which
Mannheim knew, and major differences on what society should
be like would always be class differences.
diverse society,

In our very

differences can have many more locations

than are offered by a simple model of class structure.
There were already-existing differences between holistic and
reductionist scientists when the environmental argument
began, but they were not class differences.
even differences among class fractions.

They were not

They were

differences of theoretical and methodological approach
within a skilled class.
One of Mannheim's propositions about distinctions
between classes,

however,

possible within them.

suggests distinctions that are

Mannheim found that in class society

there would be one class oriented toward the past, one

toward the present,

and one toward the future.

Conservatives favored the past, the bourgeoisie the present
(especially what was new in it), and the proletariat the
future.

These orientations were responses to actual or

projected social change:

conservatives wanted to hold on to

their established position; the bourgeoisie,

newly arrived,

wanted to keep the new order going; the proletariat, with
little in the present or past in their favor, wanted real
change leading to a different future.9

Within the

professional class of scientists now, there seem to be
different orientations toward time,

not as responses to

social change, but as responses congruent with theoretical
orientation.

Ecology recognizes the future as part of the

cyclical process of life; molecular biology concerns itself
with the timeless factuality of molecular structure.

This

orientation to time is not a close parallel to the type
Mannheim described, but the use of a time axis as a way of
seeing distinctions in the thought of different groups is
still revealing.

Difference and Parallels

Mannheim's sociology of knowledge was directed toward
showing the social origins of social and political

arguments, toward unmasking interests.

This type of

unmasking was done by Marx in his analysis of capital and
capitalists.

Mannheim was routinizing it and neutralizing

the approach about three-guarters of a century later.
Today,

about three-quarters of a century since Mannheim's

early work,

there is nothing remarkable about showing a

connection between interests and arguments.

People expect

and recognize ideological bias, at least when it is not
their own.

But while finding interests in ideas is not

remarkable in itself,

actually making the connection in

detail can point to unnoticed or untheorized implications of
familiar arguments —

in the case of environmental thought,

to the problems of integrating scientific and political
frameworks of understanding.

Another 20th-century

difference is that ideas don't stay attached to their social
origins as long as they did in 19th-century Europe.
move around more quickly,
different groups,
purposes.

They

are widely communicated to

are quickly modified and adopted for other

Concepts can rapidly depart from their origins,

and become attached to other interests.10
Mannheim gives a dialectical account of the development
of thought style: Bourgeois rationalism suppresses
traditionalism until that older view becomes relevant

(under

conditions of class differentiation of political interests)
and takes the new form of conservatism.

The parallel for
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environmental thought would be that scientific reductionism
suppresses holism until the environmental crisis makes
holism relevant, when holism takes the new form of
environmental thought.

This is a plausible reading of the

course of events in postwar biology, but to establish this
influence reguires more investigation than is possible here.
Like Mannheim's conservatives,

environmentalists want

not just to think different things, but to think things
differently.
liberty,

As conservatives gave a different meaning to

environmentalists give a different meaning to

scientific progress.

But even more significant,

they give a

different meaning to cause and effect by positioning that
action in a cyclical rather than a linear context.
Philosophically,

this is another parallel to a return to

older modes of thought —

to ancient Greek thought,

in this

case.
Just as Romantics and conservatives had to rationalize
the Romantic view by making it self-conscious,

though they

were reacting against a highly rationalized view of the
world,

the nature-oriented environmental thinkers must make

use of science,
to life.

though they oppose its mechanistic approach

Mannheim observed that "It is the fate of

irrationalism,

as of everything else, to be comprehensible

only upon the plane on which the age rests."11

Even

irrationalism,

to be

then, had to be rationalized —
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counterposed to reason using reason's terms.
on the plane of science

Our age rests

(a particular form of rationalism),

and even objections to science must be made comprehensible
in scientific terms.
Mannheim found that the conservative "tendency"
generated historical thinking
time and place,

and on the metaphysics of history rather

than of r e a s o n ) .
generate?
parts,

(the emphasis on specifics of

What does an environmental tendency

Not holism (the emphasis on wholes rather than

and on emergent properties which cannot be reduced to

constituent elements), which is already developed.

Rather,

I think the important thing is time awareness opposing
atemporality —
universals.

another version of a resistance to timeless

This is another possible parallel to Mannheim.

His concern about "historical and political ways of
thinking" is part of a larger question about "how long we
have had

(or, at least, have seen as problematic)

disjunction between ^nature' and ^history'."

a

That is, a

philosophical and methodological distinction between the
natural sciences and the historical cultural sciences.
Mannheim wanted more than a history of ideas explaining this
distinction; he wanted to know what social forces accounted
for the split between nature and history.

He recast the

development as
"a contradiction between two worldviews and ways
of thinking, borne by social forces: the
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disjunction between liberal and conservative
thinking which arose at the turn of the nineteenth
century in direct connection with the concrete
political and philosophically self-reflective
debate about the French Revolution."12
This distinction between "natural-scientific and historical
thinking...

prevails today in the sphere of methodology,"

Mannheim affirms.13

One element of the natural-law

thinking of the Enlightenment is timeless universality;
scientific law follows in the same vein.

Environmentalism

dependent on scientific ecology cannot fully resist the
timeless abstractions of science, but it can draw on that
area of scientific thinking most responsive to the time
element that defines living organisms.

In environmentalism

time awareness becomes an acute consciousness of the amount
of time we have left to solve our ecological crisis and
assure our survival.
In defining politics as the organizing center of
conservative thought, Mannheim asserted that "the political
factor must be autonomous and must become the primary
nucleus around which new groupings crystallize."

This is

another way of describing the formation of class agendas in
the developing nation state.

The environmental parallel

would be that science is autonomous

(from political or other

influence, as politics was from religious influence), and
that groups define themselves around issues that have
science as their center.

Mannheim's autonomy is an abstract
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autonomy,

on the level of construction of theory,

day-to-day affairs.
autonomy,

not of

Science has this kind of theory-level

but there are not yet major groups crystallizing

around it, around disputes over what science should be, as
there were around disputes over what the state should be.

I

believe that the possibility of such disputes is growing,
and that the science-skeptic argument will continue to
define itself.

One Style of Thought or Two?

Since the environmental argument has two major strains:
- science oriented,

information driven

- nature oriented, empathetically driven,
applying Mannheim's method of analysis to this distinction
raises the question,
-

"environmental" —

Do they combine in one style of thought
or are they two separate styles of

thought?
Style of thought differences, Mannheim says,

are most

noticeable at the level of definition of the problem.
Different styles of thought bring forth different
ontological levels.14

Enlightenment thought hypostatized

Natural Law; conservative thought hypostatized History.

So

if nature-oriented environmentalists hypostatize Nature,

and

scientific ones hypostatize Science,
styles of thought?

are they two different

Is the tendency of nature thinkers to

respond empathetically and the tendency of scientific ones
to respond analytically parallel to the abstract tendencies
of liberal thought and the concrete tendencies of
conservative thought —
of thought?

again suggesting two separate styles

On the side that answers "yes” is the

recognition that the yearning for reunion with nature is an
already established type of thought; the scientific
environmental argument is a new type.
here to feudal

(already existing)

There is a parallel

and Romantic

(new) thought

opposing Enlightenment thought.

On the "no" side is that

this distinction is, by itself,

not enough to establish a

style of thought; there would also have to be different key
problems and basic intentions,

along with the other elements

of a style of thought.

Science Criticism

There are many forms of science criticism:
- Frankfurt School criticism of instrumental reason
- critiques of technology
- holistic life sciences critiques of reductionist science
- feminist criticism of masculinist bias and
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overobjectification of the world
- social construction of knowledge critiques of scientific
objectivity
- environmental critiques,.
Environmental criticism and the criticism of science
intersect.

I realize that because environmental voices are

so diverse,

that to name the scientific type of

environmental criticism the "environmental style of thought"
may seem unfair or inaccurate.

But because the science-

based argument is what made the environment a public issue,
and is a departure from the nature-oriented arguments that
preceded it and must now to some extent include it,

I have

decided that calling the science-based argument the
environmental style of thought is correctly descriptive.
This argument scientifically legitimates the vision of all
human life as part of nature

(the inclusive environmental

v i e w ) , and thus will be an indispensable argument for that
vision so long as science remains central to our lives.
Mannheim notes that a new word is often the sign of a
new social phenomenon,
conservatism overlap,

and that though traditionalism and
the appearance of the term

"conservatism" indicated its social and political
appearance.15

Similarly, environmentalism and traditional

concern for nature overlap, but the appearance of the term
"environmentalism" indicates a new, scientific version of
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nature appearing in social and political life.

Content and Context

The plan of the the study was to take the environmental
movement as an area where a clear case could be made that
science legitimates social action,

and to determine,

using

Mannheim's sociology of knowledge,

if there was a coherent

argument focused on the uses of science and thus meeting a
preliminary condition for the development of a style of
thought —

having a center of contention around which there

are opposed arguments.

The opposed arguments,

which appear

on the surface to be environmentalist and anti
environmentalist,

would then hypothetically have been about

the nature and uses of science.

This opposition was

observed to exist between environmental and antienvironmental arguments and within environmental arguments.
Environmental arguments alone were then analyzed to see if
indeed their science skepticism was extensive enough to
support the existence of a polarity around science in which
environmentalists actively oppose a status quo of science in
society.

This presence was found and was located among

environmentalists who were also scientists.
There was a two-fold purpose in the study —

to give

examples of scientific legitimation

(implied by arguments);

to describe arguments for social action according to a
method which makes distinctions in content that can be
related to the differing traditions and conditions of
opposing groups.

As with Mannheim's "Conservative Thought,"

much is left undone in relating content to social context.
This bias is built into the method,

I now realize, which

concentrates on key epistemological problem first,

and basic

intention second, both of which are arrived at by a
documentary analysis of texts.

The historical research

which is necessary to establish social context is not
provided for in the method.

What the method does do is show

where that historical research must take place —

what group

to look at, what conditions to investigate, what events to
measure the impact of.

This means that at the end of this

study, there is a whole other work to be done —

an

investigation of post-World War II scientific endeavor in
the life sciences and in the developing field of ecology,

in

combination with an account of the environmental crises of
the time and the responses to them by scientifically trained
persons.

Frameworks

The use of "Conservative Thought" as a model for this
study was an experiment.

Could an early 20th-century

analysis of early 19th-century thought be applied to late
20th-century thought in the late 2 0th century?

One

difficulty would be having little historical distance from
which to make the analysis.
contention

The change in the center of

(from politics to science)

the analysis,

added complexity to

and required the identification of new

characteristics contained by the categories basic intention
and key epistemological problem.
internal analysis,

Besides this difficulty of

there was a problem in applying

Mannheim's analysis of social context.
For environmental thought, as compared with
conservative thought,

not only was there not a simple class

structure to work with as context (as in 19th-century
G e r m a n y ) , there was not a good fit of arguments to the
political framework that gave meaning to conservative
thought,

and that addresses problems of class interests and

social location.

Science and technology doesn't threaten

political position and class interests as directly as it
threatens the body —

its health, possibilities for

longevity, and genetic constitution.

Science is now seen to

be a double-edged sword that can harm as well as help

(and
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in its asocial relevance it is like religion —

religion

offers heaven or hell regardless of class pos i t i o n ) .
Environmental interests do not neatly fit into the political
framework.
In discussing this shift from politics as reference
point to science as reference point I have concentrated on
environmental arguments,

linking environmental thought to

the critique of science.

But of course not all critique of

science is environmental,

and not all environmentalism is

critique of science.

The observation that environmental

issues don't fit the political framework,

and do fit a

science one, may be

(exactly)

the outcome of scientists

framing the issue.

Against the conclusion that it is only

because scientists made the environmental argument that it
doesn't match political concepts,

is the fact that

politicians didn't frame environmental issues well, not only
because of anti-environmental interests, but because they
didn't have the language that captured the problem.

The

arguments of scientists provide the same sort of
paradigmatic delineation of issues for today's society that
political theorists did for the 19th-century society studied
by Mannheim.
It is my contention:
that there is an un-named style of thought emerging
which I have called environmental thought
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—

that its center of contention is science

—

that this signals that there is a conceptual shift

occuring collectively in our society,

from understanding and

legitimating from within a political framework

(state and

citizen with rights and obligations determined by a
philosophy of human nature)
scientific framework

to doing this within a

(science and its users/recipients

without clearly established rights and obligations;

facts of

nature replace philosophy of human nature; politics remains,
but with a changed identity).
The following step (using Mannheim's method)
—

that there is a new, or newly conscious,

should be:

social group

that bears the environmental style of thought

(for example,

some studies characterize environmentalists as a knowledge
class not tied to the production sector of capitalist
s o c iety).
group.

Such a group would be Mannheim's effective social

But this group is not so easily found.

The Problem of the Effective Social Group

There are so many strands to environmentalism that its
proponents cannot be squeezed into one class.
restricting my analysis to arguers/writers,

In

I am in part

saying that an elite group is skilled in certain kinds of
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discourse —
specifically,

an observation that is nothing new.

More

the group is scientists who are relatively

independent of funding and politics
governmental).

(academic or

They are relatively free to make the

critical argument,

and this distinguishes them from other,

equally competent and knowledgable scientists.
Environmentalism is tremendously inclusive as an
attitude; that's part of its strength.

Practicing

environmentalists are a much smaller group than attitudinal
environmentalists,
middle class.

but they still are spread around the

And some practicing environmentalists are

from poor communities resisting the use of their backyards
for dumps or incinerators.
expands,

Environmental allegiance

so the professing group grows larger.

The

effective group is another matter, but wherever the
questions are scientific,

there will be a knowledge elite

involved.
Mannheim puts much more effort into analyzing the
content of his conservative style of thought than he does
into analyzing its effective group.

And he emphasizes

historical currents leading to conservatism more than he
does a specifc group project to get it going.
there's a style of thought,

However,

if

then there's a coherent argument

which comes from a specific location in society no matter
how diffuse the many contributing strands.

That, at least,

is how I understand Mannheim's premise for conservatism,
although it's possible that this is a dynamic peculiar to
politics and modern class society.

The more general premise

that there are social origins for knowledge does not
disallow multiple origins so long as some group(s)

are

specifically excluded from origination.

That is, the

argument can't come from just anywhere.

In the case of

environmentalism,

industrialists, growth-oriented

businesses,

resource-exploiting occupations, are

excluded.16

I have found the origin of the science-based

environmental argument among holistically-inclined life
scientists but I have not investigated in detail how the
conditions these scientists perceived could incline them to
make their argument.
In Mannheim,
together.

class society and political thought go

It is the differences in life experience in

relation to the elements of the political framework,
structured by class division, which result in different
intents/tendencies and then in different political arguments
(styles of t h o u g h t ) .

Today, differences in experience n

relation to elements of the science framework result in
different tendencies and arguments about the direction of
science in society and environment.
applies

If Mannheim's analysis

(arguments come from specific social locations), it

seems to me that for critique to arise, there must also be
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some events in social structure —

openings or closings —

following on the polarizing events that are an impetus to a
new style of thought.
What was the social-structural opening
for the

(oppositional)

(and/or closing)

response to the scientific/

technological aspect of the environmental crisis?

The

event-opportunistic opening was the environmental awareness
following on Silent Spring and various disasters,

but this

is not the same as a social-structural opening/closing.
Both scientists and nature-oriented groups responded to
these events, but they were not events that affected social
structure

(as did the French Revolution).

For the argument to come forth, something had to have
happened —

to be perceived to have happened —

of those who put forth the argument.
wild nature disappearing.
science disciplines,

to the world

The nature group saw

Scientists in certain life-

it is possible,

- the subject of their studies —

saw the natural world -

being disrupted; they saw

a balanced and functioning environment endangered.
Was the opening/closing for scientists specifically
within the organization of scientific activity?

I believe

it may have been the increasing dominance of the
reductionist molecular biology approach that appeared to be,
to traditional biologists,

the closing of opportunities and

the ending of a tradition, while at the same time the
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environmental crisis offered an opening for anti
reductionist theorizing.17
The growing critique of science follows on science's
greatest "successes," just as the critique of the
Enlightenment followed on the "success" of the French
Revolution.

It has taken shape among scientists themselves,

and among feminists,

environmentalists,

theorists of knowledge.

and constructivist

Scientists and non-scientists

combined in the 1960s and 70s in the United States to bring
the environmental movement to the point where it became
politically visible.

Both were concerned with the being of

science, with the implications of its traditional separation
from the sphere of values.
in this way?

Could science remain autonomous

Should it be allowed to if it could?

These

questions underlay the more immediate problem of what to do
about the environment.

Science as a Center of contention for Styles of Thought

Since we are in the midst of a conceptual shift from
politics to science, both types of arguments and
legitimations are used.
contention,

With science as a center of

arguments can be developed around actions

oriented toward the practical world —

science and
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technology —

or around epistemological issues —

and objectivity:

science

is science our most objective knowledge,

is

our most objective knowledge our most valuable knowledge,

is

there any objective knowledge outside our definitions of it?
With science and politics both being centers of
contention,

two changes in the centrality of politics are

possible over time:

A)

Science replaces politics as ideologically central:

If science replaces politics as a center, commitment to
science replaces political commitment for characterization
of thought.

"Progressive" and "conservative" become

analogies rather than accurate descriptors for these
commitments,

and there is a spectrum of opinion on what

science is/should be that ranges from traditionalist to
radically revolutionary.
science,

Scientists and philosophers of

and also the layperson, will contribute to the

defining of this spectrum.
(classicists)
community,

There will be Popperians

and Feyerabenders

(radicals)

in the scientific

flat-Earthers and amateur scientists among the

public.
A growing debate on scientific programs for the future
could resemble religious arguments more than political
ones —

ecology and environment vie for importance of place

with the state, and both camps make allegiances to non
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political entities
environment)

(to objective science or to the global

while trying to construct a morality that can

encompass genetic engineering and backpack nuclear weapons.

B)

Science takes equal place with politics as ideologically

central:
linked,

Since science and politics are now inextricably
and since the

(ideal) objectivity of science and the

partiality of politics are in basic contradiction,

the

continuing difficulty of discussion over issues like ozone
layer damage, drug-induced abortion, pre-conception
biological engineering, prolonged machine-supported life in
hospitals,

AIDS, the scientific possibility but political

impossibility of ending the starvation of millions,

the

allocation of resources to the exploration and
militarization of space, the reliance of poltical decisions
on scientific expertise —
types of thought-styles,

all these may contribute to new
centered not just on politics, but

on science as well.
If the legitimacy of social action must be
scientifically as well as politically validated,

this

worldview will separate the industrialized and technologized
nations still further from the poorest part of the third
world, where nationalistic movements and political
allegiances continue to dominate.

In the West,

science has

been so successful in establishing a position as superior
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knowledge that politics must often cover itself with the
mantle of science.

This raises the question whether science

can 'free' itself from politics

(as it earlier 'freed'

itself from religion), as its ideals require,
will just become another form of politics.

or whether it

An equally

important question is whether a science free of politics
would be a more even-handed guide to common good because
less partisan than politics,

or a totalitarian rule because

of its total claim to the best method of decision making.

Science and Values

As new styles of thought develop around these
questions, the difficulties that they raise bring the
discussants inevitably to the question of values.

If the

objectivity of science is to be tested, we must see if
science favors some values over others.

If we can't

establish objectivity free of

values, then what values

does

science have?

values, how is it better

as an

If science has

ideological guide than politics, which has long given us a
way of dealing with our values?

(Politics is a limited and

imperfect way of dealing with

values, but an important

If the values of politics are

only competing interests,

of which can establish ethical superiority,

one.)
none

do the values of
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science offer a way out, or are they only another interest?
What values will guide our use of technology if science
does no more than proclaim itself a self-evident value

(like

tr u t h ) , and if politics confines itself to competing selfinterests?
And,

for the sociology of knowledge,

if what that

discipline does is show both scientific and political values
to be only self-interests,
critical role or, rather,

is it performing a needed
a nihilistic one?

This study, of course,
questions.

does not answer all of these

It attempts to clarify the science/politics

tension and indicate the shift occuring from one set of
explanations and legitimations to another.

The final

outcome of that shift is not yet determined.

Legitimation

could conceivably be redistributed fairly equally between
the two frameworks of explanation,
think it will,

or science may win,

as I

superior authority.

Postscript

The Earth Summit conference in Rio (the United Nations
Conference on the Environment and Development)

took place in

June 1992 as I was writing the final chapters of this work.
It is one of many signs that the central political issue for
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Western societies has changed.
state building,

For centuries of nation

that issue was how to govern,

government legitimate.

or what makes

Now it is how to use science,

and

not misuse it, to keep from destroying life on the planet.
Global environmental threat is an issue for all societies,
but it has a special status in the West, whose nations
cannot claim they need to play catch-up in economic
development before they act to protect the environment.

The

old political problems have not gone away for Western
nations; they remain.
identity,

But politics is taking on a new

structured around science and technology instead

of around theories of government and of the rights and
obligations of citizen and state.
In the past twenty years environmental arguments have
been extended to social and economic problems,

and are

changing our understanding of what it is that makes actions
to solve these problems acceptable or not.

The old

political framework of argument ranked opinions on how to
solve society's problems along a conservative/liberal
spectrum.

It is being replaced by a scientific framework

that ranks them on a spectrum of stances toward how science
operates in society.

On the one hand are those who trust

that the practice and outcomes of science will work to the
general good; on the other are those who are skeptical, who
find the direction of scientific research and technological
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development is too often a threat to the ecological balance
of people and nature.

A new polarity is forming,

science-trusters and science-skeptics,

one of

and it is likely to

replace the old conservative/liberal polarity as we enter
the next century.
It is not the validity of science that science-skeptics
doubt, but its direction and uses.
pesticides,

toxic effluents,

the genetic level on up.

Nuclear radiation,

are seen to endanger life from

The environmental type of argument

equates scientific knowledge with both creative and
destructive power that must be kept in hand.
another way of looking at political, economic,
choices,

It has become
and lifestyle

one that does not first call on democratic

political concepts.
The new kind of argument about social and economic
problems is fact-based and scientifically oriented; the old
kind is based on theories of government and human nature.
The new kind of argument weighs, calculates and predicts;
the old kind invokes principles and ideals, traditions and
utopias.

The new kind of argument,

form, was developed by scientists —
life sciences —

in its environmental
especially those in the

who gave a warning about the environment

which was also a warning about science.
At a time when repressive governments are being
replaced by new democratic ones, and racial and economic
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may seem absurd to say that the old politics is no longer
the issue.

But it is not that pressing political

don't count or that politics is being eclipsed —

issues
it is the

philosophical and theoretical basis of politics as we have
understood it that is coming to an end.

We have as much

trouble integrating our current hold on values with politics
as we do integrating our understanding of science with it.
And science,
example,

values and politics intersect when,

for

sexual orientation or teenage sexual activity are

judged to be matters more biologically than socially
influenced.

Increasingly,

it will be scientific opinion

about the environmental outcome of productive technologies
and market choices that will be used to justify political
action taken to effect the environment both directly and
indirectly,

not concepts of citizen and state, based on

political theory.

Even those who are skeptical of the

benefits of science must rely on science to provide
information and to give confirming or disconfirming
evidence.

Science dominates our institutions as a form of

knowledge,

and as a source of legitimation for their

actions.
If the Rio conference,
direction,

and other efforts in the same

do not advance us toward a solution of the

environmental crisis, questions about political
theories will be moot.

Equally,

forms and

if political mechanisms

theories will be moot.

Equally,

if political mechanisms

cannot be found for working toward ecological balance,
arguments about the right uses of science will be hollow.
Politics and science are inextricably linked,

and politics

can no longer be the same; nor can science retain its
traditional aloofness from political process as we undergo
the shift from one framework of argument and justification
to another.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER SIXTEEN

1. Mannheim does not summarize individual works, as I do,
but analyzes their conceptual content.
I give a detailed
account of environmental arguments because they are not
established as a category of thought in the way that
conservative arguments are.
2.
For Prussian nobles, life and occupation,
hereditary lordship, were the same.

i.e.,

3.
Mannheim does discuss the problem of "imputation" of
political and social tendencies to concepts in Conservatism,
pp. 37-43.
4.
In "On the Interpretation of Weltanschauung" in From
Karl M a n n h e i m .
5.
The documentary method was adopted and modified by
Harold Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodoloav (Englewood
Cliffs, N J : Prentice Hall, 1967) as a basic technique and
tenet of ethnomethodology: We all treat actions and
statements in our everyday world as documents of other
meanings beyond the immediate one, and these other meanings
help explain the immediate event to us.
Garfinkel applied
this method to social interaction; here I again apply it, as
Mannheim did, to written arguments within their social and
historical context.
6.
The beginning of a style of thought is a "mode of
relating to the world."
The method is to work back from the
thought to its intention (which derives from a mode of
relating) to the group who has the tradition.
7.
Commoner refers to the divergent purposes of moleular
and organism-centered biology in Science and S u r v i v a l . For
an account of reductionist and antireductionist arguments in
the philosophy of biology, see Alexander Rosen,
The Structure of Biological Science (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985), a basically reductionist treatise
written for biologists about the issue of biology's autonomy
from or provincial relation to the physical sciences.
Biological reductionism is critiqued from a Marxist point of
view in Steven Rose, Molecules and Minds: Essavs on Biology
and the Social Order (Milton Keynes, England: Open
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University Press, 1987).
Biochemist Erwin C h a rgaff, a
prominent defender of the old, pre-molecular school, is
quoted in Horace Freeland Judson, The Eighth Dav of
Creation: Makers of the Revolution in Biology (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1980) as saying: "My main objection to
molecular biology is that by its claim to be able to explain
everything it actually hinders the free flow of scientific
ideas.
But there is not a scientist I have met who would
share my opinion." (p.222).
8.
These studies indicate that environmentalists are more
likely to be employed in the service sector than the
production sector.
Being young, female, and white also
increases the tendency toward environmentalism.
so do left
politics, but Milbrath finds that political orientation does
not explain environmentalism.
See:
Riley E. Dunlap and K. Van Liere, "The New Environmental
Paradigm," The Journal of Environmental E d u cation. 1978 (4);
K. Van Liere and Riley E. Dunlap, "The Social Bases of
Enivronmental Concern: A Review of Hypotheses, Explanations
and Empirical Evidence," Public Opinion Q u arterly. 1980, 44
(2); Stephen Cotgrove, Catastrophe or Cornucopia; The
Environment. Politics and the Future (Chichester/New York:
Wiley, 1982); Lester W. Milbrath, Environmentalists:
Vanguard for a New Society
(Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1984).
9.

From Karl M a n nheim, p p . 169-71.

10.
Such movement of ideas is recognized in Weber's
"elective affinities."
11.

Conservatism, p . 65.

12.
Karl Mannheim, in Conservatism, pp. 33-35.
The editors
discuss this formulation of the question in their
introduction to the book.
13.

Ibid., p . 36.

14.

Conservatism, pp.56-58.

15.

Conservatism, pp.76-77.

16.

See note #8 above.

17.
In The Eighth D a v . Judson says of the change in
biology:
"As understanding of the cell was invaded by new kinds
of molecules, biology was invaded by new kinds of
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scientists, most famously the physicists.... For
biochemists, molscular biology also represented a
painful loss of control of the century-old continuity
of their tradition — a break which became irreparable
as the number of students entering research doubled and
doubled again in the fifties." (p.215)
The biologist E.O. Wilson has commented that "Someone said
not long ago, 'Pollution will do for the study of ecology
what cancer did for molecular b i o l o g y ,.,, Quoted in Anne
Chisholm, Philosophers of the Earth: Conversations with
Ecologists (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1972).

433

WORKS CITED

BOOKS, ENCYCLOPEDIA ARTICLES, GOVERNMENT AND LEGAL
DOCUMENTS:

Abbey, Edward.
1968.

Desert Solitaire. New York: McGraw Hill,

The Anchor Atlas of World H i s t o r y . Vol. II. Hermann Kinder
and Werner Hilgemann. New York: Doubleday, 1978.
Aronowitz, Stanley. Science as Power: Discourse and
Ideology in Modern Soci e t y . Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1988.
Bacon, Francis. Advancement of Learning. Novum Orqanum. New
A t l a n t i s . Great Books of the Western World, v ol.30.
Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1955; orig. pub. of
"Novum Organum" 162 0.
Bahro, Rudolf. Building the Green M o v e m e n t . Philadelphia:
New Society Publishers, 1986.
Barke, Richard. Science. Technology and Public Po l i c y .
Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1986.
Bates, Marston. The Forest and the Sea: A Look at the
Economy of Nature and the Ecology of M a n . New York:
Random House, 1960.
Blackbourn, David and Geoff Ely. The Peculiarites of German
History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in NineteenthCenturv Germ a n y . New York: Oxford University Press,
1984.
The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Institutions, ed.
Vernon Bogdanor. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987.
The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political T h o u g h t , ed. David
Miller. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987.
Blumenberg, Hans. The Legitimacy of the Modern A g e .
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983.

484

Boas, Marie. The Scientific Renaissance.
York: Harper and Row, 1962.

1450-1630. New

Bohme, Gernot and Nico Stehr, e d s . , The Knowledge Society;
The Growing Impact of Scientific Knowledge on Social
R e l ations. Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel, 1986.
Bookchin, Murray. The Ecology of Freedom. Palo Alto,
Cheshire Books, 1982.
_________. Post-Scarcitv Ana r c h i s m . Berkeley,
Press, 1971.

CA:

CA:

Ramparts

_________. "Toward an Ecological Solution" in
Eco-Catastrophe. by the editors of R a m p a r t s . San
Francisco: Canfield Press, 1970.
_________. Our Synthetic Environment. New York: Harper &
Row, 1974; orig. pub. 1962 under the pseudonym Lewis
Herber (New York: K n o p f ) .
Boulding, Kenneth. Economics of Pollution. New York: New
York University Press, 1971.
Bourdieu, Pierre. Distinction. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1984.
_________. Outline of a Theory of
Cambridge University Press,

Practice.Cambridge:
1977.

Bramwell, Anna. Ecology in the 20th C e n t u r y . New Haven:
University Press, 1989.

Yale

Briggs, Shirley. "Rachel Carson: Her Vision and Her
Legacy"
in Silent Spring R e visited, eds. Gino J. Marco et al.
Washington, D.C.: American Chemical Society, 1987.
Brooks, Paul. Speaking for Nature: How Literary Naturalists
from Henry Thoreau to Rachel Carson Have Shaped
A m e r i c a . San Francisco: Sierra Club, 1983.
_________. The House of Life: Rachel Carson
Houghton Mifflin, 1972.

at W o r k . Boston:

Brown, Lester R. The Twenty Ninth D a v . New York: W.W.
Norton, 1978.
Brush, Stephen G. The History of Modern S c i e n c e . Ames,
Iowa State University Press, 1988.

Iowa:

485

Bryce, James. The Holy Roman E m p i r e . London: Macmillan,
1961; reprint of 1904 - 5th - edn.
Callenbach, Ernest. Ecotopia: The Notebooks and Reports of
William W e s t o n . Berkeley, CA: Banyan Tree Books, 197 5.
Capra, Fritjof and Charlene Spretnak. Green Politics: The
Global Prom i s e . New York: Dutton, 1984.
Carsel, Robert F. and Charles N. Smith, "Impact of
Pesticides on Ground Water Contamination" in Silent
Spring Re v i s i t e d , eds. Gino J. Marco et al.
Washington, D.C.: American Chemical Society, 1987.
Chalmers, Alan. Science and Its Fabrication. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1990.
Chisholm, Anne. Philosophers of the Earth: Conversations
with Ecologists. New York: E.P. Dutton, 1972.
Cole, H.S.D. et a l , eds. Models of Doom: A Critique of The
Limits to G r o w t h . New York: Universe Books, 1973.
Commoner, Barry. Making Peace With the Planet. New York:
Pantheon, 1990.
_________• The Closing Circle: Nature. Man and
T e c h n o l o g y . New York: Knopf, 1971.
_________• Science and Survival. New York: Viking Press,
1966.
Cotgrove, Stephen. Catastrophe or Cornucopia: The
Environment. Politics and the Future. Chichester/New
York: Wiley, 1982.
Daly, Herman E., ed. Toward a Steadv-State Econ o m y . San
Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 197 3.
Dampier, Sir William Cecil. A History of Science and Its
Relations with Philosophy and R e l igion. London:
Cambridge University Press, 1961; reprint of the 1948 4th- edition.
Davies, J.E., and R. Doon, "Human Health Effects of
Pesticides" in Silent Spring R e v i s i t e d , eds. Gino J.
Marco et al. Washington, D.C.: American Chemical
Society, 1987.

485

Dickson, David. The New Politics of Scie n c e . New York:
Pantheon, 1984.
Dictionary of American Conservatism. Louis Filler.
Seacaucus, N J : Citadel Press, 1988.
A Dictionary of Modern Critical T e r m s , rev. edn., ed. Roger
Fowler. London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1987 .
Dictionary of Modern Political Ideologies, ed. M.A. Riff.
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987.
A Dictionary of Modern Politics. David Robertson.
Philadelphia: Taylor and Francis, 1985.
Dictionary of the Middle A g e s . Editor in chief, Joseph R.
Strayer. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, Vol. 3,
1983; Vol. 10, 1988.
A Dictionary of Political Thou g h t . Roger Scruton.
Harper & Row, 1982.

New York:

Dilthey, Wilhelm. Wilhelm Dilthev: Selected W r i t i n g s , ed.
H.P. Rickman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1976.
Dilthey, Wilhelm. The Essence of Philosophy, trans. Stephen
A. Emery and William T. Emery. Chapel Hill, NC:
University of North Carolina Press, 1969.
The Dorsev Dictionary of American Government and Politics.
Jay M. Shafritz. Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1988.
Dubos, Rene. So Human an A n i m a l . New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1968.
_________ . "The Environmental Teach-In" in The
Environmental H a n d b o o k , ed. Garrett De Bell. New York:
Ballantine Books, 1970.
Ehrlich, Paul. The Machinery of N a t u r e . Simon & Schuster,
1986.
_________ . The Population B o m b . New York:
1968.

Ballantine Books,

Ellul, Jacques. The Technological S o c i e t y . New York: Vintage
Books, 1964.

487

The Environmental Crisis - Opposing Viewpoints. Book editor,
Neal Bernards. San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1991.
Farr, Robert M. and Serge Moscovici, eds. Social
Representations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1984 .
Feyerabend, Paul. Science in a Free S o c i e t y . London: Verso,
1982; orig. pub. 1978 (London: N L B ) .
Fleck, Ludwik. Genesis and Development of a Scientific F a c t .
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979.
Freed, Virgil H. "Pesticides: Global Use and Concerns" in
Silent Spring Revisited, eds. Gino J. Marco et al.
Washington, D.C.: American Chemical Society, 1987.
Galtung, Johann. "The Green Movement" in The Future of the
Environment, ed. David C. Pitt. London and New York:
Routledge, 1988.
Garfinkel, Harold. Studies in Ethnomethodoloav. Englewood
Cliffs, N J : Prentice Hall, 1967.
Gay,

Peter and R.K. Webb, Modern Europe to 181 5 . New York:
Harper & Row, 197 3.

Glacken, Clarence J. Traces on the Rhodian Shore: Nature and
Culture in Western Thought from Ancient Times to the
End of the Eighteenth C e n t u r y . Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press, 1967.
Goldsmith, Maurice. The Science Critic: A Critical Analysis
of the Popular Presentation of Scie n c e . London and New
York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986.
Gouldner, Alvin W. The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise
of the New C l a s s . New York: Oxford University Press,
1982; orig. pub. 1979.
Graham, Frank Jr. Since Silent S o r i n g . Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1970.
Hall, Russell J. "Impact of Pesticides on Bird Populations"
in Silent Soring R e visited, eds. Gino J. Marco et al.
Washington, D.C.: American Chemical Society, 1987.

488

Hardin, Garrett. "The Tragedy of the Commons" in The
Environmental H a n dbook, ed. Garrett De Bell. New York:
Ballantine, 1970; orig. pub. in Science 162 (12/13/68).
Harding, Sandra. The Science Question in Feminism. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1986.
Harding, Sandra and Merrill B. Hintikka, eds. Discovering
Reality: Feminist Perspective on Epistemologv.
Metaphysics. Methodology, and Philosophy of Scie n c e .
Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983.
Hiskes, Anne L. and Richard P. Hiskes. Science. Technology
and Policy Decisions. Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1986.
Hobsbawm, Eric and Terence Ranger, eds. The Invention of
Tr a d i t i o n . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1983 .
Hollis, Martin and Steven Lukes, eds. Rationality and
Relativism. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982.
Horkheimer, Max and Theodor W. Adorno.
Enlightenment. New York: Seabury,

Dialectic of
1972.

Hynes, H. Patricia. The Recurring Silent S p r i n g . New York:
Pergamon, 1989.
Ichazo, Oscar. Between Metaphysics and Protoanalvsis. New
York: Arica Institute Press, 1982.
In Wildness is the Preservation of the W o r l d . Words from
Henry Thoreau, photographs by Eliot Porter. New York:
Ballantine, 1967; orig. pub. 1962 (San Francisco:
Sierra C l u b ) .
International Association for the Evaluation of Educational
Achievement. Science Achievement in Seventeen
Countries: A Preliminary Report. Oxford: Pergamon
Press, 1988.
Judson, Horace Freeland. The Eighth Dav of Creation: Makers
of the Revolution in Biology. New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1980.
Kearney, Hugh F . , ed. Origins of the Scientific Revol u t i o n .
London: Longmans, Green, 1964.

489

Keller, Evelyn Fox. Reflections on Gender and S c i e n c e . New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985.
Kelly, Petra.
1984 .

Fighting for H o p e . Boston:

South End Press,

Knorr-Catina, Karin and Michael Mulkay, eds. Science
Ob s e r v e d . Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1983.
Knudsen, Johnathan B. Justus Moser and the German
Enlightenment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1986.
Kurland, Gerald. Western Civilization I . New York: Monarch
Press, 1971.
Landmann, Michael. Alienatorv R e a s o n . Normal,
Literature Press, 1978.

IL: Applied

Lapp6, Frances Moore. Diet for a Small P l a n e t . New York:
Ballantine, 1971.
The Last Whole Earth Catalog, ed. Stewart Brand. Menlo Park,
CA: Portola Institute, 1970.
Leiss, William. The Domination of N a t u r e . New York:
Braziller, 1972.
Leopold, A l d o . A Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and
T h e r e . New York: Oxford University Press, 1968; orig.
pub. 1949.
Levi, Albert William. "Philosophy, The History of Western"
in Encyclopedia Britannica. 15th edition, Vol. 2,
p. 762. Chicago: Enyclopedia Britannica, 1987.
Levins, Richard and Richard Lewontin. The Dialectical
Biologist. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1985.
Loader, Colin. The Intellectual Development of Karl
Ma n n h e i m . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1985.

Lovelock, J.E. Gaia: A New Look at Life on E a r t h . New York:
Oxford University Press, 1979.

4 90

Mannheim, Karl. "Conservative Thought," in From Karl
M a n n h e i m , ed. Kurt H. Wolff. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1971.
_________. Ideology and U t o p i a . New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, n . d . ; first published in English in 1936.
_________. Conservatism, eds. David Kettler, Volker Meja and
Nico Stehr. London and New York: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1986.
Marco, Gino J., Robert M. Hollingworth and William Durham.
"Many Roads and Other Worlds," in Silent Spring
R e v i s i t e d , eds. Gino J. Marco et al. Washington, D.C.:
American Chemical Society, 1987.
Marco, Gino J., Robert M. Hollingworth and William Durham,
eds. Silent Spring Revisited. Washington, D.C.:
American Chemical Society, 1987.
Marcuse, Herbert. One-Dimensional M a n . Boston:
1964.
Marx,

Beacon Press,

Leo. The Machine in the G a r d e n . New York: Oxford
University Press, 1964.

McHarg, Ian. Design With N a t u r e . Garden City, NY: Natural
History Press, 1969.
Meadows, Donella H., Dennis L. Meadows and Jorgen Randers.
Bevond the Limits: Confronting Global Collapse.
Envisioning a Sustainable Fut u r e . Post Mills, VT:
Chelsea Green, 1992.
Meadows, Donella H., Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers and
William W. Behrens III. The Limits to G r o w t h . New York:
New American Library, 1972; orig. pub. New York/London:
Universe Books, Pan Books, 1972.
Meadows, Dennis L. et al. Dynamics of Growth in a Finite
W o r l d . Cambridge, MA: Wright-Allen, 1974.
Meinecke, Friedrich. The Age of German Liberation. 1795181 5 . ed. Peter Paret. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1977; orig. German edn. 1906.
Merchant, Carolyn. The Death of Nature: Women.
the Scientific Revolution. San Francisco:
1980.

Ecology and
Harper & Row,

491

Merton, Robert. Science. Technology and Society in
Seventeenth-Centurv England. New York: Howard Fertig,
1970; orig. pub. 1938 in O s i r i s . Vol. 4, Pt. 2.
Milbrath, Lester W. Environmentalists: Vanguard for a New
S o c i e t y . Albany: State University of New York Press,
1984 .
Mill, J.S. System of L o g i c . Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1973-74. Collected Works, Vol. 7-8; orig pub.
1843.
Mitchell, Brian R. European Historical Statistics:
197 5 . 2nd edn. New York: Facts on File, 1980.

1750-

Moscovici, Serge. "The Phenomenon of Social Representations"
in Robert M. Farr and Serge Moscovici, eds. Social
Representations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
/ Paris: Editions de la Maisons Sciences de l'Homme,
1984 .
Mukerji, Chandra.
A Fragile Power: Scientists and the
S t a t e . Princeton, N J : Princeton University Press, 1989.
Nash, Roderick. Wilderness and the American M i n d . New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1967.
National Science Board. Science and Engineering Indicators 198 9 . (NSB 89-1). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1989. (NS 1.40).
_________. Science and Engineering Indicators - 1 9 8 7 .
National Science Foundation. Federal Support to
Universities. Colleges, and Selected Nonprofit
Institutions -- Fiscal Year: 198 6 . (NSF 87-318).
Washington, D . C . : U.S. Government Printing Office,
Surveys of Science Resource Series. (NS 1.30/2).

n.d.

Nearing, Scott and Helen Nearing. Living the Good Life: How
to Live Sanelv and Simply in a Troubled W o r l d . New
York: Schocken Books, 1970.
Nelkin, Dorothy. Selling Science: How the Press Covers
Science and Technology. New York: W.H. Freeman, 1986.
Paehlke, Robert. Environmentalism and the Future of
Progressive Politics. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1989.

492

Pestel, Eduard. Bevond the Limits to Growth: A Report to the
Club of R o m e . New York: Universe Books, 1989.
Pimental, David. "Is Silent Spring Behind Us?" in Silent
Spring R e visited, eds. Gino J. Marco et al.
Washington, D.C.: American Chemical Society, 1987.
Polanyi, Michael. Personal K n owledge. Chicago:
Chicago Press, 1962.

University of

Popper, Karl. The Open Society and Its Enem i e s . 5th edn.
Princeton, N J : Princeton University Press, 1966; orig.
pub. 1945.
_________. Conjectures and Refutations. New York: Harper and
Row, 1968; orig. pub. 1962 (New York, Basic Books).
Porritt, Jonathon. Seeing Green: The Politics of Ecology
E x plained. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985.
Price, Derek de Solla. Little Science. Big Science...
and B e v o n d . New York: Columbia University Press,

1986.

Reich, Charles A. The Greening of America: How the Youth
Revolution is Trying to Make American Liva b l e . New
York: Random House, 1970.
Richards, Stewart. Philosophy and Sociology of Science:
Introduction. New York: Schocken, 1984.

An

Ricoeur, Paul. Lectures on Ideology and U t o p i a . New York:
Columbia University Press, 1986.
Rose, Steven. Molecules and Minds: Essays on Biology and the
Social O r d e r . Milton Keynes, England: Open University
Press, 1987.
Rosen, Alexander. The Structure of Biological S c i e n c e .
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Roszak, Theodor. The Making of a Counter Culture:
Reflections on the Technocratic Society and its
Youthful O pposition. Garden City, NY: Doubleday,

1969.

Rouse, Joseph. Knowledge and Power: Toward a Political
Philosophy of Scie n c e . Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1987.
Rudd, Robert L. Pesticides and the Living L a n dscape.
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964.

493

sax, Joseph L. Mountains Without Handrails; Reflections on
the National P a r k s . Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1980.
Scheler, Max. Philosophical Perspectives. Boston:
Press, n.d. [1958].

Beacon

Schneider, Stephen H. Global W a r m i n g . San Francisco:
Club Books, 1989.

Sierra

Schumacher, E.F. Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People
M a t tered. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1973.
Sheehan, James J. German Liberalism in the 19th C e n t u r y .
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978.
_________. German History.
Press, 1989.

1770-1866. Oxford: Clarendon

Smith, John Maynard. The Problems of Biol o g y . New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986.
Snyder, Gary. Earth House Hold: Technical Notes & Queries to
Fellow Pharma Revolutionaries. New York: New
Directions, 1969.
Snyder, Louis L. Basic History of Modern G e r m a n y .
Huntington, NY: Robert E. Krieger, 1980; reprint of
1957 edn.
State of Ohio v. U.S. Dept, of the Interior, 880, Federal
Reporter. 2d series, pp.462-63. D.C. Cir. 1989.
Stromberg, Roland N. An Intellectual History of Modern
Eur o p e . New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966.
Taylor, A.J.P. The Course of German Hist o r y . New York:
Capricorn Books, 1962; orig. pub. 1946.
Thomas, Keith. Man and the Natural W o r l d . NY: Pantheon,
1983.
Toulmin, Stephen. "The Construal of Reality: Criticism in
Modern and Postmodern Science" in The Politics of
Interpretation. ed. W.J.T. Mitchell. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1983.
Townsend, Robert C. Up the Organization. New York: Knopf,
1970.

494

Udall,

Stewart. The Quiet Cr i s i s . New York: Avon,

1963.

U.S.

Department of Education. Office of Educational Research
and Improvement. National Center for Education
Statistics. The Condition of Education — 1989. Volume
2: Postsecondarv Education, eds. Curtis 0. Baker and
Gayle Thompson. (CS 89-651). Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1989.

Ward,

Barbara and Rene Dubos. Only One E a r t h . New York: W.W.
Norton, 1972.

Weber, Max. "National Character and the Junkers," in From
Max W e b e r , eds. Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1946.
Weston, Burns H. "Human Rights" in Encyclopedia Britannica.
15th edition, Vol. 20, pp. 714-717 Chicago:
Encyclopedia Britannica, 1987.
Whewell, William. The Philosophy of the Inductive Scien c e s .
New York: Johnson Reprint, 1967; orig. pub. 1840.
White, Lynn Jr. "Continuing the Conversation" in Western Man
and Environmental Ethics, ed. Ian Barbour. Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley, 1973. (Excerpted in the January 1990
issue of Sanctuary magazine, publication of the
Massachusetts Audubon Society, p p . 7-9.)
_________ . Machina ex D e o . Cambridge,

MA: MIT Press,

1968.

Wilderness: America's Living H e r i t a g e , ed. David Brower.
(7th Wilderness Conference). San Francisco, Sierra
Club, 1960.
Wilkinson, C.F. "The Science and Politics of Pesticides"
Silent Soring R e visited, eds. Gino J. Marco, et al.
Washington, D.C.: American Chemical Society, 1987.
Williams, Raymond. Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and
S o c i e t y . New York: Oxford University Press, 1976.
Yearly, Steven. Science. Technology,
London: Unwin Hyman, 1988.

and Social C h a n g e .

in

495

ARTICLES IN NEWSPAPERS, MAGAZINES,
JOURNALS AND OTHER PERIODICALS

AUTHOR BYLINE:

Angier, Natalie. "Great 15-Year Project to Decipher Genes
Stirs Opposition," New York T i m e s . 6/5/90, p.Cl.
Bailey,

Ronald.

"Dr. Doom," F o r b e s . 10/16/89.

Berger, Joseph. "U.S. Pupils Get Low Marks in Science," New
York T i m e s . 9/23/88, p.24.
Broad, William J. "Small-Scale Science Feels the Pinch From
Big Projects," New York T i m e s . 9/4/90, p.Cl.
_________. "How the $8 Billion Space Station Became a $120
Billion Showpiece," New York T i m e s . 6/10/90, p.l.
_________. "Heavy Costs of Major Projects Pose a Threat to
Basic science," New York T i m e s . 5/27/90, p.l.
Browne, Malcolm W. "Supercollider's Rising Cost Provokes
Opposition," New York T i m e s . 5/29/90, p.Cl.
Culliton, Barbara J. "Science Sections in U.S. Newspapers
Increase Dramatically in Past 2 Years," S c i e n c e .
1/23/87, p . 425.
Cushman, John H . , Jr. "U.S. Court Says Industry Polluters
Should Pay Full Environmental Cost," New York T i m e s .
7/15/89, p.l.
Dunlap, Riley E. and K. Van Liere, "The New Environmental
Paradigm," The Journal of Environmental E d ucation. 1978
(4) .
Feder, Barnaby J. "Carbide to Sell India Assets to Build
Hospital for Bhopal," New York T i m e s . 4/15/92, p.Dl.
Gargan, Edward A. "Settlement on Bhopal is Accepted," New
York T i m e s . 10/4/91, p.D4.

496

Goeller, David. "The Prophet of Global Wanning,"
Environmental A c t i o n . November/December 1989, p . 24.
Hazarika, Sanjoy. "Court in India to Seize Union Carbide
Assets," New York T i m e s . 5/1/92, p.D7.
Howe,

Marvine. "Women's Group Seeks Environmental Role,"
New York T i m e s . 10/28/90, p . 16.

H y p a t i a . Special issue: ed. Nancy Tuana. "Feminism and
Science - I," 2 (3) Fall .1987; "Feminism and Science II," 3 (1) Spring 1988.
Jennings, Marie. "Blueprints for Our Planet's Future,"
Universal News S e r v i c e s . 9/12/91.
Kaye,

Tony.
p. 20.

"The Birth Dearth," The New R e p u b l i c . 1/19/87,

Lewis, Paul. "Curb on Population Growth Needed Urgently,
U.N. Says," New York T i m e s . 4/30/92.
Moore, Curtis A. "Does Your Cup of Coffee Cause Forest
Fires?" International W i l d l i f e . March-April 1989,
p p . 39-44.
Murphy, Dean E. "3 Strikes Mean Medfly May Be Out on Loose,"
Los Angeles T i m e s . 10/22/91, p.Bl.
Mydans, Seth. "University's Choice: Stars or Squirrels,"
N ew York T i m e s . 5/21/90, p.A16.
Perlez, Jane. "Nairobi Journal: Skyscraper's Enemy Draws a
Daily Dose of Scorn," New York T i m e s . 12/6/89, p.A4.
_________. "Ivory Trade Is Banned To Save the Elephant,"
New York T i m e s . 10/17/89, III, p . 13.
Ray, Dixy Lee. "Who Speaks for Science?" 21st Century
Science & T e c h n o l o g y . 2 (1) January/February 1990.
Rothschild, Miriam.
1990, p . 116.

"Essay," Scientific A m e r i c a n . August

Sachs, Wolfgang. "Environment and Development: The Story of
a Dangerous Liaison," The Ecologist. 21 (6)
November/December 1991, pp.252-57.

497

Schneider, Keith. "Growers Reach for the Ballot in
California Duel Over Pesticides," New York T i m e s .
2/22/90, p.A20.
_________. "Scientist Who Managed to 'Shock the World' on
Atomic Workers' Health," New York T i m e s . 5/3/90, p.A20.
Shabecoff, Philip.
p. 24.

"Environment'" New York T i m e s . 5/29/89,

_________. "Scientist Says Budget Office Altered His
Testimony," New York T i m e s . 5/8/89, p.l.
_________. "Urgent Help for Environment Is Plea at Forum,"
New York T i m e s . 5/4/89, p.A23.
_________. "World Lenders Facing Pressure From Ecologists,"
New York T i m e s . 10/30/86, p.l.
Simons, Marlise. "New Taint on East German Pollution,"
New York T i m e s . 9/9/90, p . 20.
Stenehjem, Michele. "Indecent Exposure," Natural H i s t o r y .
September 1990, pp.6-22.
Stevens, William K. "Huge Space Platform Seen as Distorting
Studies of Earth," New York T i m e s . 6/19/90 p.Cl.
Tierney, John. "Betting on the Planet," New York Times
M a g a z i n e . 12/2/90.
Van Liere, K. and Riley E. Dunlap, "The Social Bases of
Enivronmental Concern: A Review of Hypotheses,
Explanations and Empirical Evidence," Public Opinion
Q ua r t e r l y . 1980, 44 (2).
Vobjeda, Barbara. "Survey of Math, Science Skills Puts U.S.
Students at Bottom," Washington P o s t . 1/31/89, p.l.

498

N0 A.UTHOR BYLINE:
"Eajrth Day
% o r

Hall of Fame," Rolling stone 5/3/90,

p .5 9 .

& pub l i s h e r YearBook. iggn

"^tradition

Bid on Bhopal,” New York T i m m . 3/28/92, p . 4 0 .

"ThS v i v ? 3 - 2 0 0 0 ' JUgqerni,ut'" tentage Foundation Rgnm-,-.
”T h e

church' ” ^

GtO v t h vs*

£ se a tt.

Environment," Business Wee)<;r 5/ 11/ 9 2 .

"lri<iian C o u r t Seizes Union Carbide Dividend,"
Wfiw Y Q I* Time?, 5/23/92, p . 37.

(Reuter-o
ure r s ; ,

Ju<Jge A c c e p t s Exxon Pact, Ending Suits on Valdez spill "
N e w Y o r k Times, 10/9/91, p.A14.
P
'
" O t h e r s ' G r o u p Fights Back in Los Angeles," New York
Times > 12/5/89, p.A32.
"
"0,U y

M a n 's
Presence C a n Save Nature: Toward
aTruer
Un d e r s tanding^of the Environment," Harper'sf April

"P^ i n e n t i s Made in Exxon Case,"
ll/14/yj., P .U4.

(A P) , New York Time<=

"Ra3 i a t i o n Flowed 200 Miles to Sea, Study Finds,"
New Y Q .rk_Times, 7/17/92, p.A21.

tapi

1

"RoUr»dtabie: Kuhn and Lederberg on Scientific Thouqht — A
M e e t i n g of Biological and Philosophical Minds " New
Y2£kJtJJa£S/ 3/13/83, IV, p . 8.
' ~
Sci* n t i s t s ' Institute for Public Information survey
S I P I s ^ o£g> 18 (1) Spring 1990, p . 26.

